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THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR 



THE AMERICAN 
CIVIL WAR 

A CONCISE HISTORY OF ITS 
CAUSES, PROGRESS, AND RESULTS 

BY JOHN FORMBY 

WITH SIXTV-SIX MAPS AND PLANS 



NEW YORK 

CHARLES SCRIBNER'S SONS 

153-157 FIFTH AVENUE 

1910 



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PRINTED BY 
MAzIeLL, WATSON AND VINEY, LD. 
LONDON AND AYLESBURY, 
ENGLAND. 




CONTENTS 

INTRODUCTION PP- i-5 

CHAPTER I 

THE BEGINNING OF THE QUARREL 

Started at Beginning of Century — Struggle for Political Power — 
Slavery a Pretext, not a Cause — The Balance of State Power — The 
Fugitive Slave Act — Military Strength of the South in 1852 — The 
Kansas-Nebraska Bill — Brawls in Congress — Re-casting of Political 
Parties .......... pp. 6-15 

CHAPTER II 

FROM THE ELECTION OF PRESIDENT BUCHANAN TO HIS 
MESSAGE TO CONGRESS, DECEMBER 3RD, 1860 

The two Candidates for the Presidency in i860 — Government on 
States Rights Principles — The Dred Scott Case — -Strength of the 
South in the Cabinet — Friction increases — The John Brown Raid — 
Floyd's Preparations — " Squatter Sovereignty "—The Democratic 
Convention, i860 — The new Parties— The Presidential Election — 
Buchanan's Message to Congress ..... pp. 16-29 

CHAPTER III 
THE RIGHT OF SECESSION 

Principle claimed by the South — Former Threats of Secession — 
Was the Union only a Voluntary Compact ? — The Articles of Con- 
federation, 1778 — Their weak Points — ^Thc Constitution — Diversities 
of Interpretation — Alteration of State Constitutions — Federalism v. 
State Sovereignty pp. 30-39 



vi CONTENTS 

CHAPTER IV 

SECESSION : FROM GOVERNOR GISTS CIRCULAR TO THE 
SECESSION OF NORTH CAROLINA 

Southern State Preparations in i860 — Governor Gist's Circular — 
General Scott's Views — Southern Machinations at Washington — South 
Carolina claims the Forts — National v. State Tenure — Buchanan 
temporizes — The South Carolina Commissioners — Defections from the 
Cabinet : the Advent of Stanton — January, 1861— Status quo at Fort 
Sumter — The Cotton States secede : Others at different Times — 
Crittenden's Compromise — Confederate Congress meets — Resignations 
of Southern Officers — Confederate Army formed — Fall of Fort Sumter 
— The North awakes — -Assignment of Commands- — Affairs in Missouri 
— The Peaceful Separation Fallacy — Acts of War by the South — 
Chronological Table ....... pp. 40-56 

CHAPTER V 

THE TWO SIDES : THEIR POSITIONS, PROSPECTS, 
AND PLANS 

Boundaries — Character of large Areas — Character and Habits of 
the People — Confederate Lack of Resources — Military Geography — 
Railways — Confederate Lack of Plan — Their Coast — The two Capitals 
— The Raising of the Armies — Naval Matters — Southern Finance — 
The two Governments — State Sovereignty in the Confederacy — 
Political Objects — Military Plans pp. 57-73 



CHAPTER VI 

PREPARING FOR WAR, AND SPARRING FOR POSITION I 
MAY 20TH TO DECEMBER 3IST, 1861 

General — The Districts into which Operations fall — Northern 
Gunboats and Southern Cruisers — Confederate Agents in England — • 
The Foreign Enlistment Act — British Proclamation of Neutrality — 
Southern Manufactures — The first Steps in Organization — Affairs in 
Kentucky — The Call for Men : Appointment of Generals : Friction in 
South — McClellan made Commander-in-Chief : his Plans — Napoleon's 
Interference in Mexico — The East — Position in Virginia in May — 
Effect of making Richmond the Confederate Capital — The Moves 
before Bull Run — Joseph Johnston leaves the Valley — McDowell's 
Plan of Battle— Confederate Plans— Battle of Bull Run— The North 
prepares for War in earnest — West Virginia — Northern Communica- 
tions — Campaigns of Philippi and Rich Mountain : Lee's Campaign 
fails — The South-East — Expedition against the North Carolina Coast 
—The Taking of Port Royal — Coa,st Defence, south of Charleston — 



CONTENTS vii 

The West— Lyon's Campaign in Missouri, and Death -Move and 
Counter-Move along the Mississippi — Fremont's Emancipation Pro- 
clamation : his Removal — Union Changes in Command — Action at 
Belmont — Sidney Johnston's Dispositions — Union Dispositions and 
Plans — Gunboats on the Mississippi — The South and South-West — 
Naval Action below New Orleans — Confederate Plans in New Mexico 
— Naval Plans — The Blockade — The huge Task: Liability of Neu- 
trals — The War at Sea — The " Sumter " — The Letters of Marque— 
The " Trent " Affair — The " Nashville " — Summary — Major-General 
Lyon — Chronological Table ...... pp. 74-103 

CHAPTER VII 
WAR IN EARNEST : THE FIRST HALF OF 1862 

General — Stanton joins Lincoln's Cabinet — Lincoln — Lee's false 
Position — The East — McClellan and Joseph Johnston — McClellan and 
the Politicians — -Union Plans — The Co-operation of the Navy — Mud 
—T'he"Merrimac": attacks Union Fleet: Fight with "Monitor" — 
The "Monitor" — The " Merrimac's" short Career — Joseph Johnston 
retreats from Manassas — McClellan starts for Richmond — The Lines of 
Yorktown — Jackson in the Valley — Geography of the Shenandoah 
Valley — Actions at Kernstown, McDowell, Winchester — Union Panic 
— -Cross Keys and Port Republic — Jackson's March — Results of the 
Campaign — Geography of the Peninsula — Joseph Johnston's Opera- 
tions : Seven Pines — Lee takes Command — His Plans — Jackson 
arrives — The Seven Days' Battles — Pope's Army of Virginia — The 
South-East — Lee in the South-East — Burnside's and Goldsborough's 
Expedition — Fort Pulaski and the Florida Coast — The West — Garfield 
V. Marshall — Thomas v. Zollicoffer : Mill Springs — The Fort Donelson 
Campaign — Its Importance — Occupation of Nashville — The Pea 
Ridge Campaign— Pope takes New Madrid and Island No. 10 — 
Union Advance to Pittsburg Landing — East Tennessee — Battle of 
Shiloh — -Halleck advances to Corinth — His new Plans — Battle of 
Memphis — The South — Fortification of Vicksburg — Farragut takes 
New Orleans, but fails at Vicksburg — The South-West — Sibley's New 
Mexico Campaign — The Blockade — The Rise of Nassau — Mobile and 
Galveston — The War at Sea — The "Nashville" — The " Florida" saXXs 
from England, arrested at Nassau, and released — Summary — Notices 
— General Albert Sidney Johnston — Brigadier-General Turner Ashby — 
Chronological Table . ...... pp. 104-145 

CHAPTER VIII 
THE SECOND HALF OF 1862. THE CONFEDERATE RALLY 

General — The Confiscation Act and Emancipation Proclamations — 
Slavery Question had to be faced — The Strain on I^incoln, August- 
September — Cartel of Exchange — The Problem of raising Men — 



viii CONTENTS 

Union Plans — The East — Lee's Position and first Moves — Union 
Impasse : Halleck made Commander-in-Chief — Pope's Bombast — 
(Note : Corps Nomenclature) — Pope v. Lee — Jackson's March — The 
Fog of War — Pope's Vacillation — Battle of Groveton : Porter's 
Dilemma — Battle of Manassas — Chantilly — Panic at Washington — 
Pope removed from Command — McClellan, Halleck, and Banks — 
Lee's Plans — The Invasion of Maryland— South Mountain — Battle 
of the Antietam, or Sharpsburg — Lee's Retreat — McClellan v. Lee in 
Virginia — McClellan removed from Command — Porter court-mar- 
tialled — Burnside in Command : his Plans — The Position of Freder- 
icksburg — Battle of Fredericksburg — Operations at Suffolk — The 
South-East — The West— Plummer beats Thompson — Plans in Ken- 
tucky and Tennessee — Morgan's Raid — Bragg's Invasion of Tennessee 
— Mistake of mixing in Politics — Battle of Perryville — Siege of Nash- 
ville — Campaign and Battle of Corinth — Changes of Commanders — 
Campaign and first day's Battle of Stone's River, or Murfreesboro — 
Grant's Administration: Negroes — McClernand's Intrigues — New 
Plans — Grant's Dilemma — The Mississippi Flotilla — The South — 
Operations against Vicksburg — Banks — -The South-West — Re-taking 
of Galveston — Affairs in Arkansas — The Blockade — The War at Sea 
— The "Florida" and "Alabama" commissioned-^The "Retribution" 
— Confederate Agents in England — The French Government and 
Mr. Slidell — Summary — Notices — Major-General G. B. McClellan — 
Major-General Pope — Major-General Buell — Major-General McDowell — 
Chronological Table ....... pp. 146-186 



CHAPTER IX 

THE FIRST HALF OF 1863, TO JULY 4TH. THE CON- 
FEDERATE RALLY EXHAUSTED. THE NORTH GAINS 
DECISIVE VICTORIES 

General — Habeas Corpus Act — Plans of both Sides — The East — 
Hooker'succeeds Burnside — "Jack" Mosby — Operations at Suffolk — 
The Chancellorsville Campaign — Battle of Chancellorsville — The 
Union Cavalry — Lee after Chancellorsville — The Invasion of Pennsyl- 
vania — Confederate Re-organization — Scares at Richmond — Brandy 
Station — Lee's Advance — Hooker Moves — Stuart's Ride — Hooker 
resigns, is succeeded by Meade — The new Plans — Skirmish at Gettys- 
burg — Both Sides concentrate — Topography of Battlefield of Gettys- 
burg — The First Day at Gettysburg — The Second Day at Gettysburg 
— The Third day at Gettysburg- — ^July 4th — Confederate Slackness — 
(Note : Moves in the Gettysburg Campaign — Itinerary of Stuart's 
March)— The South-East — The West— Battle of Stone's River, con- 
cluded — Minor Operations — Halleck and Rosecrans — The Tullahoma 
Campaign — Burnside in East Kentucky — Patrolling the Rivers — The 
South — Arkansas Post — Grant's Army — Naval Attacks on the Missis- 
sippi — The first Vicksburg Campaign — The new Plan — Confederate 



CONTENTS ix 

Position — The Taking of Grand Gulf — Grierson's Raid -Campaign of 
Champion's Hill — Johnston's Moves — Siege of Vicksburg : its Sui- 
render— Events in Louisiana — The South-West— The Blockade — 
Attack on Charleston Blockade — The new Monitors — Dupont's 
Attack on Charleston — Results and Lessons — The " Weehawken " 
takes the "Atlanta" — Magruder takes Galveston — The War at Sea — 
The " Retribution " — The " Florida " — The " Alabama " — Wilkes super- 
seded in Command of U.S. Squadron — The "Alexandra" — Bulloch's 
Negociations in France — The " Georgia " — Summary — Notices — "Stone- 
wall "Jackson — -Lieutenant -General Pemberton — Major-General Reynolds 
— Major-General Van Dorn — Major-General McClernand — Chronological 
Table PP. 187-243 

CHAPTER X 

THE SECOND HALF OF 1863. THE NORTH TAKES A 
WINNING POSITION 

Affairs in Mexico — Napoleon's Jealousy of the United States — 
Anarchy in Mexico — Joint Intervention of England, France, and 
Spain — England and Spain retire — France declares War — Napoleon's 
Instructions to Forey — Dubois de Saligny — Offer of Crown to Maxi- 
milian — Napoleon outwitted — General — Union and Confederate Plans 
— Opposition to Draft in North — The East — -Lee's Retreat from 
Gettysburg — Operations in Virginia — The South-East — Attacks on 
Forts Wagner and Sumter — The West — Morgan's Great Raid north 
of the Ohio — Rosecrans advances to the Tennessee — Campaign of 
Chickamauga — Battle of Chickamauga — Comments — Consternation in 
the North — Grant takes Command — Battle of Chattanooga — New 
Plans — Siege of Knoxville — The Mississippi Flotilla — The South — 
Johnston's Retreat — Fall of Port Hudson — The South-West^Banks 
in Texas — Operations in Arkansas — The Blockade — Attacks on Charles- 
ton Blockade — -Farragut in the Gulf — The War at Sea — The " Florida " 
— The "Alabama " and " Tuscaloosa " — The " Georgia " — The " Rappa- 
hannock " — -The " Pampero " — The " Coquette " — Bulloch's Negociations 
in France — Summary — Submarines, Breech-loading Magazine Rifles, 
Machine Guns — Notices — Major-General Rosecrans — Rear-Admiral 
Dupont — Chronological Table ..... pp. 244-279 

CHAPTER XI 
THE FIRST HALF OF 1864. THE CLOSING OF THE NET 

General — Grant's Position — Premature Politics — The French in 
Mexico — Plans — Grant made Commander-in-Chief^ — The new Plans — 
The Situation of the Confederacy — The East — Longstreet in Tennessee 
— Kilpatrick's and Dahlgren's Raid — Re-organization under Grant- 
Operations in Western and South-Western Virginia — Plans for Butler 
— The Advance — The Wilderness Campaign— Battle of the Wilderness 
— Spottsylvania — Lee's Position on the North Anna — Hawes' Shop, 



X CONTENTS 

Totopotonioy — Cold Harbour- — ^Butler at Bermuda Hundred — Sheri- 
dan's Raid — Yellow Tavern— Sheridan's Fix — Hunter in the Valley- 
Cavalry Raids — Result of Cold Harbour — The Move against Peters- 
burg — ^The Siege of Petersburg — Grant's Policy — The South-East — 
The Olustee Expedition— The "Albemarle " : attacks Union Squadron — 
LieutenantCushing — The West^Forrestra.idsto Paducah — Re-organiza- 
tion of Army — Communications — Topography of Northern Georgia — 
Sherman advances to the Etowah — Railway Engineering — The Cross- 
country March — New Hope Church — Johnston's Position in front of 
Marietta — Sherman reaches the Chattahoochee — Forrest beats Sturgis 
— Morgan's Raid in Kentucky — Missouri and Arkansas — The South 
and South-West — Union Plans — The Meridian Campaign — Forrest 
beats Sooy Smith — The Red River Expedition — Recriminations- 
Affairs in Arkansas — The Mississippi Flotilla — The Blockade — Tor- 
pedo Attacks— The War at Sea — -The "Alabama " : sunk by the " Kear- 
sarge " — The "Tuscaloosa"- — The "Florida" — The "Georgia" — The 
"Rappahannock" — The French "volte face" — England buys the 
Turret-ships — Summary — Notices — General Polk — Lieut enant-Gener at 
J. E. B. Stuart — Major-General Sedgwick — Major-General Pleasonton 
— Rear- Admiral Semmes — Chronological Table . . pp. 280-325 



CHAPTER XII 

THE SECOND HALF OF 1864. THE DISRUPTION OF THE 
CONFEDERACY 

General — Union Political Position — Mexican Affairs — The true 
Objectives — Union and Confederate Plans — Governor Brown of Georgia 
— The Trans-Mississippi District — Mihtary Stagnation — The East — 
Early's Dash at Washington — The Burning of Chambersburg — 
Sheridan takes Command in the Valley — The See-saw — Battle of the 
Opequon — Fisher's Hill, Tom's Brook, Hupp's Hill — Cedar Creek — 
Minor Operations — Comments — Siege of Petersburg — The Crater — - 
Attacks on Lee's Communications, and in the Peninsula — Re-organiza- 
tion — South-West Virginia — The South — Johnston retreats to the 
Chattahoochee — Sherman seizes a Crossing — Johnston's new Position 
— Sherman's Plans — Hood succeeds Johnston — Battles of Peach Tree 
Creek and Atlanta — Death of McPherson — Re-organization on both 
Sides : Sherman's new Move — Ezra Church — Union Raids — Opera- 
tions round Atlanta — Hood evacuates it — Rest and Re-organization 
— The next Union Move — Confederate Plans — Operations resumed — 
Farragut and Granger at Mobile — Topography — The Forcing of 
Mobile Bay — The South-East — Gushing sinks the "Albemarle" — Sher- 
man's March to the Sea — Hardee's Report — The Capture of Savannah 
— First Attack on Fort Fisher — The West and South-West — A. J. 
Smith beats Forrest — Defeat and Death of John Morgan — Attacks 
oh Sherman's Communications — Price's Invasion of Missouri, and 
Pefeat — Hood's Iiivasion of Tennessee — The two Sides — Hood ad- 



CONTENTS xi 

varices — Spring Hill — Franklin — Delays — Grant's Impatience — Battle 
of Nashville — Hood's Retreat — New Union Dispositions — Comments — 
The Blockade — The War at Sea — The " Florida " : captured at Bahia — 
International Complications — The " Tallahassee," alias " Olustee " — The 
" Chickamauga" —The "Shenandoah" — Purchase of the Ram " Sphinx " 
— The " Rappahannock " — Summary — Notices — Major-General Hooker 
— Major-General McPherson — Rear-Admiral Farragut — Major-General 
John Morgan — Chronological Table .... pp. 326-375 

CHAPTER XIII 
THE FIRST HALF OF 1865. THE LAST STRUGGLES 

General— Plans of the two Sides — Aftairs in Mexico — The East — 
The Peace Commission — Small Winter Operations — Sheridan's Raid 
in the Upper Valley — Preparations for Lee's Retreat : Fort Stedman — • 
Sherman meets Grant — Dispositions and Strength — Dinwiddle Court 
House and Five Forks — Major-General Warren: Sheridan supersedes 
him — Petersburg untenable — Lee retreats, and Weitzel occupies 
Richmond — Lee's Last March — Sailor's Creek, Farmville, Appomattox 
— The Surrender — Naval Actions on the James — Flight of Jefferson 
Davis — Stoneman's Raids — The South-East — The Capture of Fort 
Fisher — Hoke's slow Retreat-^Schofield takes Wilmington and New 
Berne — Confederate Plans — Schofield in touch with Sherman — Kirk's 
Raid — Fort Sumter resists to the last : Evacuation of Charleston — 
The Campaign of the Carolinas — Averysboro — Johnston's Strength — 
Bentonville — Johnston retreats — The Union Army united at Goldsboro 
— Comments — The next Moves, and Plans — Johnston treats for Sur- 
render — The Assassination of President Lincoln — Negociations for 
Surrender of all Confederate Armies — Sherman's Terms disapproved 
— Johnston surrenders — Grant's Proposal negatived : Union Lack 
of Communication — Insult to Sherman — General Echols' Command, 
and the Flight of Jefferson Davis — The W^est — Thomas' Dilatoriness — 
The South and South-West — Plans — Canby's Campaign against 
Mobile — Wilson's Great Raid through Alabama and Georgia — Captures 
Jefferson Davis — The Blockade — The War at Sea — The " Shenandoah ' ' — 
The "Sphinx" becomes the " Stonewall" : her short Career — Sale of 
the " Rappahannock " — Mexico — Complications between France and the 
United States — Summary — Notices — Abraham Lincoln — General Hood 
— Lieutenant-General A. P. Hill — Chronological Table . pp. 376-414 

CHAPTER XIV 
THE END OF THE MEXICAN COMPLICATION 

Army and Squadron sent to watch the French — The Confederate 
Scheme of joining Maximilian — ^Sheridan's Bluff — Imperialist Suc- 
cesses — Maximilian's fatal Edict — Bazaine stands out, and watches 
United States — Juarez advances : Sheridan's Share in this — Juarez 



xii CONTENTS 

and Ortega — Napoleon tries to get out and save face : Seward's 
Policy stiffens — The Empress Charlotte's Last Move — Maximilian 
decides to abdicate, then to remain— American Minister sent to Juarez 
— Defeat and Death of Maximilian — Grant's View of the French 
Expedition to Mexico pp. 415-420 

CHAPTER XV 
RE-CONSTRUCTION 

Premature Attempts at Re-construction during the War— Lincoln 
and Johnson — Johnson's Position — The Politicians interfere with 
the Soldiers — Seward's wild Conduct in Europe — Lincoln's and John- 
son's Plans of Re-construction — The Amnesty — Provincial Governors 
— Some Southern Ideas — -Texas, Mississippi, Alabama — The Tests — 
1866. Bills and the Presidential Veto — The Commission of Fifteen — 
Florida — The XlVth Amendment — Texas : Friction in Louisiana, and 
between the President and Congress — Jealousy of Grant — Congress 
takes up Re-construction — The Re-construction Acts — 1867. Johnson 
quarrels with Stanton — The Tenure of Civil Office Bill — The new 
Military Districts — The Effect of the Change — Review — 1868. The 
XlVth Amendment : Re-admission of some States — Mississippi, 
Virginia — The Test Oath—General Amnesty — The Office of Secretary 
of War : Changes — The Impeachment of President Johnson : un- 
scrupulous Procedure — Misrule in the South — Comparison of Civil 
and Military Rule — -Johnson and his Administration — 1869. Grant's 
Presidency : Disappointment — The XVth Amendment — Mississippi — 
1870. Re-admission of several States — Trouble in the South — 
Summary of Grant's Work — Major-Generals Warren and Porter — 
(Note : Amendments to the Constitution, Nos. XIII, XIV, and 
XV) pp. 421-438 



CHAPTER XVI 
SOME ACTORS IN THE WAR 

General — Stanton — Jefferson Davis — Grant, Rawlins — Lee — Sher- 
man — Joseph Johnston — Halleck — Bragg — Sheridan — Early — Meade — 
Beauregard — Banks — Price — Thomas — Taylor — Schofield — Hardee — 
Hancock — Longstreet — Wilson — Forrest — References to Personal No- 
tices elsewhere in Book ...... pp. 439-467 

CHAPTER XVII 

RESULTS AND LESSONS OF THE WAR 

The Question of State Independence — Relation of the State to the 
Nation — The Negro Question — The "Alabama" Claims — The "Alabama" 
and "Florida" — The old Foreign Enlistment Act — Precedents — The 



CONTENTS xiii 

Acts of the North during the War — Indiscreet Ministers — Course of 
the Negociations — Liberal Plea of Not Guilty — Conservatives in 
Power — Liberals return — Weakening of the British Case — Grant's 
able Move — The British Government ceases to resist — Futile Attempts 
to save face — Instructions to the Arbitrators — The Court, Trial, and 
Verdict — A Lost Opportunity — Drafting of the Foreign Enlistment 
Act, 1870 — Other Disputes w^ith the United States — The Declaration 
of Paris — The American Mercantile Marine — Political Corruption — 
Politics and War — Freedom of the Press — Preparation for War — The 
Raising and Maintenance of Armies — Discipline — Old Generals — 
Cavalry — Typical Strokes — Disbandment — Naval Affairs — (Note : 
Principal Points of the Foreign Enlistment Act, 1870) . pp. 468-486 

MAP INDEX . pp. 487-502 

GENERAL INDEX pp. 503-520 



"s 



PREFACE 

The present work was first planned because I found 
that after a careful study of all the main campaigns, 
and many of the minor ones, in the American Civil 
War, during a period of ten years or more, I knew 
little or nothing of the War as a whole ; of the 
interdependence of the campaigns, or of the effects 
of contemporary military and political occurrences, 
which were often so marked that the campaigns cannot 
be properly understood without them. 

I could get no book of convenient size dealing with 
the whole War by land and sea, nor any work in 
which contemporary events were sufficiently kept 
together, so as to explain the varying phrases of the 
War, or had maps of satisfactory size, on standardized 
scales. None set forth the real causes of the War, or 
a summary of its results, or gave sufficient attention 
to the distracting effect of the operations of Napoleon 
III. in Mexico. 

Almost all works on the subject are full either ot 
military technicalities or personal details, and it seemed 
that there was room for a condensed history of the 
War rather than of the fighting, with the chapters 
arranged in parallel columns, as it were, and furnished 
with cross-references, and careful summaries of the 
general position at each stage. 

The chronology is based on Phisterer's ** Statistical 



PREFACE 

Records," without which it could not have been 
attempted. Many of the conclusions arrived at are 
deductions from the close study of the maps which 
was requisite to bring them within one scheme of 
scales. A great difficulty was to find out what rail- 
ways were in existence at the time of the War, for 
the maps of different authorities do not agree; but 
Sherman's great War Map has been taken as a basis, 
and it is hoped that the result has been to secure 
accuracy as nearly as possible. Another difficulty 
was the variation in the spelling of names, and even 
in differences in the names assigned to the same 
places. The accounts of the two sides have been 
compared throughout, and the author has known 
personally some of the actors in these great events. 
The War unquestionably contains many lessons for 
the Mother Nation of England, and I hope that I 
have fairly and impartially carried out, within reason- 
able limits of size, the somewhat ambitious problem 
which I have attempted to solve. 

J. F. 



April 1 910. 



LIST OF MAPS IN SEPARATE VOLUME 

1. A. THE SEAT OF WAR 

THE PROGRESS OF THE WAR 

2. THE YEAR 1861 

3. THE YEAR 1862 

4. THE YEAR 1863 

5. THE YEAR 1864 

THE WAR AT SEA 

^6. THE BLOCKADE 

7. THE HIGH SEAS. ON MERCATOR'S PROJECTION 

8. 4 A. THE BULL RUN CAMPAIGN 

9. B. THE BATTLE OF BULL RUN 

10. 2 A. CAMPAIGNS IN WEST VIRGINIA, 1861 

11. B/3. MAGRUDER'S DEFENCE OF THE LOWER PENINSULA 

12. 4 A. JACKSON'S VALLEY CAMPAIGN 

13. 2 A. THE PENINSULAR AND VALLEY CAMPAIGNS OF 1862 

14. B/3. THE SEVEN DAYS' BATTLES 

15. 2 A. THE CAMPAIGN OF SHILOH 

16. B. THE BATTLE OF SHILOH 

17. 8 A. THE CAMPAIGN OF MANASSAS 

18. B. THE BATTLE OF MANASSAS 



xvi LIST OF MAPS IN SEPARATE VOLUME 

19. 8 A. LEE'S INVASION OF MARYLAND 

20. B. THE BATTLE OF THE ANTIETAM, OR SHARPSBURG 

21. B. THE BATTLE OF FREDERICKSBURG 

22. A. CAMPAIGNS IN MISSOURI, l86l-2 

23. 2 A. BRAGG'S INVASION OF KENTUCKY 

24. A. grant's dilemma, DECEMBER, 1862 

25. B. THE battles of CHANCELLORSVILLE, FREDERICKS- 
y BURG, AND SALEM CHURCH 

,^26. 4 A. THE CAMPAIGN OF GETTYSBURG 

27. B. THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG. FIRST DAY 

28. B. THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG. SECOND DAY 

29. B. THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG, THIRD DAY 

30. B. THE BATTLE OF STONE'S RIVER, OR MURFREESBORO 
( 31. 2 A. THE CAMPAIGNS FOR VICKSBURG 

32. B. THE SIEGE OF VICKSBURG 

33. 4 A. THE COAST BETWEEN CHARLESTON AND SAVANNAH 

34. B. CHARLESTON HARBOUR AND DEFENCES 

35. B. THE BATTLE OF CHICKAMAUGA 

36. B. THE BATTLE OF CHATTANOOGA 

37. 4 A. THE CAMPAIGNS OF TULLAHOMA, CHICKAMAUGA, AND 

CHATTANOOGA 

38. B. THE WILDERNESS 

39. B. SPOTTSYLVANIA 

40. B. LEE'S POSITION ON THE NORTH ANNA 

41. B/3. JOHNSTON'S LINES, NEW HOPE CHURCH — MARIETTA 

42. 4 A. SHERMAN'S MARCH TO THE CHATTAHOOCHEE 

43. 2 A. EAST KENTUCKY CAMPAIGNS IN 1862. MORGAN'S 

RAIDS IN 1863 AND 1864 

44. 2 A. THE END OF MORGAN'S GREAT RAID 

45. 2 A. hunter's LYNCHBURG CAMPAIGN 



}/' 



LIST OF MAPS IN SEPARATE VOLUME xvii 

46. 2 A. EARLY'S DASH AT WASHINGTON 

47. 4 A. THE VALLEY CAMPAIGNS, 1863-4 

48. B/3. ATLANTA AND ENVIRONS 

49. 2 A. SHERMAN'S MARCH TO THE SEA 

49A. A, MINOR OPERATIONS IN MISSISSIPPI, 1863-4. GRIER- 
SON'S RAID, APRIL, 1863. THE MERIDIAN CAM- 
PAIGN, FEBRUARY, 1864. SOOY SMITH V. FORREST, 
FEBRUARY, 1864. STURGIS V. FORREST, JUNE, 
1864. A. J. SMITH V. FORREST, JULY, 1864 

50. A. WEST OF THE MISSISSIPPI. THE CAMPAIGNS OF 

1863-4. MISSOURI AND ARKANSAS 

51. A. WEST OF THE MISSISSIPPI. THE CAMPAIGNS OF 

1863-4. LOUISIANA 

52. 2 A. HOOD'S INVASION OF TENNESSEE 

53. B THE BATTLE OF NASHVILLE 

54. 4 A. SOUTHERN VIRGINIA. OPERATIONS IN 1864-5 

55. B/3. THE ENVIRONS OF RICHMOND AND PETERSBURG, 

1864-5 

56. 2 A, THE CENTRAL MOUNTAIN DISTRICT 

57. 4 A. WILMINGTON AND FORT FISHER 

58. B. THE CAPTURE OF FORT FISHER 

59. 2 A. THE COAST DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA 

60. 2 A. THE CAMPAIGN OF THE CAROLINAS 

61. B. FARRAGUT'S attack ON MOBILE HARBOUR 

62. B/3, MOBILE TOWN AND DEFENCES 

63. 4 A. CANBY'S CAMPAIGN AGAINST MOBILE 

64. 2 A. WILSON'S RAID IN ALABAMA AND GEORGIA 

65. MEXICO. S/5 LEV'S CAMPAIGN IN NEW MEXICO, 1862 



ERRATA 

Page V, line 2 in Contents of Chapter I. Instead of Slavery a Pretext, not a 

Cause, read The Slavery Question. 
Page 88, line 14. For great read Great. 
Page 89, line 3. For Fort, read Port. 
Page 89, lines 6 and 7, delete "the brother of the more famous W. T. 

Sherman." 
Page 181, last three lines. For Major-General . . . West Point, rra^Major- 

General John Pope served on General Scott's Staff in the Mexican 

War, and afterwards in the Cavalry on the Indian frontier. 
Page 267, line 11. For the XXth, readi\v^ Xlth and Xllth. (Cf. p. 302.) 



THE 
AMERICAN CIVIL WAR 

INTRODUCTION 

The American Civil War seems at first such a tangle 
of disconnected details, spread over so vast an extent 
of country, that the reader soon gets bewildered and 
is apt to study one part to the neglect of another: 
moreover, the accounts of it are too long for ordinary 
use. It seems therefore that there is room for a short 
Synopsis, from which details of battles, especially, 
will be carefully eliminated. For the military student 
there are many works dealing with the whole, or 
with separate campaigns or battles ; but the majority 
of people are not specialists, and might like to have 
a short and connected account of this great struggle, 
and of the events which led up to it, the lack of 
which seems to have acted as a deterrent to the 
study of a most useful and interesting episode of 
history. 

Though it may appear superfluous to mention so 
many minor operations, yet it will be seen on examina- 
tion that almost all of them had a direct effect on 
the main phase of the War in the district for the 
time being, due partly to the abnormal influence of 
political and public opinion in this War, partly to 
the length of the communications of the armies, or 
to the question of supply. 

I 



2 INTRODUCTION 

Another very great difficulty to the student of the 
American Civil War is that the principal men on 
the two sides belonged to the same nation, often to 
the same families, so that it is sometimes difficult 
to remember to which side a given person belongs : 
the names of the different leaders and warships on 
the Confederate side are therefore printed in italics, 
and of battles also, where called by them differently 
from the Union name. Owing to the fact that the 
tactical details of battles are avoided as far as possible, 
few names will be found of lower rank than that 
of General of Division. 

The War had been brewing for a long time,, but 
practically the history of it includes the three ad- 
ministrations of Buchanan, Lincoln, and Johnson, of 
the first and last of which short sketches are given. 
The War itself proceeded by regular well-defined 
steps throughout in the really vital part, between 
the Alleghany Mountains and the Mississippi River, 
where a successful blow by either side could strike 
at the heart of the other, in a military and practical 
sense. It was indecisive in Virginia till the latter 
part of the time, and swayed backwards and forwards, 
owing to the disastrous manner in which military 
considerations were overridden by political and senti- 
mental ones. Attention has been unduly concen- 
trated on the eastern theatre of war, on account of 
the political importance of the capitals, and because 
the best commanders and armies were there : for 
tactical study this is correct enough, but by such 
limitations the real history and general grasp of 
the War as a whole are apt to be lost sight of, since 
only secondary notice would be given to the regular 
stages by which it progressed in the central district, 
or, as it was then called, in the West. 

To summarize : after the fall of Fort Sumter, the 
rest of the year 1861 was employed in raising the 
armies, and in attempts to gain control of doubtful 
districts, in which the battle of Bull Run, or, as the 



A SHORT SUMMARY 3 

Confederates called it, Manassas, was an isolated 
incident. The North was the gainer on the whole 
by these operations. 

In the first half of 1862 the War began in earnest, 
and during this time the North gained ground in 
the West, or centre, but lost in the East. 

In the second half of this year the Confederates 
failed to gain control of Maryland and Kentucky, but 
made head strongly, and at the end of it were at 
the height of their power, with the North badly 
defeated at all points save one. The writer considers 
that the battle of Stone's River, or Murfreesboro, 
on December 31st, was the military turning-point of 
the War, though the Confederates made various 
strokes at different times, for political purposes, 
which, had they succeeded, might have attained 
their end, the chief of which was the campaign of 
Gettysburg. From a purely military point of view, 
however, nothing could save the Confederacy unless 
the results of Stone's River were undone. 

The year 1863 opened with the Confederates fought 

out : they had made their effort, but could not 

maintain it, and had failed to secure the centre of 

the strategical line, which was vital for both sides. 

During the first half of this year the North improved 

their position generally, but were driven back in the 

East. 

In the second half of 1863 the North gained decisive 

victories all along the line, and at the end of the year 

held a winning position. 
The first part of 1864 was spent by the North in 

strengthening their position everywhere, and in 

preparing for the final campaigns. 

The latter part of this year was the beginning of 

the end, and, especially, the first permanent move 

forward in Virginia was then made by the North. 
* At the end of the year the Confederate power was 

completely broken. 

The first half of 1865 saw the last despairing 



4 INTRODUCTION 

struggles of the Confederacy, the surrender of all 
its armies in the field, and the assassination of the 
great President Lincoln. 

It is unavoidable that the account of such a war 
should be written mainly from the point of view of 
one side, but as its object was the maintenance or 
disruption of a great nation, it should be generally 
considered from the Nationalist or Union standpoint, 
though some early stages of the quarrel, and the 
rights of and reasons for Secession, are perhaps better 
studied from the other side. 

There were faults, many faults, on both sides, which 
aggravated the early quarrels till war resulted, and 
however much one may sympathize with the gallant 
struggle of the Confederates in defence of what they 
believed to be their inalienable rights which were 
in jeopardy, still the answer that was often given 
in the Northern States to the writer, during Grant's 
Presidency, on the vexed question of States Rights and 
Secession, appears to be the right and logical view 
to take — viz. that the existence of the Nation is of 
more importance than the Wording of its Constitution 
(cf. p. 39)- 

Further, events were happening in the neighbouring 
country of Mexico, the result of the jealousy of the 
growing power of the United States on the part of 
Napoleon III., who tried to set up a countervailing 
influence, or take advantage of the weakness caused 
by disruption ; but, fortunately for the United States, 
their statesmen were aware of it, and also Napoleon 
was a little too late, and when he could perhaps 
have given trouble, they were ready to counteract him 
with an overwhelming force of veteran soldiers. Had 
the Confederates won, the situation would have been 
very different, and they themselves saw the danger, 
at a time when they had to strain every nerve against 
their Northern opponents. 

Great attention has been paid to the maps, especially 
to the standardizing of the scales, which is done in 



THE MAPS 5 

only one work which the writer has consulted, and the 
lack of which is most puzzling. For instance, no 
words will explain the magnitude of Lee's task in 
holding the lines of Richmond and Petersburg so 
well as a comparison of the maps, on the same scale, 
of these lines, and of those o{ Johnston before Marietta, 
and of Hood at Atlanta, remembering that Johnston's 
and Hood's armies were much larger than Lee's at 
this time. 

With the exceptions of the Maps of the Progress 
of the War, of the War at Sea, and of Mexico, all are 
on one of two standard scales, or on factors or 
multiples of them, the campaign maps being based 
on Philip's Atlas scale of about 60 miles to an inch, 
A, those of the battles on the French military scale 
of 8?yJi5-o, i\ mile, or 2 kilometres, to an inch, B, the 
only scale which expresses both miles and kilometres 
in terms of an inch, with an error of less than i per 
cent., in yards. The scale of B is approximately 
forty-eight times that of A. As it is hoped that 
this Short History may be found useful as a refer- 
ence, the maps — those of the campaigns especially — 
contain the names of all places mentioned in much 
more special and detailed descriptions than are given 
here. In no other work with which the writer is 
acquainted are some important campaigns given in a 
map of useful size as a whole — e.g. that of Gettys- 
burg, and the lines of Richmond and Petersburg. 



CHAPTER I 

THE BEGINNING OF THE QUARREL 

To get to the origin of the quarrel between the two 
great parties and interests in America which cul- 
minated in the great Civil War, we must go back 
to the early days of the Republic. The trouble started 
about 1790, and had become serious in 1803. An 
attempt was then made at a compromise, which satis- 
fied no one, and which itself became the subject of 
dispute. It was a mere struggle for political power, 
which took the form that it did from the peculiarity 
of the system of State voting and State representation 
in the Senate, from the great part that the individual 
States, as such, without reference to size or impor- 
tance, had in the choice of President, and the con- 
sequent settling of the policy of the country for the 
next four years, which carried with it the patronage 
at the disposal of the winning party; it was only in 
the last few years before the outbreak that the quarrel 
crystallized round the slavery question. 

The cause of the War was the resistance of the 
Southern States to what they held to be uncon- 
stitutional and unjustifiable coercion on the part of 
the North, the diff'erences regarding the admission 
of new States being the proximate, the open threats 
of the Abolitionists, and the political victory of the 
Republican or Union party at the Presidential Election 
of i860, the deciding cause, of Secession and War. 
Former quarrels and crises had arisen, which had 

6 



POLITICAL SUPREMACY 7 

brought up the questions of State Rights and the 
Right of Secession : these will be shortly dealt with 
later on. 

The two great interests in the nation were the 
traders and manufacturers on the one side, and the 
planters on the other, and these became the two 
political parties which fought for supremacy. The 
peculiar position which the individual States had 
under the Constitution, and their political power as 
States, intensified this, and slavery came into the 
quarrel merely as the supposed backbone of the 
planter party, which the other side attacked for that 
reason. 

Slavery was one of the greatest difficulties in draft- 
ing the Constitution, being then universal, except in 
Massachusetts, where it had just been given up ; it 
was supposed to be a declining institution, which 
might be acknowledged by a compromise, and left 
to fade away of itself In the Northern States it 
did decline, not from the growth of humanitarian 
feeling, but simply because it was not profitable finan- 
cially, the climate and industrial conditions being 
unsuitable to it. In the South, however, the invention 
of the cotton gin in 1793 gave a great stimulus to 
cotton production in those States which had a suitable 
climate, which climate also made coloured labour 
almost a necessity for the work. 

It is rather curious to compare the different attitudes 
of the North and South to slavery in early days. The 
slave trade was in the hands of the Northern traders, 
but was prohibited by the State Constitution of 
Georgia and by the laws of several Southern States. 
The Constitution of the United States, however, pro- 
tected it from interference by Congress till 1808, and 
when Congress did abolish it, as soon as it could, the 
dissentients came from both North and South. 
Virginia and Maryland began to allow emancipation 
by law, and showed a desire to be rid of it, as dis- 
creditable, and of doubtful utility (cf. p. 10). 



8 THE BEGINNING OF THE QUARREL 

It was never pretended that the basis of the diffi- 
culty was other than the struggle for political power 
at first. When, in 1803, it was proposed that Louisiana 
be made into a State, out of part of the territory just 
bought from France, the jealousy of the New England 
section was such that there were threats of dissolving 
the Union ; but slavery was not mentioned as a point 
in the objection, though it existed in Louisiana. A 
Massachusetts statesman gave the reason frankly in a 
letter: "That the influence of our part of the Union 
must (i.e. certainly will) be diminished by the acquisi- 
tion of more weight at the other extremity." Moderate 
men began to look for some modus vivejtdi, which 
should check these interminable quarrels, and an 
understanding grew up that there should be a balance 
kept in the admission of new States, by making slave 
and free States alternately. At first they went on all 
right, thus : 

Free Stale. Slave State. 

Indiana, 1816. Mississippi, 1817. 

Illinois, 1818. Alabama, 1819. 

Maine, 1820. 

Missouri then applied, 1821, to come in as a slave State, 
but this was bitterly opposed by the North, which was 
beginning to demand that there should be no more slave 
States. The South, on the other hand, demanded the 
preservation of the tradition of the balance of States, 
and the quarrel waxed hot, when Clay saved an 
absolute rupture by proposing what was known as the 
Missouri Compromise, that Missouri should be ad- 
mitted as a slave State, but that in future there should 
be no slavery north of the parallel 36° 30', while to the 
south of this line any new States were to be allowed 
to choose whether they came in as slave States or not. 
This of course was only an armistice, a staving off 
for a time of the evil day, which was sure to come 
sooner or later. It was accepted by Congress, but many 
Southerners voted against ^t, holding that Missouri was 



ADMISSION OF NEW STATES 9 

entitled to decide the matter for herself. As Jefferson 
Davis puts it, " the right or wrong of the institution of 
slavery was in no wise involved in these earlier 
controversies. They were essentially struggles for 
sectional equality or ascendancy." 

For the next twenty-nine years the new States came 
in on both sides in equal numbers, though not quite 
alternately, the line of demarcation being duly ob- 
served ; but in 1850 the Northern party opposed its,^^ 
being carried across the Continent to the Pacific, wherl 
the great territory of New Mexico and California was 
acquired from Spain. They had not objected to its 
being taken through the new State of Texas in 1845, 
paying an indemnity to that State for the partition, 
but, to quote Jefferson Davis again, they had then 
everything to gain and nothing to lose by keeping the 
compact ; when the conditions changed, so did their 
conduct. Practically, though, the climate of California 
was suited for white labour, that of Texas was not, or, 
at all events, was much less so. 

The quarrel blazed up again as hotly as ever, and 
another compromise or sop to the South was effected, 
which, as before, only put off the evil day, but it was 
such a one as made the difference worse. This was the 
passing of the Fugitive Slave Act in 1850 (cf. p. 28), by 
which the owners of slaves were allowed to recapture 
their slaves in any part of the free States, and to carry 
them back without trial by jury. Jefferson Davis 
and other prominent Southerners opposed it, not only 
because it merely gave them what they had before by 
the Constitution, but because they held it to be a bad 
thing to lay the obligations of the individual States on 
the General Government, and their feeling that this 
must do more harm than good was soon seen to be 
correct. 

This Act first made slavery, as such, a prominent 
plank in the political platform, and strengthened the 
hands of the Abolitionists Knmensely. Up to now, 
tfibugh their language had been violent, like that of all 



lo THE BEGINNING OF THE QUARREL 

extremists — to such an extent that even in 1831 the 
State of Georgia had offered five thousand dollars for 
the head of William Lloyd Garrison, who had started 
a paper called ** The Liberator " — yet the nation at large 
had not taken them seriously, nor interested itself much 
about the moral side of the question as distinct from the 
purely political. Now, however, things were changed. 
As McCarthy says : " States are like human beings, 
they resent being interfered with and preached at. 
The more the Abolitionists of the North thundered 
against slavery and inveighed against the South, the 
more doggedly the South resolved to stand by its 
slavery system." A little moderation might perhaps 
have weakened the Southern coalition when the split 
did come ; for, as we have seen, slavery might have 
been dropped or modified in many States, since in 
early days Virginia and Maryland were quite willing 
to let it go, though it was probably otherwise with 
the Cotton States, the leaders in Secession (cf. p. 7). 
Virginia was on the verge of a law of State Emancipa- 
tion in 1832, but it was rendered impossible by the 
excesses of the newly founded New England Anti- 
Slavery Society. The great evil of the inflaming of 
popular passions is the fact that the decision passes 
out of the hands of moderate men, who are best able 
to advise wisely and steer through the trouble, into 
those of demagogues and those swayed by their 
violence, who always form the numerical majority. 
For instance, many of the best men in the South 
would not have lifted a finger to preserve slavery; 
they considered it an unmitigated evil, even for the 
white population, and hoped that it would be gradu- 
ally eliminated. Of such opinions, notably, was 
General Lee. What they did contend for, though, 
was their State Rights, and many were driven to 
take up the defence of slavery qua slavery by the 
tactics of their opponents, among whom wsiS Alexander 
Stephens, afterwards the Vice-President of the Con- 
federacy, who was at first quite a moderate man. 



NULLIFICATION n 

Just at this time the South suffered an irreparable loss 
in the death of their. great States Rights leader, John 
Calhoun (March 31st, 1850). 

Many of the Northern States answered the passing 
of the Fugitive Slave Act by State laws which forbade 
their officials to take any part in the carrying out of 
its provisions, which were termed " personal liberty 
laws," thus nullifying the action of Congress and 
logically imposing on the General Government the 
duty of enforcing its own laws ; but the remedy would 
have been worse than the disease. This nullification 
was an old trick, as we shall soon see. 

In 1852 Franklin Pierce, Democrat, was elected 
President, taking office in the following year, and 
Jefferson Davis became his War Secretary, Soon after 
Davis took office a curious point arose, which must 
have been of use to him later when preparing for 
Secession — that in going through the list of officers 
for promotion, on the raising of several new regiments, 
it was seen that, on their military record, the number 
of those of Southern birth would be much larger than 
that of Northerners, and it was deemed advisable to 
maintain a geographical equality for political reasons. 
Thus one of the great elements of strength in the 
Confederacy was apparent long before the War, and, 
curiously enough, the Adjutant-General of this time, 
Colonel Cooper, was Jefferson Davis' Adjutant-General 
in the Confederate Government (cf. p. 66). 

Though the question of slavery, pure and simple, 
was now coming to the front by leaps and bounds, 
the next great move in the campaign was the Kansas- 
Nebraska Bill of 1854. This dealt with the organiza- 
tion of the Territorial Governments of Kansas and 
Nebraska, and the Missouri Compromise having been 
upset by the events of 1850, the purpose of this Bill 
was declared to be "to carry into practical operation 
the propositions and principles established by the 
compromise measures of 1850." It was added that 
"the true intent and meaning" of the Act was ''not 



12 THE BEGINNING OF THE QUARREL 

to legislate slavery into any Territory or State, or to 
exclude it therefrom, but to leave the people thereof 
perfectly free to form and regulate their domestic 
institutions in their own way, subject only to the 
Constitution of the United States." The repeal of 
the Missouri Compromise had been worked by Mr. 
Douglas of Illinois, and he set to work to convince the 
Northern Democrats of its value, and of his substi- 
tute, the Kansas-Nebraska Bill. The arguments used 
against the Bill were more and more those of opposi- 
tion to slavery in itself, on both moral and logical 
grounds, as incompatible with carrying on a Republic 
which affirmed as its fundamental proposition the 
equality of men and their inherent right of self- 
government : it was in this connection that Abraham 
Lincoln first came to the front, as Douglas' great 
opponent in his own State of Illinois. Douglas was 
reputed to be the ablest debater and parliamentary 
hand in the country; but Lincoln challenged him to 
a public argument, and got decidedly the best of it, 
his speeches contributed much towards the result of 
the Illinois State elections, which split up Douglas' 
party. 

The result of the Bill in Kansas Territory was sheer 
anarchy. Kansas lay to the west of Missouri, a strong 
slave State, whose settlers were imbued with the wild, 
lawless life of the West, and believed in deeds rather 
than words for enforcing their ideas. The President 
sent, as Governor, Mr. Reeder of Pennsylvania, a 
strong Democrat, with no objection to slavery ; but, 
when the first elections were announced, the Mis- 
sourians mustered along the border, well armed, and 
swamped the polling with illegal votes. Trouble had 
been expected, but nothing to what actually took place. 
The first election, however, showed a majority of good 
votes for the slavery candidate, and he was declared 
duly elected ; but Governor Reeder, a just and honour- 
able man, set himself to put a stop to the scandals 
wrought by men avowedly of his own party, which 



ANARCHY IN KANSAS 13 

were making government impossible. The invasion 
was met by a counter-invasion, each side of course 
accusing the other of starting the disturbance. There 
seems nothing to choose between the Southern 
Border Ruffians and their opponents, who were led by 
the notorious fanatic, John Brown. Between them 
they kept up a state of civil guerilla war during the 
whole of Pierce's term of office. Bogus elections 
were carried out by the two sides, who set up the rival 
draft Constitutions of Lecompton and Topeka. The 
former, recognizing slavery, was strictly legal, now 
that the Missouri Compromise was repealed, and 
slavery could only have been defeated by the anti- 
slavery party gaining a majority at the Lecompton 
Convention, not by keeping away from it. Governor 
Reeder vainly tried to keep order, but got to logger- 
heads with his Legislature, who passed laws over his 
veto and petitioned the Government to remove him, 
which the President had already seen to be necessary. 
His duties now devolved on one of the extreme slavery 
party, the Acting Governor, Woodson, and this party 
had it all their own way ; they adopted a Constitution 
copied from that of Missouri, and passed the most 
extreme slavery measures. 

This reign of the Border Ruffians caused the forma- 
tion of the Free-Soil party, mostly Democrat supporters 
of the President, who were roused by their misdeeds 
to combine against them and form an opposition State 
Constitution, called the Topeka Constitution. Kansas 
could not come in as a State with this, though backed 
by the newly formed Republican party, because the 
T^sMent and the decision of the Supreme Court 
were against it. Congress was hopelessly divided, 
the Republicans controlled the Lower House, the 
Democrats (the President's party) the Upper, and 
they barred the claim. Strengthened by this, those in 
power in Kansas became more and more outrageous, 
and passed laws to make the holding of Free-Soil 
principles, or rather of any principles in opposition to 



14 THE BEGINNING OF THE QUARREL 

their own, a sort of treason. The Free-Soilers had 
had the worst of the civil war which had been going 
on for some time, and finally Woodson, with United 
States troops at his back, dispersed one of their meet- 
ings on July 4th, 1856. All passed off quietly, but the 
Topeka Constitution and its framers played a great 
part in the history of the State for all that. Nebraska, 
the State which was connected with Kansas in the Bill, 
was not troubled, for it was not only surrounded by 
anti-slavery States, but its climate was not suited to 
negro labour. 

In the country generally the feelings and passions 
of the more extreme men on both sides had risen to 
boiling point, and matters could hardly be worse : this 
was emphasized by the assault on Mr. Sumner of 
Massachusetts by Preston Brooks of South Carolina, 
in revenge for a caustic speech attacking his uncle, 
Mr. Butler of South Carolina, in a debate which 
became very bitter on both sides. Brooks was a 
member of Congress for South Carolina, and his party 
was powerful enough to limit his punishment to severe 
censure. Sumner was badly hurt, and unable to take 
his place again for months. There were several cases 
of personal violence in Congress, all coming from the 
same side, and the flame of sectional hatred was fanned 
on both sides by indignation meetings, etc., in the 
country. The assault on Sumner took place in May, 
1856, and few things did more to rouse and unite the 
Northern side. 

In the last year of President Pierce's administration, 
at the time for the election of his successor, the two 
sides were so violently estranged that, had the De- 
mocrats not won the election, the War would have 
broken out then, four years before it really did. The 
political parties had lately been remodelled a good 
deal. The old Federalist party of early Republican 
days inclined to Nationalism rather than Federation of 
the States : on the other hand, the Republican, after- 
wards called the Democratic party, went in for State 



NEW POLITICAL PARTIES 15 

Rights, the assertion of State Sovereignty, and the 
strictly Federal nature of the Union. To the old 
Federal party succeeded that of the Whigs, which, 
though not identical, favoured a strong central Govern- 
ment. The Whigs were a good deal broken up at the 
time of the Election of 1856, and the Know-Nothings, 
or American party, who opposed the overgrowth of 
the political influence of naturalized foreigners, and of 
the Roman Catholics, arose, but after this election 
declined. The Free-Soil party, largely composed of 
dissident Democrats, disgusted with the pro-slavery 
men in Kansas, united with some of the dissidents 
of the old Whig party to form the new Republicans, 
and soon became very powerful. The issue was 
principally between them and the Pro-Slavery De- 
mocrats — that is, slavery took the principal place for 
the first time. Few outside things contributed so 
much to bring this about as the publication in 1850 
of Mrs. Harriet Beecher Stowe's novel, '* Uncle Tom's 
Cabin," which is probably the most effective political 
pamphlet on record. 



CHAPTER II 

FROM THE ELECTION OF PRESIDENT BUCHANAN TO HIS 
MESSAGE TO CONGRESS, DECEMBER 3RD, 1860 

Even at this time, in 1856, the question of peace or 
war hung on the personaHties, poHcies, and leader- 
ship of the two candidates for the Presidency — 
Buchanan and Fremont ; and it was fortunate for the 
United States as a nation that war did not break out 
under Fremont. It may be as well to give some slight 
sketch of them here. 

James Buchanan was born in a log cabin in 1791, on 
the then outskirts of civilization, in Western Penn- 
sylvania. His father was an Irish farmer, who emi- 
grated from Co. Donegal, and seems to have done 
pretty well, for he was able to educate his son as a 
lawyer. The young man rose rapidly in his pro- 
fession, and took to politics at the age of thirty, when 
he was elected to Congress ; in Jackson's Presidency 
he was sent as Minister to Russia, in 1833 became 
Senator for Pennsylvania, was Secretary of State 
under President Polk, and Minister to England in 
Pierce's time. Thus no man could have ascended the 
ladder more regularly. He was a typical Democrat 
of the old school, who believed in the minimum of 
interference by the central Government with the rights 
and institutions of the individual States. Though not 
a particularly strong man, he was able and honest, 
courteous, sensible, and conciliatory, and, as has been 
shewn above, of great and varied experience. 

16 




BUCHANAN AND FREMONT 17 

At the time of his election he was sixty-five years 
of age, and not able to bear the strain of the difficult 
times through which he had to steer the nation, so 
that he was broken down and infirm before he laid 
down his office at the age of seventy. Still, it is 
doubtful whether a stronger policy at this time would 
have succeeded better than did his efforts to heal the 
breach by conciliation, for any attempt at force would 
only have made bad worse : things had gone too far. 
When all hope of saving the Union had departed, he 
still went on doing his best to minimize Secession 
and avert war, feebly, perhaps, but still honestly and 
gallantly, according to his lights, in the teeth of un- 
popularity, and even of personal danger, until he 
broke down under the strain. 

Of all the characters who appear on the stage of 
the great American Cival War, the most extraordinary 
is John C. Fremont, of Georgia, the Abolitionist 
candidate for the Presidency in 1856. Vain, frothy, 
unstable, the exponent of extreme opinions, he yet 
imposed on many sensible men, on account of the 
sentiment to which he appealed, and made a strong 
bid for victory ; but the success of such a man would 
have been a national calamity. 

He had been a mathematical professor in the navy, 
but threw up this appointment to go exploring, and met 
with the wildest adventures. Governor of California 
~im^6, he was court-martialled for insubordination to 
a superior officer, and dismissed, when he went back 
to exploring and Indian fighting. He next appears 
as a candidate for the Presidency. On the outbreak 
of the War he was appointed one of the four new 
Major-Generals of the army and Governor of Missouri, 
but failed as a commander, and was dismissed for 
taking on himself to proclaim the freedom of the slaves 
without consulting his Government, thereby embar- 
rassing them at a critical time. He was once more 
given an independent military command, in Western 
Virginia, but resigned his commission on being placed 

2 



i8 BUCHANAN'S ADMINISTRATION 

under Pope in June, 1862, and was not employed again. 
He went into retirement till put in nomination for 
President against Lincoln in 1864 (cf. p. 326), but 
he had no chance, and his party withdrew him. 
After this he was only heard of as a wild speculator, 
alternately millionaire and pauper, and he died in 
obscurity a few years later. 

Only his work as an explorer appears to have been 
of value, for, though brave to a fault, he was useless 
as a soldier, because he could neither command nor 
obey. Though he had had great experience of troubled 
times and places, he was useless as Governor of a 
district, either in peace or war, for he had no adminis- 
trative ability, he was easily got at, owing to his over- 
weening vanity, and he winked at corrupt practices. 
With all his drive and cleverness, he was useless 
as a politician, for he was shifty, headstrong, and 
treacherous, and did not hesitate to advertise himself 
at the expense of his party. A man of brilliant genius, 
he was without ballast, and so made next to no use of 
his abilities. 

The essential difference between Buchanan and 
Fremont was this — that Buchanan never played to 
the gallery, while Fremont did little else. 

The sketch of the events of Buchanan's Adminis- 
tration is of course limited to the stages in the great 
quarrel between the North and South, but the 
President had no easy time in other ways : amongst 
other things, the troubles with Brigham Young and 
the Mormons in Utah became so acute as to require 
the despatch of a military expedition — a real difficulty 
in so distant a place. 

The election of such a thorough-going States 
Rights Democrat as Buchanan, who, though not an 
extremist, was probably a stronger one than his pre- 
decessor. Pierce, was an assurance that these claims 
would have full sympathy and recognition in the 
policy of the next four years, and removed the im- 
mediate danger of Secession, and of one party declar- 



THE DRED SCOTT CASE 19 

ing war against the Government ; but the intensity of 
the hatred between the two factions was not abated 
in the least, and steadily increased till the election of 
Lincoln. It seems best to consider the period between 
elections, rather than that between the assumption and 
laying down of office by each President, because the 
election is the declaration of coming policy, and a 
President could not affect matters much in the last 
months of his term, in the sense of initiating anything, 
but simply carried on the Government till relieved. 

Directly after Buchanan's election an event occurred 
which added fuel to the fire and strengthened the 
hands of the Abolitionists immensely — viz, the final 
decision in the notorious Dred Scott case. This had 
been going on for years, and was the suit of a negro 
called Dred Scott, who claimed the freedom of him- 
self and his family on the ground that his master, a 
Missourian army doctor, had taken him to a free State, 
where, with his master's consent, he had married a 
coloured woman, who had also been brought as a slave 
from Missouri. The master. Dr. Emerson, died in 
Iowa, a free State, in 1844; and, when the widow 
returned with them to St. Louis, Scott claimed his 
freedom in St. Louis courts and won his case, but the 
judgment was reversed on appeal by the Supreme 
Court of Missouri. As being property under the trust 
created by her husband's will, Mrs. Emerson's power 
of emancipating them was doubtful, though she was 
willing to do so, and transferring them to her brother 
and trustee, Mr. Sanford, of New York, did not alter 
matters. Scott tried again in the United States Court 
at St. Louis, and again lost, on which he appealed 
to the Supreme Court of the United States, It was 
argued there in the spring of 1856, but the decision 
was deferred. There was great excitement among the 
politicians of the Democratic side, who hoped to get a 
definition of the words "subject to the Constitution" in 
favour of limiting the control of the central courts over 
those of individual States, On March 6th, 1857, Chief 



20 BUCHANAN'S ADMINISTRATION 

Justice Taney delivered the decision to the effect that 
" The Declaration of Independence and the Constitu- 
tion of the United States do not include or refer to 
negroes otherwise than as property ; that they cannot 
become citizens of the United States nor sue in the 
Federal Courts. That Dred Scott's claim to freedom 
by reason of his residence in Illinois was a Missouri 
question, which Missouri law had decided against him. 
That the Constitution of the United States recognizes 
slaves as property, and pledges the Federal Govern- 
ment to protect it, and that the Missouri Compromise 
Act and like prohibitory laws are unconstitutional. 
That the Circuit Court of the United States had no 
jurisdiction in the case and could give no judgment 
in it, and must be directed to dismiss the suit." 

Mr. Buchanan's inaugural speech had prepared 

people for a decision " that would dispose of a vexed 

and dangerous topic by the highest judicial authority 

in the land," but this was doing it with a vengeance — 

as the North said, on party political lines, for political 

reasons, and that it was a revolutionary exposition of 

the Constitution. But most especially offensive to them 

was the pitiless logic which would reduce the status 

of a negro, in the eye of the law, to that of a dog, or a 

bale of dry-goods. Though he lost his case at law, 

and the North and South went on quarrelling over it, 

Scott did not lose really, for Mr. Sanford transferred 

him and his family to Mr. Taylor Blow, the son of his 

old Virginian master, on whose estate he was born, 

who had been backing him in his fight for freedom, 

and who set them free in May, 1857, two months after 

the decision. This case brought Lincoln again into 

prominence as the opponent of Douglas in Illinois, 

where he spoke with the greatest effect and power. 

The militant Southern section of the Democratic 
party must have been well satisfied with the com- 
position of the Cabinet and the War Department, for 
they had a great advantage there. The Vice-President 
was John C. Breckinridge, of Kentucky, afterwards a 



A SOUTHERN CABINET 21 

Major-Gcncrnl in the Confederate service; the Secre- 
tary of War, John B. Floyd, afterwards a Confederate 
Major-General; the Secretary of the Treasury, Howell 
Cobb, an active Confederate ; the Secretary of the 
Interior, Jacob T/ionipson, another. The Adjutant- 
General of the Army, Colonel Cooper, took the same 
post under the Confederate Government, with the 
rank of General, and the Quarter-Master-General, 
Brigadier-General Joseph Johnston, became a Con- 
federate General. He was not in the War Office at 
the beginning of Buchanan's term, but joined it later. 
For a party which would have seceded, and gone to 
war, had they lost the late election, and fully intended 
to do so if they lost the next, this was pretty good 
representation, in most important places. Out of the 
nine seats in the Cabinet, the Southern States had 
five : Vice-President, Secretary of War, Secretary of 
the Treasury, Secretary of the Interior, Postmaster- 
General. Besides ih\s, Jefferson Davis had been Secre- 
tary of War under President Pierce. 

The civil war still went on in Kansas, during most 
of Buchanan's term, for the district was so given over 
to riot and bloodshed that at last a strong military 
force had to be used, which soon ended the disturb- 
ances, dispersed the political factions, and forced their 
leaders to flee from the Territory. Kansas was not 
admitted as a State till 1861. In the interval between 
Buchanan's and Lincoln's elections the Anti-Slavery 
party had increased rapidly, for their nominee, Fremont, 
had not been beaten by a large majority, and they 
had good hopes of success next time. In Congress 
their attacks on slavery, and all who upheld, or even 
did not condemn it, grew more and more bitter, arous- 
ing equal bitterness in return, till in March, 1858, Mr. 
Hammond of Virginia, in replying to a more virulent 
attack than usual, made a most uncompromising and 
powerful speech, in which he impressed on his hearers 
that the Southern States were well able to guard their 
own rights and interests, and would assuredly do so, 



22 BUCHANAN'S ADMINISTRATION 

going on to deal with their prospects of separate 
existence in case of Secession. There was no mis- 
taking language like this, and it created a profound 
impression. In the autumn of that year the antago- 
nism was intensified by the agitation incidental to the 
approaching Presidential campaign. These encounters 
did not by any means always end where they began, 
in words, as we have seen, but in these cases the 
aggressors seem always to have been the more fiery 
spirits among the younger Southerners. 

In 1859 occurred the "John Brown Raid," which 
raised excitement to a dangerous pitch. John Brown, 
the fanatical Abolitionist and exponent of Free-Soil 
ideas, who, with his sons, had played a prominent 
part in the Kansas difficulties, had been, since the 
suppression of the trouble there, secretly engaged in 
organizing a plan to bring about a rising of the slaves 
in the South. In October, 1859, with the aid of a 
party of sixteen whites and five blacks, into whom he 
had infused his own reckless disdain of consequences, 
he actually invaded Virginia, and seized the Govern- 
ment Arsenal and other buildings at Harper's Ferry. 
Colonel Lee, as he then was, was ordered to take a 
battalion of marines and some militia, and capture the 
insurgents. He found that Brown had failed to stir 
up a rising of the slaves in the neighbourhood, and 
took the buildings, which were defended to the last, 
after a sharp fight. Five escaped, but Brown and six 
of his companions were tried and hanged for insurrec- 
tion and murder, justly enough ; but the extreme 
Abolitionist party made a martyr of him, and used the 
occurrence, however discreditable to their own side, 
to increase the sectional hatred to the utmost, with 
great effect. John Brown came from the wild country 
to the west of Lake Champlain, which is still known 
as " John Brown's Tract," so that his death touched 
the greatest of the Northern States, New York, and, 
what was perhaps more to the purpose, one which 
was usually Democratic in policy, thus weakening 



TENSION INCREASES 23 

the support from the Northern Democrats to their 
Southern allies. After this, and the civil war in 
Kansas, the breach widened beyond repair, and the 
bond between the two sections was found to be 
intolerable, by the South at any rate. The North 
raved of coercion ; the South denied either the right 
or the power of the f'ederal Government to apply 
anything of the sort, and said plainly that Secession 
was the lesser evil, and must come. In the then 
temper of the North, it was clear that if it did come it 
meant war, for though many of the statesmen of both 
parties thought and hoped that this would not be a 
necessary consequence, even if Secession could not 
be averted, the two sides were so embittered against 
each other that they were passing quite beyond the 
control of politicians. At all events, they waited to 
see what result the coming Presidential Election 
would bring forth, though it is difficult to believe 
that matters would have turned out differently, who- 
ever had won. 

The North accuse Floyd, a militant Southerner, the 
Secretary of War, of using his official position to 
prepare for it, and put the Southern States in the best 
possible position before he resigned. He is said to 
have designedly scattered the small army along the 
Indian frontier, which was much disturbed, and in 
distant places, so that troops could not be collected 
when wanted, and Washington, especially, was left 
defenceless : but no distribution of the army could 
have stopped the rising, for to have strengthened, 
the garrisons all round would have precipitated war, 
and lost the garrisons, a serious deduction from the 
strength of the small United States army. The South 
say that when they seized the arsenals in their States, 
but few muskets, and these obsolete, and little powder, 
were found therein : most of the muskets had gone to 
be converted from flint to percussion action, perhaps 
in the hope that they would be back when wanted ; 
but Floyd did his best to buy better ones, and seems 



24 BUCHANAN'S ADMINISTRATION 

to have used Government money freely. In Decem- 
ber, i860, just before his resignation, he proposed 
Secessionists for commissions in the forces being 
raised for the defence of Washington, and issued arms 
lavishly to their commands ; but he was out of power, 
and in Confederate service, when they made their 
great haul of the heavy guns which the United States 
forces abandoned at Norfolk Navy Yard. 

Thus the nation drifted toward war, and poor old 
President Buchanan could not stop it, for Congress, 
divided against itself, would do nothing. As the time 
for the Presidential Election of i860 drew near, the 
political excitement increased, but there was a split in 
the Democratic party, while that of their opponents 
was consolidated. This split arose over what was 
called the "Squatter Sovereignty doctrine," which was 
largely worked out by Mr. Douglas of Illinois : the 
Southern Democrats, headed by Jefferson Davis, 
vehemently opposed it. It was a development of the 
old struggle for political power, by gaining control of 
new or rising States by one party or the other. The 
Missouri Compromise had been broken by the refusal 
to carry the line through the Continent at the time of 
the admission of California as a State, and the Kansas- 
Nebraska Bill was engineered to restore to the 
Democrats the position they had lost by this occur- 
rence, ostensibly for the purpose of leaving the people 
of any Territory or State free to form and regulate 
their domestic institutions in their own way, within 
the Constitution. Douglas and others, however, 
expanded this into a claim that the first settlers of a 
Territory, in however crude and unformed a condition 
it might be, had a right to determine the character of 
its institutions. This was a very different thing, in 
reality, from the intention of the Bill, and Jefferson 
Davis, who before everything was a stickler for con- 
stitutional procedure, opposed it, partly for this reason, 
partly because he saw what an extremely dangerous 
two-edged weapon it was. The constitutional rule 



SQUATTER SOVEREIGNTY 25 

was that Congress looked after and governed the 
Territories, which were considered to be United 
States land not yet formed into States, laid them off 
by boundaries which would be convenient for the 
formation of States in the future, and when, by reason 
of the number of their inhabitants, they were ready to 
be formed into States, it was from Congress that the 
authorization was derived for " the inhabitants to 
elect representatives for a convention to form a State 
Constitution, which was then submitted to it for 
approval and ratification." But, " logically carried 
out, this new theory of popular sovereignty would 
apply to the first adventurous pioneers settling in the 
wilderness before the organization of any Territorial 
Government by Congress, as well as afterward." That 
is, the whole thing would be an unseemly scramble 
in future, perhaps worse than the late events in 
Kansas. Though it is fair to say that the authors of 
this doctrine " disavowed any claim to its application 
prior to the organization of a Territorial Govern- 
ment," it by no means follows that their successors 
would have recognized any such limitation. 

Douglas was the ablest and most powerful man 
of the Democratic party in the Northern States, so 
the quarrel was extremely serious. In April, i860, 
the Democratic Convention met at Charleston to 
select party candidates for President and Vice- 
President, but,, disagreed as to the policy to be 
adopted, and separated without doing anything. 
It is interesting to notice that Benjamin Butler of 
Massachusetts (General Butler) proposed Jefferson 
Davis as the party candidate for President, and was 
one of the first to command in action against his 
troops in the field fourteen months later. This con- 
vention was broken up by the action of some of 
the more rabid Secessionists, led by Yancey of 
Alabama : before it met they tried privately to per- 
suade the representatives of some other Southern 
States, principally those on the Gulf, to take common 



26 BUCHANAN'S ADMINISTRATION 

action, but this fell through. Virginia, Maryland, 
North Carolina, Georgia, and Louisiana tried to keep 
the peace, and restore unity in the party and country 
by all honourable means, but were opposed by the 
hotter spirits from Alabama, Florida, Mississippi, 
Arkansas, and Texas, those from the first-named 
State having come with directions, obtained by 
Yancey's influence, to withdraw if the convention 
did not accept the most extreme views with regard 
to the rights of citizens in the Territories. They 
were not accepted, and Alabama and others with- 
drew : the convention was then adjourned. One part 
met again at Baltimore, another at Richmond, and 
the Democratic party was thus hopelessly split up, 
different sections of it making different nominations 
for President and Vice-President. Douglas' party, 
the Northern Democratic National Convention, nomi- 
nated him and Fitzpatrick of Alabama; but Fitz- 
patrick declined to stand, and the name of Johnson 
of Georgia was substituted. The old, or States 
Rights section, the Southern Democratic National 
Convention, put forward Breckiiiridge of Kentucky, 
the then Vice-President, and Lane of Oregon ; some 
of the old "Whigs" and "Americans" fused into 
the Convention of the Constitutional Union Party, 
and nominated Bell of Tennessee and Everett of 
Massachusetts; while the new Republicans sent in 
the names of Lincoln of Illinois and Hamlin of 
Maine. The tenets of the first two parties have 
already been dealt with ; the Whig-Americans ignored 
the whole territorial controversy, and simply pro- 
claimed the non-committal policy of adherence to 
the Constitution, the Union, and the enforcement 
of the laws ; while the Republicans declared that 
"slavery can exist only by virtue of municipal law," 
that there was " no law for it in the Territories, and 
no power to enact one," and that Congress was 
" bound to prohibit it in, and exclude it from, any 
and every Federal Territory." That is, the first three 



LINCOT.N'S ELECTION 27 

of these parties were on one side, more or less, the 
last on the other — a divided party against a con- 
solidated one : the latter had been gaining ground 
while in opposition, and was straining every nerve 
to improve on its position at the last election, when 
it had made so good a bid for victory. Though its 
policy was decidedly anti-slavery, it was not, as last 
time, rabid Abolitionist, and there was no comparison 
between the ability and strength of its champions, 
then and now, for " Lincoln's cautious action with 
regard to the slave question undoubtedly held many 
factions together for Union, which would otherwise 
have held aloof, or have drifted into Secession. The 
cause of the Union first was Lincoln's policy, and 
its wisdom was justified by its success." 

Lincoln did not poll a majority of all the personal 
votes, the three opponents combined outnumbering 
him in the proportion of three to two, and it must 
be remembered that all three represented sections 
of the old Democratic party. This emboldened the 
Southerners to represent themselves as embodying 
the real feelings of the majority of the nation, and 
to set to work to take steps to carry their threatened 
secession into fact. 

The next occurrence after the election was the 
meeting of Congress on December 3rd, and it may 
fairly be said that the last act of President Buchanan's 
Administration was his Message to Congress on this 
occasion, for after it chaos reigned supreme, and 
no administration was possible for the country at 
large. So far as it related to the internal troubles 
of the country, his speech was to this effect. He 
lamented the decay of the prosperity of the Union, 
and its threatened destruction, which he attributed 
to "the long-continued and intemperate interference 
of the Northern people with the question of slavery." 
He said that they had been agitating in every way 
since 1835, and causing quarrels in Congress. The 
whole matter could have been settled by leaving the 



28 BUCHANAN'S ADMINISTRATION 

slave States to manage their own institutions, for 
tliey as sovereign States were alone responsible for 
them, and the North had nothing to do with the 
matter. He relied on the good sense and patriotic 
forbearance of the people, because the election of a 
particular person did not afford just cause for dis- 
solving the Union, especially when the result appeared 
to be due to temporary causes which might never 
recur. (This seems to refer to the fact that there 
was not an absolute majority of personal votes for 
Lincoln.) He thought that revolution was not justified 
except to resist " a deliberate, palpable, and dangerous 
exercise of power not granted by the Constitution," 
and that mere apprehension of contingent danger 
was not sufficient. He denied that Congress had 
refused the Southern States their rights in the 
common territory, and held that the prohibition of 
slavery in Kansas was an unconstitutional act, which 
would, he trusted, soon be put right by the judiciary 
(cf. p. 9). The Fugitive Slave Act was a valid law, 
and the efforts to defeat it unconstitutional, for he 
reminded his hearers that not only was the principle 
of it an integral part of the Constitution, but that, 
had it not been made so, the Constitution would 
never have existed at all. Consequently, if the de- 
mand of the Southern States that the Acts passed to 
nullify it be repealed, were refused, this refusal would 
be a wilful violation of the Constitution, to which 
all the States were parties, and the injured States, t 
after having first used all peaceable and constitutional 
means to obtain redress, would be justified in revolu- 
tionary resistance to the Government of the Union. 
He denied the doctrine that, as each State had 
assented to the Union, it was equally at liberty to 
dissent from and leave it, instancing South Carolina, 
whose Federal officers had resigned and left chaos, 
but gave it as his opinion that the power to coerce 
any State into submission was not one of those 
delegated to the Central Government, and therefore 



BUCHANAN'S MESSAGE 29 

could not be used, for, as a matter of history, it was 
proposed to, and expressly refused by, the Convention 
which drafted the Constitution. Such conduct would 
provoke war, not avert it, and he suggested some 
amendments to the Constitution on the question of 
slavery. Finally, he earnestly besought his hearers 
to weigh well what they were doing, and to consider 
what civil war would mean to the country and its 
prosperity. 

Though this speech took a strong party line of 
argument, still, coming from a Northern statesman, 
it was an honest last attempt to keep the Union 
together ; but the passions of both sides were now 
so thoroughly roused that the solemn warning of 
their venerable President was unheeded. 



CHAPTER III 

THE RIGHT OF SECESSION 

The election of Lincoln broke the last link with the 
Union for the Cotton States, which determined to 
secede, and immediately proceeded to do so in Decem- 
ber, the election having taken place on November 6th. 
Their object was to assert their own right of managing 
their own affairs, so far as domestic institutions were 
concerned, and to resist pressure or coercion of any 
kind from the Central Government, on the ground that 
the Union was but a compact of Sovereign and Inde- 
pendent States, from which any of them could retire 
at will : they thus claim that they were acting constitu- 
tionally throughout. The question of slavery was the 
pretext for this particular struggle for political power, 
but that of Federal control was the actual reason for 
Secession. How far were they right in their action? 

The point had been a moot one during the whole 
history of the Republic, to such a degree as to supply 
the issue which formed the dividing line between the 
two great parties in politics : it had reached an acute 
stage on several occasions, and dissatisfied States had 
often threatened to secede. It will be as well to 
describe shortly these early threats of Secession and 
their causes. 

I. In 1797 the arrogance of the French Directory, 
which, after France had helped the United States to 
gain their independence, treated them almost as a 
subject country, became so intolerable that war broke 

30 



EARLY QUARRELS 31 

out the next year, and Congress, to meet the emer- 
gency, passed an Aliens Act, to deal with immigration 
and suspicious aliens, and a Sedition Act, to check 
disloyalty among American citizens. Although the 
operation of these Acts was limited to the current 
Presidential term, they were declared to be uncon- 
stitutional invasions of State rights ; and Kentucky, 
largely under the guidance and advice of Jefferson, 
the leading opponent of the Federalist party, who 
became President three years later, passed resolutions 
denouncing them, and State laws to nullify their 
operation. Virginia did the same, and called on other 
States to follow suit, and then Virginia and North 
Carolina went further, and actually consulted Jefferson 
as to their prospects of success if they left the Union 
and set up a state of their own. 

2. When the proposition to admit Louisiana into 
the Union first came up, in 1803 (though it was not 
admitted till 1812), the question of the balance of 
power caused such friction that Secession was freely 
mooted by some of the Northern States, especially by 
Massachusetts, and no one seems to have considered 
it unconstitutional or treasonable. It was prophesied 
that severance between the free and the slave States 
must come at no distant date, and that the best con- 
ditions under which they could exist would be those 
of separation and subsequent alliance as two nations. 
It was held then, as by the Confederate statesmen in 
1860-1, that this could be done quite peaceably b}^ 
mutual arrangement. In 181 1, Mr. Quincy of Massa- 
chusetts said openly in Congress that if the Bill to 
admit Louisiana were passed it "would break up the 
Union, and that it would be the right of all, and the 
duty of some, definitely to prepare for a separation — 
amicably if they can, violently if they must." These 
expressions were ruled out of order, but the ruling 
was appealed against and reversed — a significant fact, 
when we consider the free use of the word " Rebellion " 
in 1861. 



%2 THE RIGHT OF SECESSION 

3. The next case was caused by President Madison's 
Embargo Act of 1808, which, in attempting to deal 
with the difficulties caused by Great Britain and 
France each trying to prevent the United States from 
trading with the other, almost prevented the Americans 
from trading at all, and precipitated the War of 18 12, 
which was most unpopular in the North, in New 
England especially. The South, on the contrary, the 
home of the Loyalists in the War of Independence, 
was the warlike side, so much so as to cause a serious 
risk of a split between the two parts of the United 
States. The New England traders obstructed the Act 
by every means in their power, and in 18 14 the famous 
Hartford Convention met, of regularly appointed dele- 
gates from the Legislatures of Massachusetts, Rhode 
Island, and Connecticut, with one or two from New 
Hampshire and Vermont, to consider grievances con- 
nected with the War, and this brought up the question 
of leaving the Union. They did not think it expedient 
at that time, but drew up a report dealing with the 
conditions under which Secession might become so, 
in which they complained of the combination of indi- 
viduals or of States to monopolize power and trample 
on their rights and commercial interests. The report 
ended thus : " Whenever it shall appear that the causes 
are radical and permanent, a separation by equitable 
arrangement will be preferable to an alliance by 
constraint among nominal friends, but real enemies." 
These New Englanders were much blamed for dis- 
loyalty, not because they thought of seceding, but for 
embarrassing their Government in war time, and thus 
indirectly aiding the enemy ; but the sudden end of 
the war put an end to their agitation, and the Embargo 
Act was soon taken off. Thus we see that, in the 
space of a very few years, Massachusetts and several 
other New England States had two quarrels with the 
United States, each of which was so acute as to make 
them consider the question of Secession. 

4. In 1828-30 Georgia refused to obey an Act of 



EARLY QUARRELS 33 

Congress, or respect the treaties which the United 
States had made with some Indian tribes (cf. p. 41), 
and its Legislature passed State Acts in contravention 
of the Federal authority, and acted on them ; but 
President Jackson did not interfere. The crisis, how- 
ever, was acute, and his abstention probably saved the 
situation, for force would have been met by force. 

5. In 1832 South Carolina, by her State Convention, 
and then by her Legislature, refused to recognize a 
tariff imposed by Congress, and prepared for Secession 
and war. By her original Constitution this State, as 
a sovereign commonwealth, reserved the right of 
making war and peace, and was the only one which 
did so, which may have had something to do with 
her warlike attitude. Congress passed an Enforcing 
Act to compel her obedience, and matters came to a 
deadlock; but the quarrel was soon settled by a 
compromise, the tariff being altered. But it must be 
remembered that an Act, conferring special powers 
on the President, the " Force Bill," as it was called, 
was passed on the same day as the Compromise Act 
(cf. p. 38). 

6. In 1844 the measures for the annexation of Texas 
caused the greatest friction, and the North-Eastern 
States again threatened to leave the Union. The 
Legislature of Massachusetts adopted a resolution 
condemning the use by Congress of powers which 
had never been delegated to it, and adding, that the 
annexation of Texas might drive objecting States out 
of the Union. In 1845 they sent up another resolu- 
tion, to the effect that the admission of a foreign 
State by legislation was unconstitutional, and that 
such an act would not be binding upon the people of 
Massachusetts. 

7. In 1856 the Cotton States were quite prepared to 
secede, had Fremont beaten Buchanan, and said so 
plainly. 

Here we have seven direct preparations for Secession, 
extending over the period from 1798 to 1856, none of 

3 



34 THE RIGHT OF SECESSION 

which were called treasonable at the time. Three of 
these, in 1803, 1844, and 1856, were on the main issue, 
the fight for political power by State votes, in the forma- 
tion of new States, and of these the first two were 
from New England. From the first the line of demarca- 
tion was clearly defined as that of the traders and 
manufacturers against the planters of the slave States. 
Only threats of actual Secession are dealt with here, 
but the struggle for political power by the admission 
of new States dates back to 1790. The other cases 
turned on the question of Federal control, the 
secondary element in the quarrel. 

Thus there was, throughout, a strong feeling that a 
State which came into the Union by agreement could 
leave it in the same way. This applies to new as well 
as to old States. How far was it justified ? 

The claim that the Union was a compact, into which 
the various Sovereign and Independent States had 
entered for their own mutual benefit and convenience, 
retaining their full rights of sovereignty unimpaired, 
was certainly true of the original Articles of Con- 
federation of 1778, and was not specifically abolished by 
the Constitution of 1787. 

The Articles of Confederation 
Article II runs thus : 

" Each State retains its sovereignty, freedom, and 
independence, and every power, jurisdiction, and right, 
which is not by this Confederation expressly delegated 
to the United States in Congress assembled." 

It must be remembered that each State has its own 
Constitution, and laws made under it, and that in this 
original Confederation there was no provision for 
national courts and laws, but the only law was State 
law, it being simply provided that the States recognized 
each other's laws, and gave protection to people from 
other States. These State Constitutions were thus 



THE ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION 35 

superior to the Articles of Confederation, so that 
probably the claim of South Carolina to decide 
questions of peace and war for herself could have been 
upheld, though contrary to them. They provide for 
the management of Foreign Affairs by the Central 
Government of the nation, keeping up an Army and 
Navy (without prejudice to the right of each State to 
maintain and manage its own Militia), dealing with 
questions of Trade and Customs, fixing Weights and 
Measures, National Finance, Coining Money, acting as 
Court of Final Appeal in disputes between States, etc., 
etc. ; but United States legal jurisdiction and courts 
were not constituted. A Committee of States, or any 
nine of them, might carry on the functions of Congress 
under certain circumstances. 

And Article XIII, the last, runs thus: 

*' Every State shall abide by the determinations of the 
United States, in Congress assembled, on all questions 
which by this Confederation are submitted to them. 
And the Articles of this Confederation shall be inviol- 
ably observed by every State, and the Union shall be 
perpetual ; nor shall any alteration at any time here- 
after be made in an}'^ of them, unless such alteration 
be agreed to in a Congress of the United States, and 
be afterwards confirmed by the Legislatures of every 
State." 

It was provided that Canada might come in at any 
time, but that any other new States applying for 
admission be agreed to by at least nine States ; and 
the States which agreed to these Articles were New 
Hampshire, Massachusetts Bay, Rhode Island and 
Providence Plantations, Connecticut, New York, New 
Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, 
North Carolina, South Carolina, and Georgia. These 
Articles were drawn up in 1778, and passed by many 
of the States in that year ; but the last, Maryland, did 
not do so till 1781. 

This Confederation was crude, being both too lax 



36 THE RIGHT OF SECESSION 

and too rigid, and was soon found to be quite in- 
adequate, especially in the matter of trade and dealings 
with outside nations. Foreign traders found the State 
courts too local in their prejudices, and this injured 
trade ; while, with regard to the making of treaties, 
Washington truly said : " We are one nation to-day, 
and thirteen to-morrow : who will treat with us on 
those terms?" That is, that with all their republican 
impatience of control, they found that they were too 
much divided, and that some real national control was 
a necessity, though they would not use the word 
" national." 

Under these circumstances a Convention was called 
at Philadelphia in 1787 to draft something better, to 
which all the States except Rhode Island sent delegates, 
and they evolved the Constitution, which was agreed 
to by the different States. It opens with the words : 

" We, the people of the United States, in order to 
form a more perfect union, establish justice, ensure 
domestic tranquillity, provide for the common defence, 
promote the general welfare, and secure the blessings 
of liberty to ourselves and our posterity, do ordain and 
establish this Constitution for the United States of 
America." 

This is a very different document from the Articles 
of Confederation. The Sovereignty of the States, as 
individuals, which was so markedly affirmed in them, 
is here nowhere mentioned ; but their rights of 
representation in Congress, including that of equal 
representation in the Senate, the security which they 
specially claimed at the time, were guaranteed, and 
Article IV defines their proper place as component 
parts of the nation, guaranteeing their individual, but 
not sovereign, rights. The great difference between 
the old and the new was the introduction of Federal 
jurisdiction. Article III establishing National courts 
and judges, and giving them precedence over the State 
courts and judges. 



THE CONSTITUTION 37 

Article VII, the last, runs as follows : 

" The ratification of the Conventions of nine States 
shall be sufficient for the establishment of this Con- 
stitution between the States so ratifying the same." 

The draft was said to have been agreed to unani- 
mously by the States present, by those of their 
delegates who signed it (but all did not do so), on 
September 17th, 1787: with the exception of Rhode 
Island, not represented, they are those which signed 
the original Articles. Delaware led off by ratifying 
the new Constitution that December, and the ninth 
State was New Hampshire, in June, 1788, Rhode Island 
coming in in May, 1790. Though in many States 
there was little or no opposition, the new Constitution 
was hotly debated in others : Massachusetts only 
passed it by a small majority; while Virginia, Rhode 
Island, and New York set forth, in the wording of 
their ratifications, that they retained the liberty ol 
taking back the powers thus granted to the Federal 
Government, whenever they might find it to be 
necessary, thus expressly reserving the Right of 
Secession. 

A great controversy has been made of the opening 
words, " We, the people of the United States," the 
extreme States Rights men affirming that they mean 
the people of the several States, not of the nation at 
large ; but the evidence is clear that the original was 
drafted in the names of the several States, and altered 
by the Convention. The Nationalists say that the 
new Constitution "appealed directly to the people, 
without the intervention of the State Legislatures, to 
invest them with the citizenship of the entire Union." 
The question at issue between the partisans and the 
opponents of the new Constitution was not the Freedom 
of the People, but the Sovereignty of the State Legis- 
latures, between centralized and local Government. 

In a debate in Congress in 1830, Webster described 



38 THE RIGHT OF SECESSION 

the difference between the Confederation and the Con- 
stitution thus : 

" The Confederation was, in strictness, a compact : 
the States, as States, were parties to it. But that was 
found insufficient and inadequate to the public exi- 
gencies. The people were not satisfied with it, and 
undertook to establish a better. They undertook to 
form a General Government, which should stand on 
a new basis — not a Confederacy, not a League, not a 
Compact between States, but a Constitution." 

Jefferson Davis^ in an argument more specious than 
sound, traverses this, quoting well-known Federalists 
to show that State Sovereignty remained unimpaired ; 
but they used the words to apply to it as strictly 
ivithin the Union, which, in its form of equal representa- 
tion in the Senate, the right most stoutly claimed at 
the time, was not altered. He also claims that, if any 
States retained the right of Secession, the same must 
be admitted for all, which by no means follows, 
looking to the different conditions under which they 
accepted the Constitution, and also that, in no case is 
there any right of coercing a State to remain within 
the Union if it wishes to leave it. This seems correct 
enough legally ; but before the Civil War there was a 
precedent (cf. p. 33). 

The fact remains that many States remodelled their 
State Constitutions, in view of the altered conditions, 
and this was no empty form ; for a State commands 
the allegiance of its citizens, and may punish them for 
treason to it, which had a great effect in making men, 
who did not agree with the action of their States, 
follow them into Secession, of whom the most notable 
was General Lee, who hated war as heartily as he 
hated slavery, and, though a Virginian, did not believe 
in the right of Secession, but was devotedly loyal to 
his State. State Constitutions are generally an- 
tagonistic to, or at least very jealous of, the Federal 
Government, and this is so far recognized, that the 



COERCION 39 

Government has always had the greatest reluctance 
to interfere with them (cf. p. 469), or to pass laws 
necessary to bring them into line, although the Con- 
stitution has been from time to time amended, 

Washington and Hamilton had been the great ex- 
ponents of Federalism, and people saw its use during 
the troublous times of the War of Independence and 
the next few years ; but when the national danger was 
succeeded by political quarrels, great men by smaller 
fry, national interests by local jealousies, the pendulum 
swung over to the other side, even such a man as 
Jefferson being the exponent, if not the author, of the 
doctrine of " Nullification," or State resistance to the 
central authority, the State constituting itself the sole 
arbiter in the matter. This was based on the theory 
that there was no power of coercion, which would 
make the passing of Enforcing Acts, as against South 
Carolina in 1832, a pure farce, the whole difficulty 
being a striking example of the fallacies of those 
amiable visionaries who preach moral suasion only, 
when men's passions are thoroughly roused, a course 
which often brings war, but seldom, if ever, averts it. 
President Jackson, a really strong man, missed a great 
chance of settling the question on the occasion quoted, 
had he obtained the " Force Bill " to carry them out, 
before dealing with the Compromise. 

Taking it all round, the best legal exposition seems 
to be that of President Buchanan, quoted above ; but 
there is a higher view than that of mere legality, 
which Bryce sums up in four words (cf. p. 4) : 

" SALUS REIPUBLICiE SUPREMA LEX." 



CHAPTER IV 

SECESSION : FROM GOVERNOR GIST'S CIRCULAR TO THE 
SECESSION OF NORTH CAROLINA 

As Secession actually took place, it is necessary to 
go back a little, and overlap the end of Chapter II, 
for active preparations were in progress before the 
Presidential Election of i860. So early as the Feb- 
ruary of that year, Alabama voted 200,000 dollars 
for military contingencies, in case Lincoln got in, in 
the autumn. In October, Mississippi bought a large 
number of small arms, and Floyd, the United States 
Secretary of War, had them properly inspected ; in 
the same month Georgia voted 1,000,000 dollars for 
military contingencies, and South Carolina 100,000. 

On October 5th, Goveinior Gist, of South Carolina, 
sent a circular-letter re Secession to the Governors 
of the other Cotton States, in case Lincoln w^ere 
elected : the answers were not very encouraging, 
but he followed it up by calling the Legislature of 
his State together " to appoint electors of President 
and Vice-President, and also that they may, if advis- 
able, take action for the safety and protection of the 
State." On the 25th a secret conference was held at 
Senator Hammond's house, and when the Legislature 
met on November 5th, the day before the Presidential 
Election, the Governor, in his opening message, directly 
advocated armed Secession, and the meeting of force 
by force. Preparations were made for calling a State 
Convention for the purpose of Secession. 



GENERAL SCOTT'S "VIEWS" 41 

On the other side, at the end of October, the 
Commander-in-Chief, General Scott, a loyal Virginian, 
sent his views in writing to the Secretary of War, 
in which he dealt more with the political than the 
military situation, and expressed the opinions that 
Secession was justifiable, and the right of coercion 
very limited, that disruption was preferable to inter- 
necine war, and that the country would probably split 
up peaceably into four new Republics, on lines which 
he defined ; but, as a Southerner, he advised the South 
not to secede, and hoped that they would not do 
so ; in any case, however, he deprecated the inva- 
sion of a seceded State. The contents of this most 
indiscreet paper soon leaked out, and distinctly 
encouraged the malcontents ; but Scott followed it 
up with the incredible folly, or worse, of publishing 
it in the papers, without the knowledge or consent 
of the President, in January, 1861 (cf. p. 70). 

From Floyd's private diary, which was found, it is 
plain that the Southern members of the Cabinet at 
Washington were in active correspondence with 
the Committee at Charleston, even to the length of 
arranging for the immediate purchase and delivery 
of muskets, and that this was done before any of 
the members of the Cabinet resigned. Mr. Buchanan's 
Message to Congress on December 3rd was a great 
blow to the North, for they had hoped that he, a 
Northern statesman, would have taken the oppor- 
tunity to proclaim the right of coercion of the State 
by the Nation (cf. p. t,^)). The original draft did 
inculcate submission to the facts created by Lincoln's 
election, and the use of force to compel it ; but on 
second thoughts, the lawyer got the better of the 
statesman, Buchanan's growing feebleness of purpose 
did not make for a vigorous policy, and the Message, 
as read, took entirely the opposite view. Even now, 
efforts were made in Congress to bring about a 
modus vivendi, but to no purpose. On December 14th 
^bout half the Senators and Representatives from the 



42 SECESSION 

Southern States issued a Manifesto to their con- 
stituents, from Washington, which may be called 
the official beginning of the Confederacy. It says 
that " argument is exhausted," though, only the day 
before, the Special Committee appointed to deal with 
the difficulty had offered to the Southern people 
"any reasonable, proper, and constitutional reme- 
dies, and effectual guarantees." The Democratic 
Government was still in power, and had practi- 
cally yielded to all the Southern demands ; plainly, 
therefore, the North were not the side which refused 
to reason. 

In South Carolina the State elections had replaced 
Gist by Pickens as Governor, but this caused no change 
in policy, for the new Governor immediately sent a 
letter to the President, dated December 17th, com- 
plaining that Charleston was threatened by the guns 
of the forts, that they were being strengthened, and, 
further, requesting permission to send a small State 
force to take possession of Fort Sumter, the Charleston 
Arsenal having already been handed over to the State 
authorities. As early as December 8th some of the 
South Carolina Representatives had warned the 
President that any attempt by the United States 
authorities to reinforce the forts would probably 
result in an attack on them ; and perhaps this was 
the reason why Buchanan did not take the advice 
of General Scott, who urged reinforcement, for he 
wished to avoid bloodshed, which must bring war, 
while Secession alone, he thought, need not do so. 
It would hardly be too much to say that on the 
answer to this claim of the Seceding States, to take 
over United States property within their borders at 
a valuation, as a constitutional right, turned the 
question of whether Secession was to be peaceable 
or not. 

In Article I, Section 8, of the Constitution of the 
United States, the section which specially defines 
the powers of the Nation, as against the individual 



NATIONAL PROPERTY 43 

jurisdiction of the several States, the wording runs 
thus : 

" The Congress shall have power ... to exercise 
exclusive legislation in all cases whatsoever . . . over 
all places purchased by the consent of the Legis- 
lature of the State in which the same shall be, for 
the erection of forts, magazines, arsenals, dockyards, 
and other needful buildings, and to make all laws 
which shall be necessary and proper for carrying 
into execution the foregoing powers, etc., etc." 

This gives absolute power " in all cases whatso- 
ever," but only mentions those of tenure by purchase, 
whereas the Confederates describe some of these 
tenures as leases. Jefferson Davis maintains that 
the various States ceded land for forts, etc., on con- 
dition, expressed or implied, that they should be 
used only for the purpose for which the grant was 
made ; that this was sometimes National, sometimes 
State, Defence, and that, in the case of Fort Monroe, 
it was to revert to Virginia, if abandoned or put to 
other than National use. The whole point lies in the 
Right of Secession, which the Republicans did not 
acknowledge, but it certainly existed, legally, for the 
State of Virginia. Douglas acknowledged the right 
of the State to the land, if it seceded, and Buchanan 
was willing to consider it ; but it must be remembered 
that they were the leaders of the other party. The 
cases cited, however, were of places ceded by the 
various State Legislatures for a definite purpose, not 
sold. In any event, the Confederates held that the 
right of the Nation would be annulled by the Secession 
of the State in which the property in question stood, 
such Secession being perfectly lawful, since it would 
be manifestly impossible for a Sovereign Nation to 
tolerate the maintenance by another Nation, possibly 
hostile to it, of fortified places within its borders. 
They contended that the Right of Secession provided 
for the solution of the difficulty, which was a mere 



44 SECESSION 

matter of arrangement or valuation, on the termina- 
tion of the contract between the seceding State and 
its former Nation. 

Mr. Buchanan's answer was again that of the 
cautious lawyer, rather than of the President of the 
United States, for he treated the question as open 
to argument, saying that it was for Congress, not 
for him, to decide the relations between the Govern- 
ment and the State of South Carolina, so that he 
could not surrender the forts, but that he had de- 
clined to reinforce them, trusting to the honour of 
South Carolina not to attack them pending settle- 
ment, and also hoping " that Commissioners will be 
sent by the Convention to treat with Congress on 
the subject." This was not only a direct recognition 
of the valuation theory, but of South Carolina as a 
Sovereign State outside the Union : still, however 
mistaken, it was all a consistent part of his policy 
to avert war, and, if he could not stop Secession, 
to disarm rancour, and part friends. He went on, 
however, to warn South Carolina that if she made 
war on the United States, the war resulting there- 
from would not be a case of a Nation using force 
to keep a State within the Union, which he con- 
demned, but merely of taking up the gauntlet which 
the State had thrown down — a perfectly legitimate 
ground for war. He added that no permission had 
been given to surrender the Arsenal to the State 
authorities, and that he was amazed at the demand 
for the surrender of Fort Sumter. The Secessionists 
at Washington saw at once the blunder that Pickens 
had committed in giving Buchanan a loophole for 
action, which it was their business to prevent, and 
persuaded him to ask the President to allow him 
to withdraw his letter : this consent was gladly given, 
and they were relieved from a most dangerous 
situation. 

The President made one more effort, and wrote to 
Governor Pickens in the most conciliatory tone, to see 



ANDERSON OCCUPIES SUMTER 45 

if even now it might be possible to avert Secession ; 
but the Governor merely informed the bearer that 
there was no hope of doing so — in fact, South Carolina 
passed the Ordinance of Secession that very day, 
December 20th, and on the 24th issued an "Address 
to the Slave-holding States." On December 27th, 
the Commissioners from South Carolina came to see 
the President, re the transfer of the forts at Charles- 
ton; but, the very night before, Major Anderson, who 
was in command, then at Fort Moultrie, on the main- 
land, was alarmed at the preparations made by the 
Confederates to attack him, and moved his command 
into the sea fort of Sumter for greater safety, spiking 
the guns at Fort Moultrie before he left. This altera- 
tion of the status quo made the Commissioners' task 
almost impossible, for the people at Charleston were 
furious, describing Anderson's move as an act of war, 
and demanding that he be ordered back again, etc., etc. 
Anderson was, in fact, conforming to his orders most 
strictly, for he was in charge of several forts, without 
enough men to garrison any one of them, and had 
been told to use his discretion with regard to his 
position, and the manner in which they were held. 
Instead of negociating, the Commissioners tried to 
bully; but this was childish, for even Buchanan, in 
his present temper, could not order that United States 
forts be evacuated at their demand. Buchanan care- 
fully stated that he only met the Commissioners 
as private gentlemen, and did not recognize them 
officially ; but surely, in trying to save face on one 
point, he put himself in a false position on the other, 
by meeting them as the President. 

All this time Floyd, who even now did not resign 
his office as Secretary of War, was gaining time for 
his side, and keeping the President quiet by his 
advice ; but large sums of Government money were 
found to be missing, and his name was connected with 
the matter. Cobb, the Secretary of the Treasury, had 
resigned a fortnight before ; he found the Treasury 



46 SECESSION 

full, and left it empty. Cass, the Secretary of State, 
resigned also ; but this was from disgust at Buchanan's 
weakness in declining to advise a stronger policy in 
dealing with Secession, in his Message to Congress. 
ThontaSy another Secessionist, replaced Cobb ; but 
Black, the Attorney-General, a strong Union man, 
took Cass's place, and soon made his presence felt. 
He was succeeded as Attorney-General by Stanton, 
the strongest Unionist of all. In the last days of 
December, Stanton accused Floyd to his face, before 
the President, of embezzlement and treason, and 
forced him to resign on the 29th. The poor old 
President had quite broken down, and Black was so 
angry when he saw the weakness of his draft reply 
to the Commissioners from South Carolina, that he 
threatened to resign, but consented to stay on being 
allowed to re-write it in the President's name. In its 
new form it was a very different document, short and 
sharp, and ended their mission abruptly. 

The year 1861 thus opened with a stronger guidance 
of the National business, which caused the retire- 
ment from the Cabinet of the last two Secessionist 
members : their game was up. Before they went, 
though, a meeting of Southern Members was held in 
the Capitol itself, on January 5th, which arranged to 
hold a Convention for the purpose of Secession at 
Montgomery, Alabama, in the first half of February, 
and also that the Southern Representatives should 
not resign for the present, in order to obstruct the 
business of Congress as long as possible. Even so 
late as March i6th President Lincoln, speaking in the 
Senate, acknowledged no division of the United States, 
and Mr. Mason of Virginia was present. 

While the North were vacillating on the question of 
reinforcing Fort Sumter, in which discussions General 
Scott did not shew to advantage, Pickens set about 
making new works to threaten it, and at last the 
small steamer *' Star of the West " was sent there 
with supplies, but she was fired on and turned back : 



SOUTHERN STATES SECEDE 47 

these were the first shots fired in the War. Anderson, 
however, in Fort Sumter, received his mails and 
suppHes regularly from Charleston, and was not 
molested, as the Confederates still thought that a 
peaceful solution would be reached and that force 
would be unnecessary, but they were determined to 
have the fort by some means or other : another reason 
why they troubled Anderson so little was that he was 
a Southerner, and they had hopes that he would think 
that his duty lay in Secession. 

The Southern States now took active measures : 
Mississippi left the Union on January 9th, Florida on 
the loth, Alabama on the i ith, Georgia on the 19th, 
Louisiana on the 26th, and Texas on February 2nd. 
(It seems, however, that Georgia did not secede with 
a view of continuing her existence outside the Union, 
but in order to revise the conditions under which she 
accepted the Constitution, and come back on better 
terms.) They then claimed the United States forts, 
arsenals, etc., as belonging to those States on whose 
land they stood, subject to valuation, and, with two 
exceptions. Fort Monroe, Virginia, and Fort Pickens, 
off" Pensacola, Florida, the State Militia took posses- 
sion of them. Virginia, Arkansas, Tennessee, and 
North Carolina, did not secede till Lincoln called for 
their quota of troops after the fall of Sumter, and 
Kentucky remained neutral till the War had fairly 
started ; it was then divided, and did not go, as a 
State, to either side. Missouri also did not secede, 
being nearly equally divided, both in feelings and 
territory. Maryland, too, although strongly Southern 
in sympathy, did not secede, one reason being that 
her State troops would be called out rather for the 
defence of Washington than for the attack or coercion 
of the Seceded States. The Southern States, which 
formed the Confederacy, were thus divided into two 
batches : the first seceded on the question of States 
Rights, the second on that of Coercion. North 
Carolina was attacked by the North before she actually 



48 SECESSION 

seceded, but after seizing the United States forts, etc. 
Thus these seizures were by no means simultaneous 
over the Southern States. The new Virginia Legisla- 
ture, indeed, elected on February 4th, was strongly 
against Secession, as was also that of Tennessee. 

Here we must go back a little. The suggestions in 
the President's Message of December 3rd were re- 
ferred to a small representative Committee of Thirteen, 
to which Mr. Crittenden of Kentucky proposed, as a 
working Compromise, that the South surrender the 
right of taking slaves into all the Territories, which 
was given to them by the Supreme Court, if the 
North would recognize it south of the old Compromise 
line of 36° 30' ; but that a Territory, on becoming a 
State, might do so with or without slavery, within any 
limits which Congress might fix. The Southerners 
accepted this, and the Northern Democrats pressed 
its acceptance, as the only chance of minimizing 
Secession ; but the Republicans, though they had 
fought for the Missouri Compromise, would have 
none of it. Crittenden brought it before the Senate for 
reference to the people direct, but was beaten : the 
President, in a special Message to Congress of 
January 8th, 1861, pressed it most earnestly, but in 
vain, and Crittenden's repeated efforts met the same 
fate. Then Virginia proposed a Peace Conference, 
which was called together at Washington on Febru- 
ary 4th, and represented twenty States : this also took 
Crittenden's Compromise as the best working basis, 
but the business was delayed, and this Compromise, 
and all modifications of it, were either shelved or 
defeated. At the end of February the House adopted 
an Amendment to the Constitution proposed by the 
Conference, forbidding any interference with slavery, 
but, though it also passed the Senate, it fell through, 
not being adopted by the requisite number of States. 
This was practically all that Congress did in the whole 
session to meet the danger, and was not done till after 
Secession had taken place, for they had steadily 



THE NEW CONFEDERACV 49 

refused to vote either men or money, or give the 
President special powers, as had been given to Presi- 
dent Jackson to meet a smaller crisis. 

The first Confederate Congress met at Montgomery, 
Alabama, on February 4th, formed a provisional 
Govenimoit and drafted a Constitution, which was 
adopted on March nth. Jefferson Davis of Mississippi 
was elected President, Alexander Stephens of Georgia 
Vice-President. This was done on February 9th, Lincoln 
and Hamlin being officially elected to the same posts 
in the United States, respectively, on the 13th. On 
the 15th, the Confederate Congress passed a resolution 
to appoint Commissioners to the Government of the 
United States, to avert war, if possible, and help the 
work of the Peace Conference, but events moved so 
rapidly that nothing came of this. 

Since the middle of the preceding year the Governors 
of the Southern States had been increasing the 
strength of their State Militia, drilling it, and appoint- 
ing to commands officers whom they could trust. 
Also, since December, the seizure of United States 
property in Southern States had been going on ; but, 
with two exceptions, the Southern officers in the 
old service loyally handed over their charges to 
their successors, before resigning their commissions, 
where a successor could be appointed, or until turned 
out by force. These exceptions were Major-General 
Twiggs, a veteran of the Mexican War, and Captain G. 
Magritder, of the Navy : the former surrendered the 
military posts in Texas, where he was in command ; 
the latter, property in his charge at Norfolk, Virginia. 
Twiggs was made a Major-General in the Confederate 
service, and commanded at New Orleans, till succeeded 
by Lovell at the end of the year ; Captain Magruder 
is not mentioned again. 

The Confederates took the initiative in preparing 
for war, and passed an Act to organize a General Staff" 
for their Army, on February 26th ; another Act, on 
March 6th, provided for an Army, for twelve months' 

4 



50 SECESSION 

service, not to exceed 100,000 men. On March 15th 
they authorized the construction or purchase of ten 
gunboats. Already the President, Jefferson Davis, an 
educated soldier, who had served with credit in 
Mexico and elsewhere, had assumed the general 
control of military affairs in the Confederacy, as. it 
then existed, General Beauregard had taken command 
at Charleston, and General Bragg in Florida. At the 
beginning of April, Beauregard heard that a Northern 
fleet was on its way to relieve Sumter, so on the nth 
he called on Anderson to march out, for conveyance 
to a Northern port, not as a surrender. Anderson 
refused, and the bombardment opened on the 12th, 
the fort surrendering the next day, just as the small 
relieving fleet came off the harbour. 

Then the North awoke in earnest, and rallied to the 
flag which had been fired on, without distinction of 
political party. President Lincoln, who had assumed 
office on March 4th, issued a call for 75,000 militia for 
three months' service, which was answered by Davis 
hy a call for 32,000 men, who also threatened to issue 
letters of marque at sea. The North sent an expedi- 
tion from Fort Monroe to destroy the abandoned 
Navy Yard at Norfolk, on April 20th. 

Both sides began to assign commanders to various 
places, and to concentrate men under them, mostly 
State Militia, and the Northern Government offered 
the command of its armies in the field to two Southern 
officers. Generals Sidney Johnston and R. E. Lee, be- 
tween April 15th and 21st. Both returned the same 
answer, that they hoped that there would be no war, 
but that they would follow the fortunes of their 
respective States. Both immediately resigned their 
commissions, and joined the Confederate service. 

On April 23rd two important events occurred : 
General Lee was put in command of the Virginia State 
Militia, and Captain Lyon practically given the com- 
mand of the Department of the West (Missouri). On 
April 19th the North proclaimed a blockade of the 



THE FIRST MOVES 51 

Southern ports from South Carolina to Texas in- 
clusive, and, on the 27th, after Virginia had decided 
to secede, and North Carolina had seized the National 
forts on her territory, extended it to those of these 
two States also. In the next few days President 
Lincoln called for men to serve for three years instead 
of three months. Western Virginia was occupied by 
State troops, as it was strongly Union in feeling, 
though still an integral part of Virginia. On May 6th 
the Confederate Congress passed an Act recogniz- 
ing the existence of war between the United States 
and the Confederate States, and, a day or so 
afterwards. General Lee was given the command 
of the Confederate forces in Virginia, having before 
been but the nominee of the Governor of the State. 
At several places in Virginia a few shots were ex- 
changed between Union vessels and Confederate 
batteries, but the War began first in a connected 
form in Missouri. 

The Governor of this State was Jackson, a thorough 
Secessionist, who tried to carry the State to the Con- 
federate side in the February elections ; but the energy 
of F. P. Blair rallied the Union men and defeated him, 
the result being that a body of men were elected, none 
of whom w^ould vote for Secession. Blair was a very 
able politician, who had been of the greatest use to 
the Republicans at the late Presidential Election, and 
had a brother in Lincoln's Cabinet. As soon as South 
Carolina seceded, he got his adherents together, and 
drilled them carefully as Home Guards, but was very 
short of arms. Though there were plenty in the 
St. Louis Arsenal, they were not to be had during 
Buchanan's Administration ; but the local elections 
had so discouraged the Secessionist party that no 
attempt was made on the Arsenal till the beginning 
of April, when the Governor had at disposal a small 
volunteer brigade under General Frost. It was ar- 
ranged that the State Militia should be called out 
and put under Frost's command, who was then to 



52 SECESSION 

camp in a position where he would have the Arsenal 
at his mercy : having no artillery, they sent for some 
to Baton Rouge. The Arsenal, however, was com- 
manded by a most capable man, Captain Lyon, who 
worked with Blair for the Union cause ; and they had 
exact information of their opponents' plans. Blair had 
reported to Washington that General Harney, com- 
manding the District, was of doubtful loyalty, so he 
was set aside, and Lyon put in his place for the time. 
Lyon then sent away some of the arms to Illinois, 
armed Blair's men with the rest, and took military 
command, making his camp on the very ground that 
Frost was to have occupied, and forcing him into a 
worse position, which he called Camp Jackson. Here 
he meant to^wait for his guns, and then move; but, 
as soon as the guns arrived, Lyon and Blair suddenly 
surrounded the camp with a very superior force, and 
took it, and everything in it, on May loth. On their 
return there was a riot in the streets of St. Louis, in 
which some people were shot, which, as Coercion, had 
the effect of causing the ex-Governor, Mr. Price, an 
honourable and very influential man, to offer his 
services to the Governor as a Confederate, though he 
had refused to vote for Secession. He had had 
military experience in the Mexican War, and was a 
fair commander in the field, so his defection was very 
important ; but the prompt action of Blair and Lyon 
in the next few days saved Missouri for the Union. 
These were not desultory operations as elsewhere, 
but the first beginnings of a regular stage of the War. 
(Continued on p. 92.) 

On May 20th, North Carolina, the last State to 
secede, left the Union for the Confederacy. 

This chapter takes us through the period of un- 
certainty and defection which lasted about seven 
months, from October to May, though no State 
actually seceded till December. Many clear-sighted 
men in the North saw that, in the then temper of the 
people, Secession spelt War ; but this opinion was by 



APPROACH OF WAR 53 

no means general, especially in the South, where Se- 
cession was looked upon as an absolutely constitutional 
proceeding, which no reasonable man could question, 
and they therefore thought that, though there might 
be much irritation and some military preparation, this 
latter was rather the creation of the new military 
forces of the two new nations, with a little bluff 
thrown in, than a genuine intention of going to war, 
and that the then burning question of the National 
military property in the Southern States, when 
looked at, as they doubted not that it soon would 
be, clearly and without passion, was a mere matter 
of valuation. There was, however, another view of 
this point. Some of the more rabid Secessionists, 
looking at the lack of preparation in the North in the 
first quarter of the year, said that there would be no 
war because " the Yanks dared not fight," and thus 
did much to bring it about. 

The first blow to the peaceful separation opinion 
was Mr. Black's dismissal of the Charleston Com- 
missioners at the end of December; but still few 
thought that war would really come. At the Con- 
federate Convention in February at Montgomery, the 
general opinion was plainly expressed that there 
would be no war; later in the same month Lee said 
that the position did not justify war, and both he and 
Sidney Johnston, when offered Union command in April, 
said that they still hoped that war might be averted. 
These opinions, though, show that hope was steadily 
declining. After the fall of Sumter men's passions 
were roused to white-heat, both sides called out men 
in haste, doubtful and powerful States seceded, and 
when more hostile acts followed, such as the pro- 
clamations of blockade of April 19th and 27th by the 
North, and taking the United States officers at San 
Antonio, Texas, prisoners of war, by the South, on 
April 23rd, war was inevitable, and was formally 
recognized by the Confederates on May 6th. A fort- 
night afterwards the accession of North Carolina 



54 SECESSION 

completed their side, more distinct acts of war had 
taken place in the meantime, and the two enemies 
stood facing each other. 

What were their positions, prospects, and plans 
respectively ? 



For District Areas in Chronological Table, see 
beginning of chapter vi, p. 74. 



CHRONOLOGICAL TABLE 



55 



1861 

H 

w 


January 


February 


M.\Rcn 


5. Expedition to 
relieve Fort Sum- 
ter leaves New 
York. 
18. Publication of 
General Scott's 
" Views " in the 
"National Intelli- 
gencer." 


4. Peace Confer- 
ence at Washing- 
ton, at the re- 
quest of the State 
of Virginia. 
28. Amendment 
passed by Con- 
gress to forbid 
interference with 
slavery. (Never 
ratified.) 




< 

w 

D 
O 


3. Georgia State 
seizes Fort Pu- 
laski. 
9. The first shots 
of the War. The 
" Star of the 
West," for Fort 
Sumter, turned 
back. 

10. The State of 
Florida secedes. 

19. The State of 
Georgia secedes. 




3. General Beau- 
regard takes com- 
mand at Charles- 
ton. 
11. General Bragg 
takes command 
in Florida. 


1 








s 


5. Alabama State 
seizes forts on 
Mobile Bay. 

9. The State of 
Mississippi se- 
cedes. 
11. Louisiana State 
seizes forts below 
New Orleans. 

11. The State of 
Alabama secedes. 

12. Florida State 
seizes land forts 
at Pensacola. 

26. The State of 
Louisiana secedes. 


4. Confederate 

Convention meets 
at Montgomery. 

8. Co nf ederate 
Constitution 
adopted. 

9. Jefferson Davis 
elected President. 

18. Confederate .(4 ci 
of Congress to 
provide munitions 
of war, and — 

26. to organize a 
General Staff for 
the Army, and — 

28. to raise provi- 
sional forces. 


6. Confederate ^ci 
for establishment 
of an Army, not 
exceeding 100,000 
men, for twelve 
months' service. 

11. Formal adop- 
tion of Confeder- 
ate Constitution. 

15. Confederate 
Act, to build or 
buy ten gun- 
boats. 


Is 

CO ^ 




2. The State of 

Texas secedes. 
18. Surrender of 
U.S. Army posts 
in Texas by Maj.- 
Gen. Twiggs. 





56 



SECESSION 



1861 


April 


May 1-20 




7 and 10. Reinforcements 


1-3. Virginia calls for more 




sail from New York for 


men. 




Forts Pickens and Sumter. 


3. Lincoln calls for volun- 




15. President Lincoln calls for 


teers for three years, and in- 




75, ooomen.forthree months' 


creases the Army and Navy 




service. 


of the United States. 




17. The Virginia Convention 


7. Virginia admitted into the 




secedes, subject to popular 


Confederacy. 




vote. 


18. Naval attack on Con- 




19. Lincoln proclaims block- 


federate batteries at Sewell's 


H 


ade of Southern ports, from 


Point. 


^ 


South Carolina to Texas. 




w 


19. General Patterson takes 
command round Washing- 
ton. 

20. Expedition to destroy 
Navy Yard at Norfolk. 

23. General Lee takes com- 
mand of Virginian State 
troops. 

27. Blockade of Virginia and 
North Carolina ports pro- 
claimed. 






12. Bombardment of Fort 




Si 


Sumter. 




w 


13. Surrender of Fort Sumter. 




g 


15, 16. Coast forts in North 




o 


Carolina seized by State 


20. The State of North Caro- 


to 


authorities. 


lina secedes. 




20. U.S. Arsenal at Liberty, 


7. The State of Tennessee 




Missouri, seized by Seces- 


enters into a military league 


S 


sionists. 


with the Confederacy. 




23. Captain Lyon takes tem- 


10. Lyon captures Camp Jack- 


porary command of the 


son. 




Department of the West. 


11. Riot at St. Louis. 






6. The Confederate Congress 






recognizes the existence of 






war between the Confeder- 


H 




acy and the United States. 


§ 


17. Jefferson Davis calls for 


17. The Confederate Congress 


5 


32,000 men, and offers to 


passes an Act to admit 




issue letters of marque to 


Tennessee and North Caro- 




privateers. 


lina into the Confederacy, 
under certain conditions. 


if 


23. U.S. troops at San An- 


6. The State of Arkansas 


^ 


tonio, Texas, made prison- 


secedes. 


|i 


ers of war. 





CHAPTER V 

THE TWO SIDES : THEIR POSITIONS, PROSPECTS, 
AND PLANS 

^ The dividing line between the two sides, early in 
1861, may be said to start at Fort Monroe, in Vir- 
ginia, to follow the line of the Potomac River to its 
most northerly bend, thence to strike away south-west 
across Western Virginia and Kentucky, almost in a 
straight line to the Ohio River at the most southerly 
point of Ohio State, and thence to Paducah at the 
mouth of the Cumberland. Thence it followed the Ohio 
to Cairo, the Mississippi to St. Louis, and the Mis- 
souri to Kansas City, thence along the east and south 
borders of Kansas State to the present north-east 
corner of New Mexico, down the western border of 
Texas to the 34th parallel, and along that line west- 
ward to the Colorado River, following the river to 
Fort Yuma. It may be as well to explain here that 
the Western States were very different from what they 
now are, only California and Oregon having the same 
boundaries. That is to say, on the Union side were 
ranged Maine, New Hampshire, Vermont, Massa- 
chusetts, Rhode Island, Connecticut, New York, New 
Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland (most un- 
willingly, at this time), West Virginia (not a State, 
officially, till 1863), Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, part of 
Kentucky, Michigan, Wisconsin, Minnesota, Iowa, 
part of Missouri, Kansas, Oregon, California, with 
Nebraska, Washington, and Utah Territories, and 

' Map 2. 
57 



58 THE TWO SIDES 

part of New Mexico Territory. The southern parts 
of West Virginia and Kentucky were at first either 
neutral or neutralized. On the Confederate side were 
Virginia (minus West Virginia), North and South 
Carolina, Georgia, Florida, parts of Kentucky and Mis- 
souri, all Tennessee, Alabama, Mississippi, Arkansas, 
Louisiana, Texas (including part of Indian Territory), 
and part of New Mexico Territory. 

The great northern and western Territories were 
rather a source of weakness than strength to the 
Union side, for troops had to be kept there to deal 
with the hostile Indians, and also with the Mormons. 
But Indians were organized on both sides in the 
neighbourhood of Indian Territory : though they did 
not seem to have done much good to either, it was, 
perhaps, the best way of keeping them occupied. On 
the Confederate side, the country west of the Missis- 
sippi did not produce many men in proportion to its 
size, though better settled than that on the north ; 
but the supplies from thence were almost inexhaustible, 
and it was the stoppage of their supplies which was 
the principal damage to the Confederate cause by the 
Union conquest of the Mississippi. 

In the North the population was, for the greater 
part, manufacturing and trading, with lumbermen and 
pioneers from Wisconsin and Michigan : only a small 
proportion were hunters or accustomed to the use of 
firearms ; while those used to riding were very few 
indeed, and this deficiency was most serious at first. 
The population was about three or four times as great 
as that of the Confederacy. The Southerners were 
principally planters and hunters, with a good pro- 
portion of Western men — men who were always on 
horseback, carried arms habitually, and lived a hardy 
out-of-doors life, the best possible material for soldiers : 
as a set-off to this, they were less amenable to disci- 
pline. They had many more men of position and 
breeding as leaders — another great advantage. In 
numbers, however, they were very deficient, and, even 



THEIR RESOURCES 59 

before the War, did not increase by means of immigra- 
tion, like their opponents. 

In resources the South were even more inferior to 
the North than in population, for they had next to no 
manufacturing power, and their people did not take 
to this work. Their railway repair shops, etc., were 
mostly worked by Northerners, who went back before 
war broke out, so that the South were even worse off 
than they seemed to be, and could not use to the best 
advantage the works that they had, to keep their rail- 
ways in repair during the War. At the beginning of 
it there were no works in the country which could 
roll a 2|-inch plate, cast a gun, or make a marine 
engine, except the Tredegar Works at Richmond; 
and, when the Confederacy started, Virginia had not 
seceded. There were also works at Atlanta (Georgia), 
at Selma (Alabama), and at New Orleans; but when 
this latter city was taken, their difficulties, especially 
of railroad repair, increased very much. In Virginia 
there were lead works at Wytheville, salt works at 
Saltville, and a good leather industry at Lynchburg. 

The Confederates were in need of everything for 
the equipment of an army and navy, having, as the 
agricultural section of the community, left all manu- 
factures to the North. Even in the State Armouries 
there were very few efficient arms, for most of the 
muskets had been sent away to be converted from flint 
to percussion action, and had not returned ; there was, 
besides, but little powder. Powder mills there were 
none, nor raw material with which to make powder : 
all these things were done in the North, and the South 
had to provide them in haste, when war was imminent. 
It was said of General Gorgas, the chief Ordnance 
Of^cer, that he created an Ordnance Department out 
of nothing. They had hardly any iron to repair 
bridges or build ships, and wood could not be seasoned 
in time, but had to be used green, which was one 
cause of the badness of Southern gunboats. The 
worst drawback, though, was the inability to build a 



6o THE TWO SIDES 

marine engine. It is hardly too much to say that on 
this alone the whole War may have turned, in the 
matter of breaking the blockade, with a probable 
recognition by foreign nations as a result, and a cer- 
tain simplifying of the question of supply from abroad, 
by being able to send cotton, the real wealth of the 
South, to European markets : they might then have 
been able to finance the War ; but the price of supplies 
killed them. With two exceptions, all the vessels that 
they built or armoured failed through want of engine- 
power, and one of these did so from bad armour. 

The difficulty of supply dogged the footsteps of all 
Confederate generals. It has been well said that they 
were often unjustly blamed for not following up a 
success, since people did not consider that every battle 
pretty well exhausted their stock of ammunition, the 
replenishing of which was most difficult : in the matter 
of supplies they had to live from hand to mouth. 
Another reason was the deficiency in numbers, which 
generally obliged them to use up their reserves to 
hold their own. Attempts were made during the War 
to import iron, and men to work it in the shops, 
but to little purpose, because everything passed the 
blockade by driblets, and, besides the lack of iron, 
there was not enough coal for manufacturing pur- 
poses. Yet the South, with all these disadvantages, 
stood up to its great opponent for four long years. 
It is needless to specify the manufacturing resources 
of the North, for they had everything. 

Looking at the military geography of the country, 
the North was bounded by the Potomac and Ohio 
Rivers, both excellent bases of invasion, and practically 
under its control, but was cut in two by the Alleghany 
Mountains. Though the country was well populated 
on both sides, the lateral communications were bad, 
especially near the frontier, where most important. 
The principal one was the Baltimore and Ohio Rail- 
way, which was awkwardly placed, as it ran through 
Western Virginia, and was exposed to Confederate 



THE MILITARY GEOGRAPHY 6i 

raids : there was a roundabout line through Pittsburg, 
and that was all. Only one line ran from Washington 
northwards, which passed through Baltimore, a town 
most hostile to the North at first. A very important 
consideration was the lukewarmness of Kentucky : its 
neutrality delayed operations there till 1862, by which 
time the Union side were ready ; but their position 
would have been critical in the extreme had Kentucky 
been enthusiastic for the South, for a Confederate 
army could have been massed opposite the weak spot 
where the North was only one State deep, and have 
cut it in two, while these troops, as things were, had 
to be kept far to the southward. 

The striking line of the South was through the 
middle of this State, that of the North along the 
Tennessee River, in the western part of it, not only 
taking the former line in flank and rear, but attacking 
the Confederacy directly. Thus the valleys of the 
Cumberland and Tennessee, and the country between 
them, were the strategical key of the War, in the pure 
military sense, for the sturdy Middle States were the 
backbone of both sides, and in this district the most 
important point was Nashville, on the Cumberland. 
The Union base on the great rivers was Cairo, at the 
junction of the Ohio and Mississippi, Paducah, at the 
mouth of the Tennessee, being a most important 
strategical point in front of it. The Mississippi was 
vital to the Confederacy in the long run, but not im- 
mediately, for the South- Western States sent supplies 
rather than men, and it was an invaluable waterway 
to the side which had command on the water. It has 
been said that it was a danger to the Confederate 
States on the east bank, when the Union fleet got 
control, as affording means of flank attack, but it was 
really rather a protection than otherwise, for the 
country in Tennessee was not favourable, and, south 
of Memphis, the regions of swamp and forest were 
impenetrable to troops for hundreds of miles, the only 
good bases of invasion being Memphis and Vicksburg, 



62 THE TWO SIDES 

and the land in their vicinity. South of the Ohio, no 
great navigable rivers came in on this side. On the 
west, however, these conditions were reversed, for 
here came in two great affluents, the Arkansas and 
Red River, navigable, and invaluable sources of supply 
to the South, while a landing could be made almost 
anywhere. Here the possession of the Mississippi 
gave a valuable line of attack, which the Unionists 
utilized to the full, first separating, then cutting up in 
detail, the South-Western States. The river line, 
therefore, which it was of most importance to the 
Confederates to deny to their opponents, was from 
some point covering Memphis on the north, to below 
the confluence of the Red River, which should be 
considered independently of New Orleans, a most 
important place in itself. It was vitally necessary to 
close the Cumberland and Tennessee Rivers, the latter 
especially, to the Union gunboats, the more so when 
the Confederate weakness in boatbuilding is remem- 
bered. The Confederacy was also divided by the 
Alleghany Mountains, as far south as Northern 
Georgia : but its railway system, had it been kept in 
fair working order, was the better arranged of the 
two. From Chattanooga, Tennessee, railways ran 
through the mountains to Richmond, via Knoxville 
and Lynchburg, to Charleston and Savannah, and to 
Memphis, on the Mississippi, an invaluable trunk 
system, which was almost entirely south of the 
Tennessee River, and from which several lines useful 
for attack ran north, uniting at Bowling Green, 
Kentucky, and thence running to Louisville on the 
Ohio, the great Union base : farther south, a line ran 
most of the way between Charleston and Savannah, 
and Vicksburg, with a gap between Montgomery and 
Selma, but these towns were joined by the navigable 
Alabama River : lines ran to the junction of the Ohio 
and Mississippi, to Columbus and Paducah, from 
Mobile and New Orleans, and from Richmond south 
to Wilmington, Charleston, and Savannah : there were 



THE CONFEDERATE POSITION 63 

only a few short lines on the west of the Mississippi, 
for either side. The Confederate requirements for a 
covering line, a strong defence to their country, and 
base for attack of their opponents, could have been 
found in a short line from the Mississippi, by New 
Madrid or Hickman, via Forts Henry and Donelson, 
on the Tennessee and Cumberland respectively, to 
some point farther east, perhaps the important rail- 
way junction of Bowling Green ; but this required to 
be planned properly, in order to economize power as 
much as possible, not at haphazard, and here the want 
of good central control, and a well-thought-out plan 
from the outset, was sadly lacking. It was not till 
September, 1861, that this district was brought under 
one strong and able commander, Sidney Johnston, and 
he then found that different generals had been carrying 
out their own notions independently. On the Mis- 
sissippi alone there were half a dozen heavily armed 
positions, of which only one proved of the smallest 
use, the others falling easily ; more than one of them 
mounted over a hundred heavy guns, which the Con- 
federates could not afford to lose. Less than half of the 
garrison, armament, labour, and time, wasted on these, 
would have made one strong river-flank position to 
the strategic line practically impregnable. Of course 
all this work was not done by May 20th, but the con- 
sideration of it seems not out of place here. The 
Confederates having no navy, their whole coast-line 
was open to attack, but the peculiar conformation of 
the Atlantic coast, from the north border of North 
Carolina to that of Florida, was advantageous to them, 
for it consists of a long, low barrier of sandy islands, 
behind which is a narrow inland sea, forming a perfect 
maze of creeks and islands, which give lateral com- 
munication for great distances, without the necessity of 
going into the open sea at all. In many of these narrow 
places the Confederates had erected defensive works 
As we have seen, the Confederates had taken Fort 
Sumter at Charleston, and had gained a great prize in 



64 THE TWO SIDES 

the large stock of heavy guns at Norfolk Navy Yard, 
which they were able to remove after it was abandoned 
before the expedition came which destroyed what was 
left. With two exceptions, they had taken all the old 
sea forts, mostly old brick erections of antiquated 
pattern, quite unable to withstand the heavier guns 
which had come in since they were built, and thus no 
accession of defensive strength ; they had also fortified 
other places, but, in their unwillingness to surrender a 
foot of ground, they fell into the same error as on the 
Mississippi, of trying to hold too much, were thus not 
able to stand against combined attacks by land and 
water, and lost heavily. They had the Government 
Navy Yards of Norfolk and Pensacola, but made little 
or no use of them, since neither had free access to the 
sea, one being in Chesapeake Bay, the other in the 
Gulf of Mexico. They succeeded, however, in con- 
verting the heavy smooth-bores which they had taken, 
to rifled guns, on the system of Brooke^ an ex-lieutenant 
of the U.S. Navy, who put a heavy band on the breech 
and rifled them ; these guns did excellent service. 

Washington, the Northern Capital, was about as 
bad a place for the purpose as could have been found, 
but the North took it as it stood, being the Capital. 
Besides the badness of its communications, it was 
actually on the frontier, commanded from the Virginian 
side of the Potomac. The District of Columbia had 
been carved out of Maryland, a slave-holding State, 
and was, like it, in great part Southern in feeling, so 
much so that at first Washington was the great centre 
of Confederate Intelligence : Beauregard, just before 
Bull Run, was kept exactly informed of McDowell's 
movements by Southerners there. When local volun- 
teers were organized to protect the Capital, many 
units were composed of known Secessionists, and 
Floyd, before his resignation, armed and equipped 
them well ; this was luckily discovered in time, and 
these disloyal troops were disarmed and dispersed, 
but the danger was extreme. The Northern Govern- 



THE TWO CAPITALS 65 

ment was, metaphorically, living over a powder 
magazine. The great sources of weakness were 
the liability of the Capital to attack, and the timidity 
and selfishness of the politicians, who understood 
nothing whatever about war, and increased their own 
danger by the way in which they hampered the con- 
duct of it. The ground in front and rear was taken 
and fortified, till it was very strong, so much so that 
it has been called an ideal capital because it was so 
good a military base ; but surely its value as a 
military base was almost nullified by its being the 
political capital. The politicians should have moved 
well inland, where the^'^ would not have been liable 
to be terrified out of their wits by every Confederate 
raid, because, whenever they were so, they interfered 
with the military conduct of the War. On the other 
side, the Confederate choice of Richmond as a 
capital, soon after the War began, seems more un- 
fortunate, because they were in no way bound to go 
there. The fact of its being in the great State of 
Virginia did not counterbalance its disadvantages. 
Montgomery may not have been the best place, but it 
was, at all events, well removed from any possible 
attack. Instead of taking warning by the bad posi- 
tion of the Northern Capital, the Confederates copied 
the mistake. Looking to the fact that they had no 
sea power, and could not raise the blockade, Rich- 
mond was at the mercy of the sea power of the North, 
being on a navigable river within the heads of 
Chesapeake Bay, which was landlocked, and could 
be used by vessels which were not sea-going. Wash- 
ington, Baltimore, and Philadelphia, stood on its 
upper waters, and Fort Monroe, which was never 
out of Union hands, was opposite the entrance. 
Richmond was thus exposed to attack, and had no 
direct communication with the outer world. Also, 
its being the Capital made the railways connecting 
it with the South more important, and they all had to 
pass through the narrow gap between the mountains 

5 



66 THE TWO SIDES 

and the sea : this apparent strategical danger was, 
however, neutralized by the very swampy nature of 
the country for some distance back from the coast. 
Another fault was that the position of Richmond 
confined the best Confederate general and army to 
one line of operations ; Lee called it a millstone, 
dragging the army down. 

The United States had only kept up a very small 
army before the War, hardly enough to keep the 
Indians and Mormons in order, and garrison a few 
posts, so the necessary expansion to large armies 
was a national matter with both sides, but with this 
difference — that on the Union side the old regiments 
kept together, losing officers, but hardly any men, 
because the latter were principally Irish and German 
emigrants, the native American not taking to the 
Service much. Thus many good officers remained 
with their old rank and commands till after General 
Scott's retirement, for he kept the army together, 
refusing to allow young officers to take volunteer 
commissions. Grant thought this a great mistake, 
and that, when the manhood of the nation had to be 
called to arms, the army should be broken up, and 
the trained officers and men distributed through the 
new units, with a step in rank, keeping only the Staff 
on its old footing. He thought that the South had 
a great advantage in having no army, but only a 
number of excellent officers, to create one. On both 
sides, however, the Staff was quite untrained for the 
work which was suddenly entrusted to it, and the 
regular army was so small, that only 3,000 men could 
be withdrawn from the West for the War. 

The South had a larger proportion of good officers 
to its population than the North had, and it will be 
remembered that, in President's Pierce's time, Jefferson 
Davis and Colonel Cooper, then Secretary of War 
and Adjutant-General respectively, had found this out 
on going over the lists for promotion by selection 
on the military record (cf. p. 11); we may be quite 



THE NEW ARMIES 67 

sure that when the same two men were again co- 
operating, in raising the Confederate army, they did 
not forget it. The South, not being encumbered 
with alteration or addition, but raising an army de 
novo, and their leaders being men who understood 
army requirements much better than those of the 
North, made several wise variations. They first 
formed a General Staff, then raised their Army, and 
this was for twelve months' service, not as in the 
North, for three ; they gave full rank to their senior 
officers, corresponding to the size of their army, 
making Generals, Lieutenant-Generals, and Major- 
Generals, with well-defined seniority. This may sound 
a small matter, but it was not really so ; the generals 
were not, as in the North, all of the same rank, one 
being put to command the others, regardless of 
seniority, a distinction without a difference, which 
was a most disastrous source of jealousy and in- 
trigue. Another advantage was that each Southern 
general was entitled by virtue of his rank to the 
proper staff for working his command, which was 
not the case in the North, 

At first, on both sides, the insane practice prevailed 
of the election of officers by those whom they were 
to command, but it did most harm in the North, 
since a much stronger governance was maintained 
in the South, The new volunteer forces were outside 
of the State Militia; but in the early days of the War, 
when this was the only armed force, the political 
power of the Governors of States was most impor- 
tant, for they could deal with the State force as a 
whole, and appoint officers to it, up to a Major- 
General as State Commander-in-Chief, This enabled 
the Southern States to overpower small garrisons 
and seize army stores. In many States, though, the 
military value of the Militia was almost nil. The 
South made the great mistake of not appointing a 
Commander-in-Chief till their cause was hopeless ; 
and the North, after the retirement of General Scott, 



68 THE TWO SIDES 

who was old and infirm, were unfortunate in their 
selection till the arrival of Grant. McClellan would 
probably have done much better than Halleck, had 
he not made himself impossible. 

On the naval side matters were more in favour of the 
Union, because, though the Navy was at its lowest 
ebb, the Confederates had neither ships nor the means 
of building them, and the blockade increased their 
difficulties enormously. Both sides set to work at 
once : the North to rake in anything that would float 
and carry guns, to start the blockade till something 
better could be had ; the South to try to buy what 
they could abroad, though they set aside money to build 
or buy gunboats, probably at home. At first they could 
only find one steamer fit for a sea-going cruiser, which 
was commissioned as the " Sumter." Their home-built 
boats were poor things, what with green timber and 
very inferior power of making either engines or 
armour. To remedy these deficiencies, they sent an 
officer to England in May with very free powers to 
buy or build. They had more officers than they could 
find command for, but few men. The North was very 
short of both officers, men, and ships ; though there 
had been plenty of warning, the Navy Department had 
made no preparations for war, and had only twenty- 
four available steamers when it broke out, scattered all 
over the world. Their heavy smooth-bores were very 
effective against wooden ships, but only the smaller 
patterns of rifled guns were reliable. New types of 
vessels were wanted for the peculiar coast and river 
work, for which the fine heavy frigates were quite 
unfit, but the sloop-of-war class was most useful. 
Ironclads were started at once. 

As to finances, little need be said of those of the 
North, which were strong and in full working order; 
nothing had to be created in a hurry. The South, 
however, was very poor : her wealth consisted in her 
raw products, and if she could not realize these she 
was helpless ; the Northern manufacturers supplied 



\ 



\ 

SOUTHERN FINANCE 69 

her with everything, even tools. The principal 
security on which money could be raised abroad was 
cotton, but the difficulty was to get it there, for she 
had neither mercantile marine nor navy to protect it, 
or cover its formation, and open the Union blockade, 
which at first was weak. Messrs. Eraser, TrenJiolm, 
& Co., of Liverpool and Charleston, financed the 
Confederacy in Europe, and were in close touch with 
the Confederate agents. Though taxes were levied 
on other things, cotton was the basis of Confederate 
finance ; but a sounder one could have been made by 
taking more advantage of the resources of the country 
generally and establishing direct taxation (cf. pp. 96, 
249). That this was not done was probably due to 
the fact that the Cotton States seceded in a body, and 
may have settled their financial arrangements before 
the others joined them : the consequence was that, 
though they got through the first year well, the Con- 
federates had to resort to inflation to supply the calls 
on the Treasury as the War went on, without making 
provisions for a corresponding return. The new cur- 
rency was, of course, in paper redeemable in a given 
time in specie, which time was extended by the issue 
of new bonds at high nominal interest ; each new 
issue, therefore, brought depreciation. Internal taxa- 
tion was tried, but was so unpopular that it was almost 
universally dropped, and the States paid their quota 
of taxation by borrowing on their own credit, which 
only increased the total public debt. 

Politically, Lincoln's Cabinet was not over-strong 
at first, for he had to adapt an old-fashioned form of 
government to a new use, the exigencies of Civil 
War, the prospects of War at all having dropped out 
of sight in its methods of working; and he himself 
was almost untried as a statesman, having risen to 
fame as the great debater who had beaten Douglas. 
Those, however, who knew Lincoln believed in his 
shrewd sense, and trusted him for his uncompromis- 
ing honesty; otherwise he was little known, and the 



70 THE TWO SIDES 

outlook was not promising. The weakness of the 
end of Buchanan's Administration had produced dis- 
trust and distraction in the North, and the new 
Cabinet had not settled to its work when the storm 
burst. The new Ministers were : Vice-President, 
Mr. Hamlin ; Secretary of State, Mr. Seward ; War, 
Mr. Cameron ; Navy, Mr. Welles ; Treasury, Mr. 
Chase ; Interior, Mr. Smith ; Attorney-General, Mr. 
Bates ; Postmaster-General, Mr. Blair. At first it was 
suggested that it would be a good thing to have a 
bona fide Southerner in the Cabinet, and offers were 
made to several who belonged to seceded States; but 
the scheme fell through, and no wonder. A curious 
appointment was that of Mr. Cameron, of Pennsyl- 
vania, to be Secretary of War, for he was an old 
man, a pure politician, who knew nothing of military 
matters, put in to give his important State a seat in 
the Cabinet ; but this could surely have been done 
without assigning the most important place in it to 
an unfit man, when the Nation was about to fight for 
its life. Lincoln did not begin vigorously, except in 
his prompt proclamation of the blockade, and in his 
wise action in Kentucky (cf. p. 'jy\ His call for men 
for three months was almost childish, in the face of 
General Scott's strong warnings, and there was great 
delay and vacillation about the building of ships, 
especially ironclads, which were wanted immediately. 
General Scott, the Commander-in-Chief, was a source 
of weakness, as he was apt to mingle political with 
military advice (cf. p. 41). Though thoroughly loyal to 
the Union, he was a Virginian, and dealt with the 
possibility of political compromises; but he was an 
experienced soldier, who had fought against England 
in 181 2, and commanded in Mexico, and saw clearly 
the magnitude of the task, both as to time and force. 
None of the politicians did so, and, it seems, only 
Sherman among the soldiers. Lincoln's experience 
of war was confined to guerilla Indian warfare, and 
was perhaps harmful, as giving false notions. 



THE CONFEDERATE GOVERNMENT 71 

On the Southern side, although the Cabinet was not 
particularly strong, the President^ Jefferson Davis, was 
an able and moderate man and a well-trained statesman, 
on " public form," a much better man than Lincoln : 
he and his Vice-President, Alexander Stephens, were 
thought too slow by the extreme Secessionists, for 
they had both opposed Secession as long as possible. 
It was an open secret that Davis, with his military 
training and experience, hoped for a command in the 
field rather than a seat in the Cabinet, but he accepted 
the choice of the Confederacy as his duty. He was 
practically his own War Secretary, and to a great ex- 
tent the adviser on the military conduct of the War. 
Cooper, his senior general, is only mentioned as a 
purely departmental officer. Davis was thus over- 
burdened by undertaking too much, and seems to 
have been unable to give sufficient attention to his 
primary duty of politics, especially to his relations 
with foreign countries. His Cabinet consisted of : 
Secretary of State, Mr. Toombs ; War, General Walker; 
Navy, Mr. Mallory ; Treasury, Mr. Memminger ; 
Attorney-General, Mr. Benjamin ; Postmaster-General, 
Mr. Reagan. The President of the Confederate 
Congress was Mr. Cobb, who had been Secretary of 
the Treasury under Buchanan : why he could not have 
been kept to his own work seems curious ; but Davis' 
enemies — for, like all strong men, he had plenty — 
accused him of appointing non-entities to his Cabinet, 
so that he might have no rival. This is not quite so, 
for Mallory had been Chairman of the U.S. Committee 
of Naval Affairs, and knew his work; and Benjamin 
was a man of conspicuous ability, who settled in 
England after the War, and rose to eminence at the 
Bar there, in spite of his late start. 

It is curious that Davis, the champion of State 
Sovereignty and Non-intervention, should have 
brooked no State independence, but ruled the Con- 
federacy as a whole with a strong hand. Grant often 
refers in terms of admiration to the way in which all 



72 THE TWO SIDES 

were kept in line in the South, and any croaking or 
disloyalty sternly repressed, as of great advantage 
to their cause. Late in the War, Governor Brown of 
Georgia tried to assert State independence, but the 
result was only comic, and, personally, Lee was always 
a Virginian first, a Confederate after : his intense 
loyalty to his own State, to the exclusion of almost 
all other considerations, was not only a weak point in 
the conduct of the War as a whole, but even in the 
administration of his own army (cf. p. 196). Lee^s pro- 
vincialism was the one minor point in a very great 
character. 

Politically, the first object of the North was to pre- 
vent recognition of the Confederates as belligerents 
by foreign nations, as much as it was that of the South 
to gain it, as a de facto Government, at any rate. 
When the blockade was first established, the North 
took the line that it was m.erely a piece of internal 
control, which was no affair of outsiders ; but, though 
they never took this back in so many words, they had 
to abandon it in practice from the first, and carry on 
war as war, treating prisoners as prisoners of war, not 
as rebels, whatever they might call them. 

The military plan of the North was, first, to use 
their sea power to isolate the South, and then, in con- 
junction with the army, to work up and down the 
Mississippi from New Orleans and Cairo respectively, 
to meet and cut the Confederacy in two. There were 
thus two theatres of war. East and West, of which the 
latter was the more important in a military sense, 
the former in a political one. 

Davis saw as clearly as Lincoln that the question of 
sea power was vital to the South, and that he must 
not only try to break the blockade, but get ships to 
prey on the Northern commerce, which was both 
important and vulnerable, while the South had no 
commerce to attack. In answer to Lincoln's call for 
men, he offered letters of marque at sea, and this was 
answered by the blockade (cf. p. 98). The North were 



SOUTHERN POLICY 73 

furious, and raved about piracy, etc., which did little 
harm. Only a few letters of marque were issued, to 
small vessels along the coast ; the Confederate cruisers 
on the high seas were all regularly commissioned 
ships of war. 

The South had several courses open to them in the 
War: 

1. To try to win their independence directly by 
force of arms. It was necessary, however, that this 
be done fairly soon, if at all, unless they were able to 
raise the blockade. Their chance of doing this ended 
at Stone's River, or Murfreesboro, on December 31st, 
1862. 

2. To win recognition from foreign powers, so that 
they could accredit emissaries to them directly with a 
recognized diplomatic standing, and be able to con- 
clude treaties, raise loans, and perhaps form alliances, 
which might mean the co-operation of a naval force 
able to break the blockade and let in supplies, or even 
of allied troops. In the East the War was mainly 
political, and this was specially the business of Lee's 
army. Their real chance of this issue ended at 
Gettysburg, July 3rd, 1863, but a sort of chance 
occurred when the emissaries of the French (cf. p. 247), 
who were in Mexico, professed unbounded friendship ; 
but the object of it was too transparent, and, though 
they were then fighting with their backs to the wall, 
they would have none of it. 

3. Their third and last chance was to tire the North 
out, for, as General Grant clearly shows, the North, 
being much more democratic in their Government, 
were thus much more susceptible to popular feeling, 
which was getting so thoroughly weary, that if the 
War had been protracted for another year, or even, 
perhaps, if Lee had won a great victory in 1864, they 
would probably have let the South go. He thinks 
that the chance of this ended when Johnston was 
replaced by Hood, before Atlanta, July i8th, 1864. 



CHAPTER VI 

PREPARING FOR WAR, AND SPARRING FOR POSITION. 
MAY 20TH TO DECEMBER 3 1ST, 1861 

The American Civil War embraced such an enormous 
area that several distinct campaigns were generally 
going on at the same time in the different theatres 
of war, and the best way to deal with the difficulty 
appears to be to divide up the whole area into several 
smaller ones, counting the sea as one of them, and 
taking them seriatim, in the various periods into which 
the narration naturally falls, with cross-references 
chronologically : they are taken for the purpose of 
systematic description, and do not exactly correspond 
with any of the maps.^ They are : (i) East, (2) South- 
East, (3) West, (4) South, (5) South-West, (6) The Sea. 
The States between the Alleghanies and the Missis- 
sippi are generally called the Middle States now, but 
in the 'sixties they were called Western, and to retain 
this nomenclature will avoid confusion. The western 
border of No. i is that of the States of West Virginia 
and Virginia ; of No. 2, a line drawn north and south 
through Knoxville, Tennessee ; and that of Nos. 3 and 4 
a north and south line, running slightly to the west of 
Little Rock, Arkansas ; No. 5 is to the west of this line. 
Their northern borders are : 

1. The latitude of Harrisburg, Pennsylvania. 

2. The northern boundary of North Carolina. 

3. The latitude of Cincinnati, Ohio, to the longitude 
of Knoxville, Tennessee, thence north to the latitude 
of Harrisburg, and east to the Ohio. 

' Map I. 
74 



NAVAL PREPARATIONS 75 

4. The latitude of Guntersville, Alabama. 

5. The northern boundary of Arkansas. 

The southern border of Nos, 2, 4, and 5, is the Gulf 
of Mexico, No. 2 just taking in the north of Florida. 
There were no operations in the south of Florida. 

The business of providing ships, especially river 
gunboats, was immediately taken in hand, and the 
Union Government sent for Eads, the great engineer, 
from St. Louis, and in August gave him an order to 
build seven gunboats for service on the Mississippi in 
two months, and also convert a big snagboat into an 
ironclad, all of which were most efficient vessels ; but 
in the matter of sea-going ironclads the Government 
hesitated for months, finally ordering three of different 
designs, of which only the " Monitor " class was re- 
peated. 

The South began work on the half-burnt hull of 
the '* Mernmac" in the summer, on Brookes designs, 
and also got possession of a number of steamers on 
the Mississippi, some of which were protected, others 
more heavily armoured as " rams," for river service, 
but only the mail-steamer ** Habana " was found fit for 
a sea-going cruiser ; she was soon commissioned as 
the C.S.S. " Sumter.'' The Confederate agents sent to 
Liverpool, Major Htise of the army and Captain 
Bulloch of the navy, began purchasing stores and 
munitions of war at once, in co-operation with their 
financiers there, Messrs. Fraser, Trenholm & Co. By 
the end of June, Bulloch had laid the keel of the 
cruiser afterwards known as the " Florida,'' and on 
August ist he signed the contract for the building of 
the ^^ Alabama." Both, especially Bulloch, found great 
difficulty in keeping outside the provisions of the 
Foreign Enlistment Act, so as to give no pretext to 
the British Government for seizing either ships, 
armament, or stores. He therefore consulted a Liver- 
pool lawyer, the late Mr. Hull, who got the best 
opinions on this most difficult Act, and steered him 
through his legal troubles. The position, in short, 



76 MAY TO DECEMBER, 1861 

amounted to this : That it was no offence under the 
Act to equip a ship without the realm, or for any one 
to do so within it, provided that it was not to attack 
a friendly state. Any one might have a ship built 
within the kingdom, provided that she was not 
equipped there : equipping was the offence, not building} 
A shipbuilder had nothing to do with the use to which 
the ship he built was to be put, or with the trans- 
actions of his principals with other parties. In fine, 
" The Act was not intended to protect one belligerent 
from another, but to prevent prejudice to Great 
Britain herself by acts done within the kingdom 
which would endanger its peace and welfare." It has 
since been much altered (cf. pp. 478, 485). The Union 
side freely bought arms, etc., in England, and shipped 
them over (cf. p. 472), and also persuaded many men 
to emigrate, but did not enlist them till they reached 
New York, all of which they were perfectly entitled 
to do. The Confederates' difficulty was that they had 
no recognized diplomatic agents, as had the North, who 
could put pressure on the British Government. The 
British Proclamation of Neutrality was issued on 
May 14th, and caused great resentment among the 
more extreme politicians of the North, who looked 
on it as an unfriendly act, because it recognized the 
Confederates as de facto belligerents. This was 
curious, since President Jackson had issued a Pro- 
clamation of Neutrality when the Canadian rebellion 
of 1837 broke out (cf. p. 472). 

At home, the Confederacy began with some 15,000 
rifles and 150,000 old muskets, many of them useless, 
and hardly any powder or cartridges ; they took the 
machinery from the Armoury at Harper's Ferry to 
safer places. Some States had a few serviceable 
batteries, but there were none in the Arsenals. 
Richmond could make field guns at the Tredegar 
Iron Works, and other works soon began to learn 
how to do so, and to rifle existing smooth-bores. 
' Cf. pp. 471, 486. 



ORGANIZATION 77 

When started, the process of manufacture was steady, 
of guns and powder, mills being set up in various 
places, but the latter was not of uniform quality; the 
best arms and powder were imported. Eight arsenals 
and four depots were established and fitted with 
machinery in 1861, but the troops were very badly 
equipped, for arms did not really begin to come in 
till the end of the year. A Mining Department was 
organized to work the lead mines at Wytheville and 
provide raw material generally. The North, as we 
have seen, had plenty of materiel, and their manu- 
facturing powers were ample. 

Both sides were now converted into armed camps, 
men being raised and drilled everywhere. The first 
steps in higher organization in the North were taken 
by the State Governors, Captain McClellan being 
given the command of the State troops in Ohio by 
Governor Dennison, but General Scott soon put him 
in charge of the Military Department of the Ohio, 
the States of Ohio, Indiana, and Illinois, to which was 
added West Virginia, for the protection of the vital 
Baltimore and Ohio line. McClellan had served with 
credit in the army, and was afterwards superintendent 
of a railway, which had brought out his great organizing 
ability. In April, Secretary Cameron telegraphed to 
the Governor of Illinois to secure Cairo, the key of 
the western river system, which was promptly done, 
and instant measures were taken to- crush the 
Secession movement in Maryland, Baltimore being 
occupied by an armed force in May. This State 
required the closest supervision during 1861. Wash- 
ington was protected by seizing the Arlington Heights 
just across the Potomac, on May 24th, which were 
strongly fortified, completing the ring round the 
Capital. In Kentucky, Governor Magoffin tried to 
carry the State into Secession, and, failing in this, 
issued a proclamation of neutrality. Lincoln, how- 
ever, acted promptly and wisely, and sent good 
officers there (cf. pp. 70, 481), who took military steps. 



78 MAY TO DECEMBER, 1861 

established a training camp, and created a feeling of 
security amongst Unionists, while Magoffin was still 
dabbling with politics, the time for which had gone 
by. In many places both sides were actively re- 
cruiting and drilling, but sensibly agreed not to 
molest each other at this stage. In Missouri, Blair 
and Lyon, having prevented the Secession of the 
State, were preparing to follow up their success. 

Lincoln soon saw the mistake of three months' 
service, and on May 13th called for 42,000 Volunteers, 
22,000 Regulars, and 18,000 Sailors, for three years 
or the duration of the War. General Scott said 
plainly that the short-service men would only be 
fit for garrison duty, lines of communication, and 
the defence of the military frontier close to Washing- 
ton, while larger schemes such as the opening of 
the Mississippi must wait till a better-trained Army 
was ready, and a Navy to act with it. The Union 
side were merely raising men, and gave little thought 
to adequate provision for the command of their armies 
when raised, for they put officers over the various 
bodies of troops as formed. Soon, however, they 
made four Major-Generals, next in rank to General 
Scott— McClellan, Fremont, Banks, and Halleck. Much 
more thought was given to this in the South, who 
set to work to form a Regular Army throughout, 
with proper seniority among its higher officers. 
These were told that the seniority of the old Service 
would still hold good, and five full Generals were 
gazetted on August 31st, with seniority as follows: 
Samuel Cooper^ May i6th; Sidney Johnston, May 28th; 
R. E. Lee, June 14th ; Joseph Johnston, July 4th ; 
G. T. Beauregard, July 21st. This caused serious 
friction, for, though none of them had held sub- 
stantive rank above Colonel in the old Service, both 
the Johnstons had been Brigadier-Generals in a way, 
Sidney Johnston acting with troops without nominal 
YSiuk, Joseph Johnston ranking as temporary Brigadier- 
General while holding the Staff appointment of 



FRICTION ABOUT RANK 79 

Quarter-Master-General in Buchanan's Government. 
He claimed that by virtue of this temporary rank 
he was senior officer, accused Jefferson Davis of in- 
tentionally slighting him, and attacked him bitterly. 
General Taylor, a great friend of both, tried vainly 
to heal the breach, but says that Johnston was in 
the wrong, for it was the rule of the old Service 
that Staff rank did not count as seniority for pro- 
motion, only substantive rank, and that this rule had 
been strictly kept. Others also had grievances : 
Bragg had left the Army owing to a quarrel with 
Davis in 1856, which still rankled, and Beauregard 
was also said to be dissatisfied. All this looks as 
if the charge of vindictiveness made against Davis 
had some truth ; but Bragg was a notoriously quarrel- 
some man. These differences are only mentioned 
here on account of their very serious effect on the 
conduct of the whole War. It is very curious that 
the senior officer on the Northern side was a 
Virginian ; on the Southern, a New Yorker. 

On the Northern side, McClellan was appointed 
Commander-in-Chief on October 31st, on the re- 
tirement of General Scott. The District commands 
were held by the following : 

Department of the Ohio, General Buell. 
Department of Missouri, General Halleck. 
At Port Royal, General T. W. Sherman. 
In the South- West, General Butler. 

McClellan's plans were to strike at Richmond and 
Nashville, with some secondary moves. He him- 
self would march into Virginia ; Buell, in eastern 
Kentucky, was to secure that district, relieve eastern 
Tennessee, and then turn on Nashville; Halleck to 
look after the troublesome State of Missouri, western 
Kentucky, and Tennessee ; Burnside to occupy the 
coast of South Carolina ; T. W. Sherman to seize 
Savannah, and prepare to regain Charleston ; Butler 
to attempt the recovery of New Orleans and the 



8o MAY TO DECEMBER, 1861 

lower Mississippi. These strokes were to be delivered 
simultaneously ; but McClellan delayed too long, and 
in the meanwhile the Confederates had won the 
action of Ball's Bluff on the Potomac, a little above 
Washington, and had blocked the lower river with 
batteries. Lincoln wanted to move against Richmond 
via Centreville and Occoquan Creek, and a Joint 
Committee of Congress was appointed to inquire 
into the conduct of the War. 

In the middle of 1861 occurred the first signs of 
the interference of Napoleon III in Mexico, in the 
communications with Mr. Seward about joint inter- 
ference in that country (cf p. 245). (Continued on 
p. 104.) 

The East 

During May,^ the Confederates had erected some 
batteries on the coast, and in the creeks and river 
mouths, which occasionally exchanged shots with 
the Union gunboats, since Lee's policy, as commander 
in Virginia, was rather to block the Potomac than 
take Baltimore, as the wilder spirits urged, and to 
hold Manassas Junction against the base which the 
North had seized at Alexandria. The commander 
there also drew his attention to the strategical im- 
portance of the junction with the railway from the 
Shenandoah Valley, which was at this time thought 
to be of primary importance, being a great food- 
producing district not worked by slave labour, with 
a large white population enthusiastically Southern 
in feeling. It was bounded by mountain ranges, and 
of a size which could be held by a medium force; 
it lay between the main portion of Virginia and 
West Virginia, just across the mountains ; but West 
Virginia was strongly Unionist, and had formed itself 
into a provisional State, repudiating the authority 
of the Governor of Virginia. If therefore the North 
could control the Valley, not only would the Con- 

' W. Camp Jackson, Mo., May loth. 



CONTROL OF THE VALLEY 8i 

federates be deprived of a district from which they 
drew large supplies of both men and food, but of 
an excellent line of attack, and, further, West Virginia 
would be cut off, which would be a first step in 
General Scott's policy of severing from the Con- 
federacy one district after another, till it fell.^ Harper's 
Ferry, at the mouth of the Shenandoah, was supposed 
to be of immense strength and great strategical 
importance, and even Lee., who knew it well, seems to 
have shared this view ; but when, after being seized 
by the Confederates in April, Joseph Johnston was 
ordered to hold it against any attempt at recapture 
by a force under Patterson, his trained judgment 
instantly apprised it at its true value, and he reported 
to Davis that to make it safe would take many more 
men than it was worth, with the certainty of heavy 
loss if attacked, and obtained permission to retire 
up the Valley to Winchester. 

Johnston's opponent, Patterson, was a veteran of 
the Mexican War, with a creditable record, but too 
old for active service. He was ordered to guard 
Washington from an attack via Harper's Ferry and 
cover the Baltimore and Ohio Railway, to which was 
afterwards added the duty of holding Johnston fast in 
the Valley. McDowell was appointed to command 
the force for the defence of the Capital, and hold 
fast troops which might go to strengthen yo/i;;5/o;?, at 
this time, a role secondary to Patterson's. Other 
forces on both sides were a small one under Butler, 
based on Fort Monroe in the Peninsula of Virginia, 
opposed by Magruder, who, with smaller numbers, 
ably handled, beat him in a skirmish at Big Bethel 
on June loth,^ and a Confederate force under Huger 
(pronounced Hugee), guarding the south bank of the 
James, by Norfolk Navy Yard. A Union train under 
Schenck was ambushed at Vienna on June 17th. ^ 

When Richmond became the Confederate Capital, 

' Cf. p. 87. * E. Philippi, W. Va., June 3rd. 

^ W. Boonville, Mo., June 17th. 

6 



82 MAY TO DECEMBER, 1861 

however, on June ist, the strategical balance changed 
entirely ; Manassas became of primary importance as 
the approach to it, and was reinforced, Beauregard 
being sent to take command, while McDowell's role 
was changed from defensive to offensive. He told 
General Scott that he could manage Beauregard if 
Johnston were held off, and was promised that this 
should be done, Patterson being ordered to hold the 
latter fast, or at all events to neutralize any move he 
might make, by following close on his heels. The 
small Confederate successes had been made the most 
of, and they were confident, while the North were 
rather depressed, and badly wanted a success on their 
side to counterbalance them. 

On the Confederate side, the military operations 
were directed by Davis, with advice from Cooper and 
Lee, not an ideal arrangement — any one of them could 
have done better. Beauregard was kept well informed 
of McDowell's movements by his agents in Washing- 
ton, so bided his time confidently ; and Johnston, who 
had retired to Winchester before Patterson's much 
stronger force, was watching him closely, and covering 
the Manassas Gap Railway. With Davis' consent, 
Beauregard had arranged a plan of joint action with 
Johnston, that the latter should join him on the field if 
McDowell advanced. As the time for the move drew 
nearer,^ Scott reiterated his orders to Patterson to act 
vigorously, and hold his opponent fast by an attack, 
but he kept asking for reinforcements to enable him to 
do so (though he had 18,000 men \.o Johnston' s 9,000 or 
10,000), hesitating, and calling councils of war. A 
Southern lady living in Washington informed Beau- 
regard the moment McDowell moved, and he warned 
Johnston. This army at Manassas was the only one 
that the Confederates ever called the Anny of the 
Potomac, and was some 22,000 strong, with 27 guns. 
Johnston brought with him 8,000 or 9,000 men of his 
Army of the Shenandoah, with 20 guns, and McDowell's 

' E. Rich Mountain, W. Va., July nth. 



BEFORE BULL RUN 83 

command was from 30,000 to 33,000 strong, with 49 
sruns. It seems that reinforcements were sent to 
Patterson at the List minute, which, had they gone to 
McDowell, would have turned the scale, and that, 
when Johnston slipped away, he left 22,000 Union 
troops idle, "observing" the 1,000 or 1,500 Confede- 
rates remaining to bluff them under the brilliant 
Magrudcr, who carried out his task to perfection. 
This large force was no danger to the Confederacy, 
and had to retreat as the result of the battle of Bull 
Run. It is but fair to Patterson to say that the loss 
of men from the termination of their three months' 
service was a very serious difficulty, which also 
affected McDowell to a less extent, in the very 
presence of the enemy. 

McDowell's plan of battle was to turn the enemy's 
left, force him from his position, and break the 
Manassas Gap Railway — that is, cut him off from 
Gainesville on his left rear, which would prevent /o/z/^- 
stons troops from joining ; but the Confederates made 
haste, while he delayed, wasted several days, and made 
a useless reconnaissance in force against the Con- 
federate left at Blackburn's Ford, which brought on a 
bigger action than he intended, and, before the main 
battle was ioM^X., Johnston had arrived with half his 
army. This action unduly depressed the one side and 
elated the other, but, while it made Beauregard expect 
a frontal attack, it showed McDowell that this would 
not do, for his adversary was well posted behind a 
small stream, which had difficult banks in places. 
Two Union divisions were to make a wide turning- 
movement round the Confederate left, with Tyler's 
strong division to threaten this part of their line in 
front and hold it fast, at first by a demonstration only. 
A sufficient force was left to hold the Confederates 
to their main position along the stream, and was to 
try to prevent them from sending help to their left, 
when turned. 

On the other side, Johnston took command as senior 



84 MAY TO DECEMBER, 1861 

officer, but adopted Beauregard's plan, to make a 
converging attack on Centreville, McDowell's base, 
and crush him before Patterson could come up. 
McDowell, however, spoilt their plan by attacking 
first. Their left was very weak, and, when the turning 
movement was discovered, the danger was imminent, 
for half of Johnstoiis army was not up, and the attack 
was aimed at the most vulnerable point; but the officer 
commanding the extreme left. Colonel Evans, was an 
able man, and took perhaps the boldest and most 
effective step of the whole War to meet the danger. 
He soon recognized that Tyler, with all his strength, 
would not use it at this time (though his orders were 
to make a strong demonstration), while the stopping of 
the turning column at a distance was of vital import- 
ance, to let the expected reinforcements come up and 
give them room to act. Although he commanded but 
two battalions (of ten companies each) and two guns, 
he left four companies only to face Tyler, and moved 
away with the rest to strike at the coming column, 
sending word of what he was doing to the senior 
officer commanding the left of the line. Of course he 
could not, with his tiny force, stop the enemy, but he 
delayed them seriously on Matthews Hill, while a 
strong Confederate line was being formed on the 
Henry Hill, about a mile in rear. To gain a little 
more time, a brigade and a battery were sent to his 
support, but at last this weak line was forced back, 
and Tyler also began to move, on the flank. The new 
line on Henry Hill was not ready when the Union 
batteries opened fire from Matthews Hill, and the 
bringing back of the troops from that advanced position 
caused much confusion ; but all were rallied, and the 
line formed, under cover of the inflexible steadiness of 
Jackson's brigade, which earned him his nickname of 
" Stonewalir 

During the morning, the Confederate generals had 
had several pieces of information : first, that their 
own attack on Centreville was late in starting ; next, 



BATTLE OF BULL RUN 85 

that McDowell had been too quick for them, and was 
attacking ; and then, when they essayed to change 
their plan, and turn his left, holding on with their 
own, that the Union attack was so serious that they 
would want every man they had to stop it. They 
instantly took up the new conditions so as to bring 
every available man to the critical point, where 
Beauregard took charge, Johnston directing the whole 
battle. Some fresh men came up from Richmond to 
strengthen the line on the front of Henry Hill, but 
after a while it was forced back to the rear crest : it 
had now become evident that McDowell was throwing 
his whole weight in here, and that nothing was to be 
feared from his left, so the right and centre were 
denuded to the utmost, only making a small demon- 
stration, while every man who could be spared went 
to the left. McDowell's task became more difficult, 
for, having before had the advantage of thick ground, 
he now had to attack across the open at close quarters, 
which was not in favour of his rifled guns, as against 
smooth-bores. Two of his batteries were pushed 
forward, and wrecked by the Confederate fire, a 
furious fight took place round them, the Confederate 
reserves came up from their right, and Kirby Smith's 
brigade, from the railway, attacked the Union flank : 
this turned the scale, and the Union troops were 
driven off the hill. McDowell formed a new line on 
the other side of Young's Branch, but now to stave 
off defeat, no longer to win : the Confederates ad- 
vanced against it in front, while Early's brigade, 
from reserve, which had marched round, struck it in 
flank : the battle was won, and McDowell's men 
finally broke and retreated. At first they moved in 
good order, followed only by artillery fire, but on 
reaching Cub Run the retreat degenerated into panic, 
and they never stopped till they reached Washington, 
twenty miles away. The officer commanding the 
Union left had been able to stop the Confederate 
demonstration there, but troops were sent back to 



86 MAY TO DECEMBER, 1861 

the base at Centreville in error, where the reserve 
lay idle, under a worse than incompetent commander, 
while the battle was being lost for want of it. 

Each side had about 18,000 men engaged, the 
Unionists 24 guns, the Confederates 21. Union loss, 
460 killed, 1,124 wounded, 1,312 missing— total 2,896. 
Confederate loss, 387 killed, 1,582 wounded, 13 missing, 
total 1,982. 

There was no general pursuit, for the winners were 
as much demoralized by victory as the losers by 
defeat, both sides being composed of raw troops 
with little discipline. But for this, McDowell's plan, 
which was good, might have succeeded ; some think 
that Johnston, with a brigade of regulars, could have 
marched to Washington, which was panic-stricken. 

The action of the commanders on both sides is 
worth noting : Major-General McDowell, a major in 
the old army, remembered the Major, but forgot the 
General, and went forward into the thick of the fight, 
where he was only in the way of his subordinates, 
and could not control the battle or look after his 
reserves, of which he had plenty idle ; while the 
Johnston-Beauregard combination was most happy, 
for they took their places so as to direct the battle 
to the best advantage : their correct insight into the 
dispositions of the enemy, and free use of reserves, 
are extremely instructive. 

Thus ended the first great collision. The North 
settled down for a long war, the three months' service, 
just expiring, was changed to three years' service, and 
Congress took powers to raise half a million men : 
military operations practically ceased for a time. 
McClellan was sent for from West Virginia to take 
command, and commanded the Union Army of the 
Potomac from July 27th to October 31st, Muring which 
time he raised its strength to 134,000 men. Patterson 

' W. Wilson's Creek, Mo., August roth. 
S.E. Fort Hatteras, N.C., August 28th, 29th, 
S. Head of the Passes, October 12th. 



WEST VIRGINIA 87 

was not employed again. On the Confederate side, 
Johnston established himself at Manassas, but the 
people thought the War over, and crowds left his 
army. In answer to his appeals for reinforcements, 
to cross into Maryland in rear of Washington, Presi- 
dent Davis replied that men were wanted everywhere, 
and he could not send any.^ 

WEST VIRGINIA 

(Continued from p. 81.) West Virginia lies mostly 
in the watershed of the Ohio, and gravitated gener- 
ally to the State of that name in feeling, except on 
the lower Shenandoah. The first operations after 
the declaration of war took place here, where the 
people had formed a provisional Union State. This 
was a most important fact for the North, for their 
great strategical railway ran through it, special 
points of which, such as bridges and tunnels, might 
easily be broken. Lee had said that the destruction 
of Cheat River bridge would be worth an army to 
his side. Another main line of transit was the valley 
of the Great Kanawha River, 

Both sides sent officers into this district, to gain 
control and raise men, Colonel Kelley at Wheeling, and 
Colonel Porterfield at Beverly. The latter promptly 
attacked the railway, to protect which, McClellan, in 
whose district West Virginia had been placed, sent a 
small force, and Porterfield retired to Philippi, where 
he was surprised and routed on June 3rd : ^ this action 
had the greatest political value, for it reassured the 
waverers in the district which the Confederates had 
overrun, more than three-quarters of West Virginia. 
The Union force was strengthened to protect Union- 
ists better, and put down Secession ; the Con- 
federates sent Generals Garnett and Wise to repair 

' W. Belmont, Mo.. November 7th. 

The " Trent " affair, November 8th. 
S.E. Port Royal, S.C., November 7th. 
* W. Boonville, Mo., June 17th, 



88 MAY TO DECEMBER, 1861 

their loss, on which McClellan took the command 
himself, and drove them from the mountain passes 
which they were holding at Laurel Hill and Rich 
Mountain, on July loth and nth. Part of their force 
surrendered, while Garnett fought a rear-guard 
action at Carrick's Ford, on the Cheat River, in 
which he was killed and his trains lost. These little 
campaigns had great military and political results, 
that of Rich Mountain being decisive, for, though 
operations went on for some time longer under 
Rosecrans, after McClellan went to Washington, the 
Confederates, even under Lee, never regained the 
ground lost, and the year ended with their being 
forced out of the great Kanawha Valley, leaving the 
new State controlled by the Union side. (Continued 
on p. 105.) 

The South-East 

It will be as well to deal here with the combined 
military and naval operations in the district, on the 
coast, and the inland waters, leaving purely naval 
matters, such as the Blockade, to a separate division. 

^The first was the expedition against the coast of 
North Carolina, under General Butler and Admiral 
Stringham, at the end of August, which took and 
occupied Forts Hatteras and Clark, at Cape Hatteras, 
and gained the command of the best sea entrance to 
North Carolina waters. In September, the officer left 
in command found that the Confederates were forti- 
fying positions in his front, asked for reinforcements, 
and was able to hold his own. To improve the ad- 
vantage, and drive back the Confederates, who were 
still threatening. General Burnside and Admiral 
Goldsborough were ordered to get ready another 
combined expedition, and were ready to sail at the 
end of the year with three brigades and over twenty 
gunboats and armed steamers. 

On the Atlantic coast, the Blockade v/as in the 

' Map 59, p. 390, 



THE PORT ROYAL EXPEDITION 89 

difficult position of having no good harbour for a base, 
and Captain Dupont suggested a combined expedition 
to seize one, preferably the excellent harbour of Fort ^ 
Royal in South Carolina, between Charleston and 
Savannah, which commanded the inner waters con- 
necting them. General T. W. Sherman, the brother 
of the more famous W. T. Sherman, was directed, 
with Dupont, to organize an expedition of 12,000 
men, and keep its destination a strict secret. They 
sailed from Hampton Roads on October 29th,^ but 
their fleet was caught in a gale and suffered severely, 
not reaching the blockading fleet off Charleston till 
November 3rd.^ Here definite orders were received 
but the Confederates had got wind of the expedition, 
and were ready for it. Port Roj^al Heads were 
guarded by two forts and by a few small gunboats 
under the gallant old Commodore Tattnall. The 
Union fleet consisted of two steam frigates, four 
sloops, three steam, one sailing, and three gunboats 
in the main line, and five gunboats in the flanking 
line, specially detailed to watch Tattnall and protect 
the transports. The fleet passed slowly, firing on 
both forts, while the flankers kept off the enemy's 
gunboats; then the main line turned, coming round 
again close to the larger fort. Walker, and silencing 
it. The Confederates evacuated it, and a landing- 
party ran up the Stars and Stripes. Soon after, the 
other fort was found to be empty. Fort Walker was 
very well constructed, and the two mounted 52 guns, 
some very heavy. As the expedition advanced inland 
up the rivers, the Confederates burnt and abandoned 
everything, and Port Royal Harbour, the best on the 
coast, was taken. This made it possible to maintain an 
effective blockage within the entrances of the whole 
coast from Charleston to Cape Florida, except at 

' Map 33, p. 232. 

* S. Head of the Passes, October 12th. 

' W. Belmont, Mo., November 7th. 

The '• Trent" affair, November 8th. 



90 MAY TO DECEMBER, 1861 

Fernandina, besides making a base for the sea-going 
squadron. The army made a strong camp at Fort 
Walker, and secured the country round the harbour, 
which the Confederates planned to retake ; but Sher- 
man heard of it, and asked Dupont for a naval con- 
tingent to act with him, with which he drove them in 
on January ist, 1862. 

Lee was put in command of the Department of South 
Carolina^ Georgia, and Florida, in November, and set 
to work vigorously to plan and erect coast defences, 
to shut in Port Royal, and protect Charleston and 
Savannah (cf. p. 125). Speaking generally, this line 
from Winyaw Bay, S.C, to St. Mary's River, pro- 
tected the most valuable agricultural section of the 
South, and the principal line of communication be- 
tween the Mississippi and the Potomac, till Sherman's 
March to the Sea took it in rear, and broke the back 
of the Confederacy. (Continued on p. 123.) 

The West 
(Continued from p. 52.) As soon as General Harney 
was disposed of in Missouri, Lyon and Blair acted 
vigorously. Some amiable people, who dreamed of 
neutrality for the State, sought to make a truce 
between Lyon and Price, now commanding the Con- 
federates ; but Lyon ended the meeting by an un- 
qualified assertion of the authority of the United 
States, and immediately moved against Price and 
Governor Jackson, who fled via Jefferson City to 
Boonville, where, on June i/th,^ he attacked and dis- 
persed their troops.^ Though but a skirmish in 
magnitude, this action was most important, for it dealt 
a blow at the power of Secession in the State from 
which it never recovered, and secured the Union men 
in northern Missouri. Price retreated to the south- 
west, and joined McCidloch, from Arkansas ; he also 
hoped to have had the help of Hardee, in northern 
Arkansas, but this was not given. Sigel, one of 

' E. Philippi, W. Va., June 3rd. '' Map 22, p. 166. 



BATTLE OF WILSON'S CREEK 91 

Lyon's lieutenants, attacked Price at Carthage, but 
was driven in, on which Lyon moved on Springfield. 
On July 9th, ^ Major-General Fremont was put in 
command of the Department, and approved of Lyon's 
plans. Meanwhile, on the other side, McCuUoch, a 
brave but insubordinate man, not the equal of Price 
as a soldier, refused to serve under him, and Price, to 
save friction, let him take command. They had some 
10,000 men, and Lyon moved against them from 
Springfield with about 6,000, but better organized : 
he adopted the extremely risky plan of trying to 
surprise them with simultaneous attacks in front and 
rear, but these were badly timed ; Sigel's in rear was 
beaten, and Lyon's in front hard pressed, Lyon him- 
self being killed while bringing up his reserves. This 
was the battle of Wilson's Creek, on August loth. 
General Sturgis took command, and retreated to the 
north of the State, while Price, who resumed command 
of the Confederates, reoccupied Springfield, and took 
Lexington on September 20th. 

On the Mississippi, Pillow had warned President 
Davis in June of the danger of the Union forces 
opening up the river, and wanted to move forward 
to seize Columbus, Kentucky ; but Davis did not wish 
" to force Kentucky's neutrality," and refused per- 
mission. When Polk, however, took command, on 
July 4th, he seized and fortified Columbus, Hickman, 
and other places, rather at random, and also planned 
and began Forts Henry and Donelson. Kentucky 
answered by appointing General Anderson, of Sumter 
fame, to command her militia, thus, at last, taking the 
Union side as a State. Polk had Pillow, Hardee, and 
Thompson under him, whose commands amounted to 
over 12,000 men, and he planned to seize Cape 
Girardeau, between St. Louis and Cairo, then take 
Cairo, and sweep southern Missouri, but Fremont 
was warned in time, and sent Grant from Jefferson 

' E. Rich Mountain, W. Va., July iith. 
E. Bull Run, Va., July 2 1 St. 



92 MAY TO DECEMBER, 1861 

City to take it, and assume command of south-eastern 
Missouri and southern Illinois, with headquarters at 
Cairo. He carried out his orders, but heard on reach- 
ing Cairo ^ that Polk was moving to seize Paducah, 
at the mouth of the Tennessee, marched at once, 
and forestalled him again ; he then seized the ground 
at the mouth of the Cumberland, and that opposite 
Cairo, fortifying all three positions during September.* 

At St. Louis, the Confederates, elated by the success 
of Bull Run, made head so much that Fremont felt 
that he must take strong measures, and at the end 
of August issued the famous proclamation that the 
property of " persons in rebellion against the United 
States " would be confiscated, and their slaves set free. 
He never consulted his Government before doing this, 
and embarrassed them very much (cf. p. 147), since 
they were elected on a Union, not an Abolitionist, 
platform, the result being that he was recalled on 
November 2nd, and Hunter sent to succeed him. 
Fremont had been collecting a force of 40,000 men 
to disperse Price's army, and then turn on the Con- 
federates all along the river, and roll them up, an 
ambitious programme. With this force he was on 
the point of bringing Price to action near Wilson's 
Creek, when Hunter arrived, took command, and re- 
treated without fighting. A week later. General 
Halleck came to take command of the Department, 
Missouri and Illinois, to which was now added 
Kentucky as far as the Cumberland River. 

Previous to this, Grant, who was ordered to prevent 
the Confederates detaching troops to help Price^ took 
a brigade, with two guns and a few cavalry, and 
moved from Cairo to Belmont, opposite Columbus, 
making a strong reconnaissance, which drew all 
attention to himself. He drove Pillow in, but when 
Polk came up was almost surrounded, but succeeded 
in getting back to his boats. He had also sent a small 

' S.E. Fort Hatteras, N.C., August 28th, 29th. 
'•^ S. Head of the Passes, October 12th. 



THE CONFEDERATE POSITION 93 

expedition along the west bank, which was protected 
by this action ; he took two guns and some prisoners, 
and brought 3,000 men into action against 7,000. The 
Confederates lost heavily in this sharp fight, which 
gave great confidence to Grant's command, and was 
fought on November 7th. ^ 

On the Confederate side, General Sidney Johnston 
had been put in command of Department No. 2, the 
States of Tennessee, Arkansas, Kentucky, Missouri, 
Kansas, the country to the west, and the western 
half of Mississippi, on September 15th, and at once 
set to work to deal with the situation as a whole. 
Since Grant had seized the mouths of the Tennessee 
and Cumberland Rivers, it was more than ever urgent 
to close these vital avenues against the Union side, 
and so the construction of Forts Henry and Donelson 
was hurried on, and that of Fort Heiman, opposite 
Fort Henry, begun. Here the rivers are within twelve 
miles of each other, giving a very short defensive 
line. Bnckner, in middle, and Zollicoffer, in eastern 
Tennessee, had, before this, been collecting troops to 
advance into Kentucky, by Johnstons orders, the 
former seizing and fortifying Bowling Green, the 
latter Cumberland Gap, the gate of eastern Kentucky. 
Johnston's line thus extended from the Mississippi to 
the Cumberland Mountains, Polk's command being 
on the river, Buckner's in the centre, Zollicoffer' s in 
the mountains, on the right. Both of the two latter 
had advanced farther, but had to fall back, but in 
November Zollicoffer advanced to Mill Springs and 
entrenched himself there. 

The dispositions on Johnston's right seem feeble, 
for Cumberland Gap was not only the base for this 
flank, covering that of his main attacking position 
at Bowling Green, but was in itself a most important 
strategical position commanding east Kentucky and 
West Virginia, and covering the Confederate com- 

' S.E. Port Royal, S.C, November 7th. 

The " Trent" affair, November 8th. 



94 MAY TO DECEMBER, 1861 

munications between Richmond and Chattanooga also. 
Being the gate of the mountains, it enabled troops 
to be transferred from one side to the other. This 
district therefore should have been entrusted to a 
good force, not too local in composition, under a 
carefully selected officer, instead of to two small local 
ones of inferior quality, commanded by inferior men, 
for Zollicoffer^ though brave and active, was a pure 
civilian, appointed for local reasons, and the position 
of Crittenden, his military adviser, a false one, while 
Marshall, the other, a good soldier theoretically, was 
physically unfit for active service, and so extremely 
democratic in his notions that he could maintain no 
discipline. He was not even under Johnston's orders, 
but had been sent from Richmond, and was based on 
Virginia. This position was a striking instance of 
the way in which the Confederate cause suffered by 
the lack of a Commander-in-Chief, to bring all forces 
properly into combination. 

The Union Departments were re-organized on 
November 9th, Halleck succeeding Fremont at St, 
Louis, his command reaching to the Cumberland 
River, and Buell taking Kentucky to the east of it, 
with Ohio, Indiana, Michigan, and Tennessee. Prices 
troops in central Missouri were much scattered, so 
Halleck sent Pope against him, who broke up a 
number of these detachments, on which Price retired. 
At the end of the year. General Curtis came to com- 
mand the Army of the South-West. 

Buell was Johnstons immediate opponent, and his 
instructions were to strike at Knoxville, behind Cum- 
berland Gap, and at the important Confederate com- 
munications there ; but he submitted an alternative to 
McClellan, to move the main column up the Tennessee 
and Cumberland Rivers, at Nashville join another 
moving by the east of Bowling Green, occupy the 
Confederates there and at Columbus with demonstra- 
tions, till their positions were turned, and not con- 
centrate or give a sign till all was ready. He rightly 



UNION PLANS AND MOVES 95 

laughed at the idea of any danger from an advance of 
Biickner or Zollicoffer^ for they were not the men, and 
had not the means, to make one ; but had Johnston 
been able to concentrate a good striking force in 
Bnckner's rear, things would have been very different. 
Sherman thought this danger very real indeed, and 
says that in October the Confederates could have 
walked into Louisville, the Union base. Buell's plan 
seems faulty because the North had not at that time 
enough men so placed as to make it feasible, and it 
would have required a re-arrangement of the com- 
mands; he also wasted time in arguing by letter. 
McClellan's looks better adapted to the circumstances, 
for Sherman was quite able to watch Biickner and 
Hardee, in his front ; while Buell, by concentrating to 
the left, could probably have swept Zollicoffer away, 
and seized Knoxville. 

The actual operations were : Schoepf was opposing 
Zollicoffer, and Buell ordered Thomas to join him, 
take command, and drive Zollicoffer out of the State ; 
Nelson had been on the Big Sandy River with a small 
force, and had had some success, but when he was 
moved, the Confederate force there was put under 
Marshall and strengthened ; Buell ordered Garfield 
to drive Marshall away, and he moved forward on 
December 23rd. Several campaigns were thus starting 
at the end of the year, here and in Missouri. 

On the Mississippi some gunboats were improvised 
before the end of the year, and some Union iron- 
clads delivered; but they were hardly used before the 
beginning of 1862. (Continued on p. 125.) 

The South and South-West 

In the South the only action was naval. On 
October 12th the Union fleet attempted to enter the 
Mississippi, but were attacked by a Confederate ram 
at the Head of the Passes and driven down to sea 
again ; the ram also was injured, and broke down. 



96 MAY TO DECEMBER, 1861 

Nothing definite was done here till Farragut came. 
Besides this, there were a few minor attacks 
and landings in various places.^ (Continued on 

P- I35-) 

In the South-West only a few skirmishes took place, 
and the evacuation of the United States posts in New 
Mexico and Arizona, in consequence of the ** Tiviggs 
surrender," was completed, under pressure from the 
Confederate local forces. In July, Davis ordered 
General Sibley to organize an expedition, to be self- 
supporting, and to secure the forts, etc., in that dis- 
trict, as a base from which to seize California and 
treat with Juarez, then in great straits, for the purchase 
of the northern provinces of Mexico (cf pp. 60, 249). 
Sibley, who knew the country, informed him that this 
proposition would be favourably considered. With 
the control of this great gold and silver-producing 
district, the Confederate finances might be put on a 
sound basis. At the end of the year Sibley was ready 
to start from Texas. On the other side. General 
Canby was appointed to command the New Mexico 
district in November, with orders to recover it. 
(Continued on p. 138.) 

Naval 

The two main plans of the Union Government for 
the conduct of the War involved the co-operation of 
the Navy. The first was the opening up of the Missis- 
sippi by the combined military and naval forces, so 
as to cut the Confederac}^ in two ; the second to close 
all the Confederate ports by blockade, and starve 
out the enemy. After the reverse of October 12th 
a naval expedition was organized against New 
Orleans and its forts, a number of mortar-boats being 
especially built for it. 

> S.E. Port Royal, S.C, November 7th. 
W. Belmont, Mo., November 7th. 

The " Trent " affair, November 8th. 



AFFAIRS AT SEA 97 

THE BLOCKADE 

The task of blockading some 3,000 miles of coast 
with only thirty-five ships — all that were then avail- 
able — was impracticable, in the sense that a blockade, 
to be binding, must be effective. It was kept up in 
a few places at first, being only formal in others, till 
there was force at disposal to make it real. Wherever 
practicable a lodgment was effected on land, which 
greatly relieved the blockading squadrons. 

The liability of neutral vessels depends on their 
knowledge of the blockade ; so that, while formal 
warning was given at first, and the first captures 
released, knowledge was presumed later on. Liability 
begins with the act of sailing for a port known to be 
blockaded, therefore an intermediate one was soon 
used ; but this device, as also those of transference of 
cargo, etc., where the intention was plain, was found 
out and frustrated. Still, many vessels got through, 
and the trade of Nassau, Bermuda, and Matamoros 
(Mexico) increased enormously. (Continued on p. 139.) 



THE WAR AT SEA 

At sea the principal operations were those of the 
C.S.S. " Sumter^'' which was altered from mail steamer 
to cruiser at New Orleans in April and May, and 
sailed from the Mississippi early in July, under the 
command of Captain Semmes} She was chased by the 
U.S.S. " Brooklyn," but escaped, and raided the West 
Indian and Atlantic waters for six months, took fifteen 
prizes, and reached Gibraltar in January, 1862. Here, 
being closely watched by the Northern navy, and 
unable to refit, she was laid up, and finally sold. Her 
career, therefore, belongs entirely to the year 1861. A 
few small vessels took out Davis' letters of marque 

' E. Bull Run, Va., July 2 1st. 



98 MAY TO DECEMBER, i86t 

(cf. p. 72), and some were taken, their officers and men 
being sent to New York for trial as pirates. On this, 
Davis wrote to Lincoln, on July 6th, saying that, if 
they were treated in this way, he should be compelled 
to do the same to a similar number of Union prisoners, 
and renewed a proposition which he had before made 
for an exchange. Getting no reply, he made the 
Union prisoners draw lots, to be treated in the same 
way as the crew of the Savannah^ who were not treated 
as pirates. The question of exchange was not properly 
settled for another year between the two Governments 
(cf p. 149). 

In October, the U.S.S. " San Jacinto " (Captain 
Wilkes) was looking for the ''Sumter' in Cuban waters, 
when the captain heard that Messrs. Slidell and Masoit, 
the Confederate Commissioners to Europe, were at 
Havana, intending to sail to England in the British mail 
steamer " Trent." He therefore lay in wait for her, hove 
her to, and seized the Commissioners, on November 8th. 
His action nearly brought on war with England — the 
Guards were ordered to Canada, and the situation was 
critical in the extreme, but Lincoln and his Govern- 
ment kept their heads. They saw what Wilkes' action 
meant, and that it could not be defended, but the 
great difficulty was the popular excitement in both 
countries : the last act of the Prince Consort was to 
tone down the angry letters. Mr. Seward wrote a 
manly and sensible despatch, acknowledging that the 
act was the error of an officer, for which England had 
a right to expect reparation, and added that " the 
prisoners will be cheerfully liberated." Later on we 
shall see Captain Wilkes' high-handed ways carried 
to the verge of insubordination, and hampering his 
superior officers (cf pp. 178, 234). 

On October 26th the ''Nashville" a fast paddle 
steamer, armed as a cruiser, left Charleston and cruised 
in the North Atlantic, putting in at Southampton on 
November 21st for repairs, and remaining there till 
the end of the year. (Continued on p. 140.) 



SUMMARY AND NOTICE 99 

Summary 

Union Gains. — Several lasting steps were gained 
during the year. In West Virginia the skirmish ot 
Philippi confirmed the political, the campaign of Rich 
Mountain the militar}^ situation. In Missouri the 
seizure of Camp Jackson prevented the Governor {rom 
establishing Secession rule, and the action of Boon- 
ville secured northern Missouri for the Union. The 
country at the confluence of the four great rivers' 
Mississippi, Ohio, Tennessee, and Cumberland, was 
also secured — an invaluable base for opening the 
Mississippi and for striking at the heart of the Con- 
federacy. The Navy seized Cape Hatteras and Port 
Royal, the latter base being practically a necessity 
for the effective maintenance of the Blockade. 

Union Loss. — Major-General Nathaniel Lyon, killed 
in action. 

Confederate Gain.— The northern half of New Mexico 
and Arizona, a possible base for extension westward. 
(Continued on p. 141.) 

Major-General Lyon 

A very great man passes from the scene thus early 
in the War, who, had he been spared, bade fair to 
become the greatest commander of all. He made and 
carried out his plans quickly and surely, so that every 
move, no matter how small his force, had decisive 
results, with the sole exception of the action in which 
he lost his life. 

Here is a generous appreciation of him by a 
Confederate officer, Colonel Snc ad \ "Rarely have 1 
met so extraordinary a man as Lyon, or one that has 
interested me so deeply. Coming to St. Louis from 
Kansas on the 6th of February, this little, rough-visaged, 
red-bearded, weather-beaten Connecticut captain, by 
his intelligence, his ability, his energy, and his zeal, 
had at once secured the confidence of all the Union 



loo MAY TO DECEMBER, 1861 

men in Missouri, and had made himself respected, if 
not feared, by his enemies. In less than five months 
he had risen to the command of the Union armies in 
Missouri, had dispersed the State Government, had 
driven the Governor and his adherents into the 
extremest corner of the State, had almost conquered 
the State, and would have completely conquered it 
had he been supported by his Government ; and now 
he had given his life willingly for the Union which 
he revered, and to the cause of Human Freedom, to 
which he was fanatically devoted." (Continued on 
p. 142.) 



CHRONOLOGICAL TABLE 



lOI 



1861 



May 21-81 



21. Magruder takes command 
at Yorktovvn. 

22. Butler takes command at 
Fort Monroe. 

28. McDowell takes command 
in North-East Virginia. 



June 



6. Virginian forces trans- 
ferred to the Confederate 
States. 

10. Magruder beats Butler at 
Big Bethel. 

17. Action at Vienna. 





31. Naval Attack on Con- 
federate batteries at Acquia 
Creek. 


McClellan's Campaign in 

West Virginia. 
3. Philippi. 


Sooth West Souxh-East 






Lyon's Campaign 

Guerilla Warfare 
24. Resolutions of mediation 
and neutrality adopted by 
Kentucky. 


in Missouri. 
17. Battle of Boonville. 
in Missouri. 






11 

o i 




Capture of the " Savannah," 
letter of marque, at end of 
month. 



MAY TO DECEMBER, 1861 



1861 


July 


August 


Septembbr 




Patterson and Jo- 








seph Johnston in 








the Valley, Beau- 








regard and Mc- 








Dowell in front of 








Washington. 








16. M c D w e 1 1 








moves on Manas- 




Rosecrans v. Lee in 




sas. 




West Virginia. 


« 


21. Battle of Bull 

Run. 
Campaign in West 
Virginia. 

10. Laurel Hill. 

11. Rich Mountain. 
13. Carrick's Ford; 

Pegram surrenders. 










28, 29. Fort Hat- 




ii 




teras taken by 









Union troops. 






Lyon's Cam- 




Sidney Johnston 




paign in Missouri, 


to forms a Defensive | 




5. Action near Car- 


10. Wilson's Creek. 


line in Kentucky. 




thage, Missouri. 








Guer 


ilia Warfare in Missouri. | 


^ 


\Z. Polk takes 


At end of month 




H 


command of De- 


Grant seizes Pa- 




^ 


partment No. 2 — 


ducah, and the 






He adquarters. 


mouths of the 






Memphis. 


Cumberland and 
Tennessee, and 




g 




fortifies them . . 


during September. 


C3 
5 


United States p 


osts, in Arizona and 


New Mexico, evacu- 




8. Sibley orderec 




ated by the army. 




to raise a force in 








Texas to expel 








U.S. forces from 






a^ 


New Mexico. 






Is 


6. Jefferson Davis 






K i2 


writes to Lincoln 






^ 


about the prison- 






03 <! 


ers taken on the 
" Savannah." 
The " Sumter " 








puts to sea. 


The " Sumter " at £ 


, ea, in West Indian 






wal 


:ers. 



CHRONOLOGICAL TABLE 



103 



1861 


October 


NOVBAIBBR 


Decbmber 


H 


Rosecrans v. Lee in 


The Confederates 






3 


West Virginia. 


abandon West 






w 




Virginia. 










7. Port Royal 










taken. 






3 




Lee assigned to 






w 




command the 
Department of 











South Carolina, 






tn 




Georgia , and 
Florida. 










2. Fremont super- 
seded by Hunter. 








Sidney Johnston 


7. Battle of Bel- 








forms a Defen- 


mont. 








sive line in Ken- 
tucky. 


9. Halleck ap- 
pointed to com- 
mand the De- 
partment. 








12. Union Naval de- 








H 


feat at the Head 








D 



of the Passes of 








t/5 


the Mississippi. 












9. General Canby 










appointed to 










command the 










Department of 










New Mexico. 






ll 


The "Sumter" at sea, 


in the West Indies 






5 a 




and Atlantic, going 
8. The " Trent" 


to Gibraltar at 
of year. 


end 


(/J <! 


2i.The'' Nashville" 
sails. At sea in 


affair, in West 
Indian waters, 
the North Atlantic. 










21. The "Nashville" 


The " Nashville 


' at 






puts into South- 


Southampton 








ampton. 







CHAPTER VII 

WAR IN earnest: the first half of 1862 

General 

(Continued from p. 80.) A most important event 
occurred in January, 1862 — viz. tlie retirement of 
Cameron, Lincoln's Secretary of War, and the ap- 
pointment of Stanton to succeed him. Except that 
both were loyal to the Union, a greater contrast than 
were these two men to each other could not have been 
found, for Cameron was a mild, courteous, and 
conciliatory old gentleman, utterly unwarlike, and, in 
any case, too old for such a post ; while Stanton 
was masterful and domineering, combative to the last 
degree, and so rude and mannerless that Lincoln, 
who knew him at the Bar, before the War, would not 
act in the same cases with him. He had joined 
President Buchanan's Cabinet in December, i860, and 
forced the traitor Floyd to resign before he had been 
in it a week. He was loyal and honest to the core, 
and it is characteristic of both men, first that Lincoln 
should have offered the most important place in his 
Cabinet to a political opponent whom he personally 
detested, and that it should have been accepted, and 
secondly that the relations between them should soon 
have ripened into the most cordial mutual trust and 
esteem. Stanton soon gained great influence with 
the President, but, though honestly meant, it was by 
no means always wisely exercised, for he was the 

104 



LINCOLN AND STANTON 105 

greatest stickler for the absolute subordination of 
military to political control as a matter of principle, 
and continually reminded the President that he was 
the constitutional Commander-in-Chief, and could not 
divest himself of this responsibility, thereby often 
hampering the proper conduct of the War. Lincoln 
was essentially a politician and man of peace, but so 
clear-headed that he soon picked up the broad 
principles required, though he often issued bad 
military orders, especially in the early stages of the 
War. It is easy to blame him, but he had to consider 
the strength of public opinion, and some of those who 
should have taken military details off his shoulders 
were either not competent to do so, or ignored public 
opinion to an unreasonable extent, and he had to get 
out of the difficulty as best he could. 

On the Confederate side, in March, Lcc was 
" charged with the conduct of military operations in 
the Army of the Confederacy," but an Act of Congress 
to make him Commander-in-Chief yN2i's> vetoed by Davis 
as unconstitutional, a fatal error. Lee soon resigned 
the useless position. (Continued on p. 147.) 

The East 

(Continued from p. 88.) We left McClellan and Joseph 
Johnston facing each other, barely twenty miles apart, 
one at the lines of Washington, the other covering 
Manassas Junction at Centreville : here they remained 
a month or so longer,^ organizing and training their 
armies, but making no hostile move, and seeming to 
regard the space between them as neutral ground. 
They were, however, very differently circumstanced, 

' W. Paintsville, Ky., Januaiy 7th. 
W. Mill Springs, Ky., January igtli, 20th. 
S.E. Roanoke Island, N.C., February 8th. 
W. Fort Donelson, Ky.. February i6th. 
S.W. Valverde, N.M., February 21st. 
W. Pea Ridge, Ark., March sth-8th. 
W. Pound Gap, Ky., March 6th, 



io6 THE FIRST HALF OF 1862 

for while Johnston^ thanks to his excellent " Intelligence 
Department " in Washington, knew all about the 
Army of the Potomac, McClellan's information about 
him, derived, oddly enough, from professional detec- 
tives, was quite wrong, for it made him out to be 
twice as strong as he really was. This affected 
the Union plans very much, for, except Patterson, 
McClellan was more influenced by the bogey of 
his enemy's imaginary strength than any general in 
the War. 

The first real hostilities in the East broke out 
between the politicians of Lincoln's Cabinet and 
McClellan, who took the extreme civil and military 
views respectively of their positions and duties with 
regard to the conduct of the War. The Cabinet 
believed in debate in council, every member's opinion 
being equally good, while McClellan held his tongue, 
which in the then state of feeling at Washington was 
more than usually a military necessity ; but he shewed 
a total lack of tact and temper, treated the politicians 
" de haut en bas," and made no concealment of his 
contempt for them and their opinions ; he was also 
extremely rude to President Lincoln. The members 
of the Cabinet were much aggrieved, claiming that 
they had a right to be consulted in the affairs of the 
nation, and when McClellan wanted support he did 
not get it, essential points in his plans being counter- 
manded, which caused them to fail. This trouble 
arose again when the same set made the same com- 
plaint against Halleck, and against Lincoln for 
allowing such a state of things. At this time Lincoln 
was so strongly pressed to remove McClellan from 
the Army, that it was decided to do so ; but a plan of 
attack was settled, and he was kept in command of the 
Army of the Potomac, the Command-in-Chief being 
taken from him. 

To go back a little, McClellan had wanted to re- 
commence operations earlier all along the line, but 
organization was backward in the West, and the 



McCLELLAN AND THE CABINET 107 

complications with England over the " Trent " affair, 
of which he saw the full danger, made him keep 
concentrated in his own hands the largest force that he 
could, for use in any new direction, till the trouble had 
blown over. In December he was seized with typhoid 
fever, which delayed matters for weeks, after which 
so severe a spell of weather set in as to stop opera- 
tions with any but the most seasoned soldiers. It 
was largely in consequence of the awful state of the 
roads that he planned to move by sea and take Rich- 
mond in flank and rear, in order to get to work 
sooner. All plans had to be explained to Committees, 
civil and military, and Government sanction obtained 
for them, while the President issued army orders also. 
One of these was to appoint commanders to the new 
Army Corps into which the Army of the Potomac 
was divided, which McClellan had specially asked 
should not be done till he could form a better opinion 
of the capacities of his lieutenants ; another, on 
January 27th, was an order that all the armies of the 
Union should take the offensive on February 22nd, 
Washington's birthday, and the pretext for removing 
McClellan from the Command-in-Chief was his non- 
compliance with this, though, before it was issued, 
he had ordered Grant, in the West, where the climate 
was more open, to move against Fort Donelson. 

Lincoln's original plan was to move by the Occo- 
quan, through Virginia, driving Johnston back, and 
McClellan's idea of going by sea was bitterly opposed 
by the politicians as " a traitorous move to uncover 
Washington," which was well defended ; but at last, 
after interminable explanations, they allowed it. It 
need hardly be said that secrecy could not be properly 
kept with all this discussion, and the plan probably 
came to Johnston's ears. McClellan's first idea was 
to move via Urbanna on the lower Rappahannock ; 
but Johnston's able retreat from Centreville, at exactly 
the right time, to the south of that river, defeated 
this, and caused the base to be changed to Fort 



io8 THE FIRST HALF OF 1862 

Monroe on the Peninsula, another delay, which gave 
the Confederates time to forestall McClellan there, 
and make him fight his way. It was at first 
intended that the Navy should co-operate, but, 
incredible as it may seem, the military authorities 
did not communicate with those of the Navy, so 
the latter got no orders, and this part of the plan 
fell through. Admiral Goldsborough always main- 
tained that the first move in this quarter should 
have been one to retake Norfolk Navy Yard and 
district, which would have been quite feasible, and 
that this would have given a good permanent base 
from the first, threatening Richmond on both banks 
of the River James, which Fort Monroe, owing to 
its cramped position, could not do. This counsel 
seems most correct, but unfortunately for the Union 
cause it was not followed ; had it been, the co- 
operation of the Navy would have been ensured, 
and the ^^ Merrhnac'' destroyed before she was ready. 
The Confederates abandoned Norfolk Navy Yard in 
May, to concentrate their forces, but they had had 
the use of it and its resources for over a year, 
which was of incalculable benefit to them. McClellan's 
main idea had always been to place the Capital 
beyond the danger of a sudden "coup de main" 
by creating a system of strong defensive lines, in 
which a sufficient garrison would give a feeling of 
political and civil security, leaving the whole of the 
mobile army free for offensive operations ; but, 
unfortunately, there was no point on which the 
fears of the politicians hampered the conduct of the 
War more than on this, for no strength of lines or 
garrison could mitigate their panic terror whenever a 
raid was threatened, but they must insist on diverting 
an army from its proper work, even if the success of 
an important campaign were jeopardized thereby. 

Here, perhaps, it may be convenient to refer once 
for all to a subject which is not sufficiently 
taken into consideration when the slowness of this 



MUD AND ROADS 109 

or that general is criticized— that is, that no one 
who did not know America at the time of the War, 
or within ten years or so after it, has the faintest 
conception of the meaning of the word MUD. The 
writer has stood up to his waist in mud, on one 
of the principal roads of the West, and has seen 
waggons down over axles, floating in it. The roads 
were, for the most part, what were expressively 
termed " dirt roads," that is, passages between lines 
of fences, formed or metalled in no way whatever. 
Where anything more was done, it is nearly always 
specified, the road being described as a " pike," 
short for turnpike, or a "plank" or "corduroy" 
road. A " pike " was often a good metalled road, 
while both "plank" and "corduroy" roads were 
made on the same principle, being based on three 
longitudinal lines of heavy timber, across which 
were laid lighter pieces, forming a continuous floor ; 
in the first case the wood was squared and sawn, in 
the second it was merely rough logs. A good plank 
road gave very good going, and a new corduroy one 
was fair, but the latter sort was used principally in 
swampy and uninhabited places, and soon got rotten 
and out of repair : the experience of travelling over 
a road of this sort is not readily forgotten. 

The Confederates had been hard at work at Norfolk 
Navy Yard, converting the hulk of the old frigate 
" Merrimac " into the ironclad " Virginia,'' but no one 
ever calls her by this name. She had a central battery, 
with inclined sides amidships, the ends being awash ; 
the battery was armoured with four inches of iron 
and armed with ten guns, two 7-inch rifled, one ahead, 
one astern, also able to be fought on either broad- 
side, and eight broadside guns, two 8-inch rifled, and 
six 9-inch smooth-bores : she drew 22 feet, and was 
very clumsy and slow, the alterations having quite 
spoilt her handiness. 

On March 8th, ^ the Union fleet— four frigates, a sloop, 

' W. Pea Ridge, Ark., March 5th-8th. 



no THE FIRST HALF OF 1862 

and some gunboats — was lying in Hampton Roads, 
when the " Merrimac " came down from the yard, 
rammed and sank the sloop " Cumberland," and drove 
the " Congress " into shallow water, setting her on fire 
with shells. The other three frigates ran aground, but 
the ^'Merrimac'' did no more, owing to the falling tide 
and failing light, intending to return and finish her 
work in the morning. She had been much knocked 
about outside her armour, having lost funnel, davits, 
etc. This success, like every other of the Confederates 
in Virginia, produced a panic among the valiant 
Northern politicians, who said that the 'Merrimac" had 
Washington at her mercy. Next morning, however, 
a small, insignificant object was lying alongside the 
" Minnesota," of which there was hardly anything but a 
turret showing — the famous "Monitor," which promptly 
engaged the '^ Merrimac'' when she came out : the latter 
was working very badly, being hardly able to keep 
steam, owing to the loss of her funnel. The " Monitor," 
with her light draught of 10 feet, had much greater 
choice of position in the narrow channels : the 
" Merrimac^' finding that her shot took no effect, tried 
to ram, but was too clumsy, and was easily avoided. 
Captain Worden of the " Monitor " was badly wounded 
in the conning-tower, and the ship drew out of action 
for a time ; when she came back, her opponent was 
retiring. A drawn battle, rather in favour of the 
" Monitor." 

The latter was of a new type altogether, and has 
been described as a " cheesebox on a plank," for her 
funnel, when lowered for action, was fiush with the 
deck, which was only a few inches above water ; the 
single turret was armed with two i i-inch smooth-bores, 
and protected with six inches of armour, while the 
conning-tower, the only other thing shewing above 
deck, had 9-inch armour. She was handy, but not 
seaworthy, and was nearly lost in coming from New 
York. Two great advantages were that the guns 
could be trained in almost any direction without 



THE "MONITOR" AND THE '' MERRIMAC" in 

turning the ship, and that the crew did not depend 
on the port-hole shutters for protection whilst 
loading, since the turret could be turned away for 
the purpose. 

Had the '^ Merrimac" been seaworthy, this might have 
been the decisive action of the War, for the raising of 
the Blockade was a vital necessity for the Confederates.* 
As it was, all that they would have gained by the 
defeat of the " Monitor " would have been to drive the 
Union fleet to sea, and perhaps force McClellan to use 
a land route. The '* Merrimac's " captain, Buchanan, 
was wounded in the action, and Tattnall took his place. 
The ship was repaired at the beginning of April, but 
her draught had been increased, reducing her speed 
to four knots. She took station in the James River to 
protect the flank of Magntders lines in the Peninsula, 
but, though she challenged the Union fleet more than 
once, they were not to be drawn into action, though 
the "Monitor" was there, it being Goldsborough's policy 
to cover McClellan's expedition and risk nothing. 
The ^^ Merrimac's'' engines were so wretched that it 
would have been useless to take her outside, even 
could she have got there, for she was not safe in 
an ordinary sea. When the Confederates evacuated 
Norfolk on May 9th, she lost her base : she was too 
clumsy to fight, depended on her draught for pro- 
tection, and drew too much water to get away ; Tattnall 
had therefore no option but to destroy her. The ship 
had been so much relied on for the protection of the 
James River that the lower reaches were not fortified, 
but batteries were thrown up when she was destroyed, 
which successfully resisted the Union ironclads, and a 
gunboat flotilla was also organized on the James. 

On the Confederate s\<\e, Johnston h2.d kept up his 
bluff" at Centreville till the last possible moment, when, 
seeing that McClellan was moving, and that his 40,000 
men could not stand against four times their number, 
and also that, being liable to be turned by sea, his 
position did not defend Richmond, he retired behind 



112 THE FIRST HALF OF 1862 

the Rappahannock, which, as we have seen, upset the 
first Union plan, and gave the defence more time, 
but this entailed the dismantling of the Confederate 
batteries on the lower Potomac. 

The Union expedition began to embark on March 
17th,' and political interference with it began also, 
a division of 10,000 men being held back at Washing- 
ton. When McClellan was deprived of the Command- 
in-Chief, just before sailing, he was not notified, and 
only saw it in the papers : on reaching Fort Monroe, 
he found that the Department of Virginia had also 
been taken from him, and heard from Admiral Golds- 
borough that the Navy would not co-operate ; but 
Goldsborough did his best to help him. He had made 
his plans on the promise of 155,000 men, but found 
himself reduced to a nominal 92,000.- As soon as he 
began to advance after landing, he was confronted by 
Magruder^ who, with about an eighth of his force, held 
him in the lower Peninsula and opposite Yorktown 
for a month, covered by the '' Merrimac'' on his right 
flank, and by batteries on both sides of the strait at 
Yorktown on his left. Magruder's operations are a 
model in their way, and there he waited till McClellan 
began to besiege his lines in form, when he slipped 
away exactly at the right time, falling back on ample 
reinforcements under Longstreet, who fought the rear- 
guard action of Williamsburg, and brought all away 
safely.^ 

This brings us to the beginning of May, and we 
must now turn back and look at the situation in the 

' W. New Madrid, Mo., March 13th. 
S.E. New Berne, N.C., March 14th. 
E. Kernstown, Va., March 23rd. 
■^ The ''^Florida" leaves England. 

S.W. Apache Canon, N.M., March 26th-28th. 
^ W. Shiloh, Tenn., April 6th, 7th. 
W. Island No. 10, Tenn., April 8th. 
S.E. Fort Pulaski, Ga., April loth. 

France declares war on Mexico, April 17th. 
S.W. New Orleans, La., April i8th-28th. 
S.E. Fort Macon, N.C, April 29th. 



JACKSON IN THE VALLEY 113 

Shenandoah Valley and round Washington, where 
McClellan, when he started, had left 35,000 and 42,000 
men respectively. On January ist, Jackson marched 
from Winchester against the Baltimore and Ohio 
Railway, to break it, cut the communications between 
Banks at Frederick and Rosecrans in West Virginia, 
and isolate Kelley at Romney. Kelley retired, but 
Jackson succeeded in the rest of his plan, and held 
Romney. He hoped to damage the railway more, but 
was foiled by the indiscipline of a subordinate, who 
complained direct to the Secretary of War, by whom 
Jackson was ordered to move him from that place. So 
gross an attack on military discipline was not to be 
borne, and Jackson sent in his resignation : Johnston 
and Governor Letcher backed him up, and the Secretary 
gave way. Jackson's judgment was soon vindicated, 
for the Union troops re-occupied Romney, and com- 
pelled Johnson, in the Alleghanies, to fall back. Jackson 
soon found himself opposed by a force 38,000 strong, 
made up from several small ones, under General 
Banks, which was at first spread out from Frederick 
to Romney, while he had but 4,600. At the end of 
February, Johnston was preparing to retreat from 
Centreville, and Jackson saw that he would sooner or 
later have to conform, sent his baggage to the rear, 
and began by advancing into close touch with the 
enemy. This was the opening move of the famous 
Valley Campaign in which he was the guiding factor, 
and which is best studied from the Confederate side. 

The peculiar strategic feature of the Shenandoah 
Valley is the Massanutten range of mountains, which 
runs up the middle of it for forty miles, beginning at a 
point about forty-five miles from the Potomac. It is 
impassable to any armed force except by one road 
which crosses it near the middle. The main valley 
is on the west side, through which runs the North 
Fork of the Shenandoah, with Strasburg at the foot 
of it : the South Fork runs on the east side, through 
the Luray Valley, with Front Royal at the foot. At 



114 THE FIRST HALF OF 1862 

the south end of the range, at the head of both valleys, 
is Cross Keys. The Luray Valley is separated from 
Virginia proper by the Blue Ridge, through which run 
several passes or " Gaps," while a little above Cross 
Keys is the important town of Staunton. 

The keynote of the whole campaign is to be found 
in the fact that Jackson was the first who fully realized 
how very great was the influence which could be 
exerted on the politicians at Washington by even a 
small force within striking distance, though Lee soon 
found it out for himself. 

When Joknsion retired from CentreviWe,^ Jackson was 
left isolated in front, with the simple orders to detain 
as many Union troops as possible in the Valley to 
prevent them from joining McClellan, without unduly 
jeopardizing his own command. When McClellan 
moved forward, he ordered Banks to occupy Win- 
chester, which Jackson's small force could not prevent. 
His numbers had been magnified by rumour, but 
Banks soon heard how small they were, and sent 
away two of his three divisions, thinking one enough 
there; it was about 11,000 strong. On March 21st, 
Jackson heard that the enemy was retreating and 
advanced, but Ashby, his cavalry commander, who had 
had a skirmish with the enemy, quite underestimated 
their force, teWing Jackson that he had only a brigade, 
with guns and cavalry, before him, probably a rear- 
guard. On the 23rd, Jackson came up, found the 
enemy at Kernstown, close to Winchester, and attacked 
at once, holding their front, on open ground, with one- 
third of his command, and attacking their somewhat 
exposed and weaker right flank through the woods 
with the rest. The woods, however, made his artillery 
useless ; the Union force was twice as strong as he 
thought, and was well handled by General Kimball. 
Jackson was beaten, though the Confederate attack was 
so furious that at one time the issue was doubtful. 
Kimball lost more in killed and wounded, and was 

' E. "Monitor" and "■ Merrhnac" March 8th. 



JACKSON IN THE VALLEY 115 

quite unable to follow. Jackson, though beaten, attained 
his object : the North was literally astounded at his 
skill and audacity, and the troops sent away were 
recalled in haste, for he had shewn that he could 
neither be brushed aside nor ignored. Banks, with 
20,000 men, now observed him cautiously,^ remaining 
in the same place for weeks together, continually 
harassed by Ashby's cavalry. Johnston now wanted 
Jackson to retire by the Luray Valley, to prevent 
Banks from seizing Front Royal, between them ; but 
Jackson preferred the other valley, for if Banks would 
follow, which he did, he would be more isolated, while 
he himself would be able to watch Fremont's command, 
which threatened the Valley from the west, and support 
Johnson in the mountains. The Confederate Secretary 
of War now made another mistake in giving Ashby 
an independent cavalry command ; but he and Jackson 
seem soon to have adjusted the difference between 
them, for we find them going on again as usual. 

On the upper Rappahannock was Eivell with 8,000 
men, not far from Swift Run Gap, but, as Banks could 
cut their communications if he moved on it across the 
Massanuttens, Jackson suddenly marched and secured 
it, camping close by, in the Elk Run Valley. Banks 
followed to Harrisonburg, 2iWd Johnson came to Staun- 
ton, having Fremont, with a larger force, in front of 
him. Jackson's position held Banks fast, and Fremont's 
men were scattered across West Virginia. At this time 
McClellan was stuck fast in front of Magruder's lines, 
in rear of which Johnston's army was rapidly assem- 
bling, but McDowell had been moved from Washing- 
ton to Fredericksburg, and the Northern prospects 
looked better. Lee, however, was given the charge of 
all operations in Virginia, and put Ewell uxid^v Jackson, 
who brought him near to Swift Run Gap,' and then 
moved suddenly across Banks' front to attack Milroy, 
one of Fremont's lieutenants, in the mountains to the 
west, picking up Johnson as he went. To do this, he 

' E. Siege of Yorktown, Va., April 5th-May 3rd. 



ii6 THE FIRST HALF OF 1862 

began with a demonstration against Banks, to keep 
him quiet, and then moved on Staunton. Banks 
thought he had retreated, and that men might now 
be sent to McClellan, but on second thoughts this 
seemed too risky, for where was he? Banks, Fremont, 
and McDowell stood round, with 70,000 men to 
Jackson's 5,000, but Asliby was between them, blocking 
their communications, and they hardly dared to move, 
for WHERE WAS JACKSON? Johnson'' s command added 
some 2,500 men to Jackson's force, and they came up 
with Milroy at the village of McDowell, in a position 
difficult of approach, and halted close opposite. Mil- 
roy wanted to retreat, but thought that his best 
chance lay in making a strong attack first ; this, how- 
ever, was heavily beaten, but he made good his retreat. 
Jackson did not follow far, but returned to the Valley, 
where Ewell ]ome.d him ; with some more men sent by 
Lee, this brought his little army up to 17,000 men. 
Banks, now with only 10,000, had fallen back to 
Strasburg, where he entrenched himself; Jackson cut 
him off from Fremont by blocking the roads through 
the passes, and retired to Harrisonburg. It was now 
the beginning of May, and Confederate prospects 
looked so bad that Lee urged Jackson to strike again, 
swiftly and hard. 

The North now hoped that the Valley was at last 
secure ; McDowell began to move away towards 
McClellan ; while Banks thought his enemy safe at 
Harrisonburg for the time, and distributed his com- 
mand from Strasburg to Winchester, with the cavalry 
watching the flank at Front Royal. Suddenly Ashby 
burst on the Union cavalry, driving it in in confusion, 
and hard on his heels down the Luray Valley followed 
the whole of Jackson's force, rolling up detachment 
after detachment, and driving the entire command 
through Winchester, and over the Potomac. Banks 
could only save the Strasburg detachment, no stand 
was possible, and had not Ashby' s men got out of 
hand, and stayed to plunder, he would never have 



JACKSON IN THE VALLEY 117 

reached that river ; the Confederate infantry stopped 
just beyond Winchester from sheer exhaustion, and 
this saved him; a day or so after, the Stoneivall 
Brigade struck at Harper's Ferry.^ Another wild panic 
seized Washington : McDowell was stopped, and 
much of his command taken to defend the Capital ; 
Fremont was called in ; and McClellan was told that 
he must either attack Richmond at once, or come and 
defend Washington. The whole plan of the Unionists 
in the east was again broken up, but when they 
stopped to think, had not their enemy over-reached 
himself and fallen into a trap, for McDowell and 
Fremont, with more than double numbers, were 
nearer to a point of junction, on his line of retreat, 
than he was to that point. They were ordered to 
hurry and cut him off, but groped forward timidly, 
while Jackson marched and just brushed past, going 
on to Harrisonburg.^ If he had failed to get through, 
he had intended to retreat into Maryland, but, had 
he done so, he would have found that Stanton, who 
expected this, was ready for him. Fremont followed 
in pursuit. Shields' division of McDowell's Corps 
watching the Luray Valley from Front Royal, and 
Jackson went on to Cross Keys, whence he could 
watch both valleys, reaching it on June 5th. Here 
fell General Ashby, in a cavalry skirmish, a great loss 
to the Confederates, Jackson went to Port Republic 
in the upper Luray Valley with most of his force, 
whence he could watch Shields, and keep touch with 
Ewell at Cross Keys. Shields advanced in isolated 
detachments, and Fremont attacked Ewell just as the 
first of these came in front of Port Republic : the 
situation at first looked critical ; but Jackson soon saw 
that there was but a small force to deal with, and sent 
most of his men to help Eivell. Fremont attacked at 
Cross Keys by driblets, and Ewell, handling a smaller 
force ably, beat him handsomely, while Jackson held 

' W. Confederates evacuate Corinth, Miss. , May 30th. 
^ E. Seven Pines, Va., May 31st to June ist. 



ii8 THE FIRST HALF OF 1862 

his own. The next day the plan was reversed, Jackson 
turning on Shields with most of his force, and watch- 
ing Fremont's beaten troops with the rest : he had 
calculated on settling Shields' men quickly, but the 
detachment, under Tyler, fought so stoutly that there 
was danger of Fremont coming up in force in rear 
before they were beaten ; he therefore broke down the 
bridge by which Fremont must approach, who only 
interfered with a little artillery fire, Tyler was finally 
driven back on the rest of his division, which checked 
Shields, and Jackson concentrated his army at Brown's 
Gap. Fremont retired, followed hotly by the Con- 
federate cavalry, now under Munfofd, to Strasburg. 
Jackson turned back into the Valley as if to follow, but 
was really making arrangements to go to Richmond, 
for McClellan had been checked at Seven Pines, and it 
was important to get up at once. He concealed his 
plans from every one but Colonel Munford, the army 
being ordered to know nothing and ask no questions. 

Jackson moved first on Gordonsville, which might 
be either against Washington or McClellan's army, 
and rode forward, meeting Lee on the 23rd. Munford 
kept his cordon of scouts so well that not the least 
whisper of the march got out, Jackson's late opponents 
fearing instant attack, when he was actually fighting 
before Richmond, McDowell alone saw that the right 
thing was to reinforce McClellan and nQ.g\ect Jackson ] 
but the terrified politicians would have none of it, and 
when the march became known it was too late to do 
so. In thirty-eight days the Army of the Valley had 
marched four hundred miles and fought three battles 
and many minor actions, winning all, Jackson struck 
such terror into his opponents that they would hardly 
stand against him at the end of the campaign. His 
force never reached 18,000 men, yet with it he had 
paralysed the action of over 70,000, and had kept more 
than 50,000 from joining McClellan, whose plans de- 
pended on their support. 

The main campaign in the Peninsula of Virginia 



THE PENINSULA OF VIRGINIA 119 

was the very opposite to the brilliant secondary one 
just described, for it principally consisted of about a 
week's heavy and continuous fighting between two 
large forces, in rather a small space. The features of 
the terrain were also quite different, the Peninsula of 
Virginia being for the most part low and flat, with 
sluggish streams, large swamps, and thick woods. 
Only on the north of the Chickahominy, and close to 
Richmond, was there any extent of fairly high, clear 
ground. Curiously enough, there were no good maps 
of it, and many mistakes were due to this. Both Lee 
And Johnsto)i were blamed, but neither had been much 
on the spot since the War began, and then had had 
more urgent business. Lee made arrangements for a 
survey, but McClellan was already on them : he was 
well supplied with maps, for the officers of the 3rd 
Pennsylvania Cavalry had been making sketches of 
the ground for some weeks, from which he got a far 
better map than any that the Confederates had. The 
Peninsula was bounded on the north by the estuary 
of the York (called the Pamunkey above tide water), 
and on the south by the James, was about seventy-five 
miles long, from Richmond to Fort Monroe, and twenty 
less to the Yorktown lines, while the scene of the main 
fighting was a space about twenty miles square, to the 
east and south-east of Richmond. 

As soon as McClellan had passed the Yorktown 
lines and driven Longstreet back at Williamsburg,^ his 
first care was to get his troops in hand, who were 
landing at different places, and to establish a proper 
base and lines of supply. He took West Point for his 
main depot and White House for his immediate base, 
by orders from Washington, for he himself preferred 
a base on the James. By May 24th ^ he was in posses- 
sion of several bridges over the Chickahominy, and 
Johnston's army was all to the south of it. He heard 
on that day that McDowell would join him via 

' E. McDowell, W. Va., May 8th. 

* E. Front Royal and Winchester, Va., May 23rd-25th. 



I20 THE FIRST HALF OF 1862 

Fredericksburg in a few days, but later was informed 
of the changes due to Jackson's rout of Banks, and that 
the President thought that the main effort must be in 
front of Washington. While there was any chance of 
McDowell's co-operation, McClellan kept to his base 
on the Pamunkey, but when Jackson appeared on the 
scene, and this became impossible, the base was shifted 
to the James, for which all preparations had been 
made beforehand. 

The Army of the Potomac consisted of the Ilnd, 
llird, IVth, Vth, and Vlth Corps, the cavalry being 
very weak, and its strength on June 20th was 105,000 
men. The Confederate army was about 86,000 strong, 
including y«c^5ow'5 command. 

The Confederates had a force at Hanover Court 
House watching McDowell, which McClellan drove in. 
Johnston at first brought his army to the north of the 
Chickahominy, and McClellan's came up slowly, 
seizing some bridges, and moving a part of the army 
to the south side on May 24th. Johnston then crossed 
to the south of the river, because, in the first place, 
McDowell was not coming, and Jackson was, and also 
because the Confederate defence of the river James 
had been so much entrusted to the " Merrimac " that no 
proper batteries had been made on that side, and when 
she was destroyed it not only wanted more protection, 
but McClellan was more likely to try to use it. The 
Chickahominy has swampy banks and is often difficult 
to cross except at the bridges; on May 31st ^ it was 
swollen and unfordable, some of McClellan's bridges 
were destroyed, and half his army was on each side. 
Johnston promptly attacked the force on the south side, 
throwing twenty-three brigades against it, and watch- 
ing the other half with only four. This was the battle 
of Fair Oaks or Seven Pines^ which went on for two 
days, the Union army being driven back some dis- 
tance. On the evening of June ist, Johnston was 
severely wounded, and the next day Lee was appointed 

' W. Confederates evacuate Corinth, Miss., May 30th. 



LEE SUCCEEDS JOHNSTON 121 

to succeed him in the command of the army, while 
continuing to control all operations in Virginia.^ For 
the next three weeks the weather was so bad that the 
roads were almost useless for the movement of troops, 
and McClellan fortified his position, but no more : he 
was also waiting for reinforcements, which has been 
bitterly said to have been his normal position. 

When Lee took command, he was still uneasy about 
McDowell's Corps, which was watched by Stuart's 
cavalry, and thought it best to drive McClellan off his 
line of retreat by moving to the north of the Chicka- 
hominy and attacking the Union right. Stuart was 
ordered to make a reconnaissance in rear of the 
enemy's army,^ and rode completely round it with a 
cavalry brigade and two guns, from Ashland, via the 
Pamunkey, round to the James, and back along that 
river to the Confederate lines : they had little fighting, 
but brought much information. The principal value 
of the ride was the confidence which it gave to the 
men, for McClellan's change of base foiled Lee's plan. 
Lee ostentatiously sent reinforcements for Jackson to 
Gordonsville, which, as was intended, had a great 
effect on Lincoln and Stanton, and thus indirectly 
hampered McClellan. He actually ordered Jackson to 
start for Richmond on the 20th, but this march had 
been discussed before between them. 

With the arrival of Jackson begin what are called 
the Seven Days' Battles. On the 25th, McClellan 
moved to within five miles of Richmond, Jackson 
seemed lost, and McDowell was ordered up again, 
some of his troops reaching McClellan. But Jackson 
was then at Ashland, twelve miles away, and McClellan 
heard rumours which made him suspicious : his right 
was at Mechanicsville, and Jackson^ with A. P. Hilly 
was to attack it in the morning ; but Jackson was late, 

' W. River battle of Memphis, Tenn., June 6th. 

E. Cross Keys, Va., June 8th. 

E. Port Republic, Va., June 9th. 

' June I2th-J5th. 



122 THE FIRST HALF OF 1862 

so Hill went in alone on the 26th, and was badly 
beaten, but Jackson's presence was now revealed, and 
decided McClellan to change his base to the James at 
Harrison's Landing. On the 2'/\\\, Jackson, A. P. Hill, 
and Longstreet, attacked Porter's Vth Corps at Gaines' 
Mill, and drove it back, taking 22 guns, while 
Magriidcr manceuvred so ably on the south bank of 
the river, as to prevent any help being sent to Porter, 
who was quite overmatched. The Confederates, with 
a smaller army, had again succeeded in bringing greater 
numbers to the decisive point. Eivell was sent to 
break McClellan's communications with the York 
River, which he did, but the latter did not care, having 
changed his base to the James. 

^ We now enter on the second phase of the campaign, 
the retreat and escape of McClellan. On the 29th, 
the Confederates took the initiative, attacking in 
various places on the south of the Chickahominy, but 
McClellan had had the bridges broken, which kept 
Jackson back that day. Lee had now found out the 
change of base and retreat, and tried to cut it off. On 
this day Keyes, with the IVth Corps, was sent to 
occupy Malvern Hill, and get into^ touch with the 
gunboats. The Confederates were pressing forward 
on the Glendale, Williamsburg, and Newmarket roads, 
but luckily for McClellan Stuarfs cavalry was follow- 
ing Stoneman's to White House, in a false direction. 
June 30th was the critical day, the battle of Glendale 
and Frayser's Farm, for had Jackson, who was checked 
at the White Oak Swamp, got up in time, nothing 
could have saved McClellan's army. As it was, the 
pursuit was checked with the loss of a few guns, and 
time gained for the position of Malvern Hill to be 
taken up, to cover the embarkation of the army, which 
was a very strong artillery position, with flanks resting 
on the James. The Confederates did not know the 
ground, and lost their way, throwing out Lee's plans. 
They could not get their guns through the thick, 

' S. Naval attack on Vicksburg, Miss., June 26th-29th- 



END OF THE CAMPAIGN 123 

swampy country, the attack was disjointed, and failed, 
and the Union troops moved to Harrison's Landing 
on the night of July ist, after the battle, getting away 
from Malvern Hill safely ; but had Lee's troops been 
able to get through the mud round it, on the 2nd, 
McClellan's army might have been destroyed, for 
Malvern Hill did not protect the Landing, and the 
disorganization was so great that ground which did 
do so was not fortified till Stuart, following Stoneman, 
came up and foolishly opened fire from thence with 
some horse artillery guns. This roused the Union 
troops to their danger, Stuart was driven off, and the 
ground made safe, before the Confederate infantry 
could get up. There was no more fighting, or hin- 
drance to the embarkation of the Union troops, but 
this did not take place for some weeks. 

This Peninsular Campaign is the only one in 
which Jackson did not come up to his reputation ; 
he was late at Mechanicsville, and not at his best 
at either Frayser's Farm or Malvern Hill, but the 
explanation is that he was down with fever during 
the whole of th^. week. McClellan, throughout, seems 
to have been oppressed with the *' enormous forces " 
against him, and when he knew of Jackson's arrival 
from the Valley, to have given up all idea of taking 
Richmond, and thought only of saving his own army 
from destruction. His change of base was a most 
difficult operation, carried out with consummate skill. 

On June 26th, President Lincoln ordered the Army 
of Virginia to be formed, composed of Banks', Fre- 
mont's, and McDowell's commands, each as an Army 
Corps, and placed General Pope in command. Fre- 
mont refused to serve in a subordinate capacity, 
resigned his commission, and was not employed 
again. (Continued on p. 150.) 

The South-East 

(Continued from p. 90.) General Lee remained at 
his post, organizing the Atlantic coast defences of 



124 THE FIRST HALF OF 1862 

the South till March, when he was recalled to Rich- 
mond. His lines were made for the combined action 
of infantry with artillery, both field and heavy, in 
carefully placed batteries, and they were wonderfully 
effective. 

^Burnside's and Goldsborough's expedition sailed 
for Cape Hatteras early in January, but met with 
such bad weather that they took a month to assemble 
in Pamlico Sound. ^ They took Roanoke Island, which 
gave the control of the inner waters of North Carolina, 
on February 8th, then seized Elizabeth City, and 
drove the enemy out of Winton.^ The Confederates 
had blocked the Neuse River at New Berne and 
made strong works there, but this position was taken 
on March 14th,* with over 60 guns and many prisoners, 
and Burnside fortified it against any attempt at re- 
capture. Lastly, he moved against Fort Macon, on 
Bogue Island, a strong old-fashioned fort, which had 
to be reduced by a regular siege, and fell on April 29th. ^ 
The Confederates had fortified a position commanding 
the Dismal Swamp Canal, which they were said to be 
going to use, to pass rams, which they were building, 
through to the river James. An expedition seized 
this position, and sent a steamer through, to secure 
the waterwa}'- for the Union, a great shortening of 
communications. On paper this gave an excellent 
position, reaching from Roanoke Island to Norfolk, 
which directly flanked the vulnerable southern com- 

' Map 59, p. 390. 

^ W. Paintsville, Ky., January 7th. 

W. Mill Springs, Ky., January 19th, 20th. 
' W. Fort Donelson, Ky., February i6th. 

S.W. Valverde, N.M., February 21st. 

* E. "Monitor" and '^ A/err iwac," Hampton Roads, Va., March 8th. 
W. Pound Gap, Ky., March 6th. 

W. Pea Ridge, Ark., March 5th-8th. 
W. New Madrid, Tenn., March 13th. 
S.W. Apache Canon, N.M., March 26th-28th. 

* E. Siege of Yorktown, Va., all April. 
E. Jackson in the Valley, all April. 

S. New Orleans, La., April i8th-28th. 



THE SOUTH-EAST COAST 125 

munications of Richmond, passing through a narrow 
belt of country, but the ground was too swampy 
for it to be of any practical use. 

^ T. W. Sherman and Dupont defeated a Confederate 
attempt to retake Port Royal on January ist, after 
which it was not molested. Its capture was followed 
by the abandonment of the coast south of Charleston 
by the Confederates, except Fort Pulaski, commanding 
the entrance to Savannah, one of the old brick forts. 
The surrounding land was so swampy that it was 
thought that the fort could not be invested, but 
Sherman sent an expedition under Gillmore, who 
managed to make batteries on the mud marshes, 
beginning on February 7th, and opened fire on 
April loth, the fort surrendering the next day. The 
result was to close the Savannah River to blockade- 
runners (cf. p. 366), and set free some of the blockading 
vessels for service elsewhere. There were sundry 
other small actions up and down the coast. At the 
end of February, Dupont sent an expedition against 
Fernandina, Florida, but there was no resistance, for 
Port Royal took most of the back-waters in rear, 
and in this case the strong defences were abandoned 
by orders from Lee (cf. p. 90). St. Augustine was 
next occupied, also without fighting. The coast 
defences here were for the most part given up, 
and the Union gunboats patrolled the back-waters 
of this part of Florida. (Continued on p. 165.) 

The West 

(Continued from p. 95.) In the extreme east of 
Kentucky, Garfield had been trying to get his com- 
mand started through the mud against Marshall at 
Paintsville, and came close to it on January 6th. ^ Next 
day he attacked him, without result, in a position to 
which he had withdrawn : both sides retired, Garfield 
to the Big Sandy River, where he remained till 

' Map 33, p. 232. 
-' Map 43, p. 308. 



126 THE FIRST HALF OF 1862 

March. Marshall had great difficulty in supplying 
his men, and sent many back, south of the Cumber- 
land Mountains. Garfield again advanced, and on 
March 6th drove him back from Pound Gap, freeing 
eastern Kentucky from the Confederates, and then 
went on to join Buell, leaving a force to watch his 
late opponents. 

^The next force in the line, under Thomas, was also 
delayed by mud : it had been ordered to move in 
December, Thomas started on January ist, and on 
the 17th came to Logan's Cross Roads, within ten 
miles of Zollicoffer's fortified position at Mill Springs. 
He had not yet picked up Schoepf, so Crittenden, who 
had assumed command of the Confederate force, de- 
termined to attack before their junction, and did so 
on the 1 8th: after a severe fight in which General 
Zollicoffer was killed, the Confederates fell back beaten, 
and Thomas pursued to the Mill Spring lines, Schoepf 
joining him there. Each side had about 4,000 men 
in action. The next morning Thomas moved out to 
attack the lines, but found them empty : the Con- 
federate retreat was an absolute rout. This was the 
first real Union success of the War, and broke down 
the right flank of Sidney Johnston's formidable line, 
from here to the Mississippi, The Confederates call 
this action Fishing Creek. 

In January, McClellan directed Grant to make a 
reconnaissance to prevent the Confederates from 
sending reinforcements from Columbus, Fort Henry, 
or Fort Donelson, to Buckner, who was at Bowling 
Green, confronting Buell. He at once advanced in 
two columns between the Mississippi and the Ten- 
nessee, to threaten both sides, which effectually held 
the enemy to his position, and helped Thomas in his 
advance on Mill Springs. Finding that Fort Heiman 
on the Tennessee, opposite Fort Henry, was very 
weak, Grant asked Halleck's permission to take it, 
which was at first refused, but when Admiral Foote 

' Map 43, p. 308. 



FORT DONELSON 127 

joined in the application, it was granted, and they 
started on February 2nd. The rivers were very high, 
and Fort Henry, on low ground, was partly flooded : 
Fort Donelson on the Cumberland was very strong, 
and the lines of the two forts were only seven miles 
apart. This double position was so vital to the Con- 
federates that Grant assumed that they would send 
every man they had to make it safe ; but Johnston 
made two mistakes, first in dividing his disposable 
force and sending only half of it, secondly in sending 
this into Fort Donelson, not keeping it outside as a 
covering force : he should have gone himself, with 
every available man. Tilghman^ commanding Fort 
Henry, in a bad position, sent most of his men to 
Fort Donelson, and soon surrendered;^ a Union gun- 
boat was then sent on to break the Memphis and 
Ohio railway bridge over the Tennessee. Floyd, 
Pillow, and Biickner were commanding at Fort 
Donelson. Floyd was merely a political general, 
Pillow, who had been in the Mexican War, had won 
more notoriety by intrigues than honour by fighting, 
but the junior, Buckner, was an able soldier. A recon- 
naissance shewed that the fort was only approachable 
on the west, the Cumberland River being on the east, 
and flooded streams on north and south : the Con- 
federate lines on the west were strong, between the 
streams, with continuous abattis. Halleck sent all 
the reinforcements that he could, while Foote brought 
the gunboats round from the Tennessee. Grant at 
first had only 15,000 men, against 21,000 in an en- 
trenched position, but more soon came. Remembering 
Pillow's incapacity (cf. p. 442), he began with one or 
two important movps, which he would never have 
dared to make against a competent man. Foote came 
the day after, the 13th, and next day they made a 
combined attack, without result. The weather was 
very cold, and the men suff"ered much. The gunboats 
were badly mauled and not available again at once, 

' S.E. Roanoke Island, N.C., February 8th. 



128 THE FIRST HALF OF 1862 

and the Confederates then attacked, with some success 
on the Union right : Grant, however, saw that they 
were trying to cut their way out, and at once attacked 
on the other flank, broke their Hnes, and took a 
winning position. After his treason in December, 
i860, Floyd was very doubtful of his treatment if 
taken, so he and Pillow got away on a steamer, 
leaving Buckner to surrender the fort, the only thing 
to be done. Forrest with the cavalry cut his way out. 
It was here that Grant's famous letter, demanding 
immediate and unconditional surrender, was written, 
and on the i6th the fort surrendered, with some 
15,000 men, about 4,000 having gone with Floyd, 
Pillow, and Forrest. Grant had about 27,000. Floyd 
and Pillow disappear from the War, for though 
Johnston gave them fresh commands, the appointments 
were not sanctioned. 

This should have been, if followed up, the decisive 
battle of the War. Johnston saw its full importance, 
and it depressed the South more than any event till 
the surrender of Lee. Grant says in his " Memoirs," 
" My opinion was and is still that immediately after 
the fall of Fort Donelson the way was opened to the 
National forces all over the South-West without much 
resistance. If one general who would have taken 
the responsibility had been in command of all the 
troops west of the Alleghanies, he could have marched 
to Chattanooga, Corinth, Memphis, and Vicksburg 
with the troops we then had." 

^ Grant moved on Clarksville, which he found evacu- 
ated, but had not then enough transport to attack 
Nashville. The fall of Fort Donelson broke Johnston*s 
great line, and he fell back to a new one 200 miles to 
the south, along the Memphis and Charleston Rail- 
way. This made Nashville untenable, and Thomas 
occupied it early in March, by Buell's orders, who 
also had sent Mitchel against Bowling Green in Feb- 
ruary, to prevent help being sent to Fort Donelson, 

' S.W. Valverde, N.M., February 2 1st. 



EVENTS IN MISSOURI 129 

which place he entered without resistance. Johnston's 
retreat left the Confederate position at New Madrid 
and Island No. 10, the left of their old line, uncovered, 
and Pope was sent against it, while Grant followed 
Johnston directly. The Memphis-Corinth-Chattanooga 
Railway was vital to the safety of the Confederacy, 
and Beauregard^ who commanded near Corinth, 
wanted to collect 40,000 men, and attack Paducah, 
but Johnston disapproved, thinking it better to con- 
centrate on the spot, take the offensive, and fight a 
decisive battle near the railway. 

While these operations were going on in Kentucky, 
another attempt was made to drive the Confederates 
out of Missouri, and undo Hunter's aimless retreat 
when he took over the command from Fremont, which 
left much of Fremont's and Lyon's work to be done 
again. At the end of 1861 General Curtis had come 
to take command of the Army of the South-West, 
and marched against the enemy on February loth. 
^Johnston had put the Confederate army under the 
command of Van Dorn, an able man, and a trained 
soldier, since Pj'ice and McCnlloch, who were com- 
manding separate detachments at the time of the 
Union advance, were never likely to pull together. 
Price retreated before Curtis into Arkansas, and joined 
McCnlloch ; Van Dom's headquarters were at Pocahon- 
tas, whence he hastened to the arm}^, and on March 6th 
tried to cut off a detachment under Sigel, but the 
latter got back to his main body. Van Dorn then 
moved in the night to get round Curtis' entrenched 
position, but was discovered ; McCnlloch made a 
furious attack on the 7th, but was beaten off and 
killed ; Van Dorn and Price, however, on the other 
flank, drove the Union line in, but night put an end 
to the fighting. The battle was renewed next day, 
when the Union troops advanced and drove the Con- 
federates off the field. This was the battle of Pea 
Ridge, or as the Confederates call it, Elkhorn Tavern. 

' Map 22, p. 166. 

9 



136 THE FIRST HaLF OF 1862 

With the exception of a raid in October, it gave peace 
to Central Missouri for two years. This battle was the 
converse of that at Wilson's Creek, for here the Union 
side were in position, and the Confederates attacked 
in two bodies, which lost touch, and were beaten in 
detail. The Union strength was 10,500, with 49 
guns; loss, 1,384, including 201 missing. Confederate 
numbers, 16,200, including two Indian brigades, with 
50 guns; loss, 800 to 1,300, including 200 to 300 
prisoners. After this battle, the Confederate forces 
were sent to strengthen their army in Tennessee, and 
Curtis was unopposed, but the area of his control 
was his power of supply. (Continued in West, p. 165 ; 
South- West, p. 176.) 

On February 14th, Halleck ordered Pope to go and 
reduce the position of New Madrid and Island No. 10, 
which the Confederates had fortified when they de- 
cided to leave Columbus. The position was a sharp 
bend, forming two well-defined peninsulas, and the 
island commanded the approach from Cairo. Tipton- 
ville, which was almost cut off by swamps, was 
opposite New Madrid. Pope soon found that he must 
have some heavy siege guns, and till they came, set 
to work to block the river to the enemy. On March 
1 2th, New Madrid was bombarded, and evacuated in 
the night, the Union troops going on to stop the 
river below by Tiptonville. The gunboats engaged 
the island, and there seemed no passing it : Pope tried 
to do so by cutting a canal, opposite, but this gave 
the Confederate engineer time to improve his works, 
and Foote was then asked if he could run past the 
batteries with some of his boats : this was done by 
night, and the batteries below were silenced. The 
Confederates retreated on Tiptonville, Pope pushed a 
strong force across the river, and cut them off, when 
three generals and 7,000 men surrendered, and 150 
good guns were taken, on April 7th. Pope then went 
on against Fort Pillow, farther down, but was re- 
called by Halleck to Pittsburg Landing. 



THE MAIN CAMPAIGN 131 

After the fall of Fort Donclson, Johnston and 
Beauregard were separated, one being in middle 
Tennessee, the other on the Mississippi : it was impor- 
tant to keep them apart, and Halleck sent Grant up the 
Tennessee to harass their communications. On March 
nth,' Halleck's command was enlarged to include all 
Kentucky, which brought Buell under him, whom he 
ordered to move on Savannah, where his army was 
concentrating : this altered the whole position. 

On the Confederate side, Johnston was bitterly 
attacked for the loss of Fort Donelson, but the 
President backed him up. When he retreated from 
Nashville, and was cut off from Beauregard, he gave 
up central Tennessee to effect a junction with him, 
and moved on Corinth via Murfreesboro and Decatur, 
to protect the railways, reaching it on March 24th, 
with 40,000 men. Grant was twenty-three miles away, 
Buell ninety ; it was plainly his best move to crush the 
one before the other could come up, but he waited for 
Van Dorn, coming from Missouri, and lost the chance, 
for Buell was marching all the time. 

Halleck had put Grant's command under C. F. 
Smith, and sent it to Pittsburg Landing, to select a 
site for a depot, with a view to moving on Corinth, 
but the troops were camped on both sides of the 
river, not disposed to meet attack. Grant took com- 
mand again on March 17th, and arranged to advance 
as soon as Buell came, but though he knew that the 
Confederates were concentrating at Corinth, twent}'' 
miles away, he seems not to have altered the scattered 
dispositions , his headquarters were at Savannah, the 
point on which Buell was moving, nine miles awa}', 
and he used to go to Pittsburg Landing in the day- 
time and back at night.^ 

' E. "Monitor" and ^^ Merrimac" Hampton Roads, Va., March 8th. 

W. Pound Gap, Ky. , March 6th. 

W. Pea Ridge, Ark., March 5th-8th. 

S.E. New Berne, N.C., March 14th. 
■^ E. Kernstown, Va., March 23rd. 

S.W. Apache Cafion, N.M., March 26th-28th. 



132 THE FIRST HALF OF 1862 

Before starting to join Grant, Buell had sent G. W. 
Morgan to seize Cumberland Gap, which after some 
manoeuvring against Kirby Smith he succeeded in 
doing, while Mitchel, in middle Tennessee, was to 
strike at Huntsville, Alabama, and occupy the Mem- 
phis-Charleston railway, which he did immediately 
after the battle of Shiloh, but he destroyed bridges, 
which was not wanted to be done. Mitchel was much 
bothered by a cavalry raid under John Morgan, who 
surprised some detachments, but was defeated at 
Lebanon, Tennessee. Though organized opposition 
was over, yet a good deal of guerilla warfare went on, 
which gave him much trouble in holding the main 
line for over a hundred miles, from Stevenson to 
Decatur and Tuscumbia. 

On April 4th, Grant's outposts had a sharp skirmish 
with the Confederate cavalry, but even though it was 
now clear that Johnston was advancing, Grant neither 
concentrated his scattered force nor moved his own 
headquarters to the threatened point : he had been 
a good deal hurt by his horse falling with him, but 
this hardly seems to account for the neglect. Johnston 
had intended to attack on the 5th, but the formation 
of his army took so much time that a surprise that 
day was out of the question : he attacked, however, 
the next day, with three Arm}- Corps, each in one 
line, a most cumbrous formation in such thick ground 
(cf. p. 160). He drove Grant's men steadily back from 
near Shiloh Church into a corner by Pittsburg Landing, 
between the Tennessee River and Owl Creek, but was 
killed about 2.30 p.m., and Beauregard took command. 
As the assailants got nearer the river they came under 
the fire of the gunboats, a deep ravine protected the 
Union flank, and the retreating guns formed a strong 
line, which checked them : just in the nick of time 
Buell's leading brigades came up, and the Confederates 
drew off for the night, the newcomers taking up the 
Union outposts : the battle was saved. The next 
morning. Grant, now strongly reinforced, attacked, 



SHILOH AND AFTER 133 

and by evening the Confederate army was in full 
retreat on Corinth. In this battle, commonly called 
Shiloh, from Shiloh Church, which was in the centre 
of the battlefield, the brunt of the fight fell on Sherman, 
who gained great credit, but Grant was much blamed 
for his action on and before the first day. 

On the 9th, a force was sent forward in pursuit, but 
its cavalry was driven in by Forrest, who gained time 
for Beauregard to reach Corinth unmolested. Both 
sides had failed in their objects : the Union army had 
not marched to Corinth unopposed, and the Con- 
federates had not beaten Grant and Buell in detail. 
Halleck came and took command on the iith,^ and 
when Pope's and other reinforcements came in he had 
over 100,000 men, but he waited too long for them. 
He divided the army into four Corps, with Grant as 
second in command, and felt his way to Corinth most 
timidly, entrenching at every halt, ordering his leading 
troops not to get into serious action, and allowing the 
enemy to delay him in every way.^ Beauregard was 
reinforced, nominally to over 100,000 men, but sick- 
ness and absence reduced his effective force to 53,000. 
Though his position at Corinth was very strong, it 
was too large for his force, and he could not risk 
being shut up there. He therefore gained as much 
time as possible in order to remove his sick and stores, 
and so well did Halleck's over-caution play into his 
hands ^ that Sherman did not get up to the main 
position, twenty miles from Pittsburg Landing, till 
May 17th, while it was the 27th before anything like 
a general movement was made. This was held off, 
and on the 29th and 30th ^ Beauregard got clear away : 

' S.E. Fort Pulaski, Ga., April loth. 

- S. New Orleans, La., April i8th-28th. 

E. Siege of Yorktown, Va., all April. 

E. Jackso7i in the Valley, Va., all April, 

^ E. Williamsburg, Va., May 5th. 

E. McDowell, W. Va., May 8th. 

* E. Front Royal and Winchester, Va. , May 23rd-25tli, 

E, Seven Fines, Va., May 31st, June isl. 



134 THE FIRST HALF OF 1862 

on the 31st Halleck occupied Corinth. A few days 
later, Beauregard was found in a very strong position 
at Tupelo, but both sides separated without further 
fighting. The Confederate army was redistributed, 
and Beauregard went on sick-leave, being succeeded 
by Bragg. It was in the pursuit of Beauregard from 
Corinth that Sheridan came to the front. He, as a 
smart young professional soldier, was recommended 
for the command of a cavalry regiment, and did so 
well that he was soon given a brigade, after which he 
never looked back, 

Halleck had been wonderfully successful in his 
command, or rather his lieutenants had, for the Con- 
federates had been driven steadily back without a 
check, ever since he took command at St. Louis the 
November before. He now prepared to move East, 
with Chattanooga as his objective, and began by 
sending Buell back into middle Tennessee, to ensure 
the safety of the western part of that State. Buell's 
new orders were based on the fact that the Confederate 
concentration in Mississippi would nearly empty Ken- 
tucky and Tennessee of their troops, which would 
enable him to strike at Chattanooga, but his trouble 
was the long and vulnerable railway from his base, 
Louisville. Halleck ordered him to move on Hunts- 
ville, in June,^and repair the Memphis-Charleston rail- 
way for this attack and future use, and would not consent 
to his advancing via Nashville and McMinnville. 

The possession of Corinth on the Memphis-Char- 
leston line by the North, made Memphis untenable 
by the Confederates, and Forts Pillow and Randolph, 
built for its protection by water, were abandoned ; 
but the Confederates had got together a strong gun- 
boat flotilla, under Hollins, who did not wish to retire 
without trying conclusions with the Union boats, now 

' E. Cross Keys, Va., June 8th. 

E. Port Republic, Va., June 9th. 

E. The Seven Days, Va., June 26th-Tuly 1st. 

3. Naval attack on Vicksburg, Miss., June 26th-29th, 



THE BATTLE OE MEMPHIS 135 

commanded by Davis. Hollins was driven back in 
a small action on May loth, though two Union boats 
were sunk, and Davis followed to Memphis, a de- 
cisive battle being fought on June 6th, in which the 
Confederate flotilla was destroyed. Memphis sur- 
rendered to Davis, who then went up the White 
River, to co-operate with General Curtis, after the 
battle of Pea Ridge, till the end of the month. The 
battle of Memphis decided the control of the Mississippi, 
for, though the great river was still blocked by strong 
works at Vicksburg and elsewhere, the Confederate 
gunboats were almost a negligible quantity thence- 
forward : here and there a few were got together, and 
there were some Union scares of armoured rams, but 
that was all. (Continued on p. 165.) 

The South 

(Continued from p. 95.) In December, 1861, the 
urgent importance of fortifying Vicksburg had been 
pressed on General Lovell, commanding the Confederate 
Department No. /, at New Orleans ; but he was so short 
of both men and means that he could do nothing.^ 
When Fort Donelson fell, however,^ and the Union 
forces came South, the matter became vital ; Beaure- 
gard, an excellent engineer, drew up plans, and the 
fortifications were put in hand early in April and 
pushed forward, so that they were ready before any 
attack came. During the second quarter of 1862, the 
work here was hard and continuous, but there was 
very little fighting. By the middle of June, the works 
were ready, and troops sent to garrison them. Van 
Dorn being sent to take command. 

The command of the naval expedition against New 
Orleans was given to Captain Farragut, who sailed 
from New York on January 9th, and reached his 

' W. Mill Springs, Ky., January 19th, 20th. 
- S.E. Roanoke Island, N.C., February 8th. 
S^W. Valverde, N.M., February 21st., 



136 THE FIRST HALF OF 1862 

headquarters at Ship Island on the 20th. The fleet 
consisted of four screw sloops, of from 22 to 24 guns 
each, one paddle steamer, of 17, nine gunboats, a 
number of mortar-boats, and some armed merchant 
steamers. Bringing the heavy vessels over the bar 
was a difficult operation^ as they had to be lightened 
a good deal, and it was April 7th ^ before all were over. 
The river was defended by two principal works. Forts 
Jackson and St. Philip, nearly opposite each other, 
some ninety miles below New Orleans : there were 
three armoured rams, the ^^Manassas," ^^ Louisiana,'" and 
''Mississippi,'' the two last not quite finished, and several 
others, mostly armed river boats. Besides a number 
of fire-rafts for the attack of the Union wooden fleet, 
there were obstructions, and the river was blocked 
by a line of hulks chained together. The forts 
mounted over 100 guns, but only half of these were 
heavy : there were other works higher up, and an 
inner line close to New Orleans. The weak point of the 
defence was that all its forces were not under the same 
command, the naval command being divided between 
the Confederate Navy and that of the State, and 
independent oi Lovell. The '■'Louisiana " was moored 
near the forts as a floating battery. Farragut recon- 
noitred carefully, and advanced on the i8th, the mortar- 
boats leading : they kept up a heavy fire on the forts 
for two days, as a preliminary, and then the line of 
hulks was broken by two of the gunboats. Farragut 
advanced in two columns on the night of the 23rd : 
the heavy ships covered the gunboats, and the mortar- 
boats kept down the fire of the forts with a continuous 
bombardment while the fleet was passing : one column 
passed within some fifty yards of the forts with little 
loss, being sheltered by the raised bank of the river. 
The Confederates sent down their fire-rafts, but 

' E. Siege of Yorktown, Va., all April. 
E. Jackson in the Valley, Va., all April. 
W, Shiloh, Tenn., April 6th, 7th. 
W. Island No. 10, Tenn., April 8th. 
S.E- Eort Pulaski, Ga., April loth. 



CAPTURE OF NEW ORLEANS 137 

managed them badly, allowing them to drift singly 
with the current, so that they were easily avoided ; 
one, however, was brought down by a tug against the 
flagship " Hartford," setting her on fire when in close 
action with the forts, but she cast it adrift, sank the 
tug, and put the fire out, without slackening her own 
fire ; a gallant performance. Had these rafts been 
lashed in line, sent down in big batches, or steered, 
they would have been very formidable. The ram 
" Manassas " charged the Union fleet, ramming the 
" Brooklyn," and doing damage which would have been 
serious at sea ; she went on to attack the " Mississippi," 
but ran aground, and, being riddled with shot, was 
adandoned and blown up : the ^''Louisiana " hardly used 
her guns, and the undisciplined State Defence fleet 
behaved badly. Some of the Union fleet did not get 
past, but Farragut went on past the other lines and 
anchored at New Orleans. He first destroyed the 
ram ^'Mississippi,'" which would have been ready in a 
few days, and then summoned the forts to surrender 
on the 25th, shelling them till they did so on the 28th :^ 
the ''Louisiana " was set on fire and blown up. A few 
days afterwards the Confederates evacuated Pensacola, 
Florida, the Union forces took possession on May loth, 
and it became the headquarters of the Gulf Squadron. 
It is said that Napoleon Hlrd, of whose intrigues we 
shall see more, had hinted that if New Orleans held 
out he might refuse to respect the blockade, or 
formally recognize the Confederacy. This would have 
been most serious for the Union cause, but Farragut's 
success averted it. 

On May ist. General Butler came and took military 
possession of New Orleans,- and Farragut went on up 
the river : he took one or two small places, but at 
Grand Gulf his gunboats were roughly handled, and, 
though he had the mortar fleet with him, he did not 
think that he could clear the river, without army 

' S.E. Fort Macon, N.C., April 29th. 
^ E. fackson in the Valley, Va., all May. 



138 THE FIRST HALF OF 1862 

co-operation at Vicksburg, which, though not quite 
completed, was strong enough to resist him. He 
withdrew at the end of May,^ for his crews were 
sickly, his ships were knocked about, and the river 
was getting very low. Late in June - he went up again, 
and brought his mortar-boats into action against 
Vicksburg, moving the fleet slowly past the batteries, 
whose fire they could keep down, but that was not 
taking the place or clearing a thoroughfare for steamer 
traffic. He communicated with Davis' flotilla, which 
had come down from the White River. (Continued 
on p. 175.) 

The South-West 

^(Continued from p. 96.) At the beginning of January,^ 
General Sibley moved against Fort Craig, New Mexico, 
with about 2,000 men, his opponent, Canby, having 
3,800, mostly regulars. A battle was fought at Val- 
verde on February 2ist,^ just across the Rio Grande 
from the fort, in which the Confederates had the best 
of it, taking some guns : Canby retreated into the fort. 
Sibley then moved on to Albuquerque and Santa Fe, 
but in March Colonel Slough came to Fort Union and 
took command of the northern section. He moved 
against Colonel Scurry and completely defeated him 
at Apache Canon, or Glorieta^ on March 28th.® Soon 
after, Canby moved out to co-operate with him, and 
fought some indecisive actions : time was all in his 
favour, for when the United States troops had 

' W. Confederates evacuate Corinth, Miss., May 30th. 

E, Seven Pines, Va., May 31st, June 1st. 

E. Cross Keys, Va., June 8th. 

E. Tort Republic, Va., June 9th. 
- E. The Seven Days, Va., June 26th-July ist. 
^ Map 65, p. 420. 

* S.E. Confederate attack on Port Royal, S.C, January ist. 
W. Mill Springs, Ky., January 19th, 20th. 

* S.E. Roanoke Island, N.C., February 8th. 
W. Fort Donelson, Ky., February l6th. 

" E. Kernstown, Va., March 23rd., 



NEW MEXICO 139 

evacuated the territory, they had destroyed or 
removed their stores, and Sibley could not main- 
tain his men, for, though he claimed the territory. 
Confederate paper-money did not circulate, Slough 
was quite able to cover Fort Union, and Fort 
Craig vi'as too strong to attack ; there was, there- 
fore, nothing left for him but retreat. Canby let 
him go, being content with watching him out 
of the country, for he would have had to feed 
prisoners : he was, however, severely blamed for 
his inaction. SibUys retreat was most disastrous : 
he reached Fort Bliss in May, but went on to 
San Antonio when he heard that a Californian 
force was coming against him. This campaign 
ended Confederate control west of Texas, and the 
country was taken over again and administered 
by the Union side. (Continued on p. 176.) 



The Blockade 

(Continued from p. 97.) The Blockade went on 
steadily, the North Atlantic Blockading Squadron 
under Goldsborough, the South under Dupont, mostly 
picking up small vessels in the inner waters : at this 
time, however, the regular blockade-runner began to 
come on the scene, a vessel built for the business, for 
speed rather than amount of cargo, for the profits 
were so great, as prices rose, that it paid to run ships 
of this sort. They mostly started from a port near 
to the blockaded one, Bermuda, Nassau, or Havana, 
the goods coming out in ordinary vessels, from which 
they were transhipped. The trade of Nassau, especi- 
ally, increased enormously : without direct evidence 
it was most difficult to stop the traffic, and vessels 
bound for Matamoros, close to the Texan border, were 
generally ordered to be released if captured, on the 
ground that a neutral port could not be blockaded. 
Contraband of war was even sent via New York to 



I40 THE FIRST HALF OF 1862 

Nassau, but this trade increased so much as to arouse 
suspicion, and soon a most rigid scrutiny was instituted, 
which' put a stop to it. There was no hesitation in 
condemning a vessel of the blockade-runner type if 
caught, but at this time most of them got through, for 
the blockade was not very close, and the risk of being 
hit was small at night, when they always approached 
the coast, where they had private signals to guide 
them in. This service was very well organized, coast 
troops being told off for it, with field artiller}^ in some 
places, so that, even if a vessel had to be run ashore, 
the cargo was often saved. 

Dupont made several attempts to seal up Charles- 
ton by sinking ships in the channel, but without 
success. 

In the Gulf of Mexico the Blockading Squadron was 
divided, the eastern portion being based on Key West, 
the western at Pensacola. Farragut took command of 
this latter district in February. The principal ports 
were New Orleans and Mobile : the first was taken 
in April, but Mobile, though easy to blockade, was 
also easy to defend, being at the head of a large 
bay, with a narrow entrance guarded by strong 
forts : there were inner channels among the islands, 
which were most difficult to watch. Galveston, 
Texas, was easy to blockade, and not well de- 
fended. During the first half of the year, Farragut 
was up the Mississippi with the bulk of his com- 
mand, leaving a few small vessels to maintain as good 
a blockade as they could. (Continued on p. 177.) 

The War at Sea 

(Continued from p. 98.) The ''Sumter's" career as 
a cruiser ended in 1861, though she was not actually 
sold till December, 1862. The ''Nashville " started back 
from Southampton in February, and took two prizes, 
after which she was not employed again as a sea-going 



THE ''FLORIDA'' 141 

cruiser, not being strong enough, but was kept at 
Savannah for local defence. 

In March,^ the new cruiser ^' Florida l' built on the 
Mersey, was ready for sea: she was called the "Oreto," 
and was ostensibly to trade to Palermo, but her 
destination was changed to Nassau just before sailing. 
Not an officer or man was enlisted for the Confederate 
service, and she carried no warlike stores, though in 
the United States case for the Geneva Arbitration it 
was stated that she had on board guns and carriages. 
It was difficult to get a commander and crew : Bidloch 
had wanted Pegram of the " Nashville^''' but he had 
gone, and as it was dangerous to keep her lying in the 
Mersey, Captain Low, an Englishman in Confederate 
service, was told to go as a passenger, and at Nassau 
to hand the ship over to Captain Maffitt; but, as he 
had not arrived when she got there, she was detained 
on suspicion, but released, nothing contraband being 
found on board, though Captain Hickley, R.N., who 
examined her, had reported that she was in every re- 
spect fitted as a man-of-war, with magazines, etc., com- 
plete, and could be armed and made fit to go into 
action in twenty-four hours (cf. p. 471). Maffitt arrived 
in May, and took charge, but these delays went on till 
August, for the Northern Navy had established a 
blockade of the channels outside Nassau. (Continued 
on p. 177.) 

Summary 

(Continued from p. 99,) Union Gains. — Nothing in 
the East. In the South-East, the capture of Roanoke 
Island, and control of the inland waters of North 
Carolina, and of most of those of South Carolina and 
Florida. In the West, there were a number of distinct 
steps : Mill Springs, the taking of Fort Donelson, 
Shiloh, the occupation of Nashville, Corinth, Memphis, 

' E. " Monitor" and " Merrimac,'' Hampton Roads, Va., March 8th. 
The " Florida'''' sails from England in March. 



142 THE FIRST HALF OF 1862 

and the Memphis-Charleston railway, and the naval 
battle of Memphis : in Missouri, the battle of Pea 
Ridge. In the South, the taking of New Orleans, 
opening the greater part of the Mississippi, and the 
occupation of Pensacola. In the South- West, the re- 
gaining of the territory west of Texas and Arkansas. 
At Sea, a steadily improving Blockade, 

Confederate Losses. — General Albert Sidney Johnston 
and Brigadier-General Turner Ashby, both killed in 
action. (Continued on p. 179.) 

Notices of Officers 

(Continued from p. 100.) Albej^t Sidney Johnston was 
the hope of the Confederacy, senior to Lee, and better 
known at the beginning of the War. Born in Ken- 
tucky in 1803, he served in the Army from 1827 to 
1834, but saw only Indian warfare: in 1836 he went 
to Texas, then an independent Republic, rose to com- 
mand its Army, and was also Secretary of War. He 
served with credit under General Taylor in Mexico, 
and was given rank again in the United States Army 
after the annexation in 1849. In 1857 he commanded 
the remarkable expedition to Utah with conspicuous 
ability, and commanded in California from December, 
i860, till the outbreak of the Civil War. In the War, 
it would have been well for the Confederates had he 
had the command of the Western States sooner. His 
strategy seemed feeble, in both the Fort Donelson and 
Shiloh campaigns, and his clumsy dispositions lost a 
day at Shiloh, which was important. Personally, he 
was a man of the most noble character, and the idol of 
the South. 

Brigadier-General Turner Ashby, Jackson's Cavalry 
Commander, was rather a typical Southern gentleman 
than a great soldier. A magnificent rider, of reckless 
courage, and indefatigable activity, he preferred the 
excitement of war to its routine duties, and did not 
enforce discipline properly, by which Jackson's plans 



TURNER ASHBY 143 

Suffered, at least once. Still, his strategic cavalry 
handling before the battle of McDowell remains a 
model of such work, and Jackson said that he had 
never known a better partisan officer. Ashby was a 
power in himself, and his death was a serious loss 
to the Southern cause. (Continued on p. 180.) 



144 



THE FIRST HALF OF 1862 



1862 


January 


February 


March 


s 

^ 






8. The "Monitor" 
and " Merrimac" 
i n H amp ton 
Roads. 

17. McClellan starts 
for the Peninsula. 

Jackson in the 
Valley. 

23. Kernstown. 


< 

w 

§ 


1. Confederate at- 
tack on Port 
Royal fails. 


Operations of the Coast Division, 

under B urnside. 
8. Roanoke Island. 14. New Berne. 




7. Paintsville. 
19, 20. Mill Springs 
or Fishhig Creek. 


8. Fort Henry 
taken. 
16. Fort Donelson 
taken. 


6. Pound Gap. 
5-8. Pea Ridge, or 
Elkhorn Tavern. 
Pope before New 

Madrid. 
13. New Madrid 
taken. 


s 
§ 








a 


The " Nashville" at 
Southampton. 


Sibley's Expedition 
Ariz 
21. Valverde. 

The "Nashville" in 


to New Mexico and 

ona. 

26-28. Apache Ca- 
non, or Glorieta. 

The "Florida" sails 
from England, un- 
armed. 

bhe North Atlantic. 



CHRONOLOGICAL TABLE 



145 



1862 


Aprii. 


Mav 


JuNB TO July 1 




McClellan's Siege of 


Yorktown to 5. 
5. Williamsburg. 








31, June 1. Fair Oaks, or Seven Pines. 




Jackson's Campaign 


in the Valley, to 15. 


a 




8. McDowell. 8. Cross Keys. 


f5 




23-25. Front Royal, : 9. Port Republic, 






Winchester. 


12-15. Stuart's ride. 
26 to July 1. The 

Seven Days' 

Battles. 




Gillmore's Coast 








Operations. 








10. Fort Pulaski 






4j 


taken. 






w 


Burnside's Coast 






S 


Operations. 









29. Fort Macon 






tc 


taken. 








The Shiloh Cam- 








paign. 








6, 7. Battle of Shi- 




6. River battle of 




loh. 




Memphis. 


1 


Halleck's advance 


17. Halleck before 




on Corinth. 


Corinth. 




8. Pope takes Is- 


Beauregard evacu 


ates Corinth and 




land No. 10. 


retreats to 


Tupelo. 




18-28. Farragut 








takes New Or- 








leans. 



















26-29. Naval a t- 
tack on Vicks- 


< 






burg. 


Sibley's retreat to 


Texas. 




< 


17. France declares 






^^H 


War on Mexico. 














^ i 








r 

to 









10 



CHAPTER VIII 

the second half of 1 862. the confederate rally 

General 

(Continued from p. 105.) In September, 1862, came 
Lincoln's Proclamation emancipating the slaves, the 
steps leading to which are better put here in a con- 
nected form than kept to their strict chronological 
order. It must be remembered that Lincoln was 
elected on Union, not Abolitionist, lines, and always 
acknowledged it, so that this Proclamation was a dis- 
tinct change of policy. 

In August, 1 86 1, Congress passed what was called 
the Confiscation Act, providing that "any propert}^ 
used by any persons for the purpose of taking part 
in insurrection against the United States shall be law- 
ful prize, and be condemned as such." This included 
slaves, such hostile employment vitiating any future 
claim of ownership. It was called unconstitutional, 
but Congress claimed that it had a perfect right to 
deal with the exceptional situation. The Act did not 
emancipate slaves as such, but only those directly 
employed in work for the furtherance of the War 
against the United States. At that time it was thought 
that an Emancipation Proclamation would have been 
dangerous to the Union, as it might have lost Kentucky 
and Missouri, and locked up many more troops in 
Maryland. 

In March, 1862, Lincoln sent a Message to Congress, 

146 



EMANCIPATION QUESTIONS 147 

advocating the gradual abolition of slavery, and in- 
viting the co-operation of slave-holding States. Though 
adopted by Congress, no States responded, and the 
attempt fell through. In April, slavery was abolished 
in the District of Columbia. 

General Fremont was removed from command in 
Missouri in November, 1861 (cf. p. 92), for what seems 
a similar step to the Confiscation Act, but the difference 
lay in this, that his proclamation confiscated the 
property of persons " in rebellion," and declared their 
slaves free, without the proviso that such property or 
slaves must have been used against the Union, and 
further, would have been dangerous in the hands of 
such a rabid Abolitionist. The North was not at this 
time strong enough to enforce the Act, and it remained 
a dead letter till July, 1862, when another Act was 
passed which declared forfeit to the United States the 
property of all persons taking part in, or aiding, 
rebellion, after sixty days from the giving of public 
warning by the President, and that all captured or 
escaped slaves " be deemed captives of war, and be for 
ever free of servitude. That, except for some crime, 
no slave escaping, and being claimed, be delivered to 
his owner unless he shall prove that he had nothing 
to do with rebellion." This was practically Fremont's 
proclamation of the year before, the point lying in 
Congress treating Secession as treason and rebellion, 
under the section of the Constitution which authorized 
measures " to suppress insurrections." This could 
not be carried into practice in the conduct of the 
War, nor, in the case of at least one State, be legally 
maintained. 

Slavery, though, could not be ignored any longer, 
because each Union general dealt with it in his own 
way, often politically. Sherman, for instance, who had 
been a lawyer before the War, instructed his officers 
to mete out plain, substantial justice, to have nothing 
to do with confiscation, and to restore the property of 
those who took the oath of allegiance, holding that "all 



148 THE SECOND HALF OF 1862 

persons living in ttie lines are presumed to be good 
citizens, and are entitled to the protection of the laws 
of the United States so long as they conform to them," 
and that " every opportunity should be given to the 
wavering and disloyal to return to their allegiance." 
He disapproved of harsh measures, as likely to em- 
bitter and prolong the War, and it would have been 
well had his clear view of justice and common sense 
been generally acted on by the country. 

In August, an Emancipation Proclamation by 
General Hunter was disallowed, on the ground that 
such matters were the prerogative of the Executive, 
and ultra vires in a subordinate ; but, in the first 
half of September, Lee's victorious army was on 
Northern soil, at the very doors, Bragg was march- 
ing through Kentucky towards Louisville, a superior 
Confederate force advancing to take Corinth and 
the strategic railway, and Nashville in great straits, 
closely besieged : chaos reigned at Washington, 
Halleck was incapable, the politicians panic-stricken, 
and the strain on President Lincoln became insupport- 
able. A deeply religious man, who viewed slavery 
from the moral standpoint, he became convinced 
that these continual defeats were the judgment of 
God on the nation which would not abolish it, and 
vowed to Heaven that he would do so, if a victory 
were vouchsafed to the Union arms. A day or so 
later, Lee's invasion had failed, the Proclamation of 
Emancipation was issued, and then followed, in quick 
succession, the failure of Bragg s stroke, the defeat of 
Van Dorn before Corinth, and the relief of Nashville. 
This new departure in principle made the War "before 
all the world, not only a war for a political union, but 
also a war against slavery," and had the greatest 
effect on European opinion, where it " created so 
commanding a sentiment in favour of our cause that 
our enemies there could not prevail against it." It 
did not cause the dissensions in the North which had 
been feared, and checked the alarming increase of 



PRISONERS AND RECRUITING 149 

political power which the continual failures of 1862 
had given to the Democrats. 

An important matter in the conduct of the War was 
settled on July 22nd, when a regular Cartel of 
Exchange was arranged between the two Govern- 
ments (cf. p. 98). Previous to this, the Union 
Government, though unable in practice to treat 
prisoners as rebels, had refused officially to recognize 
them as prisoners of war, but in 1862 the Confeder- 
ates held the greater number of prisoners, and the 
obstinacy of the North was injuring their own peopU 
Prisoners had been exchanged before this arrange- 
ment, but the negociations were irregular and un- 
certain. 

Both sides now began to feel the pinch of keeping 
up their armies to strength, and replacing the drain 
of war. Lincoln, in July, issued his famous call for 
300,000 men, to serve for three years or the duration 
of the War, which inspired one of the most stirring 
calls to arms ever written, curiously enough by a 
Quaker, beginning, " We are coming. Father Abraham, 
three hundred thousand more." The Confederates 
felt the difficulty worst, owing to their smaller popula- 
tion: though they had at first thought out the measures 
for making war better than their opponents, they had 
overlooked this vital matter. When enthusiasm was 
high, voluntary enlistment was enough, but when the 
novelty passed off, and the small pay was considered, 
conscription became necessary, as the only means that 
could be devised for the preservation of the army. 
Sherman says, " the progress of our Western armies 
had roused the rebel Government to the exercise of 
the most stupendous energy. Every man capable of 
bearing arms in the South was declared to be a 
soldier, and forced to act as such. All their armies 
were greatly reinforced, and the most despotic power 
was granted, to enforce discipline and supplies." The 
Confederate Conscript Law, passed in the previous 
April, rendered all men between eighteen and thirty- 



ISO THE SECOND HALF OF 1862 

five liable to service during the War, making them 
subject to the Confederacy, and annulling State 
control (cf. p. 330). 

In the East, the Union object was clear, to cover 
Washington and the retreat of the Army of the Poto- 
mac, and stop Lee^ measures of defence, pure and 
simple, though the politicians should have seen that 
their order of importance ought to have been inverted. 
The same course had to be adopted in the West, 
owing to the dispersion of Halleck's great army, which 
gave the Confederates a chance of invading Union 
soil here also ; but both here and in the East they 
made the fatal mistake of mixing political and military 
objects, and expecting men to rise with help who would 
not do so without it (cf. p. 481). Chattanooga had 
now become a vital strategic point, in Missouri and 
Tennessee guerilla warfare was going on, and on the 
Mississippi things were in statu quo. (Continued on 
p. 187.) 

The East 

(Continued from p. 123.) McClellan made his position 
at Harrison's Landing very strong, and there he re- 
mained for some six weeks. Lee watched him with a 
brigade of cavalry, and on the night of July 31st bom- 
barded his camps : he concentrated the army nearer to 
Richmond, where it could act in any direction. Pope 
had taken up his new command just at the beginning 
of the Seven Days' battles before Richmond, and 
began with an able disposition, which covered the 
ground well, watching both the important junction at 
Gordonsville and the Shenandoah Valley. His line 
was along the Rappahannock, with a division at 
Fredericksburg to keep open the line to Acquia Creek, 
an isolated position, which was ordered from Washing- 
ton against his wish. He objected to McClellan's 
change of base as giving the Confederates the chance 
of exchanging Capitals, which would be fatal to the 
North, but not to them, for Lee was thus put between 



POPE'S FIRST MOVES 151 

the two Union armies. Both in numbers and quality, 
the Army of Virginia was inferior to the Army of 
Northern Virginia^ and Pope's chance was to act in 
concert with a diversion by McClellan, but though 
the latter planned to attack again, he was not allowed 
to do so. Here arose a dangerous impasse, two in- 
dependent Army Commanders being at cross pur- 
poses, and Pope suggested that his old chief, Halleck, 
be placed in command of both, but the President went 
further, and made him Commander-in-Chief, without 
consulting Stanton, who was furious with what he 
called Pope's interference. Had McClellan been 
trusted, his army would have been kept to hold 
Lcc fast at Richmond, but he was impossible, and 
was brought back in August. 

When Pope took up his new command he quite 
lost his head, and issued a most unfortunate and 
bombastic order, which set every one against him, 
and his sneers at the Army of the Potomac did not 
mend matters. Sigel was put in command of his First 
Corps,^ vice Fremont resigned. Lee had sent Jackson 
to secure Gordonsville, when first threatened, but 
soon Pope repeated the attempt in force, with Banks' 
Corps.^ Banks' orders were vague, and he thought 
Jackson was to be attacked, but Pope only wanted him 
kept in check : the attack was made on August 9th 
at Cedar Mountain, and was severely beaten. Pope 
had begun well, and made Lee weaken his army by a 
large detachment, but when McClellan began to leave 
the Peninsula, Lee's hands were much freer, for he 
could either fall on the retreating army with his full 

' There is much confusion in Corps nomenclature at this time. The original 
Corps of the Army of the Potomac were designated by Roman numerals, 
Pope's Corps by words. Thus McDowell's Corps was both the 1st and the 
Third, Sumner's the Ilnd, Banks' the Second, Heintzelman's the Illrd. 
After this all Corps were numbered consecutively, but there were so many 
changes from amalgamation and new units, that it would be useless to try 
to follow them. 

■ S. The ^^ Arkansas'' in action, July 15th. 
W, Morgan^ Raid in Kentucky, July. 



152 THE SECOND HALF OF 1862 

weight, or use part for this, watching Pope with t he 
rest, or neglect McClellan and throw all his weight on 
Pope, who was rather in an exposed position. ^ He 
chose the last, and even before McClellan went, he 
was confronting Pope with 55,000 men, outnumbering 
him by 20,000. Pope's communications at Culpeper 
being rather exposed, he made a skilful retreat behind 
the Rappahannock, covered by his cavalry, and took 
up a line from Sulphur Springs to Kelly's Ford. 
Halleck, however, hampered him by making him keep 
open communications with Acquia Creek, by which 
McClellan was to advance to his support, and Lee^ 
seeing the danger of this, resolved to strike at once : 
he concentrated his army on the 21st, and then began 
some skilful manoeuvring on both sides. Lee tried 
several times to cross the river, and Jackson got a few 
men over, but they were cut off by a flood : Longstreet 
watched the river from Rappahannock Station to 
Kelly's Ford. Lee meant to turn Pope's right and 
move on Manassas via Warrenton, but Pope saw this, 
and formed the bold plan of crossing the river and 
attacking him in flank and rear, asking Halleck to 
move the reinforcements to conform (cf. p. 451). The 
plan was spoilt by a freshet on the night of the 22nd, 
when Pope, seeing that Longstreet could not cross, 
neglected him, broke the bridge at Rappahannock 
Station, and concentrated at Warrenton. Stuart 
made a raid and took a few prisoners, and Jackson 
retired from Sigel's front, Longstreet taking his place. 
Lee was now in a very bad position, for Pope had 
detained him far longer than he had expected, and 
McClellan's army was coming up ; he therefore had 
recourse to the really desperate move of sending 
Jackson round by White Plains and Thoroughfare 

' S. Baton Rouge, La., August 5th. 
S. Farragut and Williams at Vicksburg, Miss., August. 

The " Florida " and " Alabama " armed at sea, August. 
W. Raids of Forrest and Morgan, middle of August. 
W. Bragg invades Kentucky, August, September. 



EVENTS BEFORE MANASSAS 153 

Gap on Manassas, two days' march ahead of Longstrcct, 
who followed by the same road, thus dividing his 
army to make a flank march round an enemy of about 
equal strength, who held interior lines, and might 
defeat the operation in detail. 

So far the manoeuvring had been in Pope's favour, 
but he now trusted to Halleck to secure his rear, 
only sending one division to Manassas: he thought 
that Jackson was going for the Shenandoah Valley, 
but should have made Thoroughfare Gap safe. Be- 
tween the 24th and 26th he was reinforced by some 
23,000 men, four divisions of the Army of the Potomac 
and reserve troops, but he groped about slowly, while 
Jackson marched, and reached Bristoe Station undis- 
covered with 25,000 men, on the 26th. Pope was so 
positive that Jackson was going to the Valley that 
he sent no troops either to Thoroughfare Gap or 
Gainesville : he also trusted to Halleck, a fatal 
mistake. When he heard of Jackson's proximity, he 
thought it was a raid, and sent a small force to drive 
him away, ordering concentration at Gainesville, but 
the action showed him that Jackson was in force 
between him and Washington. Though the latter 
had destroyed the great Union depot at Manassas, he 
was in the greatest danger, for the Union army was 
closing in, Lee was not up, and he could neither stay 
where he was nor retreat : he therefore moved to 
the old battlefield of Bull Run on the 27th. Pope's 
dispositions were sound, and would have put him in 
the best position to deal with any developments, 
besides cutting o^ Jackson, but the Fog of War de- 
scended on him, and he got bewildered and excited. 
He saw that only a portion of Lee's army was before 
him, and without waiting for exact information, 
jumped at the idea of " bagging the crowd," and 
concentrated on Manassas, changing the positions of 
well-placed troops, and losing a day, which saved 
Jackson. McDowell, however, had kept his head, 
and sent Buford's cavalry to Gainesville, which met 



154 THE SECOND HALF OF 1862 

Longstreet at White Plains, and disclosed the whole 
situation : he promptly ordered Sigel, who was 
under his command, to stop Longstreet at Haymarket, 
sending a division to flank him at Buckland Mills, 
and at the same time looking out for Jackson. On 
getting Pope's orders to move on Manassas, he left 
one division and the cavalry to hold Longstreet, which 
actually did so for a whole day, and brought the rest 
in. Sigel had found Jackson, whom Pope might have 
destroyed, but for the concentration. When this was 
done, Jackson had gone. Pope ordered a pursuit, 
Jackson, finding his enemies gone, did the same, and 
ordered A. P. LI ill to pursue ; but Hill had captured 
some despatches, knew Pope's plans, and joined the 
main body. Pope thought that King, whose division 
was \\o\d\ng Jackson at Gainesville, was pursuing him, 
and let things go on, but had he known it, Jackson 
was at his mercy. Both sides were entirely in the 
dark on the 28th. King and Ricketts, who had been 
fighting Jackson and Longstreet separately, knew 
nothing of Pope's plans, and retired to Bristoe Station. 
Pope intended to move in overwhelming force against 
Jackson's supposed flank and rear the next day, but 
his orders were badly worded, especially those to 
Porter (Vth Corps) : even when he got the day's 
reports, and altered the orders, they were still un- 
suitable, for he refused to believe that Longstreet was 
up, and persisted that he could destroy Jackson ; but 
his chance was gone, his supplies done, and his men 
worn out. He now forbade a general action, ordering 
a retreat behind Bull Run for supplies, if the enemy 
were in force, intending to take position at Centreville, 
pick up his reinforcements, and fight there, a good 
plan, had he stuck to it. These were the orders 
for the 29th. Porter and McDowell were to go to 
Gainesville, but as they went they saw the battle at 
Groveton, and heard that Longstreet was close at 
hand. On this morning, Jackson, behind Bull Run, 
did not know whether Longstreet could get through, 



GROVETON AND MANASSAS 155 

for he was quite cut off, and thought best to take a 
position at Groveton, where he could hold on, and 
gain time for the Confederate concentration. He 
was attacked by Sigel and Reynolds, but held his 
own, and soon heard that relief was near, but the 
whole Union Army was also near, and the fight not 
over. He had beaten off Sigel, when Pope arrived, 
took command, and made a concentrated attack on 
him, in which battle his terrible powers of counter- 
stroke were never more effective. Longstrcet seemed 
to have escaped notice, and only came into action in 
the evening, to some extent. Porter and McDowell 
found that their orders were unsuitable to the real 
situation, and could get no answer to their messages 
to Pope : McDowell moved off, leaving Porter to 
confront the whole of Lougstrecfs Corps. When 
Pope's orders came, they dealt with an unreal situa- 
tion, and had they not done so, it was then too late 
to carry them out. Had Pope's whole army been 
up early, it might still have been possible to crush 
Jackson, but, when he arrived, he seemed quite to have 
forgotten his own orders and intention not to fight a 
general action on that ground ; but he may have still 
thought that his original plan was possible. 

The Confederates fell back a little during the night, 
and Pope still maintained that they were retreating : 
he was furious with Porter for not carrying out his 
impossible orders of the day before, and thought the 
report oi Longstreefs Corps being present was only an 
excuse. He elected to fight it out there, and gave 
orders to " pursue the enemy." Lee saw the mistake, 
and let it go on, for he had formed one of the greatest 
plans of his life, trusting to Jackson's weakened Corps 
to bear the brunt of the Union attack, while Longstrcet 
moved round to take Pope in flank. Pope did not 
expect an attack on his own left, and had withdrawn 
troops which covered the left of his own attack, which 
was beaten. McDowell, in this part of the field, saw 
the danger, and took steps to meet it, and at last 



156 THE SECOND HALF OF 1862 

Pope saw it too, and acted promptly and well, but 
too late. 

Jackson could only just hold his ground, with sup- 
port from Longstreefs artillery. Longstreet struck at 
the salient of the Union position, Bald Hill, Jackson 
advancing at the same time. The position was at 
length carried, but the Henry Hill held out till dark, 
and under cover of this defence the Union army 
retreated across Bull Run in good order ; there 
was no pursuit, and just after the battle 20,000 good 
fresh troops came up, from the Hnd and Vlth Corps. 

The Union army had 55,000 men in action, the 
Confederates 54,000 : the Union losses for the two 
days are not separated from those of the rest of the 
campaign, but the Confederates lost 9,474. The battle 
was fought on the old Bull Run battlefield, with the 
positions reversed, and is generally called the Second 
Bull Run, or the Second Manassas^ but the two would 
seem to be better described if the first was called 
Bull Run, the other Manassas. 

On the 31st the Confederates began to move, and 
Jackson got the worst of a severe action with the IXth 
Corps at Chantilly : Pope's army was withdrawn to 
the lines of Washington next day. 

Neither Pope nor his men were demoralized, but 
the public were, and Halleck, who at first behaved as 
if he still trusted him, was too weak to resist their 
pressure, suddenly removed him from command, and 
put no one in his place : then the army did go to 
pieces. 

Had Pope fallen back on his communications on the 
25th and 26th, he would have caught Jackson isolated 
and crushed him, and had he stuck to his plan of fall- 
ing back to Centreville on his supports, he would have 
got away safely ; but he fought a general action with- 
out them. He had not the confidence of the army, 
like McClellan, and his braggadocio and abuse of the 
Army of the Potomac set every one against him. He 
disappears from the War. 



BANKS SAVES THE SITUATION 157 

Just before the battle, McClellan reported to Halleck 
at Washington, but the latter was helpless, as ever, 
in emergency, so McClellan did the work, but had to 
wait for sanction for everything: but for this, the Vlth 
Corps would have been up before. He was expressly 
limited to the command of the Washington lines, even 
after the battle. He wanted to know whether the 
troops, 70,000 good men, were to be used to help Pope 
to win, or to defend the Capital, and while Halleck 
vacillated. Pope was beaten. Pope being dismissed, 
and matters getting worse, Lincoln took charge, and 
on September 3rd appointed McClellan to command 
the army. This change was made possible by the 
nerve and ability of Banks, on whom the weight fell, 
through Halleck's default. Though too ill to take the 
field himself, he was directed to assume command at 
Washington in McClellan's absence, and through his 
exertions chaos was reduced to order, McClellan's 
army was enabled to start, and steady re-organization 
went on at Washington. He made the situation safe. 
Lincoln thought that Lee might cross the border, and 
that Baltimore and Pennsylvania must be covered as 
well as Washington. Lee gives his plans thus: That as 
Virginia was now clear of the enemy, it was desirable 
to keep it so, and also to move into Maryland, since 
its " condition encouraged the belief that the presence 
of our army would induce the Washington Govern- 
ment to retain all its available force to provide against 
contingences," i.e. that he {Lee) would utilize the 
known Southern sympathies of the State. His mili- 
tary plan was " to cross the Potomac east of the Blue 
Ridge, in order, by threatening Washington and 
Baltimore, to cause the enemy to withdraw from the 
south bank, where his presence endangered our 
communications. Having accomplished this object, it 
was proposed to move the army into western Mary- 
land, establish our communications with Richmond 
through the Valley of the Shenandoah, and by 
threatening Pennsylvania induce the enemy to follow. 



158 THE SECOND HALF OF 1862 

and thus draw him from his base of supplies." The 
plan was good, giving a chance of striking at one of 
the objectives, and of raising recruits : it would also 
shift the burden of occupation on to the enemy, and 
secure the crops of the Valley and of north-east 
Virginia. Further, the Confederate army was more 
mobile, and McClellan never attacked. There was, 
however, another point, and a difficult one : Were Lee 
and his army in a condition to carry the plan out ? It 
must be done at once, if at all, but the men were in 
rags, and the whole army in urgent need of a refit. 
Was the time or the refit most wanted ? He wanted 
recruits, but the ragged misery of his army was 
not an attractive advertisement. Another thing, his 
numbers were not sufficient to encourage doubters. 
Further, he had not calculated on the way in which 
the defeat of Manassas had united the North, or that 
Maryland was so firmly controlled, that no rising was 
now possible, while Washington was secure. The 
refit was an absolute necessity, and the decision 
must be condemned as ill-considered and premature, 
resulting in more harm than good to the Confederate 
cause. 

McClellan had foreseen Lee's probable move, and 
watched the fords with cavalry, the Confederates 
crossing on the 4th, He moved west from Washing- 
ton, with his right well forward and his left on the 
river, so as to cover both Washington and Baltimore, 
concentrate at once in any direction, and be able to 
follow into Pennsylvania if required. Lee crossed 
at Leesburg, and moved on Frederick, hoping that 
this would cause the retreat of the Union troops at 
Martinsburg and Harper's Ferry, which were on his 
communications; but as it did not, he determined to 
free them as he went, trusting to McClellan's slow- 
ness, and ordered Jackson to clear Martinsburg, and 
McLaws and Walker to take Harper's Ferry. The 
army was to pass the mountains and concentrate I 
near Hagerstown. These orders were issued at 



THE MARYLAND CAMPAIGN 159 

Frederick on the 9th, but a copy was left behind, 
which fell into McClellan's hands on the 13th. He 
had been moving slowly, and Halleck's interference 
made things worse, but he now woke up, for he had 
just time to catch Lee's army separated, and beat it 
in detail. Jackson had cleared Martinsburg, but the 
taking of Harper's Ferry caused a delay which would 
have been fatal had McClellan moved at once ; but 
he delayed till next day, and the danger passed. 
The Union army moved in two bodies, on Cramp- 
ton's and Turner's Gaps, in the South Mountain 
Range, where, on the 14th, was fought the confused 
series of actions for Turner's Gap, called the battle 
of Boonsboro or South Mountain, between the Union 
advance and D. H. Hill and Loiigstrect, who fell back, 
though McClellan did not know this till next morn- 
ing. These actions gained time for the capture of 
Harper's Ferry and the concentration of the Con- 
federate arm}' at Sharpsburg. McClellan had lost 
both chances, of beating Lee in detail, and of saving 
Harper's Ferry. Both he and Franklin, commanding 
the Vlth Corps, were so much impressed with Lee's 
"enormous forces," that they did not press on as they 
should have done. Lee issued a proclamation to the 
people on getting into Maryland, saying that his 
army had come to help them to throw off the yoke 
of the North, which deprived them of their rights, 
believing that they wished to do so, but if this had 
ever been true, they were now under firm control, 
and the proclamation was coldly received. The people 
sympathized with the South, but not to the extent 
of making their State part of the theatre of war. 

Lee heard of the battles of South Mountain and 
the capture of Harper's Ferry at the same time, 
and was astonished at McClellan's new activity, on 
which he had not reckoned. Maryland was apathetic, 
and his political attempt had failed : it was no use 
going on, and he had the choice of either recrossing 
the Potomac or of holding his ground, and chose 



i6o THE SECOND HALF OF 1862 

the latter, though the most risky, because he wanted 
to shew the Maryland people that he was as good 
as his word, and a successful action might cause 
a change in his favour. He therefore took position 
at Sharpsburg with the troops which were up, on 
the 15th, and though McClellan came up, he did not 
attack. Next day Lee changed position to cover 
his retreat better, standing across an angle of the 
Potomac, with the unfordable Antietam Creek about 
800 yards in front of his right and centre. Jackson 
came up, and Hooker's 1st Corps took ground 
opposite Lee's left for the attack next day, and this 
disclosed the plan, which was to attack his left 
strongly at first, and if successful, to push a Corps 
against his right, and cut off his retreat, holding 
him in the centre. This plan was spoilt by delays 
in execution, partly owing to jealousy among the 
Union generals. 

McClellan's orders for the 17th were clumsy, and 
made combined action difficult, and Lee had seen 
through his plan the day before. During the morn- 
ing, the 1st, XHth, and llnd Corps attacked the 
Confederate left in succession, piecemeal, and without 
mutual support, and also were formed in long lines, 
close together, a most clumsy and helpless order (cf 
p. 132): they gained a little ground by the Dunker 
Church, but Jackson retook it with one of his great 
counterstrokes. The holding action in the centre was 
carried out by the Vlth Corps and part of the IVth, 
mostly with artillery, but had McClellan thrown in 
his strong IXth Corps on the Confederate right, 
when Lee had his hands full on the other flank in 
the morning, the Confederate army must have been 
destroyed. The IXth went in alone, after midday, 
and was beaten. Though there was a little desultory 
fighting afterwards, the battle was practically over : 
tactically it was a draw, but an invading army cannot 
afford such a result, and the invasion of Maryland 
was at an end. 



AFTER SHARPSBURG i6i 

The Union army was 87,000 strong, and its losses 
12,500; the Confederate, 35,000 strong, losses about 
9,500. 

Lee's awful losses would have broken down a weaker 
man, and his resolution was never better shewn than 
when he decided, after hearing the reports that night, 
and against the opinion of his generals, not only to 
hold his ground, but to drive in the Union right 
in the morning : he only gave the attack up when a 
careful reconnaissance shewed it to be impracticable; 
but he stood his ground, and offered battle again 
all day, but it was not accepted. It is said that 
in the early dawn of the i8th, the Union scouts 
were checked by seeing an extended fighting-line in 
their front, and waited till it got light, when, as no 
one moved, they advanced and found a line of dead 
men, and that the time gained by this check enabled 
Lee to make his dispositions. McClellan's army was 
much disordered, but his reason for not attacking 
on the 1 8th was probably due to his habitual over- 
estimate of the enemy's strength, and this gave Lee 
the invaluable time required to arrange for retreat : 
that night the Confederate army crossed the Poto- 
mac. Next day there was an attempt at pursuit, but 
Jackson was at hand, and under his direction the 
rearguard turned so savagely to bay that it was not 
molested further, and both armies drew off to rest 
and refit. ^ 

McClellan held the line of the Potomac, inactive. 
On October 6th, ^ Halleck ordered him to go and fight 
Lee, or drive him south, but he did not move, and 
Stuart raided round his army, destroying much 
property, and returning to Virginia in safety. At 
the end of the month, McClellan moved on Warrenton, 

' W. luka, Miss., September 19th, 20th. 

W. Bragg' s Invasion of Kentucky, September. 

W. Siege of Nashville, Tenn., September. 

* W. Corinth, Miss., October 3rd, 4th. 

W. Perryville, Ky., October 8th. 

VV. Fredericktown, Mo., October 21st. 

II 



i62 THE SECOND HALF OF 1862 

to get between Lee and Richmond, and force him to 
concentrate farther south, by Gordonsville, which 
would clear the way for an advance by Fredericks- 
burg or the Peninsula. The North, however, had 
had enough of him, his vapours, delays, and excuses, 
for though he had driven Lee out of Maryland, 
and covered Washington, yet he was impossible, 
always quarrelling with the Government, and at 
loggerheads with his generals, so, on November /th,^ 
he was relieved, and Burnside put in his place. He 
was not employed again during the War, 

McClellan's retirement was immediately followed by 
the trial and disgrace of General Fitz John Porter, for 
the causes of which we must go back a little. General 
Pope's report on the battle of Manassas censured 
Generals Porter, Franklin, and Griffin, and recom- 
mended that they be removed ; but when McClellan 
returned to command, he persuaded the President to 
retain them. When McClellan left, however. Porter 
was relieved on the same day, and the case against 
him only was taken up. He was tried by court- 
martial, charged with disobedience of orders at the 
battle of Manassas, and with shamefully retreating in- 
stead of pushing into action, and cashiered. The 
sequel will be found later on (cf. p. 437). 

When Burnside took command he proposed to 
feint at Culpeper and Gordonsville, and then move 
on Fredericksburg, to go on against Richmond ; and 
this was approved, with the proviso that it be done 
quickly if at all, Halleck engaging that the requisite 
stores, especially pontoons, should be sent forward 
at once (cf. p. 451). Burnside re-organized the army 
in three Grand Divisions of two Corps each, under 
Sumner, Franklin, and Hooker, and moved to the 
Rappahannock in the middle of November; but the 
pontoons were late, and this altered the situation. 
Sumner reached the river on the 17th, and was told 
to wait for the pontoons, at a time when Lee had 

' W. Relief of Nashville, Tenn., November 17th. 



EVENTS BEFORE FREDERICKSBURG 163 

only a weak picquet line along it, Lo)igstreefs Corps 
being at Culpeper, and Jacksoiis in the Valley. Lee 
feared that the enemy would be on him before he 
could concentrate on the Rappahannock, and at first 
thought of taking position on the North Anna River 
in rear, with such troops as he could get together, 
manoeuvring against the Union flank with the rest ; 
but when he knew the reason of Burnside's delay, 
he determined to concentrate the whole army at 
Fredericksburg, as a stronger defensive position, and 
fight there. It was an unfortunate decision, for the 
position had two grave faults : it could be turned by 
the fords above Falmouth ; but especially, the ground 
on the north side of the river would prevent any 
pursuit if successful, and the battle could not be 
decisive. Lee's real reason for fighting here against 
his better judgment, was that the President had 
ordered him not to retire more than he could help, 
hoping for European intervention if he held his 
ground. 

The high ground on the north bank commanded 
the lower wooded hills on the south, which had a 
strip of low land between them and the river ; so Lee 
decided to allow his enemy to cross, and catch him 
deploying on the level, with the river behind him. 
He therefore kept his works and troops well back, 
at the edge of the woods, and, to deceive Burnside, 
did not complete his concentration till the day before 
the battle, but had all troops warned and in easy 
reach. The Confederate army was 78,000 strong. 
Burnside had wished to make Lee concentrate, and 
then slip away by sea and attack Richmond ; but Lee 
watched the lower river till the very last, and the 
Government and public opinion prevented Burnside 
from carrying out his plan : he had to fight there, but 
thought now that he had caught Lee's army scattered, 
and could beat him in detail. 

The Confederate position was six miles long, resting 
its left on the river opposite Falmouth ; and Burn- 



i64 THE SECOND HALF OF 1862 

side determined to attack it straight in front, without 
proper reconnaissance, and making little or no plan 
beyond sending in Sumner's Grand Division on the 
right, Franklin's on the left, and ordering Hooker's 
to follow Sumner. He posted a great line of guns, 
many of them heavy, on Stafford Heights, and threw 
his pontoons over the river in full view of Lees army 
on December nth, when there was some sharp fight- 
ing at the bridges. The morning of the 12th was 
foggy/ and Sumner and Franklin crossed and began 
to deploy ; but Sumner had not room for his numerous 
guns on the cramped ground. Hooker was kept in 
reserve behind the river. The army was 113,000 
strong. Burnside's orders were very vague : those 
to Franklin merely tied his hands and weakened his 
attack, since he had to keep an eye behind him to 
hold the line of retreat open, which was the business 
of the reserve. Franklin had Jackson's Corps in his 
front, while Sumner faced Longstreet. 

The battle of Fredericksburg, on the 13th, was 
very simple. Franklin's attack was strongly met and 
ilanked, but at length he got forward and hrokQ Jack- 
son's first line, but the second line and reserves closed 
in and drove him back with heavy loss. Sumner, 
who had no definite orders, attacked the very strong 
ground of Marye's hill, and was repulsed with fearful 
loss ; and then Franklin was ordered to attack again, 
but could get no more out of his beaten troops. 
Hooker covered the retreat as best he could. Burn- 
side quite lost his head, and thought of attacking 
the next morning with one Corps, but was dissuaded. 
Lee expected an attack, and kept his strong position ; 
but he never could have advanced from it against 
the great line of Union guns. The Union loss was 
12,633, the Confederate 5,377. 

The two armies remained facing each other 
across the Rappahannock till the end of the 

' S.E. Foster's Expedition to Goldsborough, N.C., December I2th-i8th. 



OPERATIONS AT SUFFOLK 165 

year,* the Confederate cavalry making several raids 
within a short distance of Washington. 

Suffolk, on the Nansemond, with the railway to 
Petersburg and Weldon, is the key to the approaches 
to the lower James from the south, and in September 
Generals Pcttigrew and French advanced against it. 
General Peck was sent from Fort Monroe with three 
brigades to seize it, and fortified the position care- 
fully, which alarmed the Confederates, who thought 
that this was to be the base for a new move on 
Richmond : they therefore stopped their advance 
and fortified a line along the Blackwater, against it. 
(Continued on p. 188.) 

The South-East 

(Continued from p. 125.) Foster succeeded Burnside 
in the command of the Coast Force at New Berne, 
and in December- he advanced and dispersed a 
Confederate force which was concentrating at Golds- 
borough ; this was about the only military operation 
in this district in the half-year. (Continued on p. 217.) 

The West 

MISSOURI (cf. p. 130) 

(Continued from p. 135.) After the battle of Pea 
Ridge the Confederates were scattered and powerless, 
though fighting went on here and there, but in Octo- 
ber Colonel Thompson got a force together and began 
marauding in the south-east of the State. Colonel 
Plummer was sent against him with a Union force, 
and completely defeated him near Fredericktown on 
October 21st, after which only guerilla fighting went 
on in places. 

' vS. Holly Springs, Miss., December 20th. 

VV. Chickasaw Bluffs, Miss., December 29th. 

The " Monitor" founders at sea, December 29lh. 

W. Stone's River, Tenn., December 31st. 
- E, Fredericksburg, Va., December 13th, 



i66 THE SECOND HALF OF 1862 

KENTUCKY AND TENNESSEE (cf. p. 1 34) 

East of the Mississippi, at the end of June, Halleck's 
great army was widely scattered, and its communica- 
tions were both long and vulnerable, for subsistence 
necessitated dispersion. McClellan in Virginia had 
begun to agitate for reinforcements from the western 
army, but if this were now weakened, all that had 
been gained would be lost again. Pope had just gone 
East, and Rosecrans took his place. Grant and Buell 
resuming their old commands;^ in the middle of July, 
Halleck went to take up his duties as Commander- 
in-Chief, and Grant succeeded him, but kept his 
army command. Buell, based on Louisville, was at 
Huntsville, Alabama, on the Memphis-Charleston line, 
preparing to strike at Bragg s base at Chattanooga, 
while Morgan was at Cumberland Gap, and the line 
Vicksburg-Port Hudson was the only part of the 
Mississippi now held by the Confederates. Grant 
sent reinforcements to Buell, reducing his own and 
Rosecrans' forces to 42,000. He had to guard 200 
miles of railway, and therefore concentrated at three 
main points, Memphis, Corinth, and Tuscumbia, with 
some troops at Jackson and Bolivar. 

Bragg, who had succeeded Beauregard, was about 
to march from Tupelo to Chattanooga, to which place 
Sidney Joh}tston had sent all surplus stores, and make 
it his base for the next move. Things were going 
very badly for the Union in the East, and he seized 
the opportunity of their dispersion in his district to 
strike a blow, in co-operation with Van Dorn and 
Price from Mississippi, which should at all events 
free Tennessee from the invader, if not drive him 
back altogether. The Union chance was thus lost, 
and Bragg controlled events, for their armies were 
not again united till after the fall of Vicksburg, when 
they were collected under Grant to drive him out of 

' E. Cedar Mountains, Va., July gth. 
S. The " Arkansas " in action, July 15th. 



BKAGG'S PLAN OK CAMPAIGN 167 

Chattanooga. The Confederates made great efforts 
to raid the Union depots and lines of communication. 
In the race for Chattanooga, Bragg had the great 
advantage of marching in country clear of the enemy, 
with no fear for his communications, while his oppo- 
nent was hampered by the repairs of the railway, and 
weakened by detaching troops to guard it against 
Confederate cavalry raids in his rear. John Morgan^ 
heavily defeated in May, started with a fresh raid 
from Knoxville in July, sweeping through central 
Kentucky and destroying depots, telegraphs, and 
railways. He claimed to have travelled over 1,000 
miles in 24 days, destroyed all U.S. stores in 17 
towns, and neutralized and dispersed 2,700 men, with 
a loss of 20, recruiting 300 on the way. At the same 
time Forrest started from McMinnville, and surprised 
and took Murfreesboro, with huge stores and much 
treasure, easily eluding the force sent against him, 
and attacking the line south of Nashville, while 
Morgan dealt with that to the north of it. Buell was 
helpless for want of cavalry, small infantry detach- 
ments being useless, and even when he got it, was 
not at first able to make head. 

Buell knew that Bragg was going to move against 
him, but not by what route, but he assumed that 
Nashville, held by Rosecrans, would be his objective, 
and posted Thomas at McMinnville, on the flank of 
Braggs route. Bragg manoeuvred to confirm him 
in this idea, till the available Union force was con- 
centrated in Murfreesboro, leaving the rest of the 
country clear. Bragg's plan, which was intended to 
free the soil of the South from the Northern armies, 
was for Kirhy Smith to move through eastern Ken- 
tucky to Lexington and thence to Cincinnati, while 
he himself, with the main army, pushed through 
central Kentucky to Louisville. Van Dorn and Price 
were to move on Corinth, to prevent Rosecrans from 
reinforcing Buell. With Louisville and Cincinnati 
in their hands, it would be a short step to the 



i68 THE SECOND HALF OF 1862 

Northern States, and, with the number of recruits 
which they hoped to obtain en route, they could easily 
resist any force brought against them. This had 
been Sidney Johnston's plan, which Bragg, as his 
successor, tried to carry out, but success depended 
on the man, for Johnston was a Kentuckian and most 
popular there, while Bragg was the very reverse, 
and spent the crisis of the campaign in wrangling 
and wasting time with politics, when all his 
thoughts should have been kept for purely military 
matters. 

Kirby Smith threatened Cumberland Gap, and 
Buell detached a force to watch him early in August,^ 
but found that this district was taken from his com- 
mand, which did not help the Union side. Kirby 
Smith cut the post off, perhaps owing to this, and 
then moved on Cincinnati, defeating Nelson at Rich- 
mond, in front of Louisville, on the 23rd, and, while 
threatening the latter place, taking care to keep his 
men together for the decisive battle. Though this ad- 
vance caused the utmost consternation in Cincinnati,^ 
the Kentucky people were lukewarm in the Con- 
federate cause, and did not come forward. Bragg 
moved on Gainesville, forcing Buell to use a parallel 
line farther west, and to leave detachments at various 
places, but missed a chance of bringing him to action 
while in retreat and weakened. Buell would then 
have been driven into Ohio to refit, and Bragg could 
have wintered and recruited in Kentucky, or con- 
centrated against him when he moved south on 
Nashville. Buell, at Murfreesboro, did not find out 
what was going on till the beginning of September, 
and started for Louisville on the 7th, hoping either to 
retard Bragg's march, or to make him, "if he would 
not fight for Kentucky, leave the State in the posses- 
sion of the Union forces before he could gain anything 
by his advance." Though Bragg had the start, he 

' S. Baton Rouge, La., August Sth. 
■' E, Manassas, Va., August 30th, 



BRAGGS INVASION OF KENTUCKY 169 

lost time by taking Munfordsville/ which let his 
opponent up, so he retreated to Bardstown to keep 
touch with his depot at Lexington, and uncovered 
Louisville, where Buell went at once, filled up with 
supplies, and moved out again on the 30th. His 
army now consisted of three Corps and two divisions, 
which latter were sent against Kirby Smith, with 
whom Bragg tried to make a junction, retiring fight- 
ing. He had already given up the great attack on 
the North, for the huge political promises of a rising 
en masse were utterly false, and he was encumbered 
by the mass of supplies which he had brought for 
his intended recruits; he said openly that the State 
was not worth fighting for, and only wanted to get 
away, the battle of Perryville^ being fought as a rear- 
guard action to cover the concentration and retreat, 
while he and Kirby Smith were at Frankfort, installing 
a provisional Confederate Governor of the State. 
Bragg relied on the separation of the Union forces, 
and told Polk, on whom the command of the battle 
fell, to crush the portion at Perryville, McCook's 
Corps, on October 8th. McCook, however, held his 
ground, and the Union army concentrated during 
the battle. Buell intended to attack the next day, 
but found that Bragg had retired in the night. 

Union force : strength 58,000, 22,000 being very raw, 
loss 4,211. Confederates: strength 35,000 to 40,000, 
loss 3,396. 

Buell followed, but Bragg held him off with his 
rearguard, and retreated steadily, the pursuit ceasing 
before he reached Cumberland Gap.^ 

Meanwhile Breckinridge had been besieging Nash- 
ville, and reduced it to great straits : at one time he 
gained considerable success, but Bragg forbade him to 
storm the place for political reasons. It was relieved 

' E. Sharpsburg, Md., September 17th. 

VV. luka, Miss., September 19th, 20th. 

* W. Corinth, Miss., October 3rd, 4th. 

' W, Fredericktown, Mo., October 2ist. 



I70 THE SECOND HALF OF 1862 

on November 17th. Bragg made a great mistake in 
detaching so large a force for this siege, as he wanted 
every available man for his main object. Buell gave up 
the pursuit in order to cover Nashville, for he expected 
Bragg to concentrate within reach of it and fight a 
decisive battle for Kentucky, but he did not do so. 

To go back to the secondary Confederate operations 
in connection with the Kentucky campaign. Bragg 
called up the forces of Van Dorn and Price from 
Mississippi, to prevent the junction of Rosecrans and 
Buell. Price was the nearest, and struck at the Union 
post at luka, which he took, but this gave Grant the 
chance of striking at him before Van Dorn could come 
up : he attacked on two sides, ^ to surround him, but 
the timing of the combination failed, and Price got 
away and joined Van Dorn, Lovell also joining them 
a few days later. Grant was so hampered by the 
Confederate cavalry raids that he used the triangle 
of lines by Humboldt, and made his headquarters at 
Jackson. Van Dorn considered the situation, and 
thought that he could best attack Grant's great 
fortified triangle from the west or north-west against 
Corinth, when success would entail the fall of the 
whole and drive him back into Kentucky, as Bragg 
had driven Buell, destroying the whole fruits of the 
Union campaign from Fort Henry to Corinth. He 
started to carry this out at once, and attacked Corinth 
on October 3rd. After a very severe fight the Union 
forces were driven from the advanced to the main line 
of defence. The battle was renewed the next day, 
Van Dorn attacking the main position furiously. 
Several redoubts were taken and retaken, but the 
main attack failed, the supports being late, and by 
noon the Confederate army was in full retreat. Rose- 
crans could not pursue, for his men were worn out, 
but, being reinforced on the 5th, he started to do so : 
Grant sent other troops to cut off Van Dorn's retreat, 
but he got away, and the troops were recalled. Each 

' September 19th, 20th. 



CHANGES IN COMMAND 171 

side had about 23,000 men in action : Rosecrans' losses 
were 2,359, ^^^^ Dorn's 4,838, There seems to have 
been more blame than praise earned in these cam- 
paigns. Both Buell and Bragg were blamed for the 
Kentucky campaign, and Grant was much dissatisfied 
with Rosecrans in that of Corinth. Sherman says 
that the effect of the battle of Corinth was very great,' 
and enabled the Union side to assume the offensive, 
being a decisive blow to the Confederate cause in 
west Tennessee (cf. p. 240). Jefferson Davis replaced 
Van Dorn by Pemberion, and Rosecrans succeeded 
Buell on November 24th, for Halleck, as soon as the 
Kentucky campaign was over, had ordered the latter 
to make a campaign into eastern Tennessee, on very 
unfavourable lines. Buell answered that it was im- 
practicable, and disposed his men to cover Nashville 
and the railway, on which Halleck removed him from 
command. The fact was, that the greatest pressure 
was being brought to bear on President Lincoln to 
send help to the Unionists of Knoxville and district, 
who were being very roughly handled, and he insisted 
that this be made a matter of urgency. 

Rosecrans, like Buell, expected Bragg to concentrate 
near Nashville and fight for Kentucky, in order to 
save Tennessee also, and began by restoring his 
communications with Louisville ; but Bragg concen- 
trated at Murfreesboro,^ sending out almost all his 
cavalry to raid, on which Rosecrans moved against 
him from Nashville on December 26th. The advantage 
which he so promptly seized was a very real one, for 
Morgan was now in command of a model independent 
cavalry force of two brigades, with artillery. He did 
much damage, but was far away when the decisive 
battle was fought, wasting his power on secondary 
objects ; his presence would probably have turned 

■ W. Peiryville, Ky., October 8th. 

* E. Fredericksburg, Va., December 13th. 

W. Forrest's Raid, late December. 

S. Holly Springs, Miss., December 20th. 



172 THE SECOND HALF OF 1862 

the scale. Bragg was on the watch, and delayed his 
enemy for several days with advanced detachments, 
while he concentrated his army at leisure in his 
chosen position on Stone's River. Rosecrans came 
in front of it on the 29th,^ and spent the 30th in 
reconnaissance and preparation for the attack on the 
morrow. 

Bragg's main body was on the west of the river, 
with a detachment under Breckinridge on the other 
side, covering his base and line of retreat, which 
Rosecrans planned to attack with two Corps, leaving 
one, McCook's, to hold its own for the requisite time. 
Oddly enough, Bragg s plan was exactly the same, for 
his right, under Breckinridge, to hold its own, while 
with the rest he destroyed McCook. Bragg struck 
first, and caught McCook unready, and badly posted, 
Hardee's Corps driving him in with a rush. Luckily, 
the next Union Corps, Thomas', had not yet moved, 
and steadied the fight till Rosecrans came up in 
person. He saw at once that his planned attack must 
be abandoned, and that he could only just hold his 
own, and ordered Crittenden's Corps, which had 
started, to come back into reserve. The fighting 
was most furious, Thomas' stubborn defence being 
gradually driven back, and the reserves brought into 
action. Bragg also was quite alive to the importance 
of the struggle, and threw in his last reserves for a 
final great attack, which was repulsed, and the battle 
ceased from sheer exhaustion, after the most frightful 
losses. The Union line was driven back a good way, 
but still held the key of the position. The result was 
due to Rosecrans' brilliant personal leadership, with- 
out which even Thomas' dogged defence would have 
been of no avail. Bragg brought up his trains, to 
finish it where he stood, but his army was quite fought 
out. (Map on p. 218.) 

To return to Grant, and the headquarters of the 
district. He had started a very important move in 

' S- Chickasaw Bluffs, Miss., December 29th, 



GRANT'S TROUBLES AND PLANS 173 

the administration of the country, the employment of 
freed sLaves within their own districts, on a regular 
system, which was practically the beginning of the 
" Freedmen's Bureau " : they were thus able to main- 
tain themselves at their own homes ; they were not 
at first paid wages, but carefully looked after, and 
supplied with what they wanted in return for their 
labour. 

The military situation was, that he had hardly 
enough troops to defend the district which he occu- 
pied, but might cover it by driving the enemy back, 
and after the battle of Corinth the time seemed 
favourable for taking the initiative : he therefore 
proposed to concentrate at Grand Junction, and move 
down the railway to the back of Vicksburg, Halleck 
ordering Curtis to co-operate with him from Helena. 
He was told that he might soon expect a good 
reinforcement of new levies. He was, however, 
bothered with a political intrigue, for one of his 
lieutenants, McClernand, a man of great political 
influence, had gone to Washington and got the com- 
mand of an independent river expedition against 
Vicksburg behind Grant's back, who heard of it 
when making his new plans, and asked where he 
stood. He was told that he commanded the troops 
in his department, but that operations in Mississippi 
must be confined to the enemy's troops, which must 
be turned by a river column. This looked ver}^ like 
holding Grant back till McClernand had made his try. 
Grant and Sherman talked things over, and seemed 
to have the choice of two courses : 

1. To send Sherman back to Memphis with two 
divisions, to pick up the new levies there, and the 
troops at Helena, and move down the river to 
the mouth of the Yazoo, to attack Vicksburg in rear, 
while Grant co-operated from Oxford. 

2. To concentrate the whole force at Grenada, 
repair the railway to Memphis, and then move 
against Vicksburg via Jackson. 



174 THE SECOND HALF OF 1862 

No. I had the disadvantage that the enemy held 
the interior lines, but as both portions were strong 
enough to take care of themselves, it was thought 
better than No. 2, which meant moving by land alone, 
and repairing railways ; but as they could not be 
used in the later stage of the advance, this would 
be too slow. Admiral Porter and his flotilla were 
to co-operate. 

Halleck was kept informed, and on December 5th 
he told Grant not to go south of the Tallahatchie 
river for the present, and authorized him either to 
command the river column or give it to Sherman : 
he chose the latter, partly to forestall McClernand, 
whom he did not think fit for it.^ On the i8th he 
was told to form his army into four Corps, giving 
one to McClernand, which was to operate down the 
river, and this was the reason why he took command 
himself 

The Confederates were now thoroughly alarmed, 
and put Joseph Johnston in command from the Alle- 
ghanies to the Mississippi, with Bragg and Pemberton 
under him, though he pointed out that the district 
was too large to work. Forrest was sent to rein- 
force Pemberton^ and moved against Grant's com- 
munications, making a most successful raid which 
destroyed the railway from Jackson to Columbus, 
cut off Grant's communications with Columbus and 
Washington, from the 19th to the 30th,^ and stopped 
his supplies for a longer time. Van Dorn also made 
a cavalry raid from Tupelo, and destroyed Grant's 
main depot at Holly Springs, and then attacked 
Bolivar, but was repulsed, and retired to Grenada. 
Grant had sent out his cavalry against the Mobile- 
Ohio Railway, but they were hastily recalled, to drive 
Van Dorn away. The Confederates were using their 
interior line with a vengeance against Grant's luck- 
less scheme No. i, for the raids had a most decisive 

' E. Fredericksburg, Va., December 13th. 
- W. Stone's River, Tenn., December 31st. 



GRANT PARALYSED 175 

influence. Grant had to fall back, and lost touch 
with Sherman, who had started down the river from 
Memphis, with 32,000 men^ without waiting for 
McClernand. He attacked Chickasaw Bluffs, before 
Vicksburg, in pursuance of his orders, on the 29th, 
but was heavily repulsed : he could not keep his army- 
there, on low, unhealthy ground. Grant could not help, 
and he returned to the Mississippi on January 2nd. 
Though all these operations are put in the Western 
district, as I have defined it, for continuity of narra- 
tive, some of them were in the Southern. 

The Mississippi flotilla, whose headquarters were 
at Cairo, was much strengthened, two new types of 
gunboats being added : one light, called " tinclads," 
proof against field-guns and musketry, and of light 
draught ; the other heavily armed and armoured, 
drawing nine feet of water. Porter had succeeded 
Davis in command, and was busy equipping them 
till late in November. Davis, before he went, had 
arranged with General Curtis to scour the river 
on both sides, to prevent the Confederates, who 
were continually attacking Helena, from making a 
lodgment anywhere. A division of gunboats was 
told off to patrol the rivers Tennessee and Cumber- 
land, but the most important change was that the 
control of the flotilla was transferred from the Army 
to the Navy, a great gain in efficiency. (Continued 
on p. 217.) 

The South 

(Continued from p. 138.) Such urgent orders were 
sent to Farragut to take Vicksburg, that though he 
saw that his fleet would require the aid of a large 
land force to do so, he tried with a small one,^ a 
brigade and two batteries under Williams, which 
landed and took position while the fleet ran past 
the batteries, but could do no more. Williams was 
not strong enough to cut the place off by a canal, 

' W. Morgan's and Forrest's Raids, mid-July. 



176 THE SECOND HALF OF 1862 

the season was unhealthy, and he returned to Baton 
Rouge. 

The Confederates had built a powerful ram, the 
^'Arkansas,'' which was attacked by the Union gun- 
boats in the Yazoo River on July 15th, and then 
ran through the fleet to Vicksburg. Van Dorn 
proposed to take Baton Rouge and the mouth of 
the Red River, to keep touch with the West ; but 
his attack on Baton Rouge, on August 5th, failed, 
the ram broke down, and being found useless, partly 
owing to her wretched engines, partly to damages 
received in action, was destroyed. Breckinridge, 
however, secured the mouth of the Red River, and 
seized and fortified Port Hudson : the Union troops 
fell back to New Orleans at the end of the month. 
When communication was made between the fleets 
on the upper and lower river on July ist. Porter 
reported the importance of the Red River and the 
Atchafalaya to Farragut : had these been seized 
and held, the Union side would have gained a solid 
step forward, which was not done by the premature 
attack on Vicksburg. At the end of November, 
some gunboats were sent up the Yazoo under Walke, 
to clear the way for the army, and had continuous 
and severe fighting, losing one of the new heavy 
boats by a mine. 

In December, Banks succeeded Butler in command 
of the Department of the Gulf, being ordered to co- 
operate with Grant, occupy the Red River country, 
protect Arkansas and Louisiana, and form a base for 
operations against Texas. Though his army, now 
numbered as the XlXth Corps, was over 30,000 strong, 
it was so scattered by detachments that only half that 
number was at his disposal (cf. p. 228). (Continued 
on p. 221.) 

The South-West 

(Continued from pp. 130 and 139.) In Arkansas, 
in July, Hindman was sent to re-organize the Con- 



THE SOUTH-WEST. AFFAIRS AT SEA 177 

federate district, and raise a new army, which he 
did with great energy, and Curtis retreated to 
Helena. More troops were collected on the Union 
side, and an " Army of the Frontier " formed under 
Schofield, who nearly cleared the State of Confederate 
forces by the end of the year. Magruder, the Con- 
federate commander in Texas, retook Galveston on 
January ist, 1863, which may be considered as a 
part of the great Confederate rally. (Continued on 
p. 269, Chapter X.) 

The Blockade 

(Continued from p. 140.) The Blockade was being 
steadily drawn tighter in the narrow waters of the 
east coast, and strengthened outside the main ports ; 
but, while Fort Fisher stood, it was always at a dis- 
advantage off Wilmington. Several efforts were made 
to block the entrance to Charleston by sinking ships 
in the channel, but without success. The North suf- 
fered a loss, perhaps more sentimental than very great, 
in the foundering of the famous " Monitor" at sea on 
December 29th, on her voyage to New York. Really, 
however, her defects were known, and a better class 
of vessels of the same type was nearly ready to 
take her place. In the Gulf, Farragut controlled the 
whole coast, except at Mobile and Sabine River. 
(Continued on p. 229.) 

The War at Sea 

(Continued from p. 141.) The Confederates now 
began to make themselves felt at sea. In August 
the ''Florida^' which had been closely watched for a 
long time by the Northern cruisers at Nassau, while 
trying to meet the vessel carrying her armament, 
which was waiting about in the neighbourhood (cf. 
p. 471), succeeded in doing so; but she was short of 
stores and men, her crew were down with fever, and 
she ran for Havana, lying there for some months, till 

12 



178 THE SECOND HALF OF 1862 

her captain, Maffitt, ran the blockade into Mobile to 
fit up properly, and was there till the close of the 
year. In August, also, the " Alabama " met her tender, 
and was armed at the Azores, having left Liverpool in 
July. She immediately began her attack on Northern 
commerce, destroying twenty vessels in the first two 
months in West Indian waters, but was nearly caught 
by the " San Jacinto " in November. The North made 
a systematic attempt to stop these cruisers, telling 
off special vessels for the work, and giving them 
excellent information. This service was in charge of 
Captain Wilkes, of " Trent " notoriety, and he shewed 
his high-handed ways to the detriment of his own 
side, annexing to his own command vessels belonging 
to others which came in his way (cf. pp. 98, 234). 
Farragut and others fell foul of him over this, and the 
friction was a help to the " Alabama " at least once. 
An American steamer, called the " Uncle Ben," had been 
seized in Cape Fear River at the very beginning of 
the War; she was converted to a sailing ship, armed, 
and about November sailed as the cruiser " Retribution" 
and kept among the Bahama Islands, doing much 
damage. 

Meanwhile, Bulloch was not idle in England : he 
had definite orders to build some sea-going ironclads, 
and finally contracted with Lairds' to build two turret- 
ships as soon as possible, which were begun in July. 
Lieutenant North, of the Confederate Navy, was sent 
over with, it seems, independent instructions, and he 
contracted for an armoured frigate, which was built 
on the Clyde ; but, when nearly finished, it was so 
evident that she would be stopped, that she was sold 
to the Danish Government. A small wooden vessel 
was also being built for Bulloch by Miller of Birken- 
head, who built the " Florida" and at the end of the 
year she was nearly ready for launching. 

Although the French Proclamation of Neutrahty 
was much more stringent than the English, since it 
forbade any French subject to co-operate in any 



FRENCH NEUTRALITY 179 

manner ivhatever in the equipment or armament of a 
vessel for either side, yet in 1862 Mr. Slidell, the 
Confederate Commissioner to France, received an in- 
timation that if his Government made arrangements 
to build ships of war in France, the builders would 
not be interfered with, and the ships would be allowed 
to leave French ports on any moderate excuse. This 
hint came from an authoritative source, and we shall 
see the reasons for it later (cf. p. 235). (Continued on 
P- 233-) 

Summary 

(Continued from p. 142,) Though the Confederates 
seemed to have reached the height of their aggressive 
power in September and October, their recoil from 
the extreme points which they then reached was not 
the result of a defeat in battle on either of the two 
main theatres of war, for these expeditions both had 
the defect that they were political as well as military, 
and both Sharpsbiirg and Perry ville were fought when 
the army was retreating, having failed in its political 
object. Corinth was a real defeat, and felt as such, 
but a fortunate battle might still undo the results of 
the Fort Donelson campaign in the West, and they 
were within an ace of winning it at Stone's River. 

At the end of the year, nothing could be more uni- 
formly gloomy than the Union prospects. In the East, 
the Army of the Potomac had just received another 
stunning blow, and was helpless for the time being ; 
but Lee was not in a position to follow up his success, 
and President Davis made the fatal mistake of acting as 
if the War were practically ended, instead of straining 
every nerve to finish off his opponents. Neither Lee^ 
Johnston, nor Bragg was deceived on this point in the 
least. In the West and South, Grant was helpless, his 
troops dispersed, and his communications destroyed : 
Farragut had had to retire on New Orleans, having 
failed in his attempts on Vicksburg, and the Con- 
federates had strengthened their lines on the Missis- 



i8o THE SECOND HALF OF 1862 

sippi : Sherman, isolated from Grant, had just been 
heavily defeated before Vicksburg, and Rosecrans, at 
Stone's River, was driven back and beaten to his 
knees, but still unconquered. At sea, the blockade of 
Galveston was raised on January ist, 1863, the famous 
" Monitor" went down in December, and the " Florida " 
and " Alabama " were let loose, the latter preying 
actively on Northern commerce. 

Union Gain. — The State of Missouri and part of 
Arkansas, the control of the Mississippi from Helena 
to Vicksburg, and almost all the Gulf Coast. 

Confederate Gain. — Galveston, Texas, retaken. (Con- 
tinued on p. 236.) 

Notices of Officers 

(Continued from p. 143.) A number of Generals 
dropped out, and were not employed again in the 
War, of whom the most notable were Generals 
McClellan, Pope, Buell, and McDowell. 

George Brinton McClellan was educated at West 
Point, and distinguished himself in the Mexican War 
as an Engineer : he was attached to the Allied Armies 
in the Crimean War, left the Army as a Captain, and 
became the Manager of the Baltimore and Ohio Rail- 
way, where his great organizing powers had full scope. 
On the outbreak of the Civil War he was given 
the command of the State forces of Ohio, but soon 
got a larger district from Government, and was one 
of the four new Major-Generals first appointed. His 
campaign in West Virginia was brilliant, and the day 
after the battle of Bull Run he was given the command 
of the Army of the Potomac, becoming Commander- 
in-Chief soon after, but he did not hold this office 
long. He raised his army to a great strength, and so 
thoroughly organized and trained it that it never lost 
the stamp of his hand, or its enthusiastic loyalty to 
him personally, which latter fact was, later on, 
embarrassing to the Government. Naturally a man 
of charming manners, his sudden advancement seems 



McCLELLAN i8i 

to have turned his head, and he posed as the saviour 
of his country, somewhat prematurely. He minded 
his own business, and took no notice of amateur 
advice, especially of that of the politicians of Washing- 
ton, but he went too far in the undisguised contempt 
and rudeness with which he treated them all. It is 
difficult to understand why Lee said that McClellan 
was the ablest commander whom he met in the War, 
for his faults as a commander in the field were 
flagrant. He was over-cautious and dilatory, and 
though able to plan could never strike, or throw his 
weight on the decisive point. He was always unduly 
oppressed with the ** enormous forces " of the enemy, 
even when far inferior to his own, and would refuse 
to move till reinforced, which was curious in a man 
so confident otherwise. The devotion of his men was 
also curious, for he was hardly ever .seen in battle, or 
seemed to influence it when it was going on : he was 
no conspicuous, dashing leader, as were Sheridan and 
Stuart. He was always laying on others the blame 
of any failure, and the relations between him and his 
Government went from bad to worse, till he became 
impossible. McClellan is a striking illustration of the 
fact that a very great military organizer, good handler 
of large bodies of men, and fair strategist, may be only 
a mediocre commander in the field on a large scale. 
In the two latter ways his talents seemed to lie in 
a smaller compass, for his little campaign in West 
Virginia was most effective. Still, no account of the 
War can fail to acknowledge his great services, for 
he forged the weapon which others used with crushing 
effect. Though he ran as Democratic candidate for 
the Presidency in 1864, he repudiated the doctrine 
of the extremists of the party, who advocated the 
abandonment of the war as a failure. He was, how- 
ever, beaten by an overwhelming majority. 

Major-General John Pope's only service before the 
War had been in the cavalry on the Indian frontier, 
after he left West Point. He is often called a mere 



i82 THE SECOND HALF OF 1862 

incompetent braggart, due to the effect produced by 
his amazing Order on taking command of the Army 
of Virginia, and by the airs which he assumed; but 
is this judgment fair ? He lost his head and made 
a fool of himself, but an unbiassed examination of his 
work shews him to have been a most able soldier. 
In the West he was considered Halleck's best lieu- 
tenant, and did well whatever was entrusted to him : 
he also did well in the command of a Department, 
and was put in command of the Army of Virginia 
when it was seen that McClellan's retreat would 
uncover Washington. This was a scratch force of 
three Corps, of which only one had much military 
value, yet with these, and some reinforcements from 
the Army of the Potomac, he did as much as, or more 
than, any other Eastern commander on the Union 
side. Though opinionated and obstinate, he was bold,, 
skilful, and wary, quick to plan, to manoeuvre, and 
to strike, the only man who could stand against 
Lee and Jackson on even terms in manoeuvre or 
battle. His good manoeuvring drove Lee to the 
desperate expedient of Jackson's flank march, which 
might almost be described as the gambler's throw 
of strategy, and was only saved from total failure by 
the merest accident ; then, when the battle came, no 
Eastern Union army was so little beaten as was the 
Army of Virginia, the next day. Pope was an 
excellent commander when he could see the situation 
for himself, but had not the gift of writing clear 
orders, and failed in co-ordinating the movements of 
a number of large units. He was the first Eastern 
commander who thoroughly understood the use of 
cavalry, which after his time increased in numbers 
and efficiency. He was also no intriguer, and, though 
aggrieved at the manner of his removal from com- 
mand, did not resign his commission in a huff, like 
some, but accepted as duty the insignificant task of 
keeping order on the Indian frontier. During the 
Reconstruction period, after the War, he was given 



BUELL AND McDOWELL 183 

the military command of one of the disturbed districts 
of the South. 

Don Carlos Buell was a West Point man, a thorough 
soldier, and excellent organizer, who drilled and or- 
ganized his army carefully from the first ; the Army 
of the Cumberland owed its efficiency to him as much 
as did the Army of the Potomac to McClellan, He 
was a good strategist, and the great campaign of Fort 
Henry, Fort Donelson, and Nashville was planned by 
him : at Shiloh he saved the situation. He seems to 
have made few or no bad mistakes in the field, and 
owed his removal to criticizing Halleck's plans, and 
not attempting to do what he believed to be im- 
possible. He was one of the officers who had been 
shelved, to whom Grant, when Commander-in-Chief, 
again offered command in the field, but his Spanish 
pride made him refuse to serve under an officer who 
had been junior to him. 

It seems a mystery why General Irvin McDowell 
held no command in the field after the battle of 
Manassas. An old West Point man, a soldier pure 
and simple, he never intrigued or meddled in politics, 
and it does not appear that he ceased to be employed 
because he was a " McClellan man," as it is almost 
certain that Porter did. Though senior to Pope, he 
worked under him loyally, which good service Pope 
cordially acknowledged. He was an excellent or- 
ganizer, and had the clearest military insight of any 
Eastern Union officer in the early part of the War, 
being the one man who saw through the object of 
Jackson's Valley Campaign, and the way to deal with 
the whole situation ; but his advice was not taken. 
When the Fog of War descended so thickly on Pope 
and Jackson, in the last two days before Manassas, 
McDowell was the only man who saw anything 
through it ; in the battle itself, his information and 
observation were the most accurate, and both the 
measures which he advised, and those which he took, 
throughout, were those best fitted to deal with the 



i84 THE SECOND HALF OF 1862 

situation. His one military mistake seems to be that 
he went too far forward at the battle of Bull Run, 
and lost control of it. He had a sharp tongue, how- 
ever, and was unpopular in the Army. He demanded 
an enquiry after Manassas, as an answer to some 
adverse criticism, but although this was not proved 
true, he was not employed again. (Continued on 
P- 237-) 



CHRONOLOGICAL TABLE 



185 



1862 


Jm-Y 


August 


September 




The Army of the PO|tomac at Harrison's 






Landing, to 15. 






14. Pope and Lee, preliminary, to 23. 






Banks and Jackson 24. Campaign of 


Manassas to 1. 




in the Valley. 29. Battle of Grove- 


3. Pope relieved 


H 


9. Cedar M u n - ton. 


from command. 


5) 

< 


tain. 


30. Battle of Ma- 


McClellan ap- 


W 




nassas. 


pointed. 






31. Chantilly. 


3-19. Lee's Inva- 
sion of Maryland. 

14. South Mountain. 

17. Battle of Sharps- 
burg, or the Anti- 
etam. 


1 








w 

(0 










Morgan's Raid in 


7. Bragg's Invasio 


n of Kentucky. 




Kentucky. 


23. Richmond. 


7. Buell marches 




Forrest's Raid in 




against Bragg. 


^ 


Tennessee. 




Siege of Nashville. 


H 




Van Darn's and P 


rice's Campaign. 


^ 






19,20. luka. 




Guer 


ilia Warfare in Mis 


souri. 






Combined Operation 


s on the Mississippi. 




Porter equip 


ping the new Missis 


sippi flotilla. 




15. The"Arkansas" 


5. Van Dorn at- 






in the Mississippi. 


tacks Baton 






Farragut and Wil- 


Rouge. 




B 


liams attack 1 




§ 


Vicksburg. 






« 


• 


Combined Operation 
Farragut retires to 
New Orleans. 


s on the Mississippi. 




1 
Hindman re-organ- Union " Army of th 


e Frontier " formed 


H « 


izes Confederates j under Schofieldlin Arkansas. 


1^ 


in Arkansas. 1 I The "Florida" goes 


^1 


Ironclads laid 


to Havana. 


B 


down for the Con- The " Florida" and 


The "Alabama" at 


3 


federates, two at the "Alabama" 


sea. 


eo < 


Laird's, one on the i armed at sea. jj 




Clyde. 1 

1 1 



i86 



THE SECOND HALF OF 1862 



1862 


October 


November 


December, to 
January 1, 1863 




McClellan watching 


7. Burnside suc- 






Lee in Virginia. 


ceeds McClellan. 








15. The Fredericksb 


urg Campaign, to 20. 


g 






13. Battle of Freder- 


^ 






icksburg. 
Some Confederate 
raids, nearly to 


East 






Washington. 






12-18. Foster's Ex- 


ii 






pedition to Golds- 



to 






borough, N.C. 




Bragg's Invasion of 








Kentucky, to 20. 








8. Perryville. 








Siege of Nashville, to 17. 






Van Dorn's and 




fc! 


Price's Campaign.; 


Last half of De- 


.5 


3. Corinth. 




cember. Forrest's 


^ 


Thompson and 


24. Rosecrans suc- 


raid on Grant's 




Plummer in Mis- 


ceeds Buell. 


communications. 




souri. 




26. Rosecrans 




21. Fredericktown. 




marches against 




Operations on the 




Bragg. 




Mississippi. 


31. Battle of Stone's 




Porter equippi 


ng his flotilla. 


River. 




Operations on the 




Van Dorn's raid 




Mississippi. 




against Grant. 


H 






20. Holly Springs. 


1 


1 Walke's Gulnboats up the Yazoo. 


c/* 






29. Chickasaw 
Bluffs. 




Schofield nearly cle 


ars Arkansas of Con- 


Magruder retakes 




federate troops. 


Galveston, Janu- 
ary 1, 1863. 




Farragut gains cont rol of the whole Gulf Coast, except Mobile | 


^i 


and Sabine River. 




h 


The "Florida" at The " Florida" goes 


The " Florida " at 


w^< 


Havana. to Mobile. 


Mobile. 


§1 


The " Alabama", at sea, in West In 


dian waters. 


w9 


1 


29. The "Monitor" 
founders at sea. 




The "Retribution" at 


sea, among the Ba- 




hama I 


slands. 



CHAPTER IX 

the first half of 1 863, to july 4th. the confede- 
rate rally exhausted, the north gains decisive 
victories 

General 

(Continued from p. 150.) The elections of 1862 had 
gone against the party which wished to prosecute 
the War vigorously and finish it, with results which 
caused serious difficulty later. On March 3rd, Con- 
gress passed an Act authorizing the President to 
suspend the Act of Habeas Corpus "whenever, in 
his judgment, the public safety may require it " (cf. 
p. 251). The Constitution especially allowed this to 
be done, in cases of emergency. 

The great Confederate Rally ended at Galveston 
on January ist; the South had shot its bolt, and its 
chance of winning independence by force of arms 
passed away with the old year, broken against the 
indomitable defence of Rosecrans' army at Stone's 
River. The North were thus free in the West to 
pull themselves together, though it was some time 
before they could begin to move forward steadily, but 
in the East they had another bitter disappointment 
and danger before they reached the same point. 

Their objects were : to open the Mississippi, seize 
the Confederate base at Chattanooga, drive Lee back 
on Richmond, and protect the Unionists in east 
Tennessee. The Confederate objects were at first 
to cover Chattanooga and hold Rosecrans, concen- 

187 



i88 THE FIRST HALF OF 1863 

trating against Grant, and to strengthen their position 
on the Mississippi. In the East, after Chancellors- 
ville, to make a decisive politico-mihtary stroke, to 
play on civilian fears, and to bid for foreign recogni- 
tion. (Continued on p. 249.) 

The East 

(Continued from p. 165.) On January 2Sth, Hooker 
succeeded Burnside in command of the Army of the 
Potomac, and went back to the organization by Army 
Corps, of which he had seven, his total strength being 
124,000 to Lee's 62,000: as both sides were spread 
out along the Rappahannock, facing each other, it is 
evident that Lee's line was the weaker : they remained 
in observation till the end of April. 

It was in the spring of 1863^ that the celebrated 
'^ Jack " Mosby began his raids and surprises on Union 
outposts and communications. He was a partisan 
leader pure and simple, who depended for success 
on ubiquity and the smallness of his force. When 
the Army of the Potomac was lying in front of 
Centreville, he attacked their outposts continually, 
and caused such a scare that the planks of the chain 
bridge at Washington were taken up at nights ; at 
this time he could not muster more than 20 men. 
He was often pursued by large forces, but easily 
escaped. In February he nearly succeeded in captur- 
ing General Wyndham in his own quarters, and did 

' S.E. Charleston. Confederate rams attack blockaders, January 3rd. 
W, Stone's River, January ist-3rd. 
W. Bragg retreats, January 4th. 
S. Arkansas Post, January nth. 
S.W. Magruder retakes Galveston, January ist. 

The " Alabama'" sinks the " Hatteras," January nth. 

The " Florida " leaves Mobile, January 15th. 
S. Grant on the Yazoo, February and March. 
S. Banks v. Taylor, February and March. 
S. Farragut attacks Port Hudson, March 14th. 
S.E. Naval attack on Charleston, April 7th. 
S. Grant moves to Grand Gulf, April. Crosses river, 29th. 
S. Grierson's Raid, April I7th-May 2nd. 



OPERATIONS AT SUFFOLK 189 

take General Stoughton in his, soon after. Just before 
the battle of Brandy Station, Hooker asked for the 
cavalry division from Washington to reinforce Plea- 
sonton (cf. p. 195), but it was refused, as being 
necessary to hold the communications against Mosby, 
who had just destroyed a supply train. He was 
chased by a major-general and 3,000 men, vanished, 
and a few days afterwards captured a cavalry camp 
in Maryland, He often neutralized a hundred times 
his own force, and created a constant feeling of in- 
security on the Union side. 

We saw that in September, 1862, General Peck had 
seized the important position of Suffolk, and made 
the Confederates fortify a line against it to protect 
Richmond. In February, Hooker being still inactive, 
Longstreet was sent with two divisions to strengthen 
the troops already there, and take command of this 
district, with headquarters at Petersburg. His force 
was about 20,000, while Peck began with 15,000, and 
was reinforced up to 25,000. Longstreet invested 
Suffolk, and made several unsuccessful assaults, the 
gunboats of the James flotilla taking an effective part 
in the defence. On April 19th, part of his lines were 
taken, but he reported still that he could take the 
place, but that it was not worth the cost, and that he 
should confine himself to getting supplies. Hooker 
moved before Lee expected, and Longstreet did not 
arrive in time for Chancellorsville, though sent for 
in all haste. 

The main armies were in their old places, Lee at 
Fredericksburg, Hooker opposite, and Hooker's plan 
was to feint below that town with three Corps under 
Sedgwick, while Slocum with the other four went 
round by Kelly's Ford against Lcc's left and rear, so 
as to turn him out of his works on the heights. 
Hooker began, rightly enough, by ordering Stone- 
man to move against Lee's communications with the 
cavalry, try to make him fall back for want of 
supplies, and then harass and detain him till the 



igo THE FIRST HALF OF 1863 

main army, following a fortnight after, came up. The 
Confederate cavalry was very weak at this time, while 
his own was strong. The weather was wet, and the 
river unfordable, which delayed Stoneman's start for 
a fortnight, and then Hooker would not wait, and 
all crossed together. His impatience spoilt his plan, 
for his cavalry were of little use to him on this 
account. He made demonstrations in various places 
to puzzle Lee, and on April 28th his army began to 
cross. Averell, with a cavalry division, outmanoeuvred 
Stuart, who fell back on Anderson's force at Chan- 
cellorsville. Sedgwick handled his command most 
ably, to make it seem larger than it was, and got a 
good part of it over the river, but as he did not 
advance, Lee saw that the attack would come on the 
other side, and at once concentrated on Chancellors- 
ville, leaving a force to watch him. Hooker dallied 
so long in front that Anderson had time to fortify his 
position, and Lee to concentrate his army : a prompt 
stroke would have driven Anderson back, and secured 
Banks' Ford, which would have brought the wings 
of the Union army twelve miles nearer to each other, 
and forced Lee to fight at a disadvantage, but now he 
was between them, and the disadvantage on the Union 
side. When Hooker moved, he found his enemy in 
front of him in a fortified position. 

On May ist. Hooker moved out to attack and drive 
back the enemy, and form a line from Tabernacle 
Church to Banks' Ford, but he got into thick cover, 
the troops lost their way, and the resistance was 
strong and ably managed. Though ground was 
gained, the advantage was not pressed, and the Union 
army fell back to its old positions. The left rested on 
the river, but Howard's Xlth Corps, on the right, was 
" in the air." Howard was warned about it, but he 
was so over-confident, and so tetchy about being in- 
terfered with, that Hooker said no more. The more 
Lee looked at his enemy's position the less he liked it. 
Hooker's centre and left were unassailable, but Stuart 



JACKSON'S FLANK MARCH 191 

discovered that the right was not so, on yN\\\z\\ J ackson 
proposed to march round through the woods with his 
own Corps and drive it in, which was approved. This 
left Lee to withstand Hooker's whole army with 
almost a skeleton force, and, as a plan of battle, was 
risky in the extreme, but it promised great results if 
successful : Lee had used it with success at both Man- 
assas and Sliarpsbiirg, for he relied with confidence on 
the valour and devotion of his men, and they never 
failed him. Had Howard strengthened his positions 
like the others, Jackson would have been held fast, 
and Lee probably destroyed, Jackson started at once, 
screening his movements with cavalry, but the column 
was seen, and the march reported to Hooker as either 
a retreat or an attack on Howard, to whom an urgent 
warning was sent, and also to Slocum, commanding 
the next Corps. Attacks to try the Confederate front 
showed Hooker that they were not retreating, so must 
be attacking, but though Sickles proposed to cut off 
Jackson, and Slocum attacked Lee single-handed, he 
vacillated, and would not order a combined attack, 
which might have had great results. The Union 
cavalry followed Jackson for some distance, but then 
came back. Howard laughed at the reports of 
Jackson's march, and only threw out two battalions 
to cover his flank, while he sent his reserve brigade to 
support Sickles. His men, therefore, were off their 
guard when the attack burst on them, and drove 
them in in utter rout, for which they were unjustly 
blamed, for no troops could have withstood such an 
attack under such circumstances. The whole Corps 
was driven to the rear, the only question being 
whether the rest of the army could hold its ground ; 
but a desperate cavalry charge saved a line of guns, 
which was able to maintain its fire and keep the Con- 
federate advance in check till reinforcements came, 
and steadied the fight. Jackson sent for Hill's fresh 
division to hold the front in the evening, going for- 
ward himself to reconnoitre, but as he returned in the 



192 THE FIRST HALF OF 1863 

dusk he was fired on by his own outposts and mor- 
tally wounded : he died on the loth. In the night 
(of May 2nd) Sickles recovered a good deal of the lost 
ground and some of Howard's guns, etc., by a deter- 
mined attack, and the 1st Corps came up fresh. 
Pleasonton, commanding the army cavalry, held Hazel 
Grove, the key of the position, which he fortified, and 
Hooker ordered Sedgwick to take Lee in rear. The 
unlucky Xlth Corps was sent away to re-organize. 

On May 3rd, Hooker formed a new line at Hazel 
Grove with an exposed salient, which was taken by 
Jackson's Corps, now under Stuart^ and from it his 
guns searched the main Union position with fire. 
The Confederates took two lines on the east of the 
road, but the third was held till night. On the west 
side, after a furious battle, swaying to and fro, the 
last Union line was taken. Hancock held on till the 
last, and retired in good order. The Union army now 
stood on three sides of a square, and had 37,000 fresh 
men in reserve, while they were surrounded and 
attacked by Shtart with only 26,000 exhausted men, 
disposed on a weak, over-extended line : had halt 
these reserves been put in, the fortunes of the day 
could have been retrieved. Hooker was incapacitated 
from the concussion of a shot striking the pillar of a 
house against which he was leaning, but as he was 
not unconscious, no one else would take the responsi- 
bility of acting. Lee, that morning, had found his 
enemy's position too strong to attack with his skeleton 
force, and turned on Sedgwick. Hooker's plan had 
depended on the latter attacking Lee's rear at day- 
break, but it was nearly noon before he had taken 
Marye's Hill, opposite Fredericksburg, and then, 
instead of pushing on at all hazards, he halted till 
three o'clock to reform : this gave McLaws time to take 
position at Salem Church and stop him ; he could not 
force this position, and meanwhile the main Union 
attack was beaten. 

A bridge was thrown in the night to shorten the 



THE END OF THE BATTLE 193 

communications between the Union wings, and Sedg- 
wick sent for orders, but Hooker, who was still 
dazed from the shock, was understood to say that 
he must take care of himself. On the 4th, the main 
Union body was inactive, and Lee kept it quiet by 
attacking with a small force, while he reinforced 
McLaws^ to capture Sedgwick's command or drive it 
across the river. It was surrounded and driven back 
to a convex position, with both flanks resting on the 
river, and only the road to Banks' Ford open for 
retreat, but, luckily, the engineers threw another 
bridge in its rear. The main Union army was in 
a similar position some miles off, and Lee's army 
between the two. Lee now determined to break 
Sedgwick's centre, and crush him, but the day was 
getting on : Early attacked his left, to cut him off from 
the river, but though driven back, his line was not 
broken, and at dark he was still covering the bridges. 
In the night he took up a shorter line, but to do so 
abandoned Taylor's Hill, the key of his position, for 
which he has been censured, since it might have en- 
abled Hooker to concentrate, and practically attain 
his object, but Hooker was still useless; Sedgwick's 
force had had all the heavy fighting of the day, and it 
was reported that Lee had been strongly reinforced : 
Sedgwick had to deal with the situation as he found it. 
Lee did not molest his retreat. On the 5th, the Union 
army retired, and was not followed, leaving its dead 
and wounded, 14 guns, and 20,000 stand of arms. 

The Union loss was 17,197, of whom 5,000 were 
missing, that of the Confederates 13,019, of whom 
2,753 were missing. 

To turn back to Stoneman and the Union cavalry. 
They did not get their intended start, and had no 
influence on the battle, for their army was in retreat 
before they came on Lee's communications, where 
they did little damage, though his main depot was 
at their mercy, and the loss of it would have made 
him fall back for substance, victory or none ; but 

13 



194 THE FIRST HALF OF 1863 

they did not know where to strike. Stoneman 
covered his march with a division, and was getting 
into touch with the enemy when he was recalled : 
he covered himself by raiding and breaking rail- 
ways in all directions, and rejoined on the 8th. He 
detached Kilpatrick's command, which passed close to 
Richmond and caused great alarm, going on thence 
to Gloucester Point, held by the Union troops, and 
then, by skilful manoeuvring, to Urbanna, where 
the crossing of the Rappahannock was covered by 
a gunboat. Kilpatrick rejoined on June 3rd, 

After Chancellorsville,^ things remained in statu 
quo for some time, as both armies wanted rest. 
Lee was depressed, for the Confederacy could not 
continue the War at such fearful cost, and he had 
lost his great lieutenant, ^'■Stonewall'" Jackson. He 
saw that an immediate alteration of balance was 
necessary ; but the South was elated, thinking that 
the War could now be finished by another victory, 
this time on Northern soil. The reports of its 
agents, both abroad and in the Northern States, 
all spoke of a favourable change of opinion, that 
France was becoming very civil, and England only 
waiting for some such event to recognize or even 
join them, and that the Northern people were sick 
of disaster and ruinous taxation, and would then 
be quite willing to come to terms. On the other 
hand, it was plain that if Johnston were not strongly 
reinforced Vicksburg must soon fall, with disastrous 
consequences. Were they not now in a position to 
hold their own in the East for a time, with a smaller 
army, and send Longstreet's fine Corps to him ? Long- 
street wanted to send troops to enable Bragg to start 
another Kentucky campaign, and draw Union troops 
off. And, thirdly, Lee might take position in the Valley 
with two Corps, using the third (cf. p. 195) to raid 

' S. Grant fights his way round Vicksburg, and invests it, May ist-i8th. 
S. Banks invests Port Hudson, May 27th. 
Mexico. The French take Puebla, May 17th. 



I 



CONFEDERATE PLANS 195 

Pennsylvania, and cut the communications between 
east and west. What was wanted was to settle on 
the decisive point, and bring all available troops 
to bear on it : the chance of a great victory on 
Northern soil was distinctly better than that ot 
avoiding defeat in the South : further, it would be 
immediately decisive, while the latter would not, 
and even fair success in the North would probably 
bring foreign recognition, with the power of raising 
loans, or even the chance of an alliance, as an offset 
to the loss of the great river, which, in such a case, 
might be only temporary. Longstreefs dispersion 
theory would not do, and public opinion demanded 
something more energetic than the last plan. Lee 
advised that Longstreet should remain in the East, 
and that the Army of Northern Virginia should 
invade Pennsylvania. The Confederate Government 
gave their great general a free hand, and consented 
to abide by his decision. The general plan being 
settled, the next thing was the choice of route. 
Hooker was protected on the east by the wide 
rivers and Union gunboats, and their army would 
be exposed to defeat in detail if it crossed the 
Rappahannock by Fredericksburg. The lines along 
the east or west side of the Blue Ridge re- 
mained, and Lee at first intended to use the former, 
relying on Stuart to flank the march and hold 
Pleasonton (cf. p. 189), who now commanded the 
Union cavalry, in check ; but the battle of Brandy 
Station, on June 9th, so weakened the Confederate 
cavalry that he changed his plans. 

During May, Longstreet and his two divisions had 
come in from Suffolk, and Lee's army was now 
88,000 strong, of whom some 68,000 were effective. 
He re-organized it in three Corps (cf. p. 194), of which 
Longstreet kept the First, Ewell took the Second, and 
A. P. Hill the Third; there was thus no direct 
successor to Jackson, for though Stuart, who took 
his Corps pro tempore, proved a brilliant handler of 



196 THE FIRST HALF OF 1863 

all Arms in general action, he could not be spared 
from the cavalry. He was certainly junior to both 
the new Commanders, but in choosing them Lee 
was not guided by seniority, nor even, it is said, 
by merit, for he passed over the two senior officers 
(cf. p. 72), Generals D. H. Hill and McLaws, for 
the sole reason that they were not Virginians. The 
break-up and resettlement caused some friction. 

Richmond had been denuded of troops in order 
to collect an army strong enough for the work, 
although the Union forces held Fort Monroe and 
other places in the lower Peninsula, with the IVth 
Corps and other troops. General Dix being in com- 
mand of the District. Lee was much blamed for 
exposing the Capital, and was sensible of the danger, 
asking the President to put a reserve army under 
Beauregard at Culpeper, where it could be used in 
either direction, but all available troops were wanted 
where they were. The battle of Brandy Station 
was followed by Ewell's advance, which caused such 
terror that Dix was ordered to strike at Richmond 
and at Lee's communications. He moved out in 
several columns, one of which was within fifteen 
miles of Richmond, on the 15th, and the panic was 
so great that Lee was very nearly recalled ; but the 
Government got together some troops, and warded 
it off: this was the second panic in a month, Kil- 
patrick's raid causing the other. 

^The first move in the campaign was the cavalry 
action at Brandy Station on June 9th. Pleasonton, 
with three cavalry divisions and two infantry brigades, 
was watching the fords of the upper Rappahannock, 
and thinking that Stuart was at Culpeper and off his 
guard, planned to surprise him, and ordered the 
cavalry divisions to converge on Brandy Station by 
different routes, posting the infantry to cover the 
retreat. Stuart, however, was at Brandy Station 

' S. Sieges of Vicksburg and Port Hudson, June. 
Mexico. The French enter Mexico City, June 5th. 



THE CAMPAICxN OPENS 197 

with his whole force, and beat the first two Union 
divisions, which came up separately, in detail, the 
third arriving too late to do any good. The Con- 
federate infantry was coming up, and Pleasonton 
retreated : but for Mosby and his merry men, he 
would have had another division, and might have 
ruined the Confederate cavalry, with the most far- 
reaching results. He claimed to have gained valuable 
information and crippled Lee's cavalry, fairly enough, 
for Lee had to change his plans in consequence, 
and move by the Valley. Though it abounded in 
supplies and was protected by the mountains, the 
passes of which could be held by small forces against 
Hooker's army, this route lengthened his communi- 
cations very much. A strong Union garrison at 
Winchester under Milroy had first to be dealt with, 
and though Halleck saw through Lees plans, he had 
only told Milroy that he would soon have to fall 
back, but might remain for the present, since he re- 
ported that he had only a small force in his front. 
Suddenly Ezvell fell on him with his whole Corps, 
and drove him in in confusion, but this fighting 
took three days, and though it cleared the Valley, 
the delay gained both time and valuable information 
for the Union side. 

To return to Hooker. He got wind of the proposed 
invasion at the end of May, and saw clearly that all 
troops must be under one command, so as to be directed 
to a common end to the best advantage : he therefore 
applied to Halleck for the garrison of Harper's Ferry, 
and other troops not under his command, but was 
refused. His army was then along the Rappahannock 
by Fredericksburg, and when he heard that Ewcll had 
gone to the Valley he merely made dispositions to 
keep him there, and remained in observation. He first 
proposed to stop Lee's advance by keeping back, to 
destroy his rear Corps and communications, but was 
forbidden to uncover Washington and Harper's Ferry, 
the former being strongly held, the latter of no military 



198 THE FIRST HALF OF 1863 

value. On June loth, hearing that Richmond was 
practically defenceless, and Lee moving away, he pro- 
posed to march south, join the large force under Dix, 
seize Richmond, and then move his army back north 
of the Potomac, but was told that Lee's army must be 
his objective. When the Confederates heard this they 
thanked Halleck for another good turn. Hooker's 
plan was therefore to cover Washington and move 
parallel to Lee's advance, so as to strike at his com- 
munications at the first chance, and on the 13th he 
began to move his army back in two wings, the left, 
the 1st, Ilird, and Xlth Corps, under Reynolds, while 
he took the right, the llnd, Vth, Vlth, and Xllth. 
He took position at Centreville, with his left covered 
by the cavalry. 

Great was the alarm in Pennsylvania, and Military 
Departments for defence were hastily formed, while 
Lincoln called for 120,000 men for temporary service, 
but had not arms for them. Meanwhile Ewcll ad- 
vanced to the Potomac, and one of his brigades crossed 
it and reached Chambersburg on the 15th : the people 
fled in terror, calling on Hooker for protection, but 
he was not to be drawn from his purpose. On this 
day, when Lcc was so nearly recalled to Richmond, 
the main advance began, the Vlth Corps retired from 
Fredericksburg, and Hill, who was watching it, moved 
to Culpeper, while Longstreet marched on the east 
side of the Blue Ridge with his flank covered by the 
cavalry. His object was to hold Ashby's and Snicker's 
Gaps and tempt Hooker to move against them, when 
he might be attacked with advantage, or give a chance 
for a stroke at Washington. Hooker saw this, but 
wanted to get possession of Loudon County so as to 
throw Lee's march further away, and lengthen his 
communications. After some smart cavalry fighting, 
which resulted in Stuart being driven back from Aldie's 
Gap on Ashby's and Snicker's Gaps in rear, and on 
Longstrecfs Corps, he gained his object, and then 
watched, for he did not think that Lee would lengthen 



THE INVASION 199 

his communications so much as to invade Pennsyl- 
vania ; but Lee was " between the devil and the deep 
sea," and his only chance was to go forward. Ewelts 
Corps crossed the border, the other two covering his 
rear. 

On the 1 8th, Hooker seized the gaps of the Bull 
Run Mountains with three Corps, the rest being in 
the second line, which gave him a capital base, and 
covered Washington : he thought it needless to keep 
a large force idle there which would be of use at the 
front, but the Government were too frightened to 
hear reason. This move threw Lee's march along the 
Cumberland Valley : still the politicians would not let 
the Washington garrison hold the passes of the South 
Mountain to free Hooker, who was still south of the 
Potomac; but when he saw where the enemy was 
going, and that Washington was safe from surprise, 
he decided to follow on a parallel line east of the 
mountains. On the 25th, he began to cross the Poto- 
mac, three Corps to watch the gaps of South Moun- 
tain, three in second line, and one at Harper's Ferry, 
to threaten Lee-s communications. On this day Long- 
streefs and Hill's Corps got to Hagerstown, and Ewell 
was at Chambersburg, with Early's division moving on 
York. Lee was quite in the dark about the enemy's 
movements, for Stuart, the eyes of the army, was 
out of touch with half the cavalry, and most of the 
remainder was guarding the gaps and communica- 
tions, only one brigade being at the front, with Ewell. 
Stuart's ride round the Union army is often thought 
to be a raid, ordered by Lee, who is blamed for the 
mistake of parting with him just before a battle, but 
the fact was that more cavalry was urgently wanted 
at the front on the Susquehanna, most of it having been 
kept back to cover the flank of the march, and Stuart 
was sent by the shortest route. Lee, of course, con- 
sidered the probable moral effect of the march of three 
Confederate brigades close to Washington, but it was 
to be a march, not a raid. Stuart started on the 



200 THE FIRST HAI.F OF 1863 

24th/ to go by the rear of Hooker's positions, but next 
day he found the whole Union army in motion, and 
had to make long and dangerous detours to avoid it, 
thus losing touch with Lee, who got no information 
from him. On the 28th, he captured a large supply 
train close to Washington, and made the mistake of 
taking it along with him : this was turning the march 
into a raid, but it is said that he wanted to get even 
with Pleasonton for his defeat at Aldie's Gap. Lee, 
trusting him to act in the spirit of his instructions, 
had not tied him with definite orders. His march 
caused the usual scare at Washington, and at the 
same time Richmond was in the same condition, for 
a cavalry raid, sent by General Dix, was close to the 
town. On the 27th, Lee knew nothing of Hooker, and 
Ewell's Corps reached the Susquehanna, being at Car- 
lisle, Kingston, and York, while Longstreet and Hill 
were at Chambersburg. Lee heard, on the 28th, that 
Hooker had crossed the Potomac. 

To return to Hooker. Disregarding Eivell, he had 
followed the enemy's main army, crossing the Potomac 
on the 25th and 26th : on the 27th the left wing was 
watching the gaps west of Frederick, the right wing 
at Frederick, and one Corps near Harper's Ferry. 
On the 28th, Hooker ordered the XHth Corps to pick 
up the garrison of Harper's Ferry and strike at Lee's 
communications, but as Halleck forbade the garrison 
to move, he sent in his resignation, because "he was 
not allowed to manoeuvre his own army in the presence 
of the enemy," and it was accepted. To get at the 
real reason for this extraordinary instance of " swap- 
ping horses in crossing a stream," changing the com- 
mand of the army just before the decisive battle of 
the War, as well as for the persistent way in which 
Hooker was thwarted, we must go back a little. 
When it was necessary to look for a successor to 
Burnside, after Fredericksburg, the choice lay between 
Hooker, Reynolds, and Meade, but both Halleck and 

' W, Rosecrans' Tullahoma Campaign. 



MEADE SUCCEEDS HOOKER 201 

Stanton were against Hooker for chief command. 
Reynolds was sounded, but stipulated for a free hand, 
which threw him out, and then a strong political ring 
took up Hooker, and Lincoln appointed him, against 
Stanton, who at first thought of resigning, but was 
too loyal to do so on a personal question, and gave 
Hooker his best support. When the retreat from 
Chancellorsville was known, it was decided that 
Hooker must not be entrusted with the conduct of 
another battle. He knew something of this, but his 
political faction was so powerful that the great mis- 
take was made of letting him begin the next campaign, 
which he did with such ability and success that he 
hoped to be allowed to carry on ; but it was settled 
that he should not do so, and strong measures were 
taken to force his hand, for political reasons, so 
that he should rather resign than be dismissed : this 
is the explanation of the seemingly insane way in 
which he was thwarted. The risk of having the 
decisive battle on them before the change was made, 
was imminent, and an officer was sent down at night 
to wake Meade up, order him to take command, and 
then settle with Hooker. The tension for all parties 
was extreme : Meade did not like it at all, while 
Hooker was excessively sore and hurt, but the transfer 
was effected by the Staff, and Hooker left the Army of 
the Potomac next day. _ .. 

Meade took command on the n 4 gITt of the 28th, the 
day that Lee heard of the movement of his army, and 
both sides had to pause, get their armies in hand, and 
make new plans. Hooker had intended to advance 
to the Susquehanna on a broad front, keeping his left 
strong against Longstreet and Hill, with the XHth 
Corps following Lcc in rear to harass his communi- 
cations, or cut him off if defeated. Meade varied this 
by calling this Corps in, and also the garrison of 
Harper's Ferry, the very thing which had just been 
forbidden to Hooker. The general idea was to cover 
Philadelphia if Lee went north, and Baltimore or 



202 THE FIRST HALF OF 1863 

Washington if he turned back. When Lee heard of 
Hooker's moves, he proved their wisdom by at once 
turning back : his extreme care for his communications 
was rather on account of ammunition than food. He 
determined to strike at Baltimore, since this would 
draw the Union army away from the Cumberland 
Valley, his line of communication, and sent orders on 
the night of the 28th for a concentration at Cashtown, 
for he did not then know that Meade's new orders 
did not menace his line of retreat. 

When Meade took command, he had three Corps 
at Frederick, one just to the south of it, one near 
Harper's Ferry, and two near Middletown, watching 
the South Mountain. Lee seemed to be pressing 
forward to the Susquehanna, and Halleck indicated 
York as a likely find, so the Union orders were made 
for an advance on a broad front on the 29th, which 
would bring the left wing to Emmettsburg and neigh- 
bourhood, the right to Westminster and the country 
just west of it. Of the three cavalry divisions, one 
was on the outer flank of each wing, and one (Kil- 
patrick's) was sent to stop Sfnari : Army Headquarters 
to Taneytown. On this day, the bulk of the Con- 
federate army was at Chambersburg and Fayetteville, 
with a division at Cashtown, the point of concentra- 
tion, other outlying ones at Carlisle and York, and 
two cavalry brigades along the Susquehanna. 

The left cavalry division, under Buford, had pushed 
detachments to the west of the mountains, without 
locating the enemy, but on this day a Confederate 
brigade sent from Cashtown to Gettysburg, a seat of 
the boot trade, to get what it could, brought word 
that the Union army was in force a little to the south, 
and Hill, on hearing it, ordered it to return to Gettys- 
burg the next day. On the 30th, Stuart met Kilpatrick 
at Hanover, and managed to break off the action and 
get away, but where was he to go ? The enemy's 
troops were between him and his army, so he struck 
for York to join Early, but he was gone, then tried 



THE ARMIES CLOSE TOGETHER 203 

Carlisle to find Ezvcll, and ran against a force of Union 
militia : he then heard of Lees concentration near 
Gettysburg, and got there on July 2nd with men and 
horses utterly worn out from marching night and day. 
Had he left the waggon train alone, he might have 
arrived in time to be of use. 

Pcttigreiv's brigade of HetKs division occupied Gettys- 
burg as ordered on the 30th, but retired when Buford 
appeared with two cavalry brigades in the afternoon. 
Buford then occupied it as well as he could, and sent 
word to Reynolds and Pleasonton. Pleasonton was 
anxious about Gettysburg, as it was the key to both 
sides of the South Mountain range, standing in a 
place where the hills are lov/, and easily passable, 
while a number of good main roads radiated from it 
in all directions ; in fact, it was the most important 
road centre between the Susquehanna and the 
Potomac. The Confederates, as we have seen, heard 
of the approximate position of the Army of the 
Potomac on the night of the 2$th, but it was some 
twenty-four hours later before Meade got definite 
information about them, that they were not moving 
northward, but were close at hand to the north-west. 
On the evening of the 30th the two armies lay, the 
Confederates to the north and west, the Union to the 
south and east, of Gettysburg, mostly within a radius 
of about twenty miles. Considering that Lee had 
ordered concentration near Gettysburg on the 28th, 
and had definite information of Meade's whereabouts 
on the 29th, a day sooner than Meade had of his, the 
Confederate movements seem slack : there should 
never have been any advanced fighting for Gettysburg, 
but the smartness of the Army of the Potomac under 
its new chief had taken them by surprise. The 
Confederates were about 73,000 strong. 

On this evening Meade got information of the 
presence of the Confederates in force, and found his 
army scattered, close to them : they were better 
placed for concentration than he was, and could 



204 THE FIRST HALF OF 1863 

probably forestall him on the important position of 
Gettysburg. His left wing was badly exposed, and 
liable either to be destroyed in detail, or to draw the 
army into a general action at a disadvantage, by 
having to come up by driblets to extricate it. The 
problem was to find a place of safe concentration, 
and he sent engineers to select a good one for the 
purpose, whether Lee came from the north or the west, 
indicating the general line of Pipe Creek as a suitable 
locality, to the east of which stream runs a low line 
of hills called Parr's Ridge. Westminster, just in 
rear, was a railway terminus and an excellent base, 
being also a good road centre. This position covered 
Washington and Baltimore, and could not be turned 
without great danger, so that Lee must either attack 
it or retreat. The orders for July ist were that the 
army should close in to its left front thus : Ist and 
Xlth Corps, Gettysburg (both under Reynolds) ; Ilird, 
Emmettsburg; Ilnd, Taneytown ; Vth, Hanover; 
XHth, Two Taverns (Slocum to command the two 
latter) ; Vlth to remain at Manchester and await 
orders. Corps Commanders were, however, informed 
that it might be necessary to fall back on the Pipe 
Creek position, and were given careful instructions 
as to how it was to be occupied, if ordered. Although 
the move of the army indicated preparation for a 
battle, Meade told Reynolds that he was not sure 
whether he would attack or not till he knew more of 
Lee's plans, but the matter was decided for him, and 
he accepted the fight at Gettysburg, though it is said 
that he did not like the position. Though nominally 
over 100,000 strong, the Army of the Potomac had 
probably about 82,000 present, for it lost many men 
by straggling ; but had Halleck called in the scattered 
detachments and garrisons available, he could have 
added some 30,000 to this number, which would have 
made the battle immediately decisive. 

The battlefield of Gettysburg lies between two 
streams, Willoughby Run and Rock Creek, on the 



THE BATTLEFIELD 205 

west and east respectively, which rise north of the 
town, and run past it in a southerly direction, being 
some two miles apart opposite it, and three at the 
south end opposite Round Top : the sides of both 
streams are wooded. To the west, the roads from 
Chambersburg and Hagerstown crossed Willoughby 
Run and converged at the entrance to the town a 
mile further on, while those from Mummasburg, 
Carlisle, and Harrisburg converged at the north 
entrance ; these were the roads by which the Con- 
federates advanced. A line of hills ran close along 
the east side of Willoughby Run, S.S.W. from Oak 
Hill, a commanding eminence a mile and a half 
north of the town, and from the same point another 
line of hills ran nearly south. This was called 
Seminary Ridge, from a theological college on it, just 
west of the town. Immediately south of Gettysburg 
lies Cemetery Hill, and from it an irregular ridge. 
Cemetery Ridge, runs S.S.W., which almost joins 
Seminary Ridge a mile and a half further south, 
at Peach Orchard : a mile S.E. from this are two 
steep eminences, called Round Top and Little Round 
Top, and in the Plum Run Valley, between them and 
Peach Orchard, is a rough tangle of wood and rock 
called the Devil's Den. On the other side, the ridge 
turns eastward at Cemetery Hill and runs in a semi- 
circle to Rock Creek, a mile away, ending in a height 
called Culp's Hill. Inside this inner position runs 
the Taneytown road, due south from Gettysburg, on 
which were Meade's headquarters in the battle. 

The First Day at Gettysburg, July ist' 

Buford was occupying a line from McPherson's Farm, 
running north, and held it from 8 to 10 a.m. against 
HetKs advance from Cashtown. The 1st Corps then 
came up and relieved him, but they were driven back to 
Seminary Ridge, and Reynolds was killed when bring- 

' W. ^ra^ escapes to Chattanooga. End of Tullahoma Campaign, July I. 



2o6 THE FIRST HALF OF 1863 

ingup reinforcements: at noon Howard arrived with the 
Xlth Corps, and prolonged the line to the right, post- 
ing his reserve at the Cemetery. Buford had moved 
off and formed a line on the hills to the north, facing 
north, and also scouted to his front, where he soon 
met Ewell, and reported his advance, on which Howard 
threw back his right to face north, and asked the nearest 
Corps for support, as his line was much over-extended. 
Lee had told Ewell not to bring on a general action till 
the army was concentrated, but he seized the impor- 
tant point of Oak Hill, enfiladed the 1st Corps, and 
drove in the cavalry line : the Xlth extended more, to 
cover this ground, but Early came up and took them 
in flank, driving them through Gettysburg to Cemetery 
Hill. ///// then drove the right of the 1st Corps 
to Seminary Ridge, Buford covering their retreat. 
Howard, who commanded on the field, had had warn- 
ing of this attack, and neglected it, as at Chancellors- 
ville. A second attack drove the Corps back to the 
Cemetery Ridge, where the position had been carefully 
fortified by Steinwehr, commanding the reserve 
division, on which the Corps was rallied : the 1st 
prolonged the line to Culp's Hill. 

When Meade heard of Reynolds' death, he sent 
Hancock to take command of the field, who arrived 
near the Cemetery at about 4.30 p.m., while on the 
other side. General Lee reached the Seminary, and 
ordered a reconnaissance of the Union position, 
hoping to carry it, but his troops on the ground were 
in no condition to attack till 5.30, and by that time it 
had been made secure. The position was now a good 
one, suitable for the force holding it. Thus ended the 
first day's battle. 

The selection of Hancock to supersede Howard in 
command was somewhat curious, as he was the junior 
Corps Commander, but so far as merit goes he was, 
after Reynolds' death, about the most brilliant officer 
in Meade's army ; but it nearly caused friction, for 
Howard insisted on his seniority, the difficulty being 



THE CONFEDERATE PLANS 207 

got over by Hancock's tact. They selected the ground 
round from Gulp's Hill to Round Top as the best 
position in which the army could fight. Hancock trans- 
ferred the command to Slocum, when he came up, and 
went back to report to Meade. Meade has been blamed 
for remaining at Taneytown on this day, but he was 
in the centre of his army, for he did not know where 
Lees main force was. 

The Second Day at Gettysburg, July 2nd 

Lee, the attacker, had now to consider his position 
and prospects. Longstreet wanted to turn Meade's left, 
cutting him off from Washington, and either forcing 
him to attack, or fall back on Pipe Creek, which he 
thought would uncover the Capital. Lee, however, 
saw that while Meade could wait, he could not, for, 
having only one cavalry brigade up, he could not live 
on the country, and depended on his trains : if he 
advanced eastward, Meade could cut his communica- 
tions. A battle was necessary to the invader, and a 
defeat at Gettysburg would be less serious than one 
further east, for he would only have to hold the 
passes of South Mountain to cover the retreat. Be- 
sides, not counting cavalry, all his army was up, except 
a division and a brigade, and he knew that Meade's 
was several Corps short : he also knew that some of 
these troops were close to, and would arrive during 
the next forenoon, so that there was no time to lose. 
He therefore determined to attack at once, and ordered 
Longstreet, on the right, to begin as early as possible 
in the morning, while Eivell, on the left, as soon as he 
heard that he was fairly in action, was to attack the 
Union right about Gulp's Hill, to prevent the other 
part of the line being reinforced, Hill, in the centre, 
using his Corps as required. A plan of this sort is 
always very risky, but in this case was particularly 
so, since the Confederate army enfolded a long and 
narrow position on three sides, and a message from 



2o8 THE FIRST HALF OF 1863 

one flank to the other had to go a long way round : a 
slightly concave position is often very strong, but here 
the advantages disappeared, the parts of the army 
being too far apart for combined action. 

Meade arrived on the ground soon after midnight, 
and inspected the positions as soon as it was light 

A first he thoughtt of attacking Ewcll, but on 
examination found that this was not advisable, and 
decided to stand on the defensive, taking the precaution 
to order his Staff to have everything ready for retreat 
on Pipe Creek in case of need. The Union Corps 
were posted thus, from right to left: Xllth, Culp's 
Hill and ground to the N.W. ; at the Cemetery 
salient, the Xlth and 1st ; along Cemetery Ridge, the 
Ilnd and llird, as they came up; the Vth in reserve. 
The last three Corps, with the Artillery, were coming- 
in during the whole morning, so that the whole left 
flank of the Army of the Potomac was at Lee's mercy 
till nearly noon. The ground for the llird Corps was 
weak, with nothing better in the rear ; Peach Orchard 
in front of it was not good, but its possession would 
be advantageous to the attack, and to that extent it 
was advantageous to deny it to them. Sickles, there- 
fore, who commanded the Corps, determined to take 
the risk of occupying this advanced position, which 
might at all events gain time, for time was everything 
just then. 

On the Confederate side, Longstreet was to open the 
ball, the rest taking the time from him, and he should 
have started his men as early as possible, but in the 
early morning he was with Lee at the Seminary, argu- 
ing on the advantages of his own scheme of turning 
Meade's left and forcing him to attack, till Lee would 
wait no longer, and sent him back to his Corps. Fine 
soldier as Longstreet was, he was sometimes a difficult 
subordinate. He was to attack at once with the 
troops that he had, but he first waited for a brigade, to 
complete Hoocfs division, and then McLaws division 
took a roundabout route to avoid being seen by the 



THE CONFEDERATE ATTACK 209 

Union signallers on Round Top, and lost over an 
hour : it was 4 p.m. before the First Corps was ready 
to attack, instead of doing so soon after daybreak, 
when the position could not have been defended : by 
4 it was manned and ready. Hood w'as deploying his 
men about 3, and proposed to go round, turn the 
Union flank, and seize Round Top from the south, 
which could have been done while McLaws was 
coming up, but this time Longstreet would not wait. 
Meade had called his Corps Commanders and Staff 
together about 3, and Warren, the Commanding 
Engineer, went thence to the signal station on Little 
Round Top, and saw that the woods opposite were 
full of men, while no Union troops were on the 
ground : he laid hold of some troops of the Vth 
Corps, and brought them up in the nick of time to 
repulse a Texan brigade, which had just reached the 
top ; from this time till dark, furious fighting went on 
in the broken ground below. McLazvs broke the ex- 
posed salient of Peach Orchard, Sickles was wounded, 
and his Corps steadily driven back to the main posi- 
tion, Hancock, by Meade's direction, taking command ^ 
of this, with his own Ilnd. A little after 7 p.m. the \ o^*-*- 
Confederate attack had broken the main Union line. 



but Meade was indefatigable in bringing up reinforce- / / 



e \ Q^*^ 

ments, while supports for the attack were not forth- OvO^' 
coming, so that they were turned out, but at night y, ^ 

held the bases of the Round Tops, the Devil's Den, ^ 
and the Emmettsburg road. 

Ewells troops advanced, after an artillery duel, 
about 6.30 p.m. and found the Union position almost 
bare, for every man who could be spared had gone 
to help Sickles at Peach Orchard. Greene, who com- 
manded the defence here, handled his one brigade 
most ably, with the help of a few men from the Xlth 
and 1st Corps, and held on till dark, but Johnson's 
Confederate division had seized the works of the 
Xllth Corps close to the Baltimore road, whose 
garrison had been sent away to other places, but it 

14 



a 



2IO THE FIRST HALF OF 1863 

was too dark for them to see the advantage they had 
gained, Lee's orders were, that when Ewell attacked 
on the right, with Johnson's division, the others, 
Early's and Rodes\ should assault Cemetery Hill. 
Early attacked at 7 o'clock, broke the Union line, 
and held the position for an hour, but Rodes, for 
some reason, did not move, and then the troops 
which Hancock no longer wanted on the left came 
back, and turned Early out. Stuart and his cavalry 
came up on this day, after a smart brush with Kil- 
patrick, but were not available for action. 

The result of the day's fighting was that the Con- 
federates had broken into the Union main line with 
every one of their attacks, and had held it for a time, 
but had failed for want of support. It was the most 
disjointed battle that Lee ever fought, for the attacks 
not being simultaneous, as intended, the Union re- 
inforcements could be sent backwards and forwards. 
On the other side, exactly the reverse was the case, 
Meade and Hancock getting troops up in the nick of 
time to save every point. TheJ\rmy of the Potomac 
had never been so smartly handled. In the afternoon 
""Sedgwick's strong Vlth Corps came up, tired with its 
35-mile march from Manchester, and made some of 
the ground safe, but was not available for much fight- 
ing. Buford's shattered cavalry division was sent to 
guard the base at Westminster, and Gregg's was to 
have replaced it, but the one had gone before the 
other arrived, so that Meade was deprived of the use 
of his cavalry all day. The Confederates had gained 
ground on both flanks, and were in possession of the 
Union works on the extreme right, which their late 
owners, who got back after dark, and bivouacked 
close by, purposed to recover as soon as it was light 
enough. 

The Third Day at Gettysburg, July 3RD 

To begin with the attacking side again. Lees posi- 
tion was a most anxious one : he had gained some 



I 



PLANS FOR THE THIRD DAY 211 

successes, but the losses were fearful ; he was in an 
enemy's country, and could not replace them. He 
had one fresh division, and Stuarfs cavalry had come 
up, but they were in very poor condition. The ques- 
tion was less, could he attack ? than, could he afford 
not to do so ? for if he had a chance of victory, now 
was the time to use it, and to pass to the defensive at 
this stage would be to acknowledge defeat. It being 
decided that he should attack again, the question was, 
where and how ? Loiigstrcet, it is said, considering 
how his Corps was shaken, and the position generally, 
advised that the advantage on their left should be 
improved, and all forces which could be spared turned 
to that point, but Lee thought it too dangerous, for, 
unless success was decisive, his retreat might be cut 
off, while the shape of the Confederate line was so 
awkward as to make the plan unlikely to succeed. 
Part of HiWs Corps was comparatively fresh, and he 
decided that the attack should be made by Pickett's 
division of Longstrcefs Corps, when it came up, sup- 
ported by these troops, but, though only five miles 
away, no attempt seems to have been made to hasten 
Pickctfs arrival. Ewell was to reinforce Johnson, so 
that he could drive in the Union right at the same 
time, but the orders were not worked out with the 
usual skill, on this occasion, for Lee had not recovered 
from an illness which he had had in the spring, and 
was not himself at Gettysburg. 

Meade called a Council of War after dark on the 
2nd. His prospects were by no means rosy, either, 
for out of seven Corps, three, the 1st, HIrd, and Xlth, 
were practically ruined, the Hnd and Vth much 
shaken, and only the Vlth and XHth anything like 
intact ; one of his cavalry divisions also was ruined, 
and had been sent away to refit. There was no ques- 
tion of attacking, but all thought they should fight 
it out where they stood, in which opinion Meade 
concurred, and then issued excellent orders for the 
purpose. On the extreme right, a strong line was 



212 THE FIRST HALF OF 1863 

to be formed on Power's Hill, opposite Gulp's, and 
Johnson turned out of the Xllth Corps' works at 
dawn ; the Ilird Corps to go into reserve, the Vth 
taking its place in line, and some reinforcements for 
the 1st helped to eke this out ; most of the Vlth Corps 
was also held in reserve. Gregg's cavalry division 
was on the right on Rock Greek, facing Stuart^ while 
Kilpatrick's came in on the left. The army was better 
posted than the day before, when it came up by drib- 
lets, and all its parts were now well connected to- 
gether. Still, the exhaustion was so great that these 
dispositions were not carried out by dawn, or for some 
time after, and an early attack by the Confederates 
might have settled the matter. 

On the Confederate side, Ezvell's Corps was the 
only one ready early ; Johnson had been strongly re- 
inforced during the night, but the initiative here was 
taken by the other side, who attacked at daybreak 
in great force. Johnson fought gallantly all morning, 
but at about 1 1 o'clock had to retire. To prepare and 
cover the main assault, of Pickett s division, Lee formed 
a line of over 100 guns, which was faced by one of 
over 80, but it was imperative to economize ammuni- 
tion for the decisive moment, to the Confederates 
especially, who had not really enough to undertake 
such an operation at all. Again, in this unfortunate 
battle for them, the Confederate lack of combination 
was apparent, for they did not open fire to prepare 
the attack till 11 a.m., the very time at which their 
left wing was retiring, beaten, and the point of the 
whole plan was that these two attacks should be 
simultaneous, and help each other. After a time, 
the Union batteries ceased firing, to save ammuni- 
tion, and though neither Longstreet^ nor Alexander, 
who commanded the Confederate line of guns, 
thought they were really silenced, there was nothing 
for it but to order Pickett to move forward, at 3 p.m. 
Then the Union guns reopened, raking his line with 
cross fire, which caused a change of direction, and 



THE END OF THE BATTLE 213 

threw his supports out ; though he got through, and 
stood for some ten minutes among the wrecks of the 
Ilnd Corps Artillery, the men soon fell back in 
groups, and there was nothing for those in the rear 
to support. The Confederate guns ceased firing, to 
save ammunition in case of an advance by Meade, 
but none came, and the troops were coolly and quietly 
re-formed. Though desultory firing did not cease, 
the battle was over, in this, the principal part of the 
field. 

The cavalry were engaged on both flanks. Gregg's 
and Stuarfs divisions were fighting all day, Gregg 
getting rather the best of it. On the Union left, Kil- 
patrick moved against the Confederate right about 
5 p.m. and made several charges, but though costly, 
they effected little, for there seemed to be no com- 
bination with the other arms. 

The numbers were not so uneven as the nominal 
strength of the forces would shew, for the Union 
army lost more men by straggling, in the severe 
marches by which it was concentrated : the Con- 
federates were veterans, and better marchers. On the 
first day the Confederates were the stronger, about as 
25,000 to 18,000. On the second day there were per- 
haps 50,000 a side, but the Confederates, in their main 
attack, threw 15,000 against 10,000. On the third day 
there were perhaps 70,000 a side, of whom a large 
part of the Union Vlth Corps were not engaged. 
The losses were : Union 17,569, missing 5,434, total 
23,003 ; Confederate 15,401, missing 5,150, total 
20,551. The Union side lost Generals Reynolds and 
Farnsworth, killed, and the Confederates, Generals 
Pender, Armistead, and Garnett. 

On July 4th,' Lee entrenched a line from Oak Hill 
to Peach Orchard, and started his trains back under 
cover of it, facing Meade all day. Meade ordered 
French, at Frederick, to seize the lower passes of 

' S. Vicksburg surrenders, July 4th. 
S. Taylor threatens New Orleans, July 4th. 



2T4 THE FIRST HALF OF 1863 

South Mountain, and started some cavalry to harass 
the retreat further back, if it took place as he expected, 
but the day was principally passed in trying to ascer- 
tain Lee's movements, and in the care of the wounded : 
besides, it rained in torrents all day, which hindered 
movement. Meade determined to hold the ridge, 
which he still thought he could do, against attack, and 
forbade his subordinates, in the conduct of several 
small engagements which broke out, to risk bringing 
on a general action, but, if he could then have succeeded 
in crushing Lee's army, he would have saved two years 
of war. Whether this was possible was the question, 
for his army was so disorganized that it would hardly 
seem to have been in any condition to attack on 
the 4th. 

In this campaign, up to and during the battle, the 
Confederates acted as if they underestimated their 
enemy. They were certainly surprised by the un- 
expected smartness of movement of the Army of the 
Potomac, when it came under the orders of a first-rate 
handler of large numbers, and, though theirs was 
really the better manoeuvring army of the two, they 
failed to concentrate in time. Another thing : Lee 
had not realized the magnitude of the loss of Jackson^ 
that he had no other general who could be trusted 
with his peculiar work, especially in the matter of 
acting without definite orders. 

Note. — Moves in the Gettysburg Campaign 

The Army of the Potomac was formed in seven 
Army Corps, and a Cavalry Corps of three divi- 
sions. 

The Army of Northern Virginia in three Army 
Corps, and a Cavalry force of six brigades, of which 
three were with the army, three with Stuart. A 
mounted brigade under Imbodcn followed the army, 
but did not join till after battle. 

June 3rd. — Both armies concentrated, facing each 



MOVES IN THE CAMPAIGN 215 

other, Union on Stafford Heights ; Cavalry, Warrenton 
Junction. 

Confederate at Fredericksburg : Stuart, Culpeper 
C.H. 

June 6th. — Union, same place, but half a Corps 
across the river. 

Confederate Corps : Fredericksburg, Chancellors- 
ville, Culpeper C.H. Cavalry, Fredericksburg. Stuart, 
Culpeper C.H. 

June 9th. — ^Union army : No change. Cavalry, 
Brandy Station. 

Confederate : one Corps Fredericksburg, two Cul- 
peper C.H. Cavalry, Fredericksburg. S/w^r/, Brandy 
Station. 

(The Cavalry battle of Brandy Station was fought.) 

June I2th. — Union : Four Corps opposite Fredericks- 
burg, the others at Stafford C.H., Deep Run, and 
Bealeton. Cavalry, Warrenton Junction. Milroy's 
command in Valley, at Winchester and Berryville. 

Confederate Corps : Fredericksburg, Culpeper C.H., 
Front Royal (in Valley). Cavalry, Fredericksburg and 
Millwood (in Valley). Stuart, Brandy Station. 

June 13th. — Union Corps : Two at Dumfries, the 
rest at Hartwood, Deep Run, Bealeton, Freeman's 
Ford, Catlett's Station. Cavalry, Warrenton Junction. 
Milroy driven out of Valley. 

Confederate Corps : Chancellorsville, Culpeper 
C.H., and in Valley, at Winchester and Martins burg. 
Cavalry, Culpeper C.H., and Martinsburg. Stuart, 
Culpeper C.H. 

June 17th. — Union Corps: Two at Manassas Junction, 
the others at Occoquan Creek, Brimstone Hill, Fairfax 
C.H., Centreville, Herndon Station. Cavalry, Aldie. 

Confederate Corps: Culpeper C.H. ; Snicker's and 
Ashby's Gaps ; Winchester and Shepherdstown, in the 
Valley, and Chambersburg, Pennsylvania. Cavalry, 
Freeman's Ford, Thoroughfare Gap, Chambersburg. 
Stuart, Middleburg, Ashby's Gap. 

June 24th. — Union Corps : Leesburg, Edwards' 



2i6 THE FIRST HALF OF 1863 

Ferry, Broad Run Railway Bridge, Aldie, Gum 
Springs, Centreville, Thoroughfare Gap. Cavalry, 
west of Aldie's Gap. Militia at Gettysburg. 

Confederate Corps : Boonsboro ; Hagerstown ; Mc- 
Connellsburg, Chambersburg, and Greenwood. Ca- 
valry, Snicker's and Ashby's Gaps, Chambersburg. 
Stuart, Salem. 

June 25th. — On this day Hooker began to move his 
whole army into Maryland, and Stuart, who started to 
march round his camps, and join Ewell at the front, 
found all the Union troops in motion. 

June 28th. — Union Corps : Three along South 
Mountain, three at Frederick, one at Urbanna. Cavalry, 
Monocacy, Adamsville, Boonsboro. Militia at Har- 
risburg and Columbia on the Susquehanna, none at 
Gettysburg. During the night Meade succeeded 
Hooker in command. 

Confederate Corps : Chambersburg ; Greenwood ; 
Carlisle, York, and Wrightsville. Cavalry, Snicker's 
and Ashby's Gaps, Mechanicsburg, and New Holland, 
the two last at the front. Stuart, Rockville. 

June 29th. — Union Corps : Two south of Emmetts- 
burg, two south of Middleburg, two at Uniontown, 
one at Taneytown. Cavalry, Sabillasville ; S.W. of 
Westminster ; Littlestown. 

Confederate Corps : Chambersburg ; Fayetteville, 
Cashtown, and Fairfield ; Chambersburg, Carlisle, 
York, and Wrightsville. Cavalry, Snicker's and 
Ashby's Gaps, Mechanicsburg, New Holland. Stuart, 
Westminster. 

On this day Meade ordered French's division, from 
garrison duty, to cover his rear, and hnboden's Con- 
federate brigade, on the same duty, was at McCon- 
nellsburg. 

June 30th. — Union Corps : Marsh Run, Littlestown, 
Emmettsburg, Bridgeport, Uniontown, Union Mills, 
Manchester ; Headquarters and Artillery, Taney- 
town. Cavalry, Cemetery Hill (S.W. of Gettysburg), 
Westminster, Hanover, French's command reached 



STUARTS MARCH 217 

Crampton's Gap, en route for Frederick, and there 
were militia at Carlisle, Harrisburg, and Columbia. 

Confederate Corps : Chambersburg ; Greenwood 
and Cashtown ; Fayetteville, Heidlersburg, and 
Huntertown. Cavalry, Martinsburg, Huntertown. 
Stuart, Hanover. 

ITINERARY OF STUARTS MARCH 

June 25th and 26th. — Started from Salem, but delayed 
by the marching columns of the Army of the Potomac. 

June 27th.— Reached Dranesville in afternoon, and 
crossed the Potomac that night. 

June 28th.— Rested his men in morning; then 
advanced to Rockville, where he took a Union convoy, 
and halted for the night. 

June 29th. — Damaged the Baltimore and Ohio Rail- 
way at Hood's Mills ; halted for the night at West- 
minster, after a brush with Kilpatrick. 

June 30th. — Sharp action with Kilpatrick at Hanover 
in afternoon ; broke it off, and marched all night, to 
join Ewell at Carlisle. 

July 1st. — Dover in morning, met defence force at 
Carlisle, Ewell gone, received Lee's orders for con- 
centration, and turned back, marching continuously. 

July 2nd. — Rejoined Lee before Gettysburg in even- 
ing; horses quite used up. (Continued on p. 252.) 

The South-East 

(Continued from p. 165.) The only military operation 
in this district was a small expedition by the Union 
coast forces to Jacksonville, Florida, which they did 
not permanently hold, to disperse Secessionists, in 
March. For the naval operations, see Blockade, 
p. 229. (Continued on p, 255.) 

The West 

(Continued from p. 175.) At Stone's River, on January 
ist,^ Bragg made several feints to find out whether 

' S.W. Magruder retakes Galveston, January ist. 



2i8 THE FIRST HALF OF 1863 

Rosecrans was retreating or not : though he might 
have held his own against an attack, he was quite 
unable to make one : the Confederate army was com- 
pletely fought out. Rosecrans took the offensive and 
sent a division across the river, which fortified a 
position from which it could enfilade Polk's Corps, so 
that on the next day, the 2nd, Bragg found that he 
must either take this position or move Polk. He 
attacked, but unsuccessfully, Rosecrans reinforcing his 
advanced force and improving his position. On the 
3rd,' Bragg attacked again, but his men were driven 
back into their works, which were taken. Next day 
he made an able retreat to Tullahoma, covered by 
his cavalry. Though strong in this arm, he had felt 
the loss of Morgan very badly in the campaign. The 
Union cavalry under Stanley were well handled. The 
Union's weak point was McCook's faulty disposition, 
against which Rosecrans should have guarded by not 
giving him the post of danger, for McCook had failed 
him at Perryville in the same way. 

The Union army was 43,400 strong, and its loss in 
killed and wounded 8,800, with 2,800 men and 28 guns 
taken. The Confederate strength in the battle was 
46,000, with a loss in killed and wounded of 9,000, 
with 1,100 men and 3 guns taken. 

Rosecrans next re-organized his army in three Corps, 
numbered XlVth, XXth, and XXIst, and took over 
from Grant the control of the Tennessee and Cumber- 
land Rivers. There was little movement of the main 
armies till the end of June,^ for Morgan had destroyed 
the Louisville line so badly that it took a long time to 

' S.E. Confederate rams attack blockaders off Charleston, January 3rd. 
^ S.E. Naval attack on Charleston, April 7th. 

S. Grierson's Raid, April ijth-May 2nd. 

S. Grant takes Grand Gulf, April 29th. 

E. Chancellorsville, May ist-4th. 

S. Grant invests Vicksburg, May i8th. 

S. Banks invests Port Hudson, May 27th. 

E. The Gettysburg Campaign opens. Brandy Station, June 9th. 

Mexico. The French enter Mexico City, June 5th. 



MINOR MOVES 219 

repair, and many troops to guard. Tennessee was so 
important to the Confederates that Bragg remained 
there as long as he could, where he could also hold 
Rosecrans in his front. Grant wanted Rosecrans to 
advance, and prevent Bragg from sending troops to 
Johnston or Pcmberton^ but he thought that it was better 
to keep him where he was, lest he moved his whole 
force to help one of them before Grant had settled 
with them, and also that his army, where it was, could 
act as Grant's reserve. He did not, however, prevent 
Bragg from depleting his army to help Johnston, out 
side Vicksburg, but Johnston did not strike, and Rose- 
crans drove Bragg in before they returned. Grant's 
contention was that he should have struck sooner and 
harder, but this seems to have been impracticable. 

There were a number of minor operations, chiefly 
in the form of cavalry raids on communications, and 
Rosecrans, like Buell, asked in vain for more cavalry. 
He sent Colonel Streight from the lower Cumberland 
round through northern Alabama, who fought several 
actions with Forrest, to whom he had to surrender at 
a crossing of the Coosa River.^ This raid ended in 
the Southern district, but was in connection with 
Rosecrans' operations. In April, Grierson started 
from La Grange, Tennessee, and raided through 
Mississippi, but this was in connection with Grant's 
operations in the Southern district (cf. p. 225). 

Halleck's mind again comes in, with evil conse- 
quences : he had stopped Buell from taking Chat- 
tanooga when he had a chance, and now quarrelled 
with Rosecrans. In March he wrote a letter, of which 
both Rosecrans and Grant had copies, offering the 
vacant Major-Generalship of the United States Army 
to the first general who gained a real victor}^ The 
cool-headed Grant put it away without comment, but 
the high-spirited Rosecrans took it as a personal 
insult, and told Halleck plainly what he thought of 
him and his huckstering ways (cf. p. 276). With a 

' Map 64, p. 404. 



220 THE FIRST HALF OF 1863 

nature like Halleck's, in chief command, this was a 
fatal mistake, for it was never forgiven, and Rosecrans' 
requests in future were neglected. It is only fair to 
say, though, that Grant found him a difficult subor- 
dinate, though he recognized his great ability. Grant, 
with Halleck and Stanton, urged him to attack Bragg, 
but the country was hopelessly muddy, and he waited 
till June, since he heard good reports from Vicksburg, 
and of Burnside's approach to Knoxville. On June 
23rd he ordered the advance from Murfreesboro. 
^ Bragg's base was Chattanooga, and his advanced line 
from Shelbyville to Wartran, with cavalry on the 
flanks, at McMinnville and Columbia, the main position 
being a large entrenched camp at Tullahoma. Rose- 
crans held the first Confederate line with a feint, and 
moved round to strike at their line of retreat : though 
much delayed by mud, he mancEuvred Bragg out of 
all his positions by July ist,^ with but little fighting, 
and with fine weather would very likely have cut 
him off. Bragg escaped across the mountains to 
Chattanooga. In this most brilliant little campaign 
Rosecrans regained what had been lost the year 
before, driving an army 43,000 strong out of good 
positions with less than 60,000 men, with a loss of 
only 560. 

Though Burnside takes no active part in the affairs 
of the first half of 1863, yet his command was a factor 
which Bragg could not ignore. He took command 
of the Department of the Ohio in March, with special 
instructions to protect the Unionists of the Knoxville 
district from Confederate oppression, and to intercept 
the important railway from Lynchburg to Chattanooga. 
He was to organize a force in Kentucky, and co-operate 
with Rosecrans' advance by moving against Knoxville, 
but he did not press forward, and seems only to have 

' Map 37, p. 268. 

- E. Gettysburg, July ist-3rd. 

S. Vicksburg surrenders, July 4th, 

S. Taylor threatens New Orleans, July 4th. 



THE RIVER PATROLS 221 

come into evidence when the Tullahoma campaign was 
over. Buckner was holding Knoxville at this time. 

Tennessee and Kentucky were much disturbed by 
Confederate guerillas, and now the value of the gun- 
boat division which had been told off to patrol the 
Tennessee and Cumberland Rivers became apparent, 
for these raiding parties had a few guns for the attack 
of transports, but the gunboats could move faster than 
a land force, and stop the crossings of the rivers. A 
serious attack on Fort Donelson in February was 
beaten by the fire of a gunboat, and, on the Missis- 
sippi, on July 4th, the Confederates attacked Helena, 
Arkansas, and carried part of the position, but were 
then beaten by one of the gunboats. This was one 
of Johnston's operations against Grant's communica- 
tions. (Continued on p. 257.) 

The South 

(Continued from p. 176.) When Sherman retreated 
to the Mississippi on January 2nd,^ after his repulse 
at Chickasaw Bluffs, he met McClernand, who pro- 
duced his credentials and took command. Sherman 
suggested to him and Porter that they should move 
up the White River to attack Arkansas Post, or Fort 
Hindman, which was done successfully, the fort sur- 
rendering on the 13th. Grant then ordered the troops 
back to the Mississippi, since they were intended for 
the attack of Vicksburg, and took command himself. 
McClernand was thus brought to his place as a Corps 
Commander in Grant's army, much to his disgust. 
The army now consisted of four Corps, the Xlllth, 
XVth, XVIth, and XVIIth, under McClernand, Sher- 
man, Hurlbut, and McPherson, respectively. The 
XVIth remained at Memphis as depot. 

Soon after the fall of Arkansas Post, Admiral 
Porter attacked the Red River, which the Con- 

' W. Stone's River, January ist-3rd. Bragg retreats. 
S.W. Magruder retakes Galveston, January ist. 
S.E. Confederate rams attack blockaders off Charleston, January 3rd. 



222 THE FIRST HALF OF 1863 

federates controlled, by sending three of his vessels 
down past the Vicksburg batteries, but one was 
sunk in action, and the others taken. On hearing 
of it, Farragut determined to move, came up with 
his fleet, and attacked Port Hudson, nominally in 
co-operation with Banks, but the land force was not 
able to take part : the ships were very severely 
handled, the "Mississippi" being destroyed, and 
only the flagship " Hartford " and one other getting 
past, but they were able to gain control, and close 
the Red River to the Confederates. Farragut then 
came up to the south of Vicksburg, and got into 
communication with Porter and Grant. 

To open the campaign against Vicksburg, Grant 
ordered the canal to be enlarged which had been 
cut the year before, but when he came, saw that 
this would be useless, as the enemy had established 
a battery which enfiladed it. He then tried to turn 
the position by the bayous of the Yazoo and its 
tributaries, but the distances were great, the work 
slow, and the Confederates forestalled and defeated 
all his attempts. He spent February and March in 
vain endeavours to turn the right flank of the 
defences, and then had to devise something else ; 
but what ? There seemed a choice of three plans : 
(i) To assault the batteries. (2) To go back to 
Memphis and start afresh, along the Mississippi 
Central Railway. (3) To move round opposite 
Vicksburg, cross the river below it on to the high 
land, and attack it in rear. The first would 
almost certainly be defeated. From a military point 
of view the second was the best, but Grant chose 
the third, though it was most risky, and even the 
supplies depended on success, because if successful 
it would be decisive, and political considerations 
forbade even the semblance of retreat. The war 
was at a standstill, generally, and many clamoured 
for his removal from command. It was the turning- 
point of his career. The detail of the plan was 



THE CONFEDERATE POSITION 223 

to move down the bayous to the west of the river 
to New Carthage, some thirty miles below Vicks- 
burg, run the gunboats and transports past the 
batteries, make a combined attack on Grand Gulf, 
and bring the army over ; then to move along the 
valley of the Big Black, and attack the land side of 
Vicksburg. The original plan appears to have been for 
Banks to co-operate from the South, but this was 
nullified by the unexpected strength of Port Hudson. 

The Confederate line was very long, there being 
several outlying works such as Fort Pemberton, up 
the Yazoo to the north, but the main line began 
at Haines' Bluff, a detached position north of the 
town, and ran with intervals to Grand Gulf, 30 
miles away by land, 60 by water. To Port Hudson, 
also in Pemberton's command, the line was 200 miles 
long, and was held by about 50,000 effective men. 
The latter position was quite new, for the Con- 
federates, after Sherman's attack at Chickasaw Bluffs, 
had recognized that the Union army meant business, 
that they could not form a flotilla to oppose Porter's, 
so that the river must be held by land works, and the 
fortifications of Port Hudson, just begun, were pushed 
forward in all haste in January. Fort Pemberton and 
Grand Gulf were the outworks of the main line : to 
the north stretched the Yazoo watershed, a district of 
swamp, tangled forest, and bayou, from where the high 
land receded from the Mississippi, 180 miles away, to 
where they met again at Vicksburg, each curving 
outwards till there was a breadth of some 50 miles 
between them in the centre. Fort Pemberton was 
in the middle of this almost impenetrable tangle, 
through which Grant vainly tried to force his way. 
The river front of the Vicksburg fortifications was 
three miles long, and the works were carried round 
in rear at a distance of about two miles from the 
town. Some nine miles back from the Mississippi 
ran the Big Black River, coming out by Grand 
Gulf, 30 miles below. There were also strong 



224 THE FIRST HALF OF 1863 

works at Warrenton on the Mississippi, a few miles 
south of Vicksburg. The garrison was commanded 
by Stevenson, the district by Pemberton. From Vicks- 
burg a railway ran eastward, connecting it with two 
important lines, the New Orleans and Memphis, and 
the Mobile and Ohio, at Jackson and Meridian re- 
spectively. A relieving force was being assembled 
to the north-east, but Johnston, the Confederate com- 
mander from the Alleghanies to the Mississippi, was 
at this time at Tullahoma with Bragg. 

On the Union side, McClernand's Corps moved on 
March 28th, and reached New Carthage on April 20th,^ 
the gunboats passing the batteries on the i6th. The 
ground was swampy and the work of moving the 
army very slow, but all were ready by the 29th, 
opposite Grand Gulf. On that day Grant tried to 
cover the crossing with the fleet, but the gunboats 
were very roughly handled, and could not stand the 
plunging fire from the high batteries, and he saw 
that the place must be taken by the army. Next 
day the fleet bombarded the place, and McClernand's 
Corps crossed : Sherman was sent to make a demon- 
stration at Haines' Blufif to cover this operation, and 
handled his force so well that Pemberton thought 
that the real attack was there, and recalled the re- 
inforcements which he had sent to Grand Gulf, 
which ensured Grant's success, but Boiven, com- 
manding at Grand Gulf, made such a gallant defence 
against overwhelming numbers that the fighting was 
very severe before McClernand made good his foot- 
ing on the high ground. Sherman rejoined the 
army on May 7th.^ At this critical time Grant had 
the good luck to be cut off from Washington, for 
Halleck ordered him to join Banks further south, 
which would have killed his plan. This order was 
delivered to him when he was driving Bozven before 
him, but he could then disregard it, owing to the 

' S.E. Naval attack on Charleston, April 7th. 
■^ E. Chancellorsville, May ist-4th. 



GRIERSON'S RAID 22^ 

changed circumstances. He made his base at Grand 
Gulf, for the new campaign. 

When Grant was withdrawing his army from the 
north side, Pembertoii reported that he was retreating, 
and was ordered to send to Bragg all the troops that 
he could spare, which he did before he found out 
his mistake : he was only able to get a few of them 
back, and especially missed Van Dorn's cavalry, for 
he had to use infantry to do their work in trying 
to stop Grierson.* Grierson's raid was one of the 
most successful of the War. He left La Grange 
on April 17th with about 1,700 men, but detached 
a regiment, and went on with 1,000, marched 600 
miles in sixteen days through the State of Mississippi^ 
destroyed some 50 miles of railway, and inflicted 
more loss than he suffered, distracting the enemy's 
attention at a most critical time. He rode into 
Baton Rouge on May 2nd. This was almost the 
only successful raid carried out in an enemy's 
country, but it passed from one secure base to 
another, avoiding the great danger of return. 

Pembertoii s army was over-extended and weak in 
the centre, stretching from near Vicksburg to Jackson, 
forty miles away, when Grant got a footing to the 
south : he was told to concentrate, but thinking that 
Grant would have to retire from want of supplies, did 
not do so. Johnston came down with a small force, but 
though he had been ordered to go and take command 
of the army outside Vicksburg, did not do so, but told 
Pemberton to come and join him. Grant was too quick 
for them, he struck and broke Pembertoiis centre at 
Champion's Hill, and then drove off the force at 
Jackson ; he next turned on Johnston and drove him 
away also. Johnston's plan was to fight a decisive 
battle for Vicksburg in the field, not to shut up a large 
force there, which must fall with the place, and whose 
strength, added to the field army, would do more to 
secure it. Pemberton on the other hand did not want 

' Map 49A, p. 35o. 

15 



ii26 THE FIRST HALF OF 1863 

to uncover Vicksburg, as being the key of the Missis^ 
sippi, and also an enormous depot ; further, it was the 
Southern poHcy to gain time, either for foreign recog- 
nition, or to tire the North out. This plan, however, 
had no real chance of attaining its objects : Johnston'' s 
was the true view, but he was by no means the man to 
carry it out. Pemberton then went south to cut Grant's 
communications, which did not then exist, and the 
Confederate commanders were at cross-purposes ; they 
had about as many men as Grant, 40,000, but divided, 
with his army between them, and he beat them in 
detail. Grant having thus prevented the junction of 
the Confederate generals, and driven their troops 
apart, thought best to strike while the iron was hot 
and take Vicksburg by storm : he surrounded it, 
making connection with the fleet on both flanks, on 
the i8th,^ and made an unsuccessful assault next day. 
He then set to work to make good roads to the Yazoo 
for his right flank, and was very anxious to take the 
place before Johnstons new army, which was concen- 
trating at Canton, could interfere; but Grierson's 
destruction of railways had hindered this very much. 
Grant also sent for all possible reinforcements, and 
was so promptly answered that Johnston's chance was 
soon gone. After the failure of the 19th, Grant care- 
fully reconnoitred Vicksburg, and tried again on the 
22nd : he was checked, but McClernand's men got into 
a redoubt, and he reported to Grant that if the other 
Corps would now do their part, the place was theirs. 
They therefore attacked again, only to make bad worse, 
for before they did so, the redoubt had been retaken, 
and McClernand's men made prisoners ; the result was 
a heavy defeat. McClernand published a most offen- 
sive congratulator}^ order to his command, claiming 
that they had taken the' place, but that the others had 
failed them, which was absolutely untrue. Grant 
therefore removed him from his command, and gave 
it to General Ord. 

' Mexico. The French take I'uelila, May 17th. 



THE FALL OF VICKSBURG 2*7 

Pembcrton, wlien his troops had been defeated out- 
side the town, retired within its lines, abandoning the 
outlying works. Vicksburg lies on a line of bluffs 
rising from the river, and deeply seamed by ravines, a 
position very favourable for defence, but the best line 
was too long for his force of less than 30,000 men, 
and though it was well fortified, with many guns, the 
proportion of heavy ones was too small. Grant, find- 
ing that the place could not be rushed, invested it, for 
PcDibcrtou had to feed the population as well as his 
own men, so could not hold out long, though Johnston, 
whose army was now said to be 30,000 strong,^ might 
raise the siege. To cover it, therefore, he took the 
IXth Corps, which had just come, and a division from 
each of the others, and put them under Sherman in the 
middle of June, Sherman took a position from the 
Benton Road, east of Haines' Bluff, along the valley 
of the Big Black to the railway-crossing, and fortified 
it carefully, holding Johnston in check till Petnberton, 
who had been waiting in his trenches for forty-seven 
days, gave up in despair, and surrendered on July 4th.^ 
Johnston was always suggesting plans, but did not 
strike. 24,491 men were surrendered, 172 guns, 60,000 
small arms, and a great quantity of ammunition. 
Grant began with 43,000 men, and ended with 75,000; 
his losses were 9,362, including 453 missing. Pcni- 
berton's greatest force just before the siege was 40,000 ; 
when he moved into the town it was only 28,000. His 
losses were probably about 10,000, but the campaign 
cost the Confederates the Mississippi and the States 
to the west. This was the first compaign in the War 
in which the newly raised coloured troops were regu- 
larly used, both with the main army and to guard the 
country in rear, though a few were with Banks at Port 
Hudson in May. 

' Mexico. The French enter Mexico City, June 5th. 
- K. Gettysburg, July ist-jnl. 
W. Bragg escapes to Chattanooga : end of Tullahoma campaign, 
July 1st. 



228 THE FIRST HALF OF 1863 

^ EVENTS IN LOUISIANA (cf. p. 1/6) 

After the capture of Galveston by Magruder, works 
were thrown up in south-western Louisiana at La 
Fourche, Donaldsonville, Brashear City, and Berwick 
Bay, to protect the Union troops acting along the 
Mississippi, and secure the rear of New Orleans. 
Banks' troops were raw and badly equipped, and 
when he started for Vicksburg from the south he 
knew nothing of the occupation of Port Hudson, which 
was a complete surprise to him ; he could neither 
communicate with Grant nor turn the place by the 
other side of the river, but went back from Baton 
Rouge to co-operate with Farragut in March. Farragut, 
however, attacked at night, so that the army had to be 
mere spectators. Banks returned to the Atchafalaya, 
where he was opposed by Taylor, whom he drove 
back on the Teche to Fort Bisland, and then took that 
place. Thence he moved to Alexandria on the Red 
River, and Taylor retired to Shreveport, on which 
Banks, now in communication with Grant, crossed 
the Mississippi, and moved against the rear of Port 
Hudson on May 23rd. He invested it on the 26th, 
and assaulted it the next day, gaining some ground ; 
then a regular siege was begun, but the force was 
sickly, Grant's success problematical, and his com- 
munications harassed by Taylor. Banks assaulted 
again on June 14th, and was heavily repulsed. 
Meanwhile Taylor crossed the Atchafalaya, surprised 
Brashear City and Bayou Boeuf, threatened Donald- 
sonville, and mounted guns to cut off the Union 
communications with New Orleans, which was very 
weakly held. A division had been sent to attack 
Grant's communications at Milliken's Bend, and when 
this failed, Taylor asked for these troops, with which 
he might have taken the place, but they were refused. 
He came up within a few miles of the cit}^ and was 
checked by the fire of the gunboats, but the situation 

' Map 51, p. 362. 



THE NEW MONITORS 229 

was so serious that Emory, in command there, wrote 
on July 4th to tell Banks that he must choose between 
New Orleans and Port Hudson. 

After the naval attack on Port Hudson in March, 
Porter made several expeditions up the rivers, doing 
much damage, and then went on to Vicksburg, 
leaving some boats with Banks, while Farragut, find- 
ing things going on well, had gone to sec after the 
blockading portion of his command, in the Gulf. 
(Continued on p. 268.) 

The South-West 

(Carry forward from p. 177, Chapter VIII, to p. 269, Chapter X) 

The Blockade 

(Continued from p. 177.) On the South-East Coast 
the War centred round Charleston. On January 3rd,^ 
the two Confederate rams, the " Palmetto State " and 
" Chicora^' dashed out against the blockading squadron, 
and attacked two armed merchant steamers, which 
surrendered, but the nearest warships closed in, on 
which the rams returned to Charleston, and never got 
through the blockade at all, but the Confederates 
made a great proclamation for the benefit of foreign 
nations, claiming to have raised it. The new monitors 
soon arrived from the North, and Dupont sent them 
on small expeditions to test them. The " Montauk " 
attacked Fort McAllister, on the Ogeechee, and stood 
its fire well, and in March she went up that river again 
and destroyed the Confederate cruiser ^^ Nashville'' 
under the guns of the fort. Dupont's deductions from 
these minor operations were that " whatever degree of 
impenetrability they might have, there was no corre- 
sponding quality of destructiveness as against forts," 
and it confirmed his opinion that Charleston should 
be attacked by a combined naval and military force, of 

' \V. Stone's Kiver, January 1st -3rd. ^ragg- retreats. 
S.W. Magrtider retakes Galveston, January 1st. 

The " Ala/mnia" sinks the " Ilatteras," J.-xnuary nth. 
Jh.e " Florida " leaves Mobile, January 15th. 



230 THE FIRST HALF OF 1863 

which the army should contribute 25,000 men, but they 
could not then be spared. It seems curious that Burn- 
side's useful coast force could not have been used, in- 
stead of being broken up after clearing Pamlico Sound. 
Mr. Fox, however, the Assistant Secretary of the 
Navy, an ex-naval officer, had formed a most exagger- 
ated opinion of the powers of the new vessels, and 
Dupont was told he was expected to take Charleston 
with the force at his disposal, 9 new ironclads and 
5 unarmoured gunboats. He had already tried to 
block the harbour by sinking vessels in the fairway, 
but with only temporary effect. Seven of the iron- 
clads were improved monitors, which, though larger 
and better than the original, were not really able to 
" keep the sea," his flagship was a large central battery 
ship, carrying 18 guns, and one was a lightly armoured 
vessel, the " Keokuk." The flagship, " New Iron- 
sides," had 4|-inch plates, the regular monitors eleven 
i-inch plates, and the " Keokuk" i| to 2-inch armour. 
The monitors carried guns of different calibre in their 
single turrets, a curious arrangement, with their poor 
magazine space. They drew 1 1 feet each, the flagship 
rather more. 

' This force assembled at North Edisto, and on 
April 6th, crossed the bar and anchored off Morris 
Island, but haze prevented the attack. Next day at 
noon they weighed anchor, but to handle a squadron 
of new-type ships in a narrow, shallow channel, in a 
tideway, was most difficult and tedious. The flagship 
steered so badly that she had to anchor and let 
others go on more than once : once she lay right over 
a big submarine mine, but the firing gear would not 
work. The orders were to go forward without re- 
turning the fire from Morris Island, and concentrate 
their fire on the north-west face of Fort Sumter, at 
ranges of from 600 to 800 yards, the gunboats to form 
outside the bar, and be ready to help the ironclads. 

The Confederates had marked the ranges with 

' Map 34, p. 258. 



DUPONT ATTACKS KORT SUMTER 231 

buoys, and placed obstructions and submarine mines, 
which caused confusion in the advance, and the ships 
masked each other's fire. At 2.50, Fort Moultrie 
opened fire, followed by other Confederate works ; the 
leading ships turned at the line of obstructions between 
the bank near Sumter and Sullivan's Island, and were 
clubbed between the two strongest forts, and severely 
punished. The flagship could not be got to her place, so 
Dupont ordered the fleet to withdraw at 4.30, intend- 
ing to renew the attack next day, but when the reports 
came in in the evening he had the moral courage to say 
that he would not turn a repulse into a disaster. The 
results of this, the first important action of ironclads, 
may be instructive. The fleet had been exposed to 
converging fire from many heavy guns, five monitors 
were more or less disabled, and the wretched " Keokuk" 
was literally riddled, and sank the next morning. In 
the others, the armour, though badly damaged, had 
prevented much loss of life, but the diff'erence between 
the solid plates of the flagship and the laminated pro- 
tection of the monitors was most marked : in the former 
vessel there was a sense of absolute security in the 
battery, while the men in the turrets were exposed 
to flying bolts and splinters, and the armour was 
crushed in in many places. The "Nahant's" turret 
jammed, water poured in round that of the " Passaic," 
and the " Passaic," " Patapsco," and " Nantucket," had 
each a gun put out of action. The damage inflicted 
was but slight, only the barbette guns of Sumter 
having suffered to some extent. The armament was 
quite unsuited to the work, being mainly the heavy 
15 and ii-inch smooth-bores, of short range, which, 
although most effective against wooden ships, were not 
so against forts, for the ships were compelled to stand 
in to a range where the forts had the advantage : a 
powerful long-range rifled gun was wanted. So much 
for details. The general lessons were that the number 
of guns was insufficient, the fire too slow, the view 
from the conning-towers unsatisfactory, while the 



232 THE FIRST HALF OF 1863 

crews were not large enough to detail a landing party 
to secure any advantage. These were insuperable 
difficulties in the way of a purely naval attack. 

On the side of the defence, the heavy concentrated 
fire at marked ranges had its full effect, and the 
obstructions were well placed and useful, but the 
submarine mines did no harm : several exploded close 
to the ships, but only shook them, while the electric 
firing gear failed in the one case where it could have 
been used. A land force of 30,000 men was ready to 
deal with an attack by the army, but after this action 
it was broken up, and most of it sent elsewhere. 

On the evening of the attack, Dupont was ordered 
to send all his ironclads but two to New Orleans, the 
opening of the Mississippi being the most pressing 
work, while he held his position as best he could with 
what force was left. General Hunter also proposed 
to occupy Morris Island with the army, but Dupont 
had to decline to co-operate.^ The Confederate force 
available would at this time have been able to defeat 
this plan. 

Early in June, information was received that the Con- 
federate ironclad " Atlanta,'' late the blockade-runner 
" Fingal," which had been converted at Savannah, was 
lying in Wassaw Sound, and would soon sweep off 
the Union vessels, and the monitors "Weehawken" 
and "Nahant" were sent there. On June 17th, the 
" Atlanta " came down to attack them, but got aground, 
when the " Weehawken " took an advantageous 
position at short range, and with four shots so ruined 
her armour that she surrendered : the " Nahant " took 
no part in the action. 

Dupont sent his battered ironclads to Port Royal 
for repairs ; meanwhile the order to send them away 

' E. Chancellorsville, May ist-4th. 
S. Grant invests Vicksburg, May i8th. 
S. Banks invests Port Hudson, May 27th. 
Mexico. The French take Puebla, May 17th. 
Mexiqo. The F,reyi^ch enter Mexico City, June 5tb. 



RECAPTURE OF GALVESTON 233 

was countermanded, and he was told to attack 
Charleston again on April i6th, but this was im- 
possible, as the repairs took some months. On June 
12th, Gillmore succeeded Hunter in command of the 
army, and got together men and materiel for com- 
bined action with the fleet.^ 

The Gulf of Mexico 

Magruder, commanding in Texas, planned to re- 
cover Galveston by an attack of his army, supported 
by two improvised gunboats, and to raise the blockade, 
and on January ist carried out his plan, bringing two 
brigades against a small Union force of a few com- 
panies. He took one Union vessel, and destroyed 
another, losing one of his own gunboats in the action. 
Galveston was not recovered by the North, but they 
re-established the blockade in about a week. The 
Confederates broke the blockade at Sabine Pass, 
which was restored at once, but they also drove off 
a small land force in connection with it on January 
2ist, and an attempt to regain the ground failed. 
(Continued on p. 270.) 

The War at Sea 

(Continued from p. 179.) The '•^ Retribution''' ended 
her cruise in the Bahamas, being brought to Nassau, and 
sold, in February. We left M a ffitt 2in6. the ''Florida'' 
at Mobile, where he had run in with half a crew, to 
recruit and refit. In January, he chose a thick, wild 
night, with half a gale blowing, to elude the blockad- 
ing squadron, and got clear off, though chased. He 
took some prizes in West Indian waters in February, 
and then ran down the South American coast ; in five 
months he destroyed 14 ships, using the colliers for 
supplies. One prize was commissioned as a cruiser, 

' E. Gettysburg, July ist-3rd. 
S. Vicksburg surrenders, July 4th. 
W. Bragg escapes to Chattanooga : end of Tullahoma Campaign, July Ist. 



234 THP: first half of 1863 

and put under Read, who did much mischief along 
the Atlantic coast of the United States, twice changing 
into another vessel as soon as the one he was in 
became too well known. He made a bold attempt 
to cut out a ship from the harbour of Portland, 
Maine, but was defeated and captured. These ships 
were, the " Clarence,'' taken off the Brazilian coast, 
cruising in May and June, " Tacony,'' at work in June 
in mid-Atlantic, '^Archer,'' on American coast, end of 
June. Together they took 16 ships. 

When the " Alabama " was cruising in the Caribbean 
Sea, Seinmes saw by papers taken in prizes that 
Banks intended to attack Galveston and invade Texas. 
He therefore planned to get to Galveston at the same 
time as the fleet of transports, and make a night 
attack on them, as there would probably be no escort, 
and they would be busy with landing preparations. 
He came up a little before dark on January nth, but 
saw, instead of transports, the Union fleet coming 
back to re-establish the blockade. The " Hatteras," 
an armed merchant steamer, came out about dark to 
see what the "^/a6rtm«" was, a sharp action ensued, 
and the " Hatteras " went down in thirteen minutes ; she 
had not a chance against her opponent. The " Ala- 
bama" went back to the Atlantic, to the crossing of the 
homeward-bound and East India trades, working out- 
wards from the north end of the Bahamas to about 
half-way between the Canaries and Bermuda, where 
on March 2nd she turned south down the South 
American coast, till at the end of June she was due 
south of Bahia, about opposite Rio. She seems to 
have taken about 20 prizes in that time. 

The Northern flying squadron, looking for Con- 
federate cruisers, which had been under Wilkes, was 
in June given to Lardner, as Wilkes had made himself 
impossible by his constant quarrels with other naval 
officers (cf. pp. 98, 178). 

In Europe, Bulloch was working away to supply 
his Government with ships and munitions of war, and 



THE ''ALEXANDRA'' CASP: 235 

in March a small wooden steamer was launched for 
him by Miller of Birkenhead, and called the " Alex- 
nndrar She was being got ready for sea, but not 
armed in any way, when the U.S. Consul, Mr. Dudley, 
filed affidavits that she was intended for the Con- 
federate States, and she was seized on April 5th ; the 
matter was brought to trial in June, the complaints 
being that the ship was being " equipped," not 
" armed." The jury found for the defendants, but 
this was reversed in November, and she was detained. 
To finish the matter here : her name was changed, and 
she sailed as a merchant ship for Halifax under another 
name, thence to Nassau, where she was seized again, 
but the court decided that there was nothing to justify 
her forfeiture, and she was released in May, 1865, after 
the War was over. 

When the " Alexandra " was seized, and Lord John 
Russell stated that a much sharper watch would be 
kept in future, the difficulties increased enormously, 
especially as the two ironclad turret-ships which 
Laird was building were such unmistakable war- 
ships, fit for nothing else. In view of the overtures 
which had been made to Mr. Slidcll in France, it was 
hoped that they might be fitted out there, and got 
away from England as the ostensible property of a 
French subject. They should have been ready in 
the first half of the year, but armour-plating was a 
new business, and there were many dela3^s. Bulloch 
was given a free hand, and sold the ships to a French 
firm for whom Laird agreed to complete the contract, 
as they had an order for two ironclads from the Pasha 
of Eg3^pt, and all seemed right, but they agreed with 
Bulloch to re-sell them to him beyond British jurisdic- 
tion for a sum which would give them a fair com- 
mission. Bulloch went to France in March, to see a 
French ship-builder, who informed him that he had 
been officially and confidentially told that the Emperor 
was willing that he should build ships for the Con- 
federates (cf, p. 179), that he could send them out 



236 THE FIRST HALF OF 1863 

under the French flag to any place, and that if the 
United States raised objections, he could get authority 
to complete, arm, and despatch them, as a matter of 
legitimate business. A contract was made with him 
to build four clipper corvettes, each carrying twelve 
to fourteen 6-inch rifled guns of regulation French 
pattern, and he received a letter dated June 6th, from 
M. Chasseloup-Laubat, the Minister of Marine, grant- 
ing him authority to arm these ships. In June, 
Bulloch was told to build some sea-going ironclads 
able to navigate the Mississippi and fight vessels carry- 
ing 15 and ii-inch guns, as soon as possible (cf. p. 273). 
France was evidently the only place where this could 
now be done, since nothing more was required than 
the most ordinary business prudence. 

The Confederate Government sent over Commander 
Maury ^ on special service, at the end of 1862, and in 
March, 1863, he bought a new iron steamer on the 
Clyde, called the " Japan." She sailed in April, met 
her armament off" Ushant, a cousin of Maury's took 
command, and she was commissioned as the " Georgia'' ; 
she sailed across the Atlantic, reaching Bahia in May, 
coaled there, and went on towards the Cape of Good 
Hope. (Continued on p. 271.) 

Summary 

(Continued from p. 180.) During the first half of 
1863, the War for a time was at a standstill, for 
though the South was exhausted, the North could 
make no progress : Hooker could not move, all 
Grant's efforts were failures, Rosecrans was stuck 
fast in front of Bragg, and Banks and Farragut were 
blocked at Port Hudson. Then Lee swept back his 
enemies from Chancellorsville, over the border, and 
followed them up : he deliberately planned this in- 
vasion to be the deciding point of the War, but failed 
to win, rather than was beaten, at Gettysburg : like 
so many decisive battles^ this was tactically indecisive. 



SUMMARY •> 237 

Johnston was at cross-purposes with Jefferson Davis 
and Peniberton, so that Grant invested and took Vicks- 
burg, the other decisive point, at the same time. At 
the same time also, Rosecrans had just manoeuvred 
Bragg out of central Tennessee back to his base, 
Chattanooga. All three were winning strokes, and 
July 4th, Independence Day, saw the future existence 
of the Nation secured. Abroad, however, Napoleon's 
progress in Mexico began to be a factor in the conduct 
of the War, affecting both sides, and his new ventures 
there made him wish rather for two republics to the 
north of it than one : he was very favourable to the 
Confederate agents, but did not go so far as definite 

. political recognition. 

The half-year closed with the Union prospects as 
bright as they had been gloomy at the end of the 
preceding one; the North had permanently gained 
the control of the Mississippi (for the fall of Vicksburg 
brought that of Port Hudson), of Kentucky, of Ten- 
nessee, west of the Cumberland Mountains, and of 
Alabama, north of the Tennessee River. 

Union Loss. — Major-General John F. Reynolds, 
killed in action. 

Confederate Loss. — Lientenant-General Thomas J. 

Jackson, died of wounds. (Continued on p. 274.) 

Notices of Officers 

(Continued from p. 184.) Several prominent men 
disappear from the War during this half-year, " Stone- 
wall" Jackson, Generals Penibcrton, Reynolds, Van 
Dorn, and McClernand. 

A short notice of the most remarkable and fasci- 
nating character of the Civil War must necessarily be 
very bald, and readers are referred to Henderson's 
delightful book, " Stonewall Jackson." Thomas Jonathan 
Jackson was born at Clarksburg, West Virginia, in 
1824, lost both parents when quite young, and was 
brought up by an uncle. His father died very poor, 



238 THE FIRST HALF OF 1863 

and he had to make his own way, which developed 
his character early. He went to West Point in 1842, 
and, in spite of his defective education, did well 
enough to get a commission in the Artillery, four 
years later, just as the Mexican War broke out. 
During the first part of it he was on fortress garrison 
duty, but went to the front with General Scott in 
1847, being appointed to a field battery; he gained 
great credit at Contreras and Chapultepec, was men- 
tioned in despatches, and breveted, first Captain, 
then Major, within eighteen months of joining the 
Army. In 185 1 he left the Army, his health having 
been injured by the Mexican War, getting an appoint- 
ment as Professor at the Virginia Military Institute 
at Lexington. Here he married, and had time for 
military study, and the religious side of his character 
developed, which had hitherto been in abeyance. 
Like Lee,, Early, and other great Confederate soldiers, 
he was against Secession, but followed the fortunes 
of his State, to which he considered his first duty to 
lie. His first command was at Harper's Ferry, where 
he had the difficult task of driving notions of discipline 
and duty into his motley levies, his stern ideas on 
these questions making him most unpopular with all 
ranks at first, but when war had taught the value of 
them, no man was more adored by his command. 
They first saw this at Bull Run, where the steadi- 
ness of his brigade earned for its commander the 
nickname of ^'' StonewalV : this, however, was for the 
outside world ; to his own men he was " Old Jack." 
A fortnight before this he received his commission 
as Brigadier-General, and from that time to the day 
of his death the history of his services is that of the 
War in Virginia. There was nothing showy about 
Jackson ; he was a good, though ungraceful, rider, and 
often both badly mounted and shabbily dressed : as 
a Yankee prisoner remarked to his comrades, " Boys, 
he's not much to look at, but if we'd had him we 
shouldn't have been in this mess." He believed in 



JACKSON, PEMBERTON, REYNOLDS 239 

hiystifying his opponents and concealing his own 
plans, but carried the latter idea too far, for had 
anything happened to him, no one else knew enough 
to carry them out. He was a model subordinate, the 
only one to whom Lee could entrust a task without 
definite orders, and, though he always spoke his mind, 
he accepted an adverse decision without cavil. Per- 
haps his greatest military peculiarity was his terrible 
power of counterstroke, in which no one has ever 
approached him. Though the kindest of men, always 
ready to pardon a mistake, to anything savouring of 
dishonesty, untruthfulness, or neglect of duty, he was 
absolutely merciless, and his code of morality was 
most rigid. The mainspring of his life and of all his 
actions was his trust in God, duty first, popularity 
nowhere. A shy and self-contained man, in public 
he was reserved and reticent, but in his home his 
warmly affectionate nature came out fully, and he was 
one of the happiest of men. In fine, Jackson seems 
really to have succeeded in being what the best of the 
seventeenth-century Puritans tried to be. 

Licutenant-General Pemberton is principally remark- 
able for the fact that he was about the only Northerner 
who held high command in the field on the Confederate 
side. He was a Pennsylvanian, educated at West 
Point, who had served with distinction in the Mexican 
War, but, though a very good officer, he could not be 
called a first-rate general. When in the old Service, 
he was quartered in the South for a long time ; he 
married a Virginian lady, and imbibed the States 
Rights doctrine so thoroughly that he practised it by 
fighting against the side of his own State. After the 
fall of Vicksburg he was not employed again. 

Reynolds was said to have been the best officer who 
was killed in the War on the Union side. He was a 
brilliant soldier, who had served wdth credit in the 
Mexican War, and a smart and handsome man, 
universally popular. The choice of Burnside's suc- 
cessor in command of the Army of the Potomac lay 



240 THE FIRST HALF OF tS&s 

between him, Hooker, and Meade, but he put himself 
out by stipulating for a freer hand, if chosen. When 
Hooker had to go, the whole army looked to Reynolds, 
but the politicians put Meade in, much against his 
will, for he was one of Reynolds' warmest admirers. 
Reynolds was in command of a wing of the army, and 
it was to him that Meade looked to manage the all- 
important opening stage of the great battle of Gettys- 
burg, where he fell, respected and lamented by both 
sides. 

Major-Genera I Earl Van Dorn passed out of West 
Point in 1842, with Rosecrans, Pope, Longstreet, and 
others, distinguished himself in the Mexican War, 
and was major in the old Army when the War broke 
out. He was one of the first to resign his commission, 
and offered his sword to his native State, Mississippi. 
A brave and dashing soldier, his ability was greater 
than his good fortune, for, with few mistakes, he made 
few successes in army command. He raised such a 
storm by his enforcement of martial law in his own 
State, that after Corinth he was superseded by Pern- 
berton (cf. p. r/i), and given a cavalry command, which 
seemed to suit him much better, and where he 
exercised a real power, his greatest success being 
the destruction of Grant's main depot at Holly Springs, 
in December, 1862. In the summer of 1863 his health 
broke down, and he died the next year. Personally, 
he was a handsome and charming man, but of rather 
delicate physique. 

Major-General McClernand was a powerful politician 
before the War, a Member of Congress from the 
President's own State, Illinois, and who had great 
influence with him, which got him a high command. 
He grasped the methods of systematic warfare on a 
large scale more quickly than any other civilian 
general, and would have made a fine ofiicer, but that he 
was insubordinate and unscrupulous, and an incorri- 
gible intriguer, who trusted to shady methods to get 
what would have been earned better by a proper use 



McCLERNAND 241 

of his own great abilities. No braver, and few abler 
men, took part in the War, and he might have aspired 
to almost any position at the end of it, but he was the 
worst of the politicals, his crooked ways were his ruin, 
and he was dismissed in disgrace. Exit McClernand. 
(Continued on p. 275.) 



16 



242 



THE FIRST HALF OF 1863 



1863 


January 


Fbbruakv 


March 








8. Mosby captures 








General Stough- 


H 






ton at Chantilly. 


? 




Longstreet command ing against Peck, at 


w 




Suff 


oik. 




8. Confederate rams 






< 


attack blockaders, 






w 


off Charleston. 






1 






29. Jacksonville Ex- 








pedition, Florida. 




1-3. Battle of 








Stone's River. 








4. Bragg retreats. 






(1 


11. McClernand 


Guerilla Warfare 


in Kentucky and 


1 


takes Arkansas 
Post. 


Tenn 


essee. 




Grant getting his 


Grant's fruitless att 


empts to get at Vicks- 




army to Vicks- 


burg through the swamps of the Yazoo 


8 


burg. 


Valley. 


g 


First Operations. 




14. Farragut at- 


03 






tacks Port Hud- 
son. 






Banks and Tayl 


or in Louisiana. 




1. Magruder re- 








takes Galveston. 






i 


11. The "Alabama" 






sinks the " Hat- 


The "Alabama" an 


d " Florida " at sea. 


Is 


teras," off Gal- 






-R 


veston. 






(4 ^ 


15. The "Florida" 






^p 


escapes from Mo- 






B^ 


bile. 






g 


The "Retribution" 


The "Retribution" 




to 


at sea, among 
the Bahamas. 


sold at Nassau. 





CHRONOLOGICAL TABLE 



243 



18«8 


April 


May 


JUNB, TO July 4 






1-4. Battle of 


Mosby captures a 






Chancellorsville. 


supply train. 




12. Siege of Suffolk, 


to 4. 


. 3. 




28. S t n e ni a n ' s 




Gettysburg Cam- 




Raid, to ... . 


8. Kilpatrick's. to • 


paign. 






20-28. Glendenin's 


9. Brandy Station. 






Raid below Fre- 


11. Confederates 


;3 




dericksburg. 


cross Potomac. 






28. Meade succeeds 






Hooker. 








July 1-3. Battle of 








Gettysburg. 








June 15. Dix threa- 








tens Richmond. 








26-30. Dix a d - 








vances on Rich- 








mond. 


< 


7. Naval bombard- 




17. The "Weehaw- 




to 


ment of Fort 




ken " captures 


Sumter. 




the "Atlanta." 








23-July 1. Rose- 








crans' Tullahoma 


H 






Campaign against 


^ 






Bragg. 


27. Streight's Raid. 


to 3. 


July 4. Confederate 
attack on He- 




17. Grierson's Raid, 


to 


lena fails. 




Grant moves his 


2. 






army to South of 


1-18. Grant fights 






Vicksburg, and 


his way round to 






crosses the Mis- 


east of Vicksburg. 






sissippi at Grand 


18. Siege of Vicksb 


urg, to July 4. 


8 
1 


Gulf, 29. 


18. First Assault. 


July 4. Vicksburg 


16. Fleet passes 


20. Second assault. 


surrenders. 


w 


Vicksburg bat- 


Banks moves 






teries. 


against Port 
Hudson. 






Banks and Taylor 


27. Siege of Port H 


udson. 




in Louisiana. 










6. The" Clarence" at 


sea, off South Ameri- 


g 




can and West In 


dian coasts, to 10. 


Is 






10-25. The" racony" 


C--H 






in mid-Atlantic. 


Si 






25. The "Archer" 








along U.S. coast. 


H 


The -A lab 


ama" and "Florida" 


at sea. 


p 




Mexico. 




5 




17. The French 


5. The French enter 






take Puebla. 


Mexico City. 



CHAPTER X 

the second half of 1 863, the north takes a 
winning position 

Affairs in Mexico 

As the operations of the French in Mexico began to 
be a real factor in connection with the Civil War in 
the summer of 1863, it may be well to give a sketch 
of them here to date. 

Napoleon Ilird had long watched with apprehension 
the marvellous progress of the United States, and 
considered that it was becoming a menace to the Old 
World : so long as the different American countries 
kept within themselves, and supplied the raw material 
for his French manufactures, he was content, but 
when the United States threatened to become a 
serious manufacturing rival, and also gained influence 
over her neighbours, he cast about for some pretext 
to intervene, and place a limit on her growing power, 
so as to adjust the balance to his liking. 

Since the overthrow of the Spanish dominion b}^ 
Yturbide in 1822, Mexico had had no stable govern- 
ment, but was the prey of factions, and of adventurers 
rather than rulers, of whom some were strong and 
some were honest, but none combined these qualities 
till the advent of Juarez. After 1856, the main struggle 
was that of the Liberals against the supporters of the 
absolute power of the Roman Catholic Church, the 
Clericals. The country was bankrupt, with no pro- 

244 



CHAOS IN MEXICO 245 

spect of improvement. In 1846, its President, Paredes, 
had said that its best chance was the monarchy of a 
foreign prince, backed by Europe, and in 1859 Pre- 
sident Buchanan had asked Congress for military 
force to invade Mexico to obtain security for their 
loans, laying down their position clearly : that Mexico 
was like a ship drifting, directed by unstable passions, 
and that the United States should hold out a helping 
hand, for if any one else came in they might have to 
intervene at a disadvantage. This fear nearly came 
true, for two events played into Napoleon's hands in 
1 861 : the outbreak of the Civil War, and the sus- 
pension of payment by Juarez' Government, in April 
and July respectively.^ The latter afforded a pretext 
for immediate intervention, while the former not only 
made the United States unable to interfere with him, 
but gave him a chance of weakening them permanently 
by aiding their definite separation, and at the same 
time setting up a power on their borders to curb their 
expansion. He remembered Paredes' saying, and was 
in communication with Mexican refugees of the de- 
feated Clerical party, who consulted him about ap- 
proaching some Catholic prince and establishing a 
monarchy. He recommended Maximilian of Austria, 
whom they sounded in the spring of 1862 to such 
effect that he refused the proffered crown of Greece 
a year later. 

When Mexico suspended payment, France and 
England broke off relations with President Juarez, 
and then, v.^ith Spain, agreed on joint intervention 
to obtain security, and asked the United States to 
join them. Mr. Seward, the Secretary of State, did 
not consent (cf p. 80), but proposed to Congress on 
October 14th that the United States should meet 
claims on Mexico up to a given sum, taking as security 
the public domain and the valuable mines; this, how- 
ever, the last thing that Napoleon would have wished, 
was not agreed to. The three Powers signed the 

' E. Battle of Bull Run, July 21st. 



246 THE SECOND HALF OF 1863 

Convention of London on October 31st, again asking 
the United States to join them, but this time 
Mr. Seward sent a strong reply ^ to the effect that 
the States could not agree to any measures of coercion 
in the distracted state of Mexico, and adding that 
" it is of the highest importance to the United States 
that the Sovereigns agreeing to the Convention do 
not seek for any territorial aggrandisement, and do 
not intend to exert any influence to hinder the right 
of the Mexican people to the free choice and estab- 
lishment of their own form of government." 

The joint expedition started and arrived in De- 
cember, but in January, 1862, the French admiral 
made claims against which the others protested. In 
February,^ the Convention of Soledad was signed, 
recognizing Juarez, and formally disclaiming any 
intention of attacking the independence, sovereignty, 
or integrity of the Mexican Republic. This was 
conformable with the intentions of England and Spain, 
whose ideas of intervention were limited to such acts 
as the seizure of the Customs as guarantees for pay- 
ment ; but Napoleon suddenly sent very large rein- 
forcements,' and brought back the Clerical refugees 
who had been intriguing with him to establish a 
monarchy, that is, to interfere with the form of 
government, so his allies broke off the agreement, 
sent their men back, and let France go on alone. 
The French notified the Mexican Government that 
hostilities would begin as soon as the troops of the 
other nations had retired, and persuaded the refugee 
General Almonte to proclaim himself dictator ad 
interim. As the Convention of Soledad would put 
the French troops in a very bad position in case of 
war, their commander. General Lorencez, broke it on 
some flimsy pretext, and advanced against the Mexican 

' The "Trent " affair, November 8th, 1861. 
2 W. Fall of Fort Donelson, February i6th, 1862. 

•* E. The " Monitor" and " Merriuiac" March gth. 

E. McClellan starts for the Peninsula. 



WAR IN MEXICO 247 

general Zaragoza on April igth.' He had very hard 
fighting, was beaten at Pucbla, and gained ground 
very slowly, so General Forey was sent out to take 
command in October. Napoleon showed his hand 
too much at this time- in his attempts to create a 
Buffer State between Mexico and either or both 
parties in the Civil War, for his Consul in Texas 
wrote to the Governor of that State to suggest the 
re-establishment of the old Republic, that is, the 
secession of Texas from the Confederacy, adding that 
the answer would be a useful guide to him in corre- 
spondence with his own Government (cf p. 73). The 
French Consul at Richmond had also been meddling 
in the matter,^ and both of them were ordered to leave 
the Confederate States. In the spring of 1863,^ Forey 
advanced, taking Puebla in May, driving Juarez from 
Mexico City, and entering it on June 5th. Now was 
his time to put in force his instructions for the recon- 
struction of the country, which were written by 
Napoleon himself, and laid stress on the danger of 
the United States becoming the controlling power 
on the American continent, but said that if Mexico, 
with French help, obtained a stable government, " we 
shall have placed an impassable barrier against the 
encroachments of the United States." Definite in- 
structions were given for calling an Assembly and 
forming a provisional coalition Government of all 
parties, who were to ascertain the will of the nation 
as to the form of government desired, with due care : 

' E. McClellan before Yorktown, all April. 

S. Capture of New Orleans, April 20th. 

- E. June. The Peninsular Campaign. 

E. Lee's Invasion of Maryland, September. 

W. Bragg's Invasion of Kentucky, September. 

' E. Fredericksburg, December 12th. 

W. Stone's River, December 31st. 

' E. Chancellorsville, M.ny ist-4th, 1863. 

W. Tullahoma Campaign. June. 

E. Battle of Gettysburg, July ist-3rd. 

S. Surrender of Vicksburg, July 4th. 



248 THE SECOND HALF OF 1863 

if a monarchy were chosen, the name of Maximilian 
was to be submitted as the candidate approved by 
France. The Emperor went on to say that whoever 
took the throne would have to act in the interests 
of France, both because they were identical with 
those of Mexico, and because he would be dependent 
on French support, and reminded Forey that the 
carrying out of the objects of the expedition was a 
necessity for the honour of France, both military and 
political. 

Napoleon's trusted agent in the country, however, 
to whom his generals were referred for instructions, 
was M. Dubois de Saligny, an ambitious and intriguing 
man, whose reports were framed rather to suit his 
master's wishes and his own ambitions than the real 
state of affairs, and the idea of an honest plebiscite did 
not suit him at all : his aim was rather, now, to commit 
Napoleon to an enterprise from which he could not 
recede, and by means of which he, de Saligny, might 
perhaps rise from his present anomalous position 
to be Ambassador at the Imperial Court of Mexico. 
No time was to be lost for him and Almonte, who 
persuaded Forey to issue the requisite proclama- 
tions, and then chose a Governing Committee of 35, 
who named a Provisional Executive of 5, and an 
"Assembly of Notables" of 215 members, all the 
members of these Committees consisting of their own 
supporters in the Clerical party. The Assembly 
passed the following Resolutions on July loth : 
(i) "That the Government be a hereditary Catholic 
Monarchy." (2) " That the monarch's title be The 
Emperor of Mexico." (3) "That the Crown be offered 
to Maximilian." (4) "That in case of his refusal, 
Napoleon be asked to name another suitable prince." 

The Provisional Government called itself "The 
Regency of the Empire," got in the adhesion of some 
towns in French occupation quickly, and sent to 
Maximilian, to offer him the Crown as the genuine 
wish of the people, these adhesions being only an 



MAXIMILIAN ACCEPTS THE CROWN 249 

instalment. He accepted it, if ratified by tlie voice of 
the wliole nation, and they plied him with nominal 
adhesions and votes, till on December 26th he wrote 
and accepted the Crown definitely. Napoleon had 
begun to suspect that de Saligny was playing his own 
game, and was very angry when he found how he had 
been outwitted : he wrote at once, repudiating the 
Resolutions, and insisting that his instructions be 
carried out properly before anything were fixed, for 
the farce was too flagrant to pass muster, and the 
blame lay on him. He recalled de Saligny and Forey, 
but the mischief was done : he was, however, pacified 
by the fresh adhesions sent to Maximilian, and let 
things go on, appointing Bazaine, who had been in 
the country for some time, to the command. Having 
driven back the Mexican army, the next thing was 
to settle down, and try to re-organize the hopeless 
finances, both for their own sake, and also to enable 
them to bear a good share of the cost of the expedi- 
tion. Napoleon took the same view as Seward and 
Jefferson Davis (cf. pp. 69, 96), and planned to get a 
concession of the valuable Sonora mines for a French 
company, on condition that it paid a tax to the Mexican 
Government, and also part of its profits to the French 
Government. 

In December the French Minister at Washington 
said to Seward that the Emperor would be willing to 
act as a Mediator when the time came for the inevitable 
separation between North and South, but after 
Gettysburg, Vicksburg, and Chattanooga, Seward 
could laugh at him. This only increased the pro- 
found suspicion with which he regarded the Emperor 
and all his projects, which was confirmed by informa- 
tion from other sources. 

General Position and Plans 

(Continued from p. 188.) After the taking of Vicks- 
burg, Halleck repeated his mistake of the summer 
before, and dispersed Grapt's army instead of keeping 



250 THE SECOND HALF OF 1863 

it together to break down all opposition, leaving him 
there with merely a skeleton force. Rosecrans wanted 
more men to guard his communications before he 
advanced on Chattanooga, but they were refused. 
Grant wished to use the whole army against Mobile, 
and Banks also was for attacking it, when Port Hudson 
surrendered, but Halleck seemed to think the trans- 
Mississippi district of most importance, while the 
President was anxious to secure a good foothold in 
Texas, on account of his suspicions of Napoleon, and the 
effect of the entry of the French troops into Mexico City 
on June 5th. He expected French interference in the 
War, which fear was shared by the Confederates. 
P'or both sides the main objective was the central 
district, the possession of Chattanooga : though not 
perhaps quite realized in July, it soon became fully 
apparent, and everything else was made secondary to 
it, as being the last military base of the Confederacy in 
front of its heart, Atlanta, now an invaluable manu- 
facturing centre. The object of Grant's proposed 
attack on Mobile was to gain quickly a base from 
which Atlanta and Bragg s army might be attacked in 
rear. As he said, there was no need of a great expedi- 
tion to Texas to watch the French, for with the Union 
command of the sea, a strong garrison might be main- 
tained at Brownsville, which was all that was wanted 
at the time. In the East, Meade was a most cautious 
strategist, following Lee with little vigour even before 
he sent troops to Chattanooga, and Burnside, in east 
Tennessee, hardly affected the main issue. In the 
South-East, a great combined attack was planned on 
Charleston : success here would have left the Con- 
federates but one Atlantic port, Wilmington, to which 
the coast and blockading forces could then have turned 
their attention ; Mobile, their only other port, was at 
this time but weakly held, and would probably have 
quickly fallen to a land attack. 

On the Confederate side, the loss of Vicksburg and 
the failure at Gettysburg were felt to be the beginning 



THE SOUTH'S LAST CHANCE 251 

of the end : from henceforth they fought with little 
hope, and General Taylor could not see why his 
Government went on with a struggle which was only 
ruining the country, though he, as a soldier, fought so 
long as they kept up the War. There was, though, as 
both Grant and Sheridan have put on record, still a 
chance, and not a hopeless one, of tiring out the North 
politically^ by the increase of the voting power of those 
who opposed the vigorous prosecution of the War, 
The elections of the autumn of 1862 had gone much in 
their favour, which made Grant take the great risk 
that he did in choosing the plan for the final attack on 
Vicksburg. The consequence was that the North had 
the greatest difficulty in raising men, even by offering 
high bounties, and the Government was compelled to 
resort to conscription. In September, the President 
used the powers given him by the Act of March 3rd 
(cf, p. 187), and suspended the writ of Habeas Corpus 
for the duration of the War, in support of the new 
Conscription Laws. The authorities would not use 
force to raise men, and there were serious riots in 
New York, to quell which, and enforce the draft, 
troops were sent back from the army. 

All this gave encouragement to the Confederates, 
and was a legitimate factor in their calculations. 
Chattanooga was much more valuable to them than to 
their opponents, for on the south side it was not only 
strong, but had good communications, and if they could 
but clear the Knoxville district, it commanded their 
best railway line and junction, even after the loss of 
the Memphis branch. 

We have seen the extreme danger of New Orleans 
from Taylors able operations in western Louisiana, 
and Banks' nerve in holding to his objective at Port 
Hudson after Emory's alarming letter of July 4th 
cannot be too strongly commended. 

In August, the Union Government began to think 
of re-establishing Civil Government in Arkansas, 
Mississippi, and Louisiana, and Halleck wrote to 



252 THE SECOND HALF OF 1863 

Sherman about it, but he was strongly against putting 
power into local hands at this stage (cf. p. 421). 
(Continued on p. 280.) 

The East 

(Continued from p. 217.) We have seen that both 
armies stood facing each other during July 4th, Lee 
entrenching a line in which he might resist attack 
and gain time for the retreat of his trains and wounded. 
Meade also prepared to resist attack, for his troops 
were too much shaken to make one, and he employed 
the day in re-organizing and caring for the wounded. 
He was also watching whether Lee would retreat, and 
sent back cavalry to strike at him if he did so. On 
the 5th, he followed cautiously, Sedgwick coming on 
Early's rearguard, which formed up to cover the 
trains, but was only molested by long-range artillery 
fire. At this time Kilpatrick's cavalry was attacking 
Lee's trains further back, and Lee was thus able to turn 
on him and save them, but had Sedgwick been allowed 
to attack in force, this could not have been done, for 
Lee must have turned his whole attention to him, with 
results which would have been disastrous, and might 
have ended the War. Lee was almost out of artillery 
ammunition, and the garrisons might have been used 
with effect against the retreating Confederates ; the 
risk would have been little, and the result great, but 
this chance was lost. Meade moved very slowly, 
while Lee marched day and night,^ and gained so much 
time, that when he found the Potomac in flood, and 
could not cross, he had time to fortify a position, 
and renew his ammunition supply before his pursuers 
appeared. Lincoln urged the pressing of the retreat, 
but Meade did not rise to the occasion : on coming to 
Le^s position, he spent the 12th and 13th in reconnais- 
sance for an attack on the 14th, but then found that 
Lee had crossed the river in the night. If below par 

' W. Morgan's Raid in Indiana and Ohio, July. 
S. Surrender of Port Hudson, July 9th. 



LEB^S KETREAT 253 

at Gettysburg, Lee was at his best in the retreat from 
it, which was wonderfully managed. There was some 
sharp cavalry fighting, which cleared the way into 
Hagerstown for the retreating army. The Union 
cavalry seems to have been less well handled than 
before, while Stuart, like Lee, was at his best, but to 
leave two cavalry brigades in Virginia till July ist 
was a great loss of power on the Confederate side 
in the campaign. 

Lee retreated by way of the Valle}"^, crossing the 
Blue Ridge by Chester and Thornton's Gaps to Cul- 
peper, Meade advancing to the Rappahannock. At 
the beginning of September,^ Meade heard that Lee 
had sent away large forces to strengthen other places, 
and advanced, Lee falling back ; but a few days later 
came the news of Chickamauga, when the Xlth and 
Xllth Corps were put under Hooker, and sent to 
Tennessee. Lee's army was reduced to 38,000 infantry 
and 3,000 cavalry : he depended largely on the watch- 
fulness of his cavalry, and Stuaii's outpost service at 
this time is a perfect model of such work. Meade's 
cautious strategy, at this time of Lee's weakness, was 
ordered by Halleck, which looks like another good 
chance missed. In October,^ Meade, hearing that Lee 
was going to advance, fell back to Centreville, his 
cavalry being badly beaten at Buckland Mills on the 
19th. As Lee did not follow, Meade took position at 
Warrenton. In these operations Lee had several 
chances of striking at Meade's columns in detail, but 
probably because of the weakness of his army he was 
over-cautious ; also, Pleasonton's able handling of the 
Union cavalry foiled him, time and again. 

Meade advanced again to the Rappahannock at the 

' The *^ Alabama" " Tuscaloosa,''' and ^^ Georgia" at the Cape of Good 
Hope, August. 

W. Burnside occupies Knoxville, September 9th. 

S.W. Banks defeated at Sabine Pass, September 8th. 

S.E. Fort Wagner taken, September 7th. 

W. Chickamauga, September 19th, 20th. 
■^ Mexico. The Crown offered to Maximilian, October 3rd. 



254 THE SECOND HALF OF 1863 

beginning of November, and attacked, taking a part 
of the Confederate works, while the rest of the army 
crossed the river. After some fighting, both sides 
were facing each other on Mine Run at the end of 
the month. ^ Meade planned to attack both of Lee's 
flanks, one of which attacks he expected, and defeated, 
but depleted the other flank to do so, and had not 
Meade stopped the attack here, when he heard that 
the other had failed, it would probably have succeeded. 
The chance was lost, for when he wished to attack 
there the next day, the position had been made safe. 
On December ist, the army returned to its old camps 
on the north of the Rapidan : headquarters. Brandy 
Station. Both sides remained inactive during the 
winter. 

In the Valley, Imboden commanded a cavalry force 
some 3,000 strong after Gettysburg, with which he 
struck at the Baltimore and Ohio Railway, doing 
damage and creating a feeling of insecurity. On the 
Union side, Averell made two raids, one to overawe 
the Moorefield district of West Virginia, which was 
strongly Confederate in feeling, the other, in December, 
to the west of Lynchburg, breaking the Virginia and 
Tennessee Railway, and destroying a great depot 
of stores. 

Though the covering of Washington always tied 
the Union army, yet it was not fair to blame Meade 
for having done so little, since Halleck forbade him 
to take a more decided line. His campaign was 
marked by some brilliant manoeuvring and handling, 
in partial actions, very interesting to the student of 
tactics, but hardly so to the general reader. The 
result remained in Lee's favour, for he had never been 
fairly tackled. (Continued on p. 284.) 

' W. Siege of Knoxville, November 1 7th-December 4th. 
W. Chattanooga, November 23rd-25th. 

The " Alabama " in the Sunda Islands, November, December. 
Mexico. The French occupy Tampico, November. 
Mexico. The French fleet at Matamoros, December. 
Mexico. Maximilian accepts the Crown, December 26th. 



GILLMORE BEFORE CHARLESTON 255 

The South-East 

(Continued from p. 217.) In this district, attention 
was centred on the operations against the defences of 
Ciiarleston on the south side, especially Fort Wagner 
on Morris Island, by the army and navy combined. 
As we saw, General Gillmore had been making pre- 
parations for it in June, and on July 6th Admiral 
Dahlgren came to relieve Dupont. Gillmore, a first- 
rate Engineer, who had attacked several places on the 
coast, notably Fort Pulaski, off Savannah, was sent for 
to Washington after the failure of the naval attack on 
April 7th, and consulted as to the silencing of Sumter, 
so that ironclads could go up the harbour. He thought 
that it might be done by rifled guns from Morris 
Island, but said that with the small force available 
no advance could be made against the city from the 
swampy islands at the mouth of the harbour against 
the Confederate works and forces on James Island. 
The army work was to be restricted to taking Morris 
Island and silencing Fort Sumter, in these stages : 
(i) To gain a secure footing on the south end of Morris 
Island. (2) To besiege Battery Wagner, a strong work 
on it : this taken, the other works on the island would 
fall. (3) To destroy Fort Sumter from the position 
thus gained, and aid the fleet by fire when it attempted 
to enter the harbour. (4) The fleet to remove the 
obstructions, run past the enemy's batteries, and go 
up to the city. 

The creeks of the inland waters behind the coast 
islands communicated with the waters held by the 
Union fleet, and were strongly fortified, where they 
approached Charleston. Several Union attacks here 
had been beaten. The Union held the coast islands, 
except Morris Island. By adding the little garrisons 
to the Port Royal force, there would be 11,000 men 
available : they had some 200-pounder rifled Parrott 
guns, and some heavy mortars. Much of the ground 



256 THE SECOND HALF OF 1863 

was deep swamp, while Battery Wagner, the principal 
objective, was a very strong work, which had been 
closed in rear during the siege, and made into a small 
fort. It extended right across the island, which was a 
low neck in front, often awash at high tide, and all 
approach was over absolutely open ground, flanked 
by the Confederate batteries on James Island. 

The first move was a demonstration up Stono Inlet, 
which drew off some of the defence force, when a 
landing was effected on Morris Island on July loth.^ 
Next day an unsuccessful attack was made on the fort. 
Batteries were made, armed, and opened, and another 
attempt made on the i8th, which was beaten by a 
terrible musketry fire at close range. On the first 
occasion, four monitors supported the attack, on the 
second, the flagship and five monitors. They had 
been improved, and stood fire better. The silencing 
of Sumter being the principal object, it was decided 
to attack it, and besiege Fort Wagner, at the same 
time, since Sumter was within the range of the guns 
mounted in the parallels for the attack of Wagner. 
The fire of the defence, in front and flank, was most 
severe, but the approaches moved forward steadily, 
and on August 17th ^ the attack on Sumter began with 
such effect that it was soon a mass of ruins, having 
only one gun serviceable on the 24th : it was reduced 
to an infantry outpost. Meanwhile the approaches to 
Wagner, aided by fire from the ships, were advancing, 
but the narrow neck in front was so difficult to pass 
that mortar fire was largely used, and the " New 
Ironsides" came close in on September 5th. The 
rifled guns from the batteries did little damage to the 
sand parapets, but the heavy and accurate fire of the 
ship's great i i-inch smooth-bores was most effective, 
for the big shells lobbed into the work, burst just over 

' W. Morgan! s Raid in Indiana and Ohio, July. 

S. Surrender of Port Hudson, July 9. 
- The '■^Alabama" " Tuscaloosa," and ^* Georgia" at the Cape of Good 
Hope, August. 



AFFAIRS AT CHARLESTON 257 

the guns, and silenced the fire completely : though 
the defenders' flank fire from James Island was main- 
tained with great effect, the sap was close to the ditch 
on September 6th, and the work was evacuated that 
night.' This brought the fall of Battery Gregg, on 
Cumming's Point, just opposite Sumter. Wagner was 
very strong, and practically uninjured. Fort Sumter 
was summoned to surrender, but refused, and on the 
8th a boat attack was made on it, which failed. To 
put pressure on Charleston, a sand-bag battery was 
constructed on the swamp, of piles and framework, 
armed with a 200-pounder Parrott, which threw shells 
into the town at the then great range of 8,000 yards, 
but burst after a few rounds, after which a pair of 
heavy mortars were put there, to attack James Island. 
After Sumter was practically silenced, at the end of 
August, Dahlgren asked for another bombardment on 
the 30th, to enable him to go up the harbour, but he 
did not attempt to do so, or to remove obstructions. 
Sumter was heavily bombarded on October 26th, and 
at diff'erent times afterwards, to prevent guns being 
remounted. There were no more aggressive opera- 
tions against the defences of Charleston.- 

Some small raids and minor operations were carried 
out in North Carolina, and at St. Augustine, Florida. 
(Continued on p. 299.) 

The West 

(Continued from p. 221.) At the end of June, Bragg, 

at Tullahoma, finding himself threatened both by 

Rosecrans, and by an advance of Burnside against 

Buckner at Knoxville, ordered Morgan to raid into 

' S.W. Banks defeated at Sabine Pass, September 8th. 

W. Burnside occupies Knoxville, September 9th. 

W. Chickamauga, September 19th, 20th. 
- W. Siege of Knoxville, November ijth-December 4th. 

W. Chattanooga, November 23rd-25th. 

The ^^ Alabama" in the Sunda Islands, November, December. 

Mexico. The French occupy Tampico, November. 

Mexico. The French fleet at Matamoros, December. 

Mexico. Maximilian accepts the Crown, December 26th. 

17 



i2S8 THE SECOND HALF OF 1863 

Kentucky, break Rosecrans' railway connection with 
his base, and attack his detachments. Morgan wanted 
to go on into Ohio, but Bragg would not consent ; he 
^started on July 2nd from Burkesville, with 2,460 men 
and 4 guns, and though the Cumberland River was 
watched by 10,000 men, eluded them cleverly, and 
got across. He then proceeded to carry out his own 
idea, not Bragg's, and marched north : he was driven 
back at Green River, but took the post at Lebanon, 
and then moved to Brandenburg on the Ohio, crossing 
the river on the 9th into Indiana, followed by troops 
from Kentucky. The militia were called out, and met 
him everywhere. He turned north-west, marching 
round the north of Cincinnati to Buffington Island, 
where his pursuers closed on him, and he lost half 
his men, but got away. He then struck for Pennsyl- 
vania, but had to surrender at Beaver Creek, near 
New Lisbon, Vv'ith only 400 men. Had he obeyed 
his orders he would have helped his side more, for he 
did not succeed in either breaking up the railways 
or disturbing Rosecrans' communications, being dealt 
with by the militia of the different localities. 

Rosecrans, when he followed Bragg up towards 
the Tennessee River,^ had to rest and refit, and repair 
his communications, his first supply train not getting 
through till July 25th, when he established a depot 
at Stevenson. He wanted to know what Burnside was 
doing, for on his movements depended much of the 
safety of crossing the river against Bragg's flank and 
rear. Also, he asked that part of Grant's scattered 
army be used to protect his long line of communica- 
tions. Again, if he waited till the middle of August, 
the corn would be ripe, another great point, so he 
waited, and made his preparations. He could either 
attack Chattanooga from the north or north-west, and 
besiege it, or cross the river and flank Bragg out. 

' Maps 43, 44, p. 308. 

• E. Lee's retreat from Gettysburg, July 5th-i6th. 
W. Port Hudson surrenders, July 9th. 



ROSECRANS MOVES AGAINST BRAGG 259 

The first would give him very bad communica- 
tions over barren country, leaving good ones to his 
opponent : the second would be at the best place 
for the defence ; he therefore chose the third, and 
determined to cross the river below Bridgeport, 
where Bragg had a detachment, move across the 
tangle of mountains to the south of it, and strike 
at his communications, the railway to Dalton. 

His own army was then lying on the line McMinn- 
ville-Winchester,' and when the main depot in front 
was made safe, Crittenden's Corps moved up to the 
Tennessee River on August 20th, on the north and 
west of Chattanooga, and next day fired on it. Bragg 
drew in his detachment from Bridgeport, and con- 
centrated against the feint. Rosecrans further puzzled 
him by threatening a long line of the river, and on the 
26th Burnside moved forward, on which Bragg called 
in Buckner from Knoxville. Burnside occupied Knox- 
ville on September 2nd, and Cumberland Gap on the 
9th. He was now to move down to connect with, 
or perhaps join, Rosecrans, and marched out with the 
greater part of his force, leaving a garrison to fortify 
Knoxville. The field force had reached Cleveland, 
and was getting into touch with the Army of the 
Cumberland, when the battle of Chickamauga was 
fought, in consequence of which it returned to guard 
east Tennessee. 

Under cover of Crittenden's feint, the rest of the 
Union army moved to its assigned places, and 
crossed the Tennessee between August 29th and 
September 4th, getting into touch with the Con- 
federate outposts on the 6th. ^ On the 9th, Rosecrans 
heard that Bragg had evacuated Chattanooga and 
gone south : he ordered McCook's Corps to strike 
across and cut off his retreat, but on the nth the 

' The ^'Alabama,'' " Tuscaloosa" and " Georgia" at the Cape of Good 
Hope, August. 

■■' S.E. Fort Wagner taken, September 7th 
S.W. Banks defeated at Sabine Pass, September 8th. 



26o THE SECOND HALF OF 1863 

passes were found blocked, the advanced troops 
could not get forward, and definite information came 
in that Bragg s army was concentrated right in front, 
at the exit from the mountains, and that he was ex- 
pecting Longstreefs Corps from Virginia. This was 
serious, for the Union army was scattered over a 
front of some thirty miles, in a maze of valleys, 
with very bad going, and worse communication 
between them, and under these unfavourable cir- 
cumstances it was vital to concentrate it at once. 
Rosecrans had made a rash and badly calculated 
move, and was caught in the middle of it. 

Bragg saw his opponent's mistakes, on the 8th, 
both in thinking that he was in retreat, and in his 
loose dispositions, and gave orders which would 
have exposed the Union army to defeat in detail, 
but he was on bad terms with his subordinates, who 
delayed, and gave Rosecrans the time he wanted. 
Bragg ordered a concentration on the east bank of 
the Chickamauga, keeping up a cavalry screen till 
Longstrect arrived from Virginia, which he did on 
the 1 8th and 19th, without cavalry or artillery. 
Bragg issued his orders on the i8th for the battle 
next day, intending to destroy the Union left, seize 
the Lafayette road, and cut Rosecrans off from 
Chattanooga. His Corps were to advance in succes- 
sion from the right, outflanking the Union left, and 
turning to the left as they crossed the river, so as 
to drive the Union forces southward up the valley 
from Polk's front : Polk, the left Corps but one, 
who was really facing the bulk of the Union army, 
to push forward and join in the attack. D. H. Hill, 
on the left, was to cover that flank by attacking 
Rosecrans' right. These movements were not carried 
out as soon as they should have been, partly owing 
to the bad ground and the unexpected resistance of 
the Union outposts, but partly also to the dilatori- 
ness of some of the commanders. 

Between the 12th and i8th, Rosecrans was con- 



THE BATTLE OF CHICKAMAUGA 261 

centrating, some of his troops being far to the south 
at McAlpine, and on the i8th he sent Thomas to 
occupy the important Lafayette road. He held the 
line Crawfish Springs-Lee and Gordon's Mills- 
McLennon's Cove, the general line being along the 
Chattanooga-Rossville road. The whole army was 
in position about daybreak on the 19th. He told 
Thomas, when he sent him to the left, that he was 
to hold the Rossville road, and that, if hard pressed, 
the whole army would come to his help. On this 
day, 1 8th, there were some movements near the fords, 
and Thomas took more ground to his left. Next 
day, Thomas moved first, and Bragg found that 
instead of outflanking his enemy, he was outflanked 
himself, and was attacked instead of attacking, for 
a sharp fight began before his troops were in their 
places. Both sides brought up supports, and the 
battle swayed backwards and forwards. Bragg, 
seeing that Rosecrans had discovered his plan, and 
would fight for the Rossville road, put Polk in 
command on the right, supporting him with Hiirs 
Corps, A furious attack drove Thomas back and 
reached the Lafayette road, but it was recovered, 
and Thomas took up a more compact position. 
Granger, with three brigades in reserve, was at 
Rossville, covering the rear and left. The first 
day's battle was in favour of Rosecrans, for Bragg 
had failed to shake his hold on the important roads. 

For the next day, Bragg, now that all Longstreef s 
force was in, divided the army into two commands, 
under him and Polk, on the left and right re- 
spectively. The attack was to be made in echelon 
from the right, at dawn : when in action, the whole 
army was to wheel to the left, but also to press 
the Union left, to seize the Chattanooga road. 

Rosecrans' plans for the 20th were for Thomas 
to hold his old position and the Rossville road, 
McCook to hold his advanced line as long as possible, 
touching Thomas with his left, Crittenden to be in 



262 THE SECOND HALF OF 1863 

reserve in rear of the centre. All the troops were 
not in their places at daybreak, and Rosecrans found 
much fault with McCook's disposition, directing him 
to alter it. Much time was lost in making these 
corrections. 

On the other side, Bragg came up and found the 
attack hanging fire, and Polk not present. He saw 
that Thomas was not holding the Chattanooga road 
strongly, and threw a heavy attack on it, which 
was repulsed, but he now put his whole weight in 
here, and Thomas had to call on McCook for re- 
inforcements till a thin place was made in the line : 
before it could be made good, Longstreet burst in 
with one of his tremendous attacks, with five 
divisions, broke the line, and cut the Union army 
in two on Thomas' right, while Bragg again attacked 
on his left, to cut him off from Chattanooga, but 
was again repulsed. Longstreet, however, now saw 
that the conditions warranted a departure from the 
original plan of battle, and instead of wheeling to 
his left, to drive McCook up the valley, turned to the 
right on Thomas, Crittenden's men had all been 
thrown into the fight, and Granger's command at 
Rossville was the last reserve ; he had been told 
to stay there, to cover the rear, but saw also that 
his orders were no longer applicable, and moved 
up in the nick of time to save Thomas from defeat. 
Longstreef s last reserve was all that remained on 
the other side, and Bragg threw it in for a last 
furious attack, which failed, and when night fell 
Thomas was still holding his ground. 

Just before Longstreef s attack, Rosecrans had gone 
to look after things on the right, and could not return 
to Thomas except via Rossville. He there heard that 
the army was beaten, and made the fatal mistake of 
not going to see for himself, but to Chattanooga, to 
make arrangements for his beaten army, sending to 
tell Thomas to take command on the field, and retreat 
to Rossville. Thomas, however, deterrnined to hold 



COMMENTS ON THE CAMPAIGNS 263 

on till dark, and did not move till all attacks had been 
beaten off. He then took post at Rossville Gap till 
all was ready at Chattanooga, when the whole army 
was brought there, and works thrown up which 
protected it from direct attack. 

Though Rosecrans' full strength was 67,500 men, 
his long line took so many to guard it that he had no 
more than 55,000 on the field, out of which he lost 
11,080 in killed and wounded, missing 5,255, total 

i6,335- 

Bragg had some 70,000 men in action ; his losses 
were believed to be 2,673 killed, 16,274 wounded, 2,003 
missing, total 20,950. 

Up to the time that Bragg left Chattanooga, Rose- 
crans had outgeneralled him at every point : it was 
a most masterly performance to turn out a man of his 
calibre, first from Tennessee, then from his base, in 
such a way, but the calculations for the campaign 
which ended at Chickamauga do not seem to have 
been so carefully worked out as before. Rosecrans 
appears over-confident, to have under-estimated the 
difficulties of the country of northern Alabama, after 
crossing the Tennessee, and, when he heard that his 
opponent was moving out of Chattanooga, to have 
been too ready to assume that he dared not face him, 
and to have acted rashly in consequence : that he was 
not beaten in detail was more owing to the friction 
among the Confederate generals than to his own good 
management. Bragg never expected him to come the 
way he did, because he rightly thought the country 
too difficult for such an operation. The loss of time 
in concentrating the Union army was what brought 
on the battle of Chickamauga ; otherwise it would 
have been better to seize Chattanooga, which Bragg 
left to fight on better ground. Grant thought that 
when Rosecrans had got Bragg out of Chattanooga, 
he should have entrenched in a strong position, and 
not have rushed blindly forward, with his columns 
out of touch with each other, but his great mistake, 



264 THE SECOND HALF OF 1863 

which was fatal, was in leaving the field on hearsay 
evidence, and going to do quartermaster's work, which 
a subordinate could have done as well : further, if 
the danger was extreme, there was the post of the 
commanding general. He had gloriously shewn at 
Stone's River how his brilliant leadership could turn 
defeat into victory, and he now failed on what seems 
his strongest point : this case was no worse, and his 
personality was again indispensable. Thomas' in- 
domitable character again saved the army from de- 
struction, but he lacked the quickness and dash of 
Rosecrans, to go further and win. McCook failed 
again, and should never have had this chance. It is 
curious that the main battle was fought by subordinates, 
Longstreet and Thomas, almost entirely. 

This was one of the hardest battles of the whole 
War, of which it was said that neither side ever 
fought so well. D. H. Hill says that the " barren 
victory " broke the Confederates' hearts, and that their 
dash was never again seen to perfection. Bragg had 
again fought his army to a standstill against the great 
Rosecrans-Thomas combination, and lost his objective, 
Chattanooga. Both sides lost by the campaign, Rose- 
crans tactically, Bragg strategically, and neither could 
profit by his success in the other direction. 

Great was the consternation in the North at the 
news. Reinforcements were hurried up from all sides : 
Hooker went from the East, with the Xlth and XHth 
Corps, 15,000 strong, Sherman and Hurlbut sent 
troops from Vicksburg and Memphis, and Burnside 
moved forward. Rosecrans was in a most precarious 
position, down in a hole, with approaches from north 
and north-west over sixty miles of rough mountain 
tracks, and these made insecure by Confederate 
cavalry, while his regular line of supply from the 
west passed through the Tennessee Valley, which his 
enemies commanded. The railway to Knoxville was 
useless, owing to Confederate operations, and Chatta- 
pooga was a wretched position, commanded from all 



THE DANGER OF CHATTANOOGA 265 

sides. Bragg was thus certain that the Union troops 
must soon evacuate it, unless help came. 

The news from Chattanooga became worse and 
worse, for retreat would have meant not only the loss 
of all Rosecrans' guns, but of the army itself as an 
organized body, such a disaster, in fact, as had not 
yet been incurred, which would have gone far to 
neutralize the results of Gettysburg and Vicksburg, 
and to avert which a stronger hand was wanted. 
Grant was put in command of the country between 
the Alleghanies and the Mississippi, with the excep- 
tion of Banks' district, and chose the scheme of 
re-organization which substituted Thomas for Rose- 
crans. McCook and Crittenden were also relieved 
from command. The XXth and XXIst Corps were 
made into a new IVth, and put under Granger, 
Sherman and Hurlbut were hastening up, and things 
looked better. Grant at once took up the shortening 
of the line of supply, by river and a new bridge near 
Wauhatchie, covered by Hooker's command, and when 
it was opened on November ist, Thomas' army had 
only two or three days' rations left. 

^ At this time Bragg sent Longstreet away against 
Burnside, at Knoxville, which seems a huge mistake, 
to send away his best lieutenant and two divisions, 
just before an important campaign, but the reason 
was that they could not pull together, and Jefferson 
Davis came down, it is supposed, to settle the trouble. 
Grant, who knew both men well, was not surprised, 
for Bragg was most quarrelsome, and Longstreet would 
not be put upon. When he heard that Longstreet had 
gone, he planned to attack Braggs position as soon 
as Sherman came, for he wished him to take the 
principal attack, as he thought that Thomas' army 
was rather demoralized. The weather was so bad 
that Sherman did not arrive till the 21st: he was to 
attack Missionary Ridge, supported by part of Thomas' 
command, the rest making a feint of attacking from 

' The ^^ Alabama" in the Sunda Islands, November, December. 



266 THE SECOND HALF OF 1863 

Chattanooga, Hooker to hold Lookout Valley, and 
Howard's Xlth Corps, north of the river, held at 
disposal. 

On the 23rd, Thomas was sent to make a recon- 
naissance in force, to see whether Bragg was sending 
men away or retreating : he gained some ground on 
the side of Missionary Ridge, and entrenched it, while 
Sherman attacked the north end of the hill, with the 
same result. Sherman was ordered to attack at dawn 
on the 24th, and was told that Thomas would do the 
same. Hooker making a demonstration against Look- 
out Mountain. The day opened thick and wet, and 
the Confederates on the high ground could not see 
what was going on below, which helped Hooker, who 
pushed up Lookout Mountain, above the clouds, 
cleared the near end of it, and drove the Confederates 
down the other side : he entrenched where he stood. 
On the 25th he went on to Rossville, chasing the 
enemy till dark, from there, and from their works on 
the battlefield of Chickamauga. On this day, Sherman 
made his main attack on Missionary Ridge, but was 
stoutly opposed, till Grant told Thomas to take four 
divisions, seize the first line of rifle-pits in his front, 
and await orders, but instead of this they charged 
right up the steep hill and cleared it, because the fire 
on the first line of works taken, from those in rear, 
was so severe that they were less exposed if they 
went on up the steeper part of the hill. Though this 
part of the Confederate main line was very strong, 
Bragg sent for reinforcements as soon as he saw the 
move, but the Army of the Cumberland would not 
be denied, and swept over all with hardly a check, 
driving his troops back beyond Chickamauga Station. 
In the night he withdrew his troops from Sherman's 
front, and Sherman occupied their ground: the pursuit 
was kept up till the 28th, and the railway to Atlanta 
destroyed in many places. 

Union strength, 57,000 : killed and wounded, 11,405; 
missing, 4,774 ; total, 16,179, 



AFTER CHATTANOOGA 267 

Confederate strength, 71,500: killed and wounded, 
15,801 ; missing, 2,003 J total, 17,804. 

This great victory of Chattanooga enabled Grant 
and Sherman to plan the stroke which should sweep 
through the heart of the Confederacy and bring home 
to its people the meaning of WAR, at their own doors: 
the first stage being the advance to Atlanta, the great 
railway and manufacturing centre of the South, to be 
undertaken the next spring: the XlVth Corps was 
thrown forward to Dalton, the IVth sent to Cleveland, 
and the XXth to hold Lookout Valley. Grant went 
to his headquarters, Nashville, on December 20th, 
and on the other side, Johnston succeeded Bragg on 
the 27th. 

When Burnside heard of the battle of Chickamauga, 
he went back to watch east Tennessee. In October 
he was attacked from the east, but drove his assailants 
back : on the 22nd, however, his outposts were driven 
in, and he lost the country south of Loudon, his troops 
being drawn in to Knoxville on November ist, to 
oppose Longstreet, whose strong cavalry was under 
Wheeler. They tried to cut off Union detachments and 
occupy advantageous ground opposite Knoxville, while 
Burnside tried to get in his trains and supplies, and 
gain time to finish the defences. A sharp rearguard 
action was fought at Campbell's Station on November 
1 6th, in which the last trains were safely brought in, 
the ground being held till dark. 

Knoxville lies on the Holston River, a tributary of 
the Tennessee, and has some natural strength as a 
position, which had been carefully improved by fortifi- 
cation, the lines on the north side being about 5I miles 
long, with many redoubts and batteries : there were 
also interior lines, in case of need. On the south side 
there were some works, but no continuous line. The 
principal works, however, were not finished, and had 
to be used as they stood. On the 17th, the troops 
were set to strengthen the lines, under cover of the 
Union cavalry, which held its position outside the lines 



268 THE SECOND HALF OF 1863 

till dark, and by noon next day the place was defensi- 
ble, the cavalr}- holding on till 2.30, when they were 
driven in. Then the siege began, though the town 
was not completely invested. A heavy attack was 
made on the 29th, but defeated with great loss. This 
was the last of the fighting, for on December ist the 
Confederate trains were seen to be moving, the siege 
being raised on the 4th : on the 8th, General Sherman 
rode in. The garrison had been in the greatest straits 
for food, and suffered much from exposure in the 
trenches. After the battle of Chattanooga, Grant had 
sent the IVth Corps and other troops, under Sherman, 
to relieve Knoxville, before which Longstreet retired, 
but remained in east Tennessee during the winter. 
Burnside resigned, and was succeeded by Foster. 

The Union communications were much harassed by 
guerillas, in Tennessee especially, which kept a great 
many Union troops to watch them : Grant, at first, 
was not strong enough to put them down, then he 
had more urgent work to do. 

On the Mississippi, the Navy Department put the 
whole river above New Orleans under Porter, 
Farragut restricting himself to the work at sea. 
Porter divided his command into eight districts, six 
of which were on the Mississippi, one on the Ohio, 
from Cairo to the mouth of the Tennessee, while the 
eighth took the Upper Ohio and the Valley of the 
Cumberland : the number of districts was afterwards 
increased to eleven. (Continued on p. 301.) 

The South 

(Continued from p. 229.) As soon as Johnston heard 
of the surrender of Vicksburg, he retreated,^ followed 
by Sherman, whose army had been reinforced for the 
purpose, and now numbered 48,000 men. Johnston 
halted at Jackson, which had been strongly fortified, 

' W. Alorgan^s Raid in Indiana and Ohio, July. 
E. Lees Retreat from Gettysburg, July 5th-i6th- 



THE MISSISSIPPI OPENED 269 

on the 7th, and Sherman prepared to besiege him, 
but he was not to be caught, and got his army away 
most skilfully on the night of the i6th. Grant wanted 
to keep Sherman's force in hand, so the pursuit was 
not carried far. 

Banks was pressing Port Hudson hard, and when 
Gardner, commanding there, heard of the surrender 
of Vicksburg, he also surrendered, on the 9th, but he 
must have done so in a very few days. At the begin- 
ning of the siege he had 7,000 men to Banks' 14,000. 
51 guns were taken, and a great number of small 
arms. The fall of Port Hudson cleared the Mississippi, 
which was henceforward entirely controlled by the 
Union forces. The first steamer from New Orleans 
reached St. Louis on July i6th. 

As soon as he was free, Banks moved against Taylor 
and drove him back, recovering Brashear City and 
lower Louisiana. Taylor retired to Opelousas, and 
kept annoying the Union posts till the end of the 
year. (Continued on p. 309.) 

The South-West 

(Continued from p. 177, Chapter VHL) Banks' next 
work was to deal with the trans-Mississippi country : 
Halleck wanted a move on Shreveport, but the Red 
River was so low that Banks, who had full discretion, 
decided to move first against Sabine Pass and City, 
and strike from thence at Houston, the capital of 
Texas. He went by sea, convoyed by some gunboats, 
and made a combined military and naval attack on 
Sabine Pass, on September 8th,^ but was defeated. 
He then thought of marching into Texas, but the 
distance was so great that he went back to an ex- 
pedition to go by sea, which sailed from New Orleans 
on October 26th, landed at Brazos, November 2nd, 
and occupied Brownsville on the 6th. Leaving a force 

' W. Burnside occupies Knoxville, September 9th. 
W. Chickamauga, September 19th, 20th. 



270 THE SECOND HALF OF 1863 

there, Banks proceeded to occupy the coast islands/ 
from thence to the Sabine, taking a strong work on 
Matagorda Bay on December 30th. 

In May, Curtis was reheved in command of the 
Department of Missouri and Arkansas by Schofield, 
who sent all the men he could spare to Grant, while 
Steele, acting under him, took command of the army 
in Arkansas in July. On the other side, Kirby Smith 
had succeeded Holmes in February, with Holmes and 
Price under him. Holmes attacked Helena on July 
4th, on Grant's communications, but was repulsed, 
and Steele soon after moved against Price, who re- 
treated, Steele being then ordered to hold the line 
of the Arkansas River till Banks moved up the Red 
River, and both sides remained in statu quo till the 
end of the year. Kirby Smith made no attempt to 
collect the really considerable forces under his com- 
mand, and strike with them as an army, while Halleck's 
orders tied fast the 47,000 men under Schofield and 
Steele. (Continued on p. 309.) 

The Blockade 

(Continued from p. 233.) Before Charleston, the 
Confederates attacked the blockading fleet with tor- 
pedo-boats, an unsuccessful attack being made on the 
'• New Ironsides," on October 5th : no real harm was 
done, but she received a severe shock, and the engine- 
rooms of both vessels were flooded with the water 
thrown up, the boat's fires were put out, and her crew 
taken prisoners. This boat was practically a sub- 
marine, showing only a small hatch above water : she 
had been used twice before, both times going down 
and drowning her crew. Early in December, the 
monitor " Weehawken " sank at her anchors : she 

' W. Siege of Knoxville, November I7th-December 4th. 
W. Chattanooga, November 23rd-25th. 
Mexico. The French fleet at Matamoros, December. 



AFFAIRS AT SEA 271 

Was overloaded with ammunition and badly trimmed, 
so that when water came in through the hawse-holes, 
which had, carelessly, not been packed, it would not 
flow to the pumps, and she foundered. 
' So long as Fort Fisher held out, the blockading 
fleet off Wilmington had to keep well away to sea : 
ironclads could not be used here, for they were not 
really seaworthy, and the coast was more exposed 
than at Charleston. 

Farragut, now relieved of the care of the Mississippi, 
was keeping watch and ward in the Gulf of Mexico, 
but on the Mexican border the situation was com- 
plicated by the presence of the French fleet, watching 
the Mexican port of Matamoros, by which route arms 
were being run in, both by the Union side, for Juarez, 
whom the French were steadily driving northwards, 
and for the Confederates, to be smuggled into Texas. 
The task of the French cruisers was very difficult, since, 
if they found arms, they did not know for whom they 
were intended. They seized Tampico in November, 
to get hold of the Customs of that port. (Continued 
on p. 313.) 

The War at Sea 

(Continued from p. 236.) The ^^ Florida" ran into 
Bermuda in July,^ to refit, but as she wanted more 
thorough repair, she sailed for Brest at the end of the 
month, and remained there till the end of the year. 
At the beginning of July, the ^^ Alabama" was to the 
east of Rio, and turned to cross the Atlantic to the 
Cape of Good Hope, where she arrived in August,^ 
eluding the U.S.S. " Vanderbilt." She had in com- 
pany a prize which had been commissioned as the 
** Tuscaloosa^'' which Admiral Sir Baldwin Walker 

' E. Le^s Retreat from Gettysburg, July 5th- 1 6th. 

W. Surrender of Port Hudson, July 9th. 
* S.E. Fort W\igner taken, September 7th. 

S.W. Banks defeated at Sabine Pass, September 8th. 

W. Chickamauga, September 19th, 20th. 



272 THE SECOND HALF OF 1863 

refused to admit, as a prize, but was overruled by the 
civilian authorities ; the Home Office, however, ruled 
that the admiral was right. When she came back, after 
an unsuccessful cruise in the Atlantic, she was detained, 
but released because she had been allowed in before. 
The " Alabama " struck eastward across the southern 
Indian Ocean, via St. Paul's Island, then up to the 
Straits of Sunda, which she reached early in November,* 
and began to prey on American shipping with great 
effect, remaining in the narrow seas between Sumatra, 
Borneo, and Siam, till the end of the year. 

The " Georgia " was also at the Cape in August, 
having left Bahia in May. She went to the North 
Atlantic, and came into Cherbourg for repairs at the 
end of October, where she remained till the end of 
the year. Her sail power was insufficient to patrol the 
trade routes for any length of time, which made her 
use too much coal to be a successful cruiser under 
Confederate conditions (cf p. 316). 

Maury bought a vessel called the " Victor," which 
was sold out of the British Navy in the autumn, and 
though she was allowed to be rigged at Sheerness, as 
was the custom, he feared that she would be stopped, 
and ran her off to sea before she was ready, where 
she was commissioned as the ^^Rappahannock." She 
put into Calais for repairs, and was handed over to 
Captain Barron, who directed the Confederate cruisers 
from Paris, having originally come to Europe to take 
over the turret-ships from Laird. He kept her there 
till the end of the year, looking for a chance to 
arm her. 

In the summer. Lieutenant Sinclair was sent to 
England with orders to build a cruiser, and take 
command of her : he found a suitable steamer building 
on the Clyde, nearly ready for sea, and made arrange- 
ments to buy her, but she was seized before she left 
the builders' hands, while still their property. They 
compromised the case with the Crown, so that the 

' W. Chattanooga, November 23rd-25th. 



SHIP-BUILDING IN FRANCE 273 

ship remained their property, but they were not to 
sell her for two years without the Crown's consent. 
She was called the " Pampero." 

Urged on by the Northern agents, the English 
Government, on October 9th, seized the two turret- 
ships at Laird's, although sold to the French firm, 
the builders working on them under guard, with a 
powerful squadron lying outside in the Mersey. The 
Government tried to buy them from the French 
owners, but they declined to entertain the proposal. 

Owing to the difficulties of constructing engines 
in the Confederate States, Bulloch looked out for a 
vessel to carry marine engines, which he could buy in 
England, a service beyond the capacity of the ordinary 
blockade-runner. In October he bought a vessel in 
Glasgow, called the " Coquette,'^ which proved herself 
most useful for this service. 

On receipt of the letter, ordering him to get some 
sea-going ironclads built (cf p. 236), Bulloch went into 
the difficult conditions very carefully, and on July i6th 
contracted with the French builder already mentioned, 
to build two such small, handy, and powerful vessels. 
At the end of November, they were progressing rapidly, 
and the four corvettes also, but just then things began 
to look less rosy, for the Northern Government found 
out what was going on, and interfered vigorously : he 
saw grave difficulties ahead, and doubted his ability 
to get the ships to sea, in spite of the assurances of 
the French Government that it would be all right. So 
far had they gone, that Mr. Slidcll was confident that 
their policy, and that of the Emperor, was that the 
Confederate States should be able to maintain their 
position, and he believed that they would have been 
recognized by France, if England would have done 
the same, but that France was not prepared to take 
the step alone. The financing of the orders for these 
ships was extremely difficult. Bulloch was repeatedly 
asked if he could not buy some old ironclads, but 
reported that they would either be too heavy, or else 

18 



274 THE SECOND HALF OF 1863 

merely unseaworthy floating batteries. (Continued 
on p. 315.) 

Summary 

(Continued from p. 237.) The end of 1863 saw the 
positions of the two sides almost reversed, from those 
of the end of 1862 ; for the North were then beaten at 
all points, the only question being whether the South 
could maintain their advantage : now, the North had 
opened the Mississippi from end to end, cutting the 
Confederacy in two, and had also won the battle 
which Lee elected to make decisive for political reasons. 
Though Chickamauga was a set-back, yet the battle of 
Chattanooga finally secured the advantage gained and 
placed the Union in a winning position, from which 
it could go forward and finish the War. The end was 
now in sight. 

Union Gains, — In the East, the northern half of 
Virginia proper ; for the line of the Rapidan and 
Rappahannock, east of the Blue Ridge, was never 
again lost. In the West and South, the country as 
far south as the line Vicksburg-Ringgold, also the 
southern half of western Louisiana. 

Confederate Gains. — Nil. 

No prominent officer was killed on either side. 

The year 1863 was remarkable for the first employ- 
ment in war of two weapons which, even in the 
opening of the twentieth century, were hardly de- 
veloped, viz. the Submarine Torpedo-Boat and the 
Breechloading Magazine Rifle, and also for the first 
use of Machine Guns. 

The Submarine is, of course, a very old idea, but 
the Confederates first made it practical, in the sense 
that in their hands it became a real offensive weapon ; 
but the service was most desperate, for the wretched 
things went down and drowned their crews as often 
as not. They were not true submarines, not being 
entirely submerged, but the principle was there : only 
a small hatch, some ten feet long by two feet high, 



MAGAZINE RIFLES 275 

shewed above water, which was practically invisible 
in a bad light. They used spar torpedoes. 

During this year also the first practical breechload- 
ing magazine rifle, the Spencer Repeater, came : the 
Colt Rifle, merely a revolver with a stock and long 
barrel, had been used, but the loss of gas made it a 
poor rifle. The Spencer was a good weapon for its 
day, with a tube magazine running down the small of 
the butt, charged from the butt-end, and holding eight 
cartridges. Later came the Henry Rifle, improved by 
Winchester, with its long under-barrel magazine hold- 
ing seventeen rounds. It was in reference to these 
that the Confederates used to say that " those con- 
founded Yankees loaded up their guns in the morning, 
and shot all day." The Northern soldiers used their 
repeaters, tactically, to the best advantage, on the 
defensive, holding their magazine fire till the assault 
got to close quarters, and then crushing it all at once. 
Repeaters were principally served out to the cavalry, 
who had to hold positions with small forces till rein- 
forcements came, for whom this power of repelling 
attack was specially necessary. The Breechloader 
did not become general during the War, but was 
developed at this time, but the Magazine principle 
was kept in abej'ance for military purposes for many 
years, until it was adapted to take cartridges of the 
size and shape which the increasing power of military 
rifles required. 

We have also, in this year, the first mention of a 
machine-gun, Requa's, which Gillmore used in the 
trenches before Fort Wagner. Catling's is said to 
have been invented during the War, but I have found 
no mention of its use. (Continued on p. 317.) 

Notices of Officers 

(Continued from p. 241.) On the Union side, several 
senior officers were relieved from command, of whom 
the most notable were General Rosecrans and Admiral 
Dupont. 



276 THE SECOND HALF OF 1863 

Major-General W. S. Rosecrans was a professional 
soldier, educated at West Point, of brilliant and well- 
known attainments, and was one of the three men 
whom General D. H. Hill named as the most dangerous 
opponents of the Confederacy when the War broke 
out. He was warm-hearted and impulsive, beloved 
by his men, and the soul of honour, even to the verge 
of quixotism — witness his quarrel with Halleck at the 
beginning of the year (cf p. 219). A brilliant leader 
in battle, he was probably the best minor strategist 
whom the War produced, and was the only man 
against whom even Lee could do nothing, in West 
Virginia, but he was enamoured of his own opinion, 
and seems to have done little to adapt his own plans 
to those for the War as a whole. Grant found him 
a plaguy lieutenant, probably for this reason, and 
was on the point of relieving him from a subordinate 
command in his army, when he was given the com- 
mand of the Army of the Cumberland, to succeed 
Buell. After Chickamauga, Grant's first act was to 
replace him by Thomas. He was given the minor 
command in Missouri later on, where he, or rather 
Pleasonton, defeated Price's invasion of that State. 

At the opening of the War, Captain Dupont, of the 
Navy, was President of a Commission appointed to 
consider the problem of blockading the long coast line 
of the Confederacy, and drew up a careful memoir 
thereon. He suggested seizing Port Royal as a 
base, and was requested to co-operate with General 
T. W. Sherman in organizing an expedition against it, 
being appointed Flag-Ofificer, as it was then termed, 
before sailing. When the rank of Rear-Admiral was 
created, in July, 1862, he was the second on the list. 
In the spring of 1863, we have seen that his opinion 
of the naval attack on Charleston, which he was 
ordered to make, was correct, and after it he had the 
moral courage to decline to make bad worse ; but 
the Navy Department shirked the responsibility, and 
the disappointment of the country was visited on him. 



DUPONT 277 

He was very harshly treated, and reHeved from com- 
mand ; but his dashing successor, Dahlgren, could do 
no more, with the Navy alone. Dupont was after- 
wards offered the command of the Pacific Squadron, 
but indignantly refused a peace command in war time. 
(Continued on p. 320.) 



278 



THE SECOND HALF OF 1863 



1863 


July 4-31 


August 


September 




4-16. Lee's Retreat 


Operations of Meade land Lee in Virginia. 




from Gettysburg. 






^ 




25-30. Aver ell's 
Raid in West 
Virginia. 






Charleston. Combi 


ned attack on Fort 


6. Fort Wagner 


& 


Wag 


ner. 


taken. 


^ 








H 








§ 

















to 










Morgan's Raid into 




9. Burnside occu- 




I ndiana and 




pies Knoxville. 




Ohio. 




10-20. The Chicka- 


^ 


4. Holmes defeated 




mauga Cam- 


s 


at Helena, Ar- 




paign. 


^ 


kansas. 




19-20. Battle of 
Chickamauga. 




9. Surrender of 




9. Banks defeated 




Port Hudson. 




at Sabine Pass. 




Banks v. Taylor in 






1 


Louisiana. 














Steele drives back 


Price, in Arkansas. 






16. The ••Florida" 






at Bermuda. 






Is 


25. The ••Florida" 


goes from Bermuda 


to France. 




The '•Alabama" 


3. The "Florida" 


Si 




a.nd " Tuscaloosa" \ at Brest. | 


^p 




at the Cape. 




H < 




The "Georgia" at t 


he Cape, and in the 


P 





North 


Atlantic. 


W 









CHRONOLOGICAL TABLE 



279 



1868 



October 



November 



December 



Operations of Meade and Lee in Virginia. 

8-21. A verell's 
Raid in South- 
west Virginia, 



17. Grant takes 
command, from 
Alleghanies to 
Mississippi River. 



17. Siege of Knox- 
ville, to . . . 

23-25. Battle of 
Chattanooga. 



4, Longstreet re- 
treats. 



^8 



The 

J. The " Georgia" 

The " Rappahan 



Mexico. 
3. The Crown 
offered to Maxi- 
milian. 



Banks occupies 

"Florida" at Brest, 

comes to Cherbourg, 

nock " lying at Cal 

The "Alabama" in 

and the neighbour 

Mexico. 

The French seize 

Tampico. 



the Texas Coast. 

refitting. 

and stays there. 

ais, unarmed. 

the Sunda Islands, 

hood of Singapore. 

Mexico. 
The French fleet at 

Matamoros. 
26. Maximilian ac- 
cepts the Crown. 



CHAPTER XI 

the first half of 1 864. the closing of the net 

General Position and Plans 

(Continued from p. 252.) The feature of the open- 
ing year was the commanding position to which Grant 
had risen : for the first time, the balance of interest 
had shifted from the political to the military centre of 
the War, and all hopes were pinned on the great com- 
mander in the field, rather than on the dictator in the 
office. Halleck had interfered with him less and less, 
and now the plans for finishing the War were being 
openly made by Grant and Sherman : though Lee's 
was the best Confederate army in the field, both it 
and the Army of the Potomac had been playing a 
subordinate part in the last few months. 

The politicians thought it would be a capital move 
to bring one of the seceded States so under the 
control of the Union that they could form a State 
Government, to take part in the Presidential Election 
of 1864, and they chose Florida, because it was very 
open to attack by sea, and had been denuded of men 
for the Confederate service (cf p, 299). 

The movements of the French in Mexico also de- 
manded attention, for they had driven back Juarez 
to the north-west, and entered Guadalajara on Janu- 
ary 5th, and Napoleon had also managed to get the 
valuable Sonora Mines ceded to a French Company, 
and thus under his control. These, properly worked, 

280 



GRANT MADE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF 281 

would furnish the money for his project, which the 
French nation was tired of providing. 

The plans at the very beginning of the year were 
that Thomas, at Chattanooga, was to hold Johnston 
fast and prevent him from detaching against Sherman, 
who would strike at Meridian, and so destroy the 
railways that a small force could hold the east side 
of the Mississippi Valley, while the Red River Ex- 
pedition, under Banks, would do the same for the 
west side. A great concentration would then be 
made against Johnston, and Banks was to go on 
against Mobile in combination with Farragut, which, 
if taken, would be a fresh base for cutting another 
great slice off the Confederacy. Grant thought that 
the next great campaign would be through east 
Tennessee against Virginia, but in any case the two 
sides of the Mississippi must be cleared. 

^ On March 3rd, Grant was called to command the 
armies of the United States, the rank of Lieutenant- 
General being revived in his favour. This marked 
a great change in the President's policy, he at last 
saw that civilian direction of and interference with 
military movements simply spelt disaster, and for the 
future allowed Grant to translate Government re- 
quirements and views into military plans, giving him 
his whole-hearted support. Even that stickler for 
political supremacy, Stanton, assented for the present, 
but the real cause of this happy change was the per- 
sonality of Grant. The others saw that they were 
at last dealing with an absolutely loyal and single- 
minded man, unassuming, able, and resolute, who 
could really be trusted. Halleck remained at Wash- 
ington as " Chief of the Staff," and saw to the corre- 
spondence of the War, as a link with the Cabinet. 

Before he became Commander-in-Chief, Grant's plan 
was to strike at Johnston's army first, then at Atlanta, 
Banks moving against Mobile : as Banks was not 

' S. Sherman's Meridian Campaign, February 3rd-March 5th. 
S.E. Olustee Expedition, February 7th-20th. 



282 THE FIRST HALF OF 1864 

then under his command, this inclusion is significant. 
Grant thought that Forrest was the most dangerous 
opponent in the Mississippi Valley and that in second- 
ary operations he was probably the best officer on 
either side. After his promotion he varied the plan 
but little. He considered Butler's army at Fort 
Monroe his left, Meade's the centre, and his old army, 
now under Sherman, the right. Other forces were 
Sigel's in the Valley, Banks' in Louisiana, and Steele's 
in Arkansas. Butler was to move on the south side 
of the James against Richmond, Meade against Lee^ 
who was entrenched behind the Rapidan, and Sher- 
man to push Johnston beyond Atlanta. These move- 
ments were to be made in the last week in April, but 
by that time it was probably seen that Banks could 
not co-operate. 

Though Richmond was still very important, yet it 
was considered that its value had declined, the likeli- 
hood of European recognition of the Confederacy 
being less, and that the attitude of Great Britain to- 
wards Mexico in 1862 shewed that she would not 
side actively with the Confederates, but that the 
French invasion looked as if they might do so. This 
was a false inference, for England kept the two matters 
separate, going to Mexico only to protect her own 
interests, with no regard to her policy about the 
Confederacy, while France, the smaller creditor of 
Mexico, used this pretext to interfere for ulterior 
designs against the United States, in which the back- 
ing of the Confederacy was a factor. She gave the 
Confederates to understand that she would recognize 
them if England did. 

Not one of the eleven original Confederate States 
was now intact, but North and South Carolina, 
Georgia, and Alabama, were nearly so, and these 
four, with the bulk of southern Virginia and part 
of northern Florida, still held solidly together : of 
the rest, Arkansas, Louisiana, and Texas, were cut 
off, in Mississippi the Confederate power was broken, 



THE CONFEDERACY DISSOLVING 283 

and Tennessee had passed under the control of the 
Union. The signs of exhaustion were unmistakable : 
there were not the means of meeting the losses of 
another campaign, and the only chance was to gain 
time on the defensive. In March, Davis ordered 
Johnston to invade Tennessee, Longstrcd advancing 
from the Holston Valley and meeting him at Kingston, 
when the whole was to march into the valley of the 
Duck River : query, against Nashville, the real key of 
the War? This plan assumed a combined strength 
of 75,000 men, h\xi Johnston shewed that it would give 
barely 57,000 against Sherman's 110,000, which could 
deal with the two parts separately from its present 
position. The trans-Mississippi district was lost to 
the Confederacy if it could neither break the Union 
control of the river somewhere, nor engage so many 
troops to secure it as would cause paralysis elsewhere 
or make the North lose an important battle, for Banks' 
expedition was known to have denuded the garrisons 
to the last degree, and defeat, involving a retreat from 
distant Shreveport, should destroy it. Sherman 
would be stopped, and such trouble and delay caused 
as might tire the North out. In these calculations it 
was not seen that so long as the North controlled the 
Mississippi and central Missouri they could disregard 
the defeat of Banks, for Sherman's Meridian campaign 
had restricted the Confederates to their troops west 
of the river, where the Union forces were quite able 
to hold them fast. 

The Blockade was becoming stricter and stricter, 
and the distress in the Confederacy more and more 
acute, so that instead of growing cotton as a medium 
of exchange they were forced to convert Georgia into 
a wheatfield, to raise food, because they could not deal 
with cotton. Though their cruisers had practically 
driven the American flag from the sea, yet this 
brought no gain to them, as their lack of fighting 
ships prevented them from utilizing their advantage. 
(Continued on p. 326.) 



284 THE FIRST HALF OF 1864 

The East 

(Continued from p. 254.) The first events in this 
district are more connected with the Chattanooga and 
Knoxville campaigns in the West than with those in 
Virginia, the problem being how to deal with Long- 
street, who had retired into East Tennessee for the 
winter. Grant came down to see Foster, who had 
succeeded Burnside, and was watching Longstreet, and 
who suggested that it would be best to let him be 
quiet where he was as long as possible, since he would 
do more harm anywhere else, to which Grant agreed. 
Foster's health broke down, and he was succeeded in 
command of the Department and Army of the Ohio 
in February by Schofield from Missouri. As we have 
seen, Davis' proposal for Longstreefs and Johnston's 
action was shown to be impracticable, so the former 
remained where he was till Lee sent for him in April. 

In January and February ^ the two armies stood 
watching each other on the Rapidan, but on Feb- 
ruary 28th Kilpatrick started for a cavalry raid on 
Richmond to try to release the Union prisoners 
there. He divided his force into two columns, putting 
one under Colonel Dahlgren, but a warning was sent 
to Richmond from the front, and its garrison moved 
out and stopped both columns. The raid failed, 
Dahlgren was killed, and papers were found on his 
body inciting his men to kill Davis and his " traitorous 
crew," which brought a strong letter from Lee to 
Meade, who, however, was able to assure him that 
no such order had been given to Dahlgren by any 
military superior. The raid was ordered from Washing- 
ton without Meade's approval, but although it de- 
pended for success on secrecy, was currently discussed 
there, and the plan got out. Other movements were 

' Mexico. The French enter Guadalajara, January 5th. 
Mexico. Cession of Sonora Mines to Napoleon, January. 
S. Sherman's Meridian Campaign, February 3rd-March 5th. 
S. Sooy Smith v. Fo7-rest, February i8th. 
S.E. Olustee Expedition, February 7th-20th. 
S E. The " Housatonic " sunk off Charleston, February i8th. 



UNION RE-ORGANIZATION 285 

made as diversions, one of which, under Custer, suc- 
ceeded in drawing off Sfiiari's attention. 

On March 3rd, Grant was appointed Lieutenant- 
General to command the armies of the United States. 
He at first intended to direct operations from the West, 
but after he had been to Washington, saw that his 
place was in the East ; but in the field, not in a hot-bed 
of intrigue like the Capital. He recognized the 
awkwardness of being with the Army of the Potomac, 
but did not delegate authority properly to Meade, and 
often issued detailed orders over his head. In the 
West he was succeeded by Sherman, and Sherman by 
McPherson. The Army of the Potomac was re- 
organized by consolidating its five Corps into three, 
numbered the Ilnd, Vth, and Vlth, under Hancock, 
Warren, and Sedgwick respectively. This has been 
criticized as a mistake, in view of the very thick country 
in which they had to work, for which a greater number 
of smaller commands would have been better. Meade 
suggested that Grant might want another ofificer in his 
place, begging him to consider no one's feelings in the 
interests of the nation, which much raised him in 
Grant's esteem ; but he did not want to lose him. He 
did, however, substitute Sheridan for Pleasonton in 
command of the cavalry, for he was not satisfied with 
the reports of cavalry work in the East. Sheridan 
laid his ideas of it before Meade, viz. to use cavalry 
as a strong and united body to break down that of the 
enemy ; but Meade's notions of it were confined to out- 
posts and scouting and the protection of convoys, and 
he did not see that the best security lay in defeating 
the enemy's power of attack. Still, he conceded some- 
thing, of which Sheridan made full use, but he did not 
get a free hand till after the battle of Yellow Tavern. 

^ The Shenandoah and Kanawha Valleys were formed 
into a Department and put under Sigel, Crook being 
specially charged with the latter. They were to attack 
the Confederate, and protect the Union, lines of commu- 

' Maps 47, 56, pp. 338, 388. 



286 THE FIRST HALF OF 1864 

nication, Crook going against tlie Virginia-Tennessee 
line and the salt works, while Sigel threatened the 
Virginia Central at Staunton. Crook started at the 
end of April ; ^ he failed in his attack on the salt and 
lead works at Saltville and Wytheville, but drove the 
Confederates back at Cloyd's Mountain, and succeeded 
in breaking the railway bridge over the New River. 
Sigel says that this stroke would have been much 
more useful before Longstrect returned from Tennessee, 
for he had just taken post at Gordonsville, on Lees 
left. Sigel himself moved forward to create a diversion 
and free Crook, covering his flanks with two cavalry 
forces; but both were beaten, on May 8th and 13th, 
by Morgan^ who was then commanding the Confederate 
Department of Soiith-lVestern Virginia. Burbridge's 
division from Kentucky was ordered to reinforce 
Crook, but when Morgan went on his raid into Ken- 
tucky at the beginning of June, Burbridge turned back 
and defeated him (cf. p. 308). Sigel met Breckinridge 
advancing on the other side on May 25th at New 
Market, and was defeated, losing some guns and re- 
tiring down the Valley from one position to another. 
He heard of Crook's success, and was planning a 
combined move when Hunter came to succeed him in 
command of the Department,^ under whom he took 
command of a division (cf. p. 295). 

Though some of these operations were successful, 
yet they did no good as a whole, because Lee from his 
central position was always able to get the advantage. 
The consequence was that a large force had to be told 

' S.W. Sabine Cross Roads, April 8th. 

S.W. Pleasant Hill, April 9th. 

S.W. Jenkins' Ferry, April 30th. 

W. Forrest's Raid, Fort Pillow, April 13th. 

S.E. Confederates retake Plymouth, April 19th. 

W. Sherman moves against /ohnstofi. May 5th. 

E. Kautz' Raid, May 4th-i2th. 

E. The Wilderness. May Sth-jth. 

E. Spottsylvania, May 8th- 1 8th. 

E. Sheridan's Richmond Raid, May 9th- 1 3th. 
'' W. New Hope Church, May 25th-June 4th, 



THE NEW UNION PLANS 287 

off to do the work that half the number could have done, 
early in May. Sigel never had 10,000 men ; Sheridan, 
who soon followed him, had 40,000. Lee recalled Breckin- 
ridge after Sigel's defeat, but soon had to send him back. 

^ Grant wanted Butler's army to act in concert with 
the Army of the Potomac, establishing itself to the 
south of Richmond, and holding City Point as strongly 
as possible, but Butler's idea was to occupy Bermuda 
Hundred, which, though good for defence, was not so 
for offence, holding City Point with a comparatively 
small force. Butler's, the secondary object, was Rich- 
mond, Meade's, the primary one, Lees army. If Lee 
fell back on Richmond, the Army of the James was to 
unite with that of the Potomac on the river above the 
town, and they would destroy the Confederate lines 
of supply according to the direction of his retreat, the 
force in the Valley acting in concert with them if 
possible by destroying the lines of supply there, and 
then making a junction with the main army in Central 
Virginia. Merely taking Richmond would not prevent 
Lee from retiring westward, where he might perhaps 
join Johnston, and in any case would be most difficult 
to hem in. 

Then, by which flank should the main army move ? 
To go by the right would give better country but 
worse communications, but it might prevent Lee from 
interfering with the Valley, which he could now do 
freely. To go by the left would be to work in difficult 
country, but the communications would always be 
short to different points on Chesapeake Bay, following 
the advance, and no troops would be wanted to guard 
them. Still, though the troops might fight their way 
through the thick country, which was thoroughly 
known to their opponents, the movement of the trains 
would be difficult, at first at all events, for Lees signal 
station on Clark's Mountain commanded the whole 
country. Grant chose the second alternative. 

Meade's army, counting Burnside's IXth Corps, 

' Map 54, p. 386. 



288 THE FIRST HALF OF 1864 

which was not added to it till the end of May, was 
118,769 strong, with 316 guns, while Lee's was 61,953 
strong, with 224 guns. 

The bulk of the Army of Northern Virginia lay along 
the Rapidan from Barnett's Ford to Horton's Ford, 
nearly twenty miles. The left was rather refused, the 
river, front entrenched, and the right covered by the 
Wilderness, the cavalry being mostly on the lower 
river, where forage was better. Longstreet was at 
Gordonsville to guard that side, but was too far away 
when the move came. Headquarters, Orange Court 
House. A day or two before the army moved, the 
ubiquitous Mosby might have captured Grant, who was 
returning to the army from Washington by train 
without any guard. Mosby had just crossed the line 
in pursuit of some Union cavalry : had he seen the 
train, he would have got a better prize. 

THE WILDERNESS CAMPAIGN, FROM THE RAPIDAN TO 
COLD HARBOUR 

The Army of the Potomac began to move at mid- 
night on May 3rd,^ two cavalry divisions leading : 
Butler started on the 5th. The two columns crossed 
the river and reached their destinations unmolested, 
rather to Grant's surprise. A short march was 
made to keep the trains covered, which did not get 
over till the afternoon of the 5th. That morning the 
army moved forward on the roads through the dense 
woods, and Lee planned to do what he had done suc- 
cessfully before, attack it in the flank and pen it up by 
the river, but this time he had to deal with a very 
different antagonist. Even Lee attempted no bolder 
stroke than to attack double numbers in thick ground, 
and had Longstreet been at hand when wanted, more 
might have been done, but he was away at Gordons- 
ville and did not arrive till the best chance had passed. 
This was one of the disadvantages of watching a long 
line with inferior forces, which had to be accepted. 

' W. Sherman marches a.ga.\ns\. /oknston. May 5th. 



BATTLE OF THE WILDERNESS 289 

The battle of the 5th was severe, between the Ilnd 
and Vth Union Corps and those o{ Ewell and Hill; the 
Union troops were brought to a stand by flank attacks, 
but Lcc forbade the bringing on of a general action till 
Longstreet came, so both sides halted and entrenched 
where they stood. Next day the Confederates repulsed 
an attack, then made one, and were beaten : just then 
up came Longstreefs men at the double along the 
plank road, and the Union troops were again checked. 
Meade sent for reinforcements, and there was a lull 
till Longstreet moved again, driving Birney's division 
back in confusion, but as he went forward to make 
dispositions to follow up his success he was severely 
wounded by his own men, which stopped the Con- 
federate attack. Both sides now tried to combine 
their efforts in the thick cover, but Longstreefs men, 
now under Anderson, drove Hancock's back to their 
works, Burnside failed to move Hill, and after several 
ineffectual attacks by both sides the fight became 
stationary, and darkness fell. On the Union right, 
Ewell made a sudden and effectual attack, but gained 
no real advantage. On this day Stuart got the better 
of Sheridan, who fell back to cover his trains : next 
day Sheridan beat Stuart, but could not pursue and 
expose the trains. On the 7th, Lee had a strong en- 
trenched line across the turnpike and appeared more 
dangerous than ever ; Grant turned his trains off to 
the left, and moved by that flank in the night to 
Spottsylvania. On this day the Confederate cavalry 
made a desperate attempt to get at the huge trains on 
the Union left rear, defended by their cavalry, which 
beat them off with heavy loss, both then and on the 
morning of the 8th. On the 8th, Grant started Sheridan 
on his cavalry raid to Richmond (cf p. 295). 

No great battle had ever been fought on such 
ground, for it was almost like fighting blindfold, but 
Lee deliberately chose it because his enemy could not 
use his superiority of numbers. Grant had tried to 
force back the Confederate advance on the Orange 

19 



29© THE FIRST HALF OF 1864 

plank road and so get between their army and Rich- 
mond, while Lee tried to strike a crushing blow at the 
head of Grant's column where it crossed this road and 
throw it back into the Wilderness in confusion. Both 
plans failed, but the advantage remained with the 
Confederates to this extent, that at the end of the 
battle they were closer to the Union line of march 
than at the beginning, and had inflicted more loss than 
they had suffered, but their losses were irreparable ; 
those of the other side were not. The North lost 
some 15,000 men, the Confederate about 11,000, in 
killed, wounded, and missing. 

On the night of May 7th, Stuart informed Lee that 
Grant's trains were moving southward, then that his 
army was doing the same, and the race for Spottsyl- 
vania began. Stuart's cavalry blocked the road, the 
Union infantry came up to dislodge him, and that of 
his own side in support ; after a sharp action, the 
Confederates held their ground at the Court House, 
and both sides entrenched. A heavy attack was made 
later by the Vth and Vlth Corps, which was defeated. 

Next day, the 9th, Lees army was all up, and took 
up a line covering Spottsylvania Court House. The 
position was a great salient with both flanks resting 
on the river Po, and the right extending over the 
Fredericksburg road. Both sides strengthened their 
positions, and while superintending this work. General 
Sedgwick, commanding the Vlth Corps, was killed, a 
most serious loss to the Union army. On the loth, 
Hancock moved round the Confederate left with a 
reconnaissance in force, and threatened their trains in 
rear, but Early attacked him sharply, and he fell back 
as ordered. On this day also, the main Confederate 
lines were furiously assaulted, the last attack being 
repulsed with fearful loss. On the nth, there was no 
serious fighting, and Lee thought that Grant was 
beginning to withdraw from his front, and expecting 
another race for the next position, he ordered some 
guns to be withdrawn from places whence they would 



SPOTTSYLVANIA 291 

be difficult to move in a hurry, on the left and centre, 
most of those at the point of the salient being removed. 
This position had been occupied because it was good 
for artillery and would have been advantageous for 
the enemy, but as such a projection is always more 
or less dangerous, the apex of the salient had been 
strengthened by a line across its base. At dawn on 
the 1 2th, a strong attack forced this point, the guns 
were sent back to support the defence, but only came 
in time to be taken, with almost the whole oi Johnson's 
division. The supports, however, quickly occupied the 
line in rear, and Hancock's attack was stopped, Lee 
putting in ever^ man to save his centre : all that day, 
and far into the night, raged the desperate hand-to- 
hand struggle across the Confederate breastworks, in 
rear of which a shorter and better line was being 
made, which was taken up at dawn on the i3th.^ From 
then to the i8th, the arm}'' was gradually shifted more 
to the eastward to meet the extension of Grant's left, 
as before. On the latter day came a last great effort 
by the Ilnd and Vlth Corps to force the line here, 
which was the greatest failure of all, after which the 
advance of the Army of the Potomac by its left flank 
began again, and Ewcll was sent to head it off on the 
19th : - he held on all the next day and then had to 
withdraw, but delayed the operation for twenty-four 
hours. In no other battle in this desperate War was 
the fighting so heavy and long-continued or the losses 
so awful, and it was from here that Grant wrote the 
famous letter to Halleck, in which he said, " I propose 
to fight it out on this line, if it takes all summer." 

On the night of the 20th, Hancock was sent towards 
Richmond, hoping to tempt Lee to attack and expose 
himself to a counter in tlie open, but he saw the 
trap, and reported the move to Richmond. Pickett, in 
command there, moved out and stopped Hancock, and 
then the rest of the Union army marched off for the 

' W. Sliernian at Resaca, May I3th-i6th. 
- W. Sherman at Cassville, May I9th-22nd. 



292 THE FIRST HALF OF 1864 

North Anna, the Confederate army starting next 
morning. This time Lee had the advantage of 
marching by the chord of the arc on which Grant was 
moving and was able to take position on the south 
bank, and rest his men, before the Union army 
appeared, on the 23rd. 

The position which Lee had now taken up to stop 
Grant's advance is about the most astonishing instance 
of military checkmate on record, and cannot be more 
clearly explained than in the words of the Confederate 
General Law : " It did not seem to be General Lee's 
purpose to offer any serious resistance to Grant's 
passage of the river at the points selected. His lines 
had been retired from it at both these points, but 
touched it at Ox Ford, a point intermediate between 
them. Hancock's Corps, having secured the Chester- 
field bridge, crossed over it on the morning of the 
24th, and, extending down the river, moved out till 
it came upon Longstreef s and Ewells Corps in position 
and ready for battle. The Vlth Corps (General 
Wright) crossed at Jericho Mill and joined Warren. 
The two wings of Grant's army were safely across 
the river, but there was no connection between them. 
Lee had only thrown back his flanks, and let them in 
on either side, while he held the river between them : 
and when General Grant attempted to throw his 
centre, under Burnside, across the ford and the bridge, 
it was very severely handled, and failed to get a foot- 
hold on the south side. A detachment from Warren's 
Corps was sent down on the south side, to help 
Burnside across, but was attacked by Mahone's 
division, and driven back with heavy loss, narrowly 
escaping capture. General Grant found himself in 
what may be called a military dilemma. He had cut 
his army in two by running it upon the point of a 
wedge. He could not break the point, which rested 
upon the river, and the attempt to force it out of place 
by striking on its sides must necessarily be made 
without much concert of action between the two 



NORTH ANNA AND COLD HARBOUR 293 

wings of his arm^^ neither of which could reinforce 
the other without crossing the river twice ; while his 
opponent could readily transfer his troops, as needed, 
from one wing to the other, across the narrow space 
between them." 

For two days Grant tried every way to get forward, 
but Lee's position was absolutely impregnable : the 
master of numbers was completely foiled by the 
master of fence. Lee has been blamed for not following 
up Grant's repulse by an attack, but not only was he 
ill at the time, almost confined to his tent, but it 
would have been foolhardy to attempt to cross the 
river and attack double numbers in open country. 
Leey however, thought that he had lost a chance of 
gaining an advantage. 

On the morning of the 27th,' Grant's army had 
disappeared, and again the race began, Lee trying to 
head him off: on the 28th, a severe cavalry action was 
fought at Hawes' Shop ; this gained time for the 
Confederate infantry to fortify a position on Totopo- 
tomoy Creek, which Grant found too strong to attack, 
so again " sidled off," to Cold Harbour. 

On the 31st, Sheridan's cavalry had taken possession 
of Cold Harbour, and was followed by the Vlth Corps, 
and three divisions under Smith, from the Army of 
the James, Longstrecf s Corps and part of Hilts were 
thrown across their front on June ist, but although 
at first driven back, restored their line : both sides 
entrenched, and it looked like a repetition of Spott- 
sylvania. On June 2nd, Early attacked the Vth and 
IXth Corps, preventing their co-operation in the next 
day's battle. During the night the Confederate line 
was shortened and strengthened, and repulsed a great 
attack the next morning with the most awful loss, 
the whole affair only lasting eight or ten minutes. 
Although Grant issued orders for a general attack, 
both that afternoon and the next day, they could not 

' W. Sherman at New Hope Church, May 25th-June 4th. 
Mexico. Maximilian lands, May 28th, 



294 THE FIRST HALF OF 1864 

be carried out, so appalled were all ranks by the 
slaughter. The army was therefore directed to 
entrench where it stood. Lee had to send away troops 
to the Valley at this time, which prevented him from 
taking the offensive (cf. p. 296). Eivell resigned com- 
mand of the Second Corps from ill-health, and was 
transferred to the lines of Richmond, being succeeded 
by Early. 

During this campaign from the Wilderness to Cold 
Harbour, two secondary operations had been going 
on : the first, the move of Butler's army to the James, 
the second, Sheridan's raid on Richmond. 

^ Butler's army of the James (cf. p. 300), consisting of 
the Xth and XVIIth Corps, an independent division, 
and Kautz' cavalr}^ division, moved on May 5th by 
sea to the south side of the James, and took up a 
position at Bermuda Hundred, which it entrenched 
across between the Appomattox and the James, but 
not as Grant wanted, for the main force was not at 
City Point. On the 9th, Butler moved out against 
the defences of Richmond and carried a part of the 
Confederate lines at Drury's Bluff on the night of 
the 13th, but on the i6th he was driven back into his 
lines by Beauregard, who entrenched a line opposite 
him, bottling him up so that he could safely be held 
with a small force, which would allow of reinforce- 
ments being sent to Lee, but this cut both ways, for 
Butler was also strong enough to detach three 
divisions to Cold Harbour and send his cavalry under 
Kautz to attack the Danville railway. Kautz started on 
the 1 2th and got back on the i8th, having destroyed 
some stations and trains and part of the Danville line, 
and then done the same to the South Side line. 

On the Confederate side, Beauregard, a first-rate 
engineer, had been brought from Charleston where 
the danger seemed to have blown over, to command 
at Richmond where it was imminent, Pickett taking 
charge of the lines of Petersburg. 

' Maps 54, 55, p. 386. 



SHERIDAN'S RICHMOND RAID 295 

On May 8th, Grant ordered Sheridan to make 
a raid towards Richmond (cf. p. 289) : he started 
on the Fredericksburg road next day with 10,000 
men, and destroyed part of the Virginia Central 
line, Stuart concentrating against him. On the nth, 
they met at Yellow Tavern, only six miles from 
Richmond : a severe battle ensued in which the 
Confederates were defeated and Stuart mortally 
wounded. His loss was a most serious one to Lee, 
and he was, like Sedgwick, mourned by both armies. 
Sheridan moved forward in the night and lost his 
way in the mud, close to the defences of Richmond, 
where the command was in a most dangerous trap, 
but was extricated by his indomitable pluck, and 
marched round to Haxall's Landing, on the James ; 
here he got supplies from Butler, started back on 
the 2 1 St, and rejoined Grant four days later, having 
drawn off and defeated Lee's cavalry, with the loss 
of their leader, damaged his communications, and, 
especially, given a moral strength and confidence to 
the Union cavalry which it never afterwards lost. 

• When Hunter relieved Sigel in the Valley (cf. p. 286), 
he was ordered to strike at Staunton, and at Gordons- 
ville or Charlottesville, to hold as many Confederate 
troops as possible, try to join Crook at Staunton, 
thence move to Lynchburg, and destroy the railway 
and canal there : he was specially ordered to live 
on the country. He moved out on May 26th with 
8,500 men and 21 guns, driving back a Confederate 
force, and occupying Staunton on June 6th, Crook 
joining him on the 8th with nearly 10,000 men. 
He thoroughly destroyed the Virginia Central line 
and the factories and stores at Staunton, going on 
to strike at Lynchburg, a manufacturing town in 
a rich district, the most important town to Lee 
after Richmond, but his cavalry was away on a 
raid and out of touch, which delayed him at Lex- 
ington and saved Lynchburg, for the Confederates 

' Map 47, p. 338. 



296 THE FIRST HALF OF 1864 

repaired the railway and closed in. Lee had sent 
back Breckinridge against Sigel on June 7th, and 
when he heard of Hunter's advance, Early s Corps 
followed on the 13th. ^ar/y moved to attack Hunter 
in rear, for he had gone by the west of the town : 
the other side would have been better as threatening 
Gordonsville, and giving him a better line of retreat. 
He was driven through Buford's Gap down the 
Kanawha Valley, but Early did not follow far, wishing 
to keep in touch with Lee. Hunter's men suffered 
severely in the retreat, for the country was barren 
and their main depot had been moved from Meadow 
Bluff to Gauley Bridge, as safer from raids. They 
met the first supplies on June 27th, and their troubles 
ended. 

Grant has been blamed for these campaigns in 
the Shenandoah Valley, but he could well afford to 
divide his army, while Lee could not, and he thus 
forced Lee to detach largely (cf. p. 294). Hunter had 
done more than he expected, and had got well out 
of a difficult fix, but strategically he had uncovered 
the Valley and the way to Washington more than 
Sigel had done, though defeated. Lee took full 
advantage of this, and ordered Early and Breckinridge 
to strike at Maryland and again play on the fears 
of the Washington politicians, to relieve Richmond. 
Sheridan was sent to co-operate with Hunter, 
destroying the railway at Trevilian Station and 
near Charlottesville. Wherever he came on the line, 
he broke it, and had a sharp action at Trevihan 
Station with the Confederate cavalry : though he 
drove them back, he heard nothing of Hunter, and 
returned. He started on June 7th, and rejoined the 
army on the 29th. 

The battle of Cold Harbour definitely defeated 
Grant's plan of interposing between Lee and Rich- 
mond, and Richmond had been made so strong that 
he went round to the south and besieged Petersburg, 
in the end. At this time he debated whether to 



GRANT ATTACKS THE RAILWAYS 297 

continue his move by the left to the south of the 
James, or invest Richmond from the north. Though 
the latter seemed to protect Washington the best, 
the communications via Fredericksburg v^^ould be 
exposed, and those of Lee, to the south, unmolested. 
The hope of beating Lee to the north of Richmond 
had also failed, so Grant determined to hold his 
ground, sending the cavalry to break the railways 
to the west, and then to move the army to the 
south side of the James. Meade sent Wilson, with 
his own and Kautz' cavalry divisions, to cut the 
Weldon and Southside railways and go on doing 
damage till stopped. He started on the 22nd, and 
did much damage, but was surrounded by the Con- 
federate cavalry and beaten at Reams' Station, losing 
all his guns : the wreck of the command got back 
on July 2nd. Grant did not blame him, thinking 
that the damage balanced the loss, for he had marched 
300 miles in ten days, destroying 60 miles of railway 
and much rolling-stock. 

Grant remained opposite Lees lines at Cold Harbour 
till June i2th,^ when he moved the army across the 
James, the leading troops reaching the river the next 
night. Smith had been sent back to Butler for an 
attack on Petersburg on the loth, which failed : 
another attack was made on the afternoon and 
evening of the 15th, and a gap made in the Con- 
federate line, but Smith lost time by securing his 
own line instead of seizing the chance, which by 
the next morning had passed away. The Confeder- 
ates admitted that he had had the prize in his grasp. 
Next day all the army was up, and attacks were 
made on it and the two following days, gaining 
some ground, but driving Lee back to a stronger 
line. Up to the i8th the place had been defended 
by Beauregard, but on that day the Army of Northern 

' W. Sherman at Kenesaw Mountain, June ioih-30th. 
Cherbourg. The " Kearsarge" sinks the '■'Alabama^'' June 19th. 
Mexico. Maximilian enters Mexico City, June 12th. 



298 THE FIR^T HALF OF 1864 

Virginia began to come in and occupy the works. 
Lee had kept outside to defend Richmond, not at 
first thinking that Grant was really going to strike 
at Petersburg, but at last Beauregard's report and 
his own observations convinced him. The Union 
army surrounded the place, but without attacking, 
and the long siege of Petersburg had begun. The 
Confederates had formed a strong flotilla on the 
James, including some ironclads, which tried to 
molest Grant's move across to the south side, but 
he had a sufficient force of monitors and other 
vessels to hold them in check, and also placed 
obstructions in the river. 

When the Army of Northern Virginia fell back 
on Richmond, the Confederates felt the want of a 
Commander-in-Chief badly, for Beauregard, whose 
plans had to fit in with Lee's, was not under his 
command, and all communications passed through 
Bragg, the Presidents Chief Staff Officer. Lee, also, 
had been ill during the retreat from the North Anna 
to Cold Harbour, perhaps the most critical and 
anxious time of all for making plans for co-operation 
and the defence of Richmond. 

When the Army of the Potomac found itself stopped 
by the defences of Petersburg, Grant determined to 
invest the place partially by a line of works stretching 
round towards the Southside Railway, consisting of 
redoubts connected by infantry parapets, from which 
the army might be moved at any time against the rail- 
ways or Lee's army, leaving a small force to hold them 
against attack. The Confederate works were similar, 
except that their redoubts were not closed in rear. 

Grant's polic};' of wearing down Lee's army by 
mere attrition, on the principle that the North could 
afford to lose men while the South could not, would 
have failed before the enormous losses of this 
campaign, with a less resolute man. The fighting 
was mostly what the great Duke of Wellington 
called " bludgeon work," and the losses of the Army 



GRANT'S AWFUL LOSSES 29^ 

of the Potomac, in the forty-three days from the 
Rapidan to the James, came to the appalling total 
of 60,000 men : 3,000 more were lost in the last ten 
days of June, and Butler lost about 7,000 : total for 
May and June, 70,000. Lee's losses in the same time 
were 20,000. For desperate and sustained fighting, 
there was nothing in the War to equal that at Spott- 
sylvania, but the greatest slaughter in a short time, 
with its paralyzing moral effect, was at Cold Harbour. 
(Continued on p. 331.) 

The South-East 

(Continued from p. 257.) In accordance with the 
plan to get one of the seceded States to take a nominal 
part in the Presidential Election in the North for 
political reasons, and the selection of Florida for the 
experiment (cf. p. 280), President Lincoln wrote to 
Gillmore, in whose Department Florida was, in 
January,^ and he sent a division under Seymour, which 
was accompanied by five gunboats. It was thought 
that a column striking inland from Jacksonville might 
break up the internal communications and form a base 
for Union sympathizers. The declared objects were : 
(i) To procure an outlet for the raw products of the 
State. (2) To cut off the enemy's supplies. (3) To 
recruit for the coloured regiments. (4) To restore 
Florida to her allegiance. 

The expedition landed at Jacksonvilleon February 7th,' 
and a proclamation was issued, calling on the people 
to take the oath of allegiance, and declaring that the 
State had now passed under Union control. Seymour 
advised taking a strong position on the coast which 
would be an equally good rallying place for Union 
people, without the risk of an expedition inland, but 

' S.W. Banks recalled from Texas, January 4th. 

Mexico. The French enter Guadalajara, January 5th. 

Mexico. Cession of Sonora Mines to Napoleon, January. 
'^ S. Sherman's Meridian Campaign, February 3rd-March 5th, 

S. Sooy Smith v. Forrest, February i8th. 



300 THE FIRST HALF OF 1864 

was ordered to go on. By the 13th the Confederates 
had collected about 5,400 men and 12 guns, under 
Finegan, at Ocean Pond on the Olustee. The country 
was open, but the small lakes were obstructions. 
Seymour advanced with about an equal force, and 
after a hard fight had to retire to Jacksonville with 
the loss of 6 guns, and thus ended the attempt to 
bring Florida back into the Union. Soon afterwards, 
when Grant consolidated all the outlying forces that 
could be spared for service at decisive points, most 
of these coast forces were withdrawn and sent to the 
Army of the James as the Xth Corps, under Gillmore 
(cf. p. 294). 

The Confederates had built a formidable ironclad 
ram, the " Albemarle'^' on the Roanoke River : she 
was of their usual central battery type, with inclined 
sides and low ends, and was protected by four inches 
of armour in two thicknesses ; she had twin-screws 
and good engine power, and carried a heavy gun at 
each end of the battery, so mounted that it could be 
fought in line with the keel or on either side. 

They decided to attack the town of Plymouth, then 
held by Union forces, and General Hoke was ordered 
to co-operate. On April i8th,^ the ^'Albemarle'' went 
down the river, passed the forts without injury, 
rammed and sunk one Union boat, and drove off 
another. By the use of her ram she was nearly lost, 
for vessels of her type are not adapted either to give 
or receive a blow with the stem : having no proper 
" inclined water-line " they cannot offer effectual 
resistance against being dragged or pushed down, and 
swamped. The next morning, Hoke attacked the land 
works and carried them, but with heavy loss. 

On May 5th, ^ the ''Albemarle'' steamed down the 
river into Albemarle Sound with two transports in 
company to fight the Union squadron, four double- 

' S.W. Red River Expedition, March 8th-May 19th. 
- E. Grant marches against Lee, May 3rd. 
W. Sherman marches z.ga.'ms,^ Johnston, May 5th. 



THE ''ALBEMARLE'' 301 

ended gunboats and some armed steamers. A sharp 
action ensued, in which her armour proved a complete 
protection, but she was nearly sunk by being rammed 
by the gunboat " Sassacus." She replied with a shot 
through her assailant's boilers which put her out of 
action, another gunboat signalled that she was 
sinking, and the Union squadron drew off: this was 
prudent, the object being to hold the inland waters, 
which could not have been done had more ships been 
disabled. Both sides retired, and the '■''Albemarle'" 
lay off Plymouth, strongly guarded on all sides: her 
mere presence there was a terror to her enemies. 

Lieutenant Gushing of the " Monticello " had made 
a name for himself in the Navy by the most daring 
exploits : he had raided the Confederate headquarters 
at Smithville, Cape Fear River, and in June had 
reconnoitred up to Wilmington, and captured some 
despatches ; he had also found out that the Con- 
federates had destroyed their ironclad the " Raleigh''' 
This was clearly the man for a desperate service, like 
the cutting out or destruction of the " Albemarle" so 
Admiral Lee sent for him, agreed to his plan of 
attacking with two armed launches, and sent him 
to Washington to lay it before the Secretary of the 
Navy. (Continued on p. 353.) 

The West 

(Continued from p. 268.) Early in the year ^ there 
was a good deal of guerilla warfare in Tennessee and 
Kentucky, which the scattered Union forces were 
powerless to check. The head and front of the 
trouble was the ubiquitous Forrest, who raided up 

' Mexico. The French enter Guadalajara, January 5th. 
Mexico. Cession of Sonora Mines to Napuleon, January. 
SW. Banks recalled from Texas, January 4th. 
S.E. The " Housatonic " sunk off Charleston, February 17th. 
S. E. Olustee Expedition, February 7th-20th. 
S. Sherman's Meridian Campaign, February 3rd-March 5th. 
S. Sooy Smith v. Forrest, February 18th. 
S.W. Red River Expedition, March 8th-May 19th. 



302 THE FIRST HALF OF 1864 

from the south (cf. p. 310) early in April, between the 
Mississippi and Tennessee Rivers, as far as Paducah, 
where he was repulsed, and then turned back towards 
Memphis, attacking and taking Fort Pillow, which 
was held by coloured troops : his men began to 
massacre the garrison, but he stopped the slaughter 
as soon as he came up. Sherman acquits him from 
blame, saying that the policy, which he himself had 
always opposed, of raising troops from their own 
slaves to keep them in order in their own districts, 
made the Confederates so " fearfully savage " that they 
became quite uncontrollable on such occasions. After 
this Forrest went back into Mississippi. 

When Sherman succeeded Grant in the West, the 
Xlth and Xllth Corps were amalgamated to form a 
new XXth under Hooker, Howard took the IVth 
Corps, and a cavalry corps of four divisions was 
formed, but these seem to have been distributed 
among the different armies before the advance. He 
had the Armies of the Cumberland, IVth, XlVth, and 
XXth Corps, under Thomas, of the Tennessee, XVth, 
XVIth, and XVIIth Corps, under McPherson (of which 
the two former had each a division with Banks, ^ and 
the latter did not join till June), and that of the Ohio, 
under Schofield, the XXlIIrd Corps, less a division 
in Kentucky under Burbridge. Sherman was most 
anxious to get back the divisions lent to Banks before 
he started, but it was soon clear that he must go 
without them. 

The base of the Army of the Cumberland was Louis- 
ville, and Cincinnati for that of the Ohio, the great 
problem being that of supplies. Nashville, the chief 
depot, was 136 miles from Chattanooga, in the enemy's 
country, and had to be guarded. The Army of the 
Cumberland had practically the control of the rail- 
ways, which caused friction, so Sherman took charge 

' These two divisions were under A. J. Smith, and never rejoined their 
Corps. They were renumbered as the XVIth Corps, the other divisions of 
the old XVIth going to fill up the XVIIth, but for a time there were two corps 
numbered XVI (cf. pp. 344, 362). 



SHERMAN MOVES FORWARD 303 

of them himself, and, with the patriotic help of 
Mr. Guthrie, the President of the Louisville and Nash- 
ville Railway, collected sufficient transport for the 
work. He aimed at getting together a picked force 
of 100,000 men, in the lightest possible marching 
order, to be ready by May ist. The actual strength 
then was 98,797 men and 254 guns, not counting 
Stoneman's and Garrard's cavalry divisions, which 
soon joined. 

The key to the topography of the country south of 
Chattanooga is the direction of the Alleghany Chain, 
nearly N.N.E. and S.S.W. of which the eastern ranges 
run out, ending in broken country. Sherman was 
practically tied to the railway, for if he made Cleveland 
his base he would uncover Tennessee. Johnston quite 
saw this, and made his main position at Dalton im- 
pregnable, hoping that Sherman would come to grief 
against it. Sherman first planned to threaten him in 
front and send McPherson out beyond Resaca against 
his communications ; but McPherson's army was so 
weak that it was brought closer up, arid sent against 
Resaca by a shorter way, where it would be in 
touch with the army. Sherman was at his Depart- 
ment Headquarters at Nashville till the end of April, 
when he went to the front, and on May 5th, ^ the day 
fixed by Grant, the army started. On the 7th it came 
up to Johnston's position, naturally strong and arti- 
ficially strengthened to the utmost, and the orders 
were to hold him while McPherson went round by 
Snake Creek Gap, which was a complete surprise 
to the Confederates ; but even so, Johnston had so 
guarded his rear that McPherson found Resaca too 
strong to attack, and fortified a position at the mouth 
of the gap, to which he retired. Sherman thinks 
that in this he was over-cautious and lost the chance 
of a lifetime ; but it must not be forgotten that the 

' S.W. Jenkins' Ferry, April 30th. 
E. Grant marches against Lee^ May 3rd. 
E. The Wilderness, May sth-yth. 



304 THE FIRST HALF OF 1864 

whole movement depended on McPherson, and that 
he was not in chief command. Though the position 
was now untenable, Johnston held on at Dalton all 
the loth,^ but retired suddenly on the nth and had 
his whole army in well-prepared defences at Resaca, 
before Sherman's, which had moved first, could deploy 
against them. Sherman again planned to hold him in 
place by an attack while he sent troops to get in his 
rear, across the Oostenaula River, to attack the rail- 
way near Calhoun. On the 15th,- the entrenchments 
of Resaca were sharply attacked, but Johnston held 
his own and retired at night : though his army was 
only half as strong as Sherman's, he had the advan- 
tages of positions fortified in advance by gangs of 
negroes, under his engineers, and of concentration. 
The Union army, on the contrary, was more or less 
dispersed, and had to grope its way by tracks over 
the roughest country. Though Johnston retired in 
the night of the 15th, and pursuit was immediate, his 
rearguard was not overtaken till the evening of the 
17th, ^ and the next morning had again disappeared. 
The Union army reached Kingston on the 19th, and 
the enemy was reported to be in a strong position at 
Cassville, four miles to the east : Thomas' and Scho- 
field's armies were converging on this place, and 
McPherson was directed to strike at the railway in 
rear of it. The Confederate rearguard fell back on 
its lines in excellent order, and preparations were 
made for Thomas and Schofield to attack next day, 
but in the morning Johnston had again disappeared. 
Sherman, knowing the Confederate army to be about 
60,000 strong, in three Corps, could not see why so 
good a position had been abandoned ; but Johnston 
told him after the War that he had fully intended 

' E. Spottsylvania, May 8th-i8th. 

E. Sheridan's Richmond Raid, May 9th-i3th. 

E. Cloyd's Mountain and Wytheville, May loth. 
'' E. Butler before Richmond : Drury's Bluff, May I2th-i6th. 
' S.W. Banks at Simsport : end of Red River Expedition, May i6th-i9th. 



THE ADVANCE CHECKED 305 

to fight, but that owing to a disagreement with his 
generals, he continued the retreat beyond the Etowah 
River and the Allatoona Range of mountains, where 
he held the hills to the south with a thin line, with his 
main body in reserve. The country here was more 
broken, and gave him a better choice of positions. 

The art of repairing railways had been brought to 
such marvellous perfection by Colonel Wright, Sher- 
man's railway engineer, that Johnston's destruction of 
them caused very little delay. The camp joke ran 
that he " carried a spare tunnel along." 

Sherman halted at Cassville a few days to rest his 
men, repair communications, and get up supplies. 
Knowing the country, and the great strength of the 
Allatoona Pass, through which the railway runs, 
which was Johnston's line of retreat, he determined 
to turn it via Dallas, the Army of the Cumberland, 
in the centre, marching straight on that place, that 
of the Ohio to the left of it, and the Army of the 
Tennessee to the right, rather to the south. It would 
be a difficult and risky move to leave the railway and 
depend on the waggons for twenty days, in a thick 
and almost roadless country ; but it was the lesser 
evil of the two. 

The march started on the 23rd,^ and on the 25th all 
the columns were moving on Dallas and came into 
touch with the enemy near that place. The Con- 
federates were ready for them behind a strong line 
of works, near the centre of which, at New Hope 
Church, there was some very severe fighting, on that 
and the following days.^ This line completely blocked 
the Union march to get round south of the Allatoona 
Pass, and in touch with the railway again, as soon as 
possible. Sherman wanted to pass McPherson's army 
from right to left, but a strong force in front held it 

' E. Lee on the North Anna, May 23rd-27th. 
'' Mexico. Maximilian lands, May 28th. 

E. Hawes' Shop, May 28th. 

E. Totopotomoy, May 29tii 31st. 

20 



3o6 THE FIRST HALF OF 1864 

fast, and it could not move before June ist : the whole 
army though was gradually sidling away to the left, 
towards Acworth, by continuous fighting, both sides 
extending their lines in hot action. 

On June ist,^ Sherman sent two cavalry divisions 
to seize the ends of the Allatoona Pass, and ordered 
the railway to be repaired from Kingston forward. 
On the 4th, the move to the railway was made, John- 
ston having gone. This closed the first phase of the 
campaign, in which, practically in the month of May, 
the Union army had advanced 100 miles over the 
most difficult country from Chattanooga to Big Shanty, 
with continuous, but not heavy fighting, till they got 
to New Hope Church. The Union loss amounted to 
9,299, all told, while the Confederate loss was 5,393, 
not counting missing, probably about 8,500 in all. 
Sherman's cavalry divisions joining had brought in 
some 7,500 men, making about 105,000 in all, while 
Johnston started the campaign with 42,856 men, but 
Polk's Corps and other troops gave him over 64,000 
men at New Hope Church. 

When Johnston moved away from his front, Sher- 
man shifted McPherson's army, which was stronger 
than Schofield's, to the left, and Schofield's to the 
right, of Thomas, and strengthened Allatoona as a 
secondary base. Blair came in on the 8th with the 
two good divisions of the XVHth Corps, which 
balanced the losses. On the loth, the army advanced 
against the very strong position on three hills, 
Kenesaw, Pine Mountain, and Lost Mountain, which 
however was rather long for the defending force. It 
commanded all the approaches, and made great caution 
necessary, while the wet weather delayed movements. 
The Confederate cavalry were threatening the com- 
munications, and Forrest beat Sturgis on the loth 
(cf p. 308), who had been sent against him from 
Memphis, but was held off by other Union forces. 

A long line of works was made in front o{ Johnston's 

' E. Cold Harbour, June ist-i2th. 



THE LINES BEFORE MARIETTA 307 

by the r4th,^ and the weather improved : on this day 
General Polk was killed when going round his lines on 
Kenesaw Mountain. Though the Union troops gained 
some ground next day, they found better lines con- 
fronting them, as strong as a permanent fort : the 
work of fortification was so severe that Sherman 
organized pioneer corps of freed slaves, which was a 
great saving to his men. Johnston kept contracting 
his line, and Sherman thought that this was to collect 
a force for offence, to strike at the railway on which 
he depended. A large Confederate cavalry force 
passed to his rear, of which he warned his communica- 
tion troops. 

The Union army worked on the principle of an 
advance against fortified positions, gaining ground by 
degrees, by continuous fighting, but as soon as they 
took one line, they found a new one confronting them: 
Schofield therefore ordered his army to take so much 
ground that Johnston must over-extend and weaken 
himself. On the 27th, a great assault was made, which 
failed, but the Union men held their ground and made 
works close to the Confederate lines. They lost about 
2,500 men, the Confederates 800. In this fortnight's 
fighting, both sides being in fortified lines, Sherman 
records that all attacks failed, by whichever side made. 
Meanwhile Schofield had moved to a position threaten- 
ing yo/ms/o;/ '5 retreat, Stoneman's cavalry was nearly 
up to the Chattahoochee on the right, and Sherman, 
to avoid the fearful losses of attacking entrenchments, 
planned to move round again as before, leaving the 
railway, striking it again at Fulton, and trusting to the 
cavalry to hold Allatoona, his immediate base. This 
ended the month of June, in which Sherman's army 
lost 7,500, JoJinston's nearly 6,000, a great contrast to 
the awful butcher's bill in the East. 

' W. Burbridge beats Morgan at Cynthiana, Ky., June I2th. 
E. Siege of Petersburg begins, June 15th. 
E. Action of Ream's Station, June 22nd. 

Cherbourg. The " Kearsarge" sinks the " Alabama" June 19th. 
Mexico. Maximilian enters Mexico City, June 12th. 



3o8 THE FIRST HALF OF 1864 

When they reached Kingston, the armies moved 
into what we have for convenience called the Southern 
Division of the theatre of war, in which these opera- 
tions will be continued (cf p. 341). 

^ Sherman had sent Sturgis from Memphis to drive 
Forrest back and cover the communications (cf. p. 306). 
He started on June ist with two small cavalry 
brigades and some infantry, 5,000 men, and two 
batteries. On the loth, he reached Brice's Cross 
Roads, and met Forrest. After a hard fight, lasting 
all day, he was driven back with the loss of all his 
guns, and a small infantry brigade which came up 
could not retrieve the crushing defeat, Sherman ex- 
pected that raids along his whole line of communica- 
tions would follow. General Smith, with the two 
divisions from Banks' army, had returned to Memphis 
on June 9th, and was ordered to join Canby at Mobile, 
but the occasion was so urgent that he was sent 
against Forrest instead, and by the end of June had 
advanced as far as La Grange. Wheeler attacked the 
Nashville and Chattanooga railway, but Rousseau, 
commanding at Nashville, drove him off. 

Morgan^ who was in command of the Department of 
South-Western Virginia^ which included part of east 
Tennessee (cf. p. 286), had been fighting against 
Crook and Averell in Virginia in May, and heard that 
they were to be reinforced: he had also been instructed 
by Bucknery his predecessor in command, to strike at 
Kentucky. He started with about 2,000 men, drove 
off the Union garrison of Pound Gap and pushed 
on, sending detachments to cut the railways, to stop 
troops being sent from the north, but Burbridge, 
commanding a division of the XXIIIrd Corps and a 
cavalry division, moving from Kentucky to join Crook, 
heard of this march and doubled back. Morgan took 
Mount Sterling on the 9th, but a detachment which 
he had left there was routed by the Union cavalry 
that night. He took Lexington next day, then Cyn- 

' Map 49A, p. 360. 



RE-ORGANIZATION AND PLANS 309 

thiana, capturing a cavalry brigade coming up to its 
relief, but on the 12th Burbridge came up in force 
and routed him with the loss of half his command. 
He got back to Abingdon, Virginia, on June 20th. 
Though defeated, he had caused the diversion he 
intended, and delayed the apprehended incursion into 
south-western Virginia for some months. 

At the beginning of the year, the commands in 
Missouri and Arkansas were divided, Rosecrans 
coming to take the former, on January 28th, while 
Steele was confirmed in the latter, which he had 
formerly commanded under Schofield, who, as we 
have seen, succeeded Foster in the Department of the 
Ohio. In March, Pleasonton came to command 
Rosecrans' cavalry. 

(For Mississippi Flotilla, cf. p. 313.) (Continued 
on p. 359.) 

The South and South-West 

(Continued from pp. 269, 270.) At the end of 1863, 
Banks had occupied several places on the Texan 
coast, but in the beginning of January ^ Halleck sent 
him back to New Orleans to prepare for the Red 
River Expedition, which had to be made in the spring 
in combination with the Navy. In order to clear the 
Mississippi River and Valley and free as many men as 
possible for the campaign in the West, the attack of 
Johnston's army, and advance to Atlanta, Banks and 
Porter were to strike to the west up the Red River, 
while Sherman swept the Confederate troops out of 
central Mississippi. One great object was to drive 
back Forrest, for which General Sooy Smith, who was 
at Memphis with 2,500 cavalry, was to start the first 
week in February, when Sherman moved from Vicks- 
burg. A Confederate concentration against Sherman 
might enable Smith to strike south from Corinth and 
destroy the railway, and when Sherman had broken 

' Mexico. The French enter Guadalajara, January 5th. 
Mexico. Cession of Sonora Mines to Napoleon, January. 



3IO THE FIRST HALF OF 1864 

the line crossing it at Meridian,* Memphis and Nash- 
ville would be safe from a large force for some time. 

Polk commanded the Confederates near Meridian, 
two divisions of infantry and two of cavalry, not 
counting Forrest's command. Sherman marched on 
February 3rd with four divisions straight for Meridian, 
and drove the Confederate cavalry before him, but 
they harassed his march steadily, and once nearly 
took him prisoner : their infantry made no stand. ^ He 
remained at Meridian several days, breaking railways 
and destroying stores. He gave out that he was 
going to Mobile, to distract attention, for he really 
meant to be back at Vicksburg on March ist to co- 
operate with Banks on the Red River, but Grant 
forbade this, and ordered him back to his army at 
Huntsville, Alabama. 

*To return to Sooy Smith. He was to start from 
near Memphis on February ist, with 7,000 cavalry 
and 20 guns, destroy the enemy's communications, 
drive back his cavalry, and meet Sherman at Meridian 
on the loth. He was delayed by floods and did not 
reach West Point, between Tupelo and Meridian, till 
the i8th,^ where he came on Forrest in a strong 
position, and retired, Forrest following. On the 22nd,^ 
a sharp fight took place much in Forrest's favour, who 
took 6 guns, and the Union retreat became a rout before 
reaching Memphis. Forrest had only 2,500 men. After 
re-organizing his command, he moved north, raiding 
into Kentucky (cf. p. 302). (Continued on p. 341.) 

THE RED RIVER EXPEDITION (Map 5 1, p. 362) 

The plan for this expedition was that Porter's 
flotilla, taking Smith's force in transports, should 
move up the Red River and be at Alexandria on 
March 17th, while Banks marched across from the 

' S.E. Olustee Expedition, February 7th-20th. 
' The " Housatonic" sunk off Charleston, February 17th. 
' E. Kilpatrick 's and Dahlgren's Raid to Richmond, February 28th- 
March 4th. 

* Map 49 A, p. 360. 



THE RED RIVER EXPEDITION 311 

Teche and joined them there, and that Steele should 
come and meet them at Shreveport. Two armies 
and a fleet, hundreds of miles apart, were to con- 
centrate on a given day within the enemy's lines, 
on a difficult river, which was both obstructed and 
fortified, a most risky plan. Smith had 10,000 men, 
Banks 17,000, Steele 15,000, 42,000 in all, while Kirby 
Sinif/i, commanding the Confederate Department, could 
oppose them with 25,000. Taylor, commanding in 
western Louisiana, covered Alexandria with one 
division, which fell back when the flotilla and Smith's 
force came up and took Fort De Russy on the 13th, 
in front of that place. 

Banks was detained at New Orleans by Lincoln's 
orders, installing the new Governor and officials of 
the " free State " of Louisiana, and directed Franklin 
to start with the troops, the larger part of the Xlllth 
and XlXth Corps, and a raw cavalry division under 
Albert Lee. Lee reached Alexandria on the 19th, 
Banks on the 24th, and the infantry the two following 
days. On the 27th, Banks received fresh orders from 
the Commander-in-Chief to return Smith's force to 
Sherman in less than a month whether Shreveport 
were taken or not, and that he was himself then to 
go against Mobile, but the expedition was not counter- 
manded. Banks might get to Shreveport, and might 
be joined by Steele in time : both were unlikely, but 
he took the risk. The river was lower than usual, 
and the progress of the flotilla slow, the heavier boats 
being unable to pass the rapids above the town, be- 
hind which Taylors force was waiting, but he was 
surprised near Henderson's Hill, lost most of his 
cavalry, and retired beyond Natchitoches as the Union 
army advanced, now only 26,000 strong. Magruder 
however sent him a cavalry division from Texas, and 
two of infantry, from Price in Arkansas, were on their 
way. His enemy was toiling over a barren stretch 
of country, with a huge length of train to guard, on 
one road, across which he took up a good position 



312 THE FIR^ HALF OF 1864 

at Sabine Cross Roads. On April 8th, he suddenly 
attacked the Union flank and drove it in : reinforce- 
ments were brought up by Franklin, who was 
wounded, but they only staved off defeat for a time : 
the whole army was driven back in disorder, but a 
brigade came up in rear and stopped the pursuit. 
The campaign was lost to Banks, with Shreveport 
only two marches in front. Price's two infantry 
divisions joined Taylor that night. The Union army 
took position at Pleasant Hill, and Taylor, following 
in pursuit, attacked them there : after a fierce battle, 
in which about 12,000 men were engaged on each side, 
the Confederates were completely beaten and fell back 
in confusion. Kirby Smith joined Taylor that night, 
and decided to move against Steele, leaving Taylor 
to harass Banks. Banks now fell back on the river, 
where the flotilla was in great difficulties, but it 
managed to reach the falls of Alexandria with the 
loss of one ironclad, and here the real trouble began. 
Taylor attacked, but was driven off, and then Hunter 
came ^ with orders from Grant to Banks to end the 
campaign, but this was easier said than done, for he 
could not abandon the twelve gunboats and thirty 
transports in their perilous situation, with the water 
falling, and an active enemy on both banks. Colonel 
Bailey, an engineer, raised the water by building dams 
till they were able to pass, but only by stripping the 
ironclads of some armour, and destroying a number 
of guns. The building of the dams and passing of 
the boats took from April 30th to May i3th,^ and the 
whole expedition reach Simsport on the i6th, losing 
several vessels on the way. After a sharp rearguard 
action they crossed the Atchafalaya safely on the 19th. 

' W. Forresfs Raid, Fort Pillow, April 13th. 

S.E. The Confederates retake Plymouth, April 20th. 
"■ S.W. Jenkins' Ferry, April 30th. 

E. Grant marches against Lee, May 3rd. 

W. Sherman marches ?i%^ms,\. J ohnston. May 5th. 

E. The Wilderness, May Sth-yth. 
' E, Spottsylvania, May 8th- 1 8th. 



STEELE AND PRICE 313 

Thus ended this ill-fated expedition, which produced 
recriminations on both sides ; Porter and Banks were 
at loggerheads, and the latter found that Canby had 
been put over him ; several Union commanders were 
changed, Porter was replaced by Lee, and, on the 
other side, Taylor attacked Kirhy Smith, his com- 
mander, so bitterly, for losing such a chance, that he 
was relieved. It being considered too late to use 
Banks' army against Mobile, the XlXth, with part 
of the Xlllth, Corps, were sent to Grant in the 
East. 

We have seen that part of the plan of the Red 
River Expedition was that Steele should co-operate 
with Banks from Arkansas. He started and drove 
back Price, who had sent reinforcements to Taylor, 
but on hearing of Banks' retreat, and that Price had 
been reinforced, fell back on Little Rock. Price 
attacked him in his retreat, and a severe battle took 
place at Jenkins' Ferry on the Saline River on April 
30th, in which the Confederates were badly beaten, 
and Steele continued his march without molestation. 
His district was put under Canby, commanding the 
Gulf Department, as Sherman could not now give 
attention to it. Price planned an incursion into 
Missouri and began collecting his force, but did not 
move for some months (cf p. 360). 

The army being now mostly removed from the 
Mississippi, very heavy patrolling duty devolved on 
the gunboat flotilla ; several expeditions were under- 
taken up the Yazoo in pursuit of raiders, and the 
service up the Tennessee and Cumberland, in rear 
of the army, became so important that an nth gun- 
boat division was formed. (Continued on p. 359.) 

The Blockade 

(Continued from p. 271.) The Blockade was steadily 
increasing in stringency, and the Confederacy felt the 
pinch severely : all efforts to raise it by fighting ships 



314 THE FIRST HALF OF 1864 

having failed, they turned their attention more to 
submarine attack with torpedoes. 

In the district of the North Atlantic Squadron two 
attacks were made, on the U.S. frigates *' Minnesota " 
and " Roanoke," on April 9th and i2th.^ In both cases 
the torpedo was exploded close under the ship. The 
"Minnesota" seems to have kept a bad look-out, and 
her assailant, a " David " or submarine, was seen 
making off: the ship was little the worse. The 
" Roanoke " was badly shaken, but not endangered : 
nothing was seen of her assailant. If the spar 
torpedo was fired by electricity, not contact, the 
small damage done may be due to its having been 
fired prematurely, on account of the great risk of the 
attacking boat going down with the ship. 

In the South Atlantic district, in Charleston waters, 
there were three attacks. The first, on February i/th,^ 
sank the gunboat " Housatonic " : after dark something 
like a plank was seen close to the ship, and the torpedo 
exploded before a gun could be fired, the ship sinking 
at once : the torpedo-boat was lost, and probably sank 
with her. The other two attacks were made on the 
" Memphis " and " Wabash," on March 6th and 
April i8th,^ but a bright look-out being kept, each 
opened a heavy fire : in both cases the boat is believed 
to have been sunk. 

In the Gulf of Mexico, Farragut wanted to attack 
Mobile at the beginning of the year, in combination 
with the Army, but had to put it off, as Banks' troops 
were under orders for the Red River. He heard of 
the approaching completion of the Confederate iron- 
clad " Tennessee " in March, and begged for reinforce- 
ments to take the place before she was ready, but 
in vain. (Continued on p. 366.) 

• S.W. Sabine Cross Roads, April 8th. 
S.W. Pleasant Hill, April 9th. 

■^ S.E. Olustee Expedition, February 7th-20th. 
S. Sherman's Meridian Campaign, February 3rd-March 5th^ 

* S.E. The Confederates retake Plymouth, April 20th. 



THE "KEARSARGE" AND THE ''ALABAMA'' 315 

The War at Sea 

(Continued from p. 274.) The sudden appearance 
of the " Alabama " in the China Seas soon paralyzed 
the American trade, and their ships were all locked up 
in port. There was thus nothing more to do there, 
and when the U.S.S. "Wyoming" came in search of 
the "Alabama,'' she sailed westwards at the beginning 
of the year, reaching Cape Town in February : though 
she crossed the trade route of the Indian Ocean, 
touching in India on January 14th, she did not meet 
a single American ship till she came off the Brazilian 
coast at the end of April.' Here she turned north- 
wards and took two ships, going on to Cherbourg for 
repairs, which were badly needed, and reaching that 
port on June nth. While waiting to dock, the U.S.S. 
" Kearsarge " came in to pick up the prisoners whom 
Semmes had just landed, but was not allowed to do so 
in a neutral port, and went out again. Semmes sent a 
message to ask her captain, Winslow, to wait till the 
" Alabama " had coaled, when he would come out and 
fight. The two ships were very fairly matched, of 
about the same tonnage, between 1,000 and 1,100, and 
size of crew about 150. The " Alabama" was faster, 
and carried one gun more, but the armament of the 
" Kearsarge " was more effective against a wooden 
ship at suitable ranges, for her two ii-inch smooth- 
bores were more destructive than the " Alabama's " 
rifled loo-pounder and smooth-bore 68-pounder. The 
*' Alabama" carried six 32-pounder smooth-bores; the 
" Kearsarge " four, and a light rifled gun. 

On June 19th, Semmes stood out; his enemy was 
waiting, and at about a mile range the ^'Alabama's" 
rifled gun opened the fight ; then the ships closed to 
about 500 yards, steaming round each other in circles : 
this was the very best range for the " Kearsarge," and 
she made full use of it. Winslow had protected the 
vulnerable parts of his ship by chain cable, boxed in, 

' S.E. The "Housatonic" sunk off Charleston, February 17th. 



3i6 THE FIRST HALF OF 1864 

and the " Alabama's " shot took little effect. She soon 
began to sink, and surrendered. Winslow had only 
two boats left, and asked an English yacht, the 
" Deerhound," to help in saving life, which she did, 
landing Semmes and many of his crew in England. 
The United States Government demanded their sur- 
render as escaped prisoners, to which Lord John 
Russell replied that not only was there no obligation 
to do so, but that even could he do so legally, he 
would not violate national hospitality. 

In this action the " Alabama's " gunnery was inferior, 
as was likely, seeing that she could spare no ammuni- 
tion for practice, and that her powder had deteriorated 
with age. One shell lodged in the " Kearsarge's " 
stern post early in the action, which would have 
altered the result had it exploded. Thus ended the 
career of the famous " Alabama." 

The " Tuscaloosa" Captain Lozv, had been cruising 
in the Atlantic with very poor success, because the 
American flag had almost vanished from the sea. She 
was at Cherbourg when the ^^ Alabama " came in, and 
some of her officers wanted to join their old ship 
for the fight, but this would have violated French 
neutrality, and was forbidden. Nothing more is heard 
of the '* Tuscaloosa" as a cruiser, and she seems to 
have been disarmed, and gone to sea again as a 
merchant steamer. 

At the end of 1863, the ^^ Florida" was repairing at 
Brest, and sailed in February, 1864, cruising in the North 
Atlantic and along the American coast, where she de- 
stroyed some vessels, and went in to Bermuda to coal. 

The " Georgia" as we saw, was put at the disposal 
of Captain Barron in France, but being an unsatis- 
factory cruiser (cf. p. 272), he sold her to an English 
merchant : she was however followed and seized by 
the U.S.S. " Niagara," and condemned at Boston, 
while those who had fitted her out were prosecuted in 
England under the Foreign Enlistment Act, and fined. 

The ^'Rappahannock" was lying at Calais waiting 



THE FRENCH CHANGE OF POLICY 317 

for a chance to fit out and sail, but the French would 
not allow any armament or increase of crew, so she 
stayed there as depot ship. 

At the beginning of the year,^ the builders of the 
Confederate warships in France were formally told 
by the Government that the ironclads would not be 
allowed to sail, and the corvettes must not be armed 
in France, but nominally sold as neutral traders, 
which was almost a " volte face " after the assurances 
which had been given. Bulloch arranged for a nominal 
sale of the corvettes, and hoped that he could smuggle 
away one of the rams if he could sell the other to 
Sweden. In June, however, he heard that the builders 
had sold all the vessels to other Governments by 
Napoleon's imperative orders, and that the French 
Government required proof that the sales were bona 
fide. The French builder was as much surprised as 
was Bulloch, whom he met with Slidell, but they could 
do nothing. The explanation of this sudden action 
was that the American Embassy in Paris had got 
possession of some letters which disclosed all the 
transactions, and their Government was able to put 
powerful pressure on Napoleon. 

During this spring also^ the two turret-ships fitting 
out at Birkenhead, which had been sold to a French 
firm, were bought by the English Government and 
added to the Navy as the " Scorpion " and " Wyvern." 
(Continued on p. 366.) 

Summary 

(Continued from p. 275.) The North had gained the 
Peninsula and the country up to Richmond, in the 
East : in the West they controlled the country as far 

' Mexico. The French enter Guadalajara, January 5th. 

Mexico. Cession of Sonera Mines to Napoleon, January. 

S. Meridian Campaign, February. 

S.W. Red River Expedition, March-May. 
* E. & W. Grant and Sherman start, May. 

Mexico. Maximilian lands, May 28th. 

Mexico. He enters Mexico City, June 12th. 



3i8 THE FIRST HALF OF 1864 

south as the Chattahoochee, within striking distance 
of Atlanta, and all to the west of the Mississippi, for 
though challenged, their power was never in danger 
again. The Blockade was drawn tighter, and the 
Confederates reduced to the greatest straits. The 
second quarter of the year had fully vindicated the 
substitution of military for civilian control of the War, 
for all efforts were properly directed to a common end 
for the first time, while on the other side the lack of 
this advantage was seen on several occasions. 

Napoleon and his plans require a word here. In 
judging him, it must not be forgotten that with all his 
personal, all his family, ambition, there never was a 
more patriotic Frenchman, but that it was the very 
essence of his nature to prefer crafty ways to open 
ones, and that he saw his duty to France through 
Napoleonic spectacles. While maintaining the military 
prestige of France, it was his special ambition to do 
for her supremacy in the arts of peace what his great 
predecessor had done for her in war, and in this, 
England and America were his principal rivals. The 
Mexican Expedition was his way of dealing with the 
latter, and of gaining military prestige in the New 
World at the same time, while the action of the 
British Government with regard to the ships building 
for the Confederates in England, afforded him an 
opening for increasing French trade at their expense 
in 1863. He gave Slidell to understand that he would 
be willing to recognize the Confederacy, but that the 
hindrance to this was the action of his ally England, 
and he told French shipbuilders that they had now a 
capital chance of cutting in for a share of the trade, 
and that he would defend their right to do " legitimate 
business," on the broadest possible lines, and would 
not be too inquisitive about the bona fides of their 
customers. In the summer of 1864 the situation was 
quite different. The Confederacy was weakening so 
rapidly that it was more than doubtful whether the 
ships could arrive in time to be of use, while the 



NAPOLEON'S POLICY 319 

North was not only becoming stronger daily, but 
very seriously angry about the shipbuilding, and as it 
was no part of his plan to increase the complication 
by a direct quarrel with them, it seemed advisable to 
simplify things by dropping the Confederacy, which 
was now useless to him as a card in the game, and by 
directing his whole attention to Mexico. Here his 
army was progressing well, driving Juarez back to 
the far corners of the land, Maximilian had landed and 
entered Mexico City with great eclat, and it seemed 
quite on the cards that by pushing on here, the 
Empire might be firmly established before the United 
States recovered the power of interference. He could 
therefore trouble himself less with their steady sup- 
port of the Mexican Republic, and opposition to the 
Empire. He had also got his hands on the Sonora 
Mines, and hoped to finance his venture from that 
source, for the grumbling of the French taxpayer at 
having to find the money for it was becoming too 
ominous to be disregarded. 

The midsummer of 1864 found the Confederates in a 
worse position than ever, for Lee had been forced back 
to his lines before Petersburg, in the East, and his 
serious losses could not be replaced ; President Davis 
much wanted to follow the example of the North and 
enlist coloured troops for service, for many of the 
negroes openly said that they would sooner fight " for 
their own white men," but there was such opposition 
to the idea that it was shelved for a year, and when 
passed in the spring of 1865 was too late. In the 
West, Johnston had been turned out of position after 
position, although with almost miraculous intuition 
he knew exactly how long he could hold them, even 
after they had become untenable in a military sense, 
but when on the defensive he never, like Lee, attacked 
in earnest. In the South-West, Kirby Smith had thrown 
away a great chance of wrecking both the naval and 
military parts of the Red River Expedition ; but this 
was not the crisis of the War, as Taylor thinks, be- 



320 THE FIRST HALF OF 1864 

cause though the Expedition was a total failure, and 
the Confederates regained possession of much territory, 
the Northern control of the Mississippi remained un- 
broken. This being so, it seems odd that the North 
diverted so many men for a campaign of so little 
military importance, but it is said to have been a 
political move. Grant and Sherman had the two main 
Confederate armies by the throat, and they could quite 
well let the West simmer for a time. The South-West 
was definitely cut off from the mass of the Confederacy : 
Taylor says that after May i8th not a shot was fired in 
their Trans-Mississippi Department. In Missouri there 
was a small campaign in the autumn, and then all was 
quiet. The Confederates had gained no real success 
against the Blockade or in the rivers and sounds, while 
at sea, though the American flag had practically dis- 
appeared, they had lost the famous '* Alabama" and 
could not replace her, and the powerful vessels building 
for them in Europe were stopped and sold to others. 
The sad keynote of the Confederate position was 

LOSS, LOSS, LOSS, WHICH COULD NOT BE MADE GOOD. 

Union Loss. — Major-General Sedgwick, killed in 
action. 

Confederate Losses. — General Polk, killed in action 
Lietitenant-General Stuart, died of wounds. (Continued 
on p. 369.) 

Notices of Officers 

(Continued from p. 277.) Several well-known names 
disappear : on the Union side. Generals Sedgwick 
and Pleasonton ; on the Confederate, Generals Polk 
and Stuart, and Admiral Semmcs. Pleasonton and 
Semmes went to minor parts, and disappear as great 
leaders. 

General Leonidas Polk was the Bishop of Louisiana 
when the War broke out, but then took so active a 
part in Secession and was so influential a man in the 
South, that he was given a high command : though he 
had gone into the Church, he was educated at West 



POLK, SrUART, S'EIJGWICK ^it 

Point, then, as perhaps now, the best school in the 
world, and had many army friends. At first he was 
in command of a district, but soon took an active part 
in the field, and was a fair general, though he seems 
not to have pulled well with Bragg^ but this was not 
singular. He was killed while going round his lines 
on Kenesaw Mountain. 

Lieutenant-General J . E. B. Stuart, nicknamed *'Jeb," 
from his initials, was a very young man for his position, 
having been a lieutenant in the 2nd Cavalry when 
the War broke out, but he was so universally beloved 
that his rapid rise, due entirely to his conspicuous 
talents, seems to have caused no jealousy. Of medium 
height, he was a powerful, handsome man, of sunny 
disposition, fond of bright colours, and of the showy 
side of cavalry service, while not neglecting its 
essentials. A sincere and earnest Christian, his rule 
of life was as strict as Jackson's own, and between 
these two men, outwardly so different, was the 
strongest bond of sympathy and regard. Stuart seems 
to have been Lee's favourite subaltern in the old 2nd 
Cavalry, and the two were together at the time of 
John Brown's raid on Harper's Ferry. Lee felt his 
loss most acutely, as a man and a dear friend, as well 
as in his character of the magnificent cavalry general 
who could not be replaced. He brought the Con- 
federate cavalry to a pitch of efficiency to which their 
opponents could not attain for a very long time, he 
used the sword as freely as the rifle, while as a 
scouting officer, and especially on outpost duty, he 
was unrivalled. On the one occasion on which he 
had command of the three Arms in action, when 
he took over the Second Corps at Chancellorsville, 
aher Jackson was wounded, he proved himself a master 
of the art, and it is a moot point whether he would 
not have been of more use as Jackson's successor than 
even as Commander of the Cavalry. 

Major-General John Sedgwick was one of the most 
universally esteemed officers on either side. He was 

21 



322 THE FIRST HALF OF 1864 

a brave, honest, thorough-going soldier, who never 
intrigued or made interest in any way. It is said that 
he was proposed for the command of the Army of the 
Potomac after Fredericksburg, but said that he would 
not do, being a " McClellan man." He was on several 
occasions given the command, more or less inde- 
pendent, of forces larger than one Corps, and was a 
good, though not brilliant, handler of large bodies. 

Major- General Alfred Pleasonton was a major in 
the famous 2nd Cavalry of the old Service when the 
War broke out, and rose to command the cavalry 
of the Army of the Potomac, which he brought to a 
high state of efficiency. He was an excellent cavalry 
handler, as was shown during Lee's march to the 
border before Gettysburg, and in Meade's operations 
in Virginia afterwards. Good as he was, though, the 
management of the Arm did not please Grant when 
he came east as Commander-in-Chief, and he replaced 
him by Sheridan, though he said that this was no 
reflection on Pleasonton. May not part of the reason 
of the poor cavalry tactics have been Meade's views 
on the subject, which Pleasonton was not strong 
enough to combat as did Sheridan, with Grant to 
back him ? At Chancellorsville he was put in com- 
mand of a scratch force of all arms which he handled 
brilliantly, and was mainly instrumental in stopping 
Jackson's attack after the rout of the Xlth Corps. In 
March, 1864, he was sent to Missouri, where he was 
placed in charge of the cavalry under Rosecrans, and 
took the principal part in driving Price out of that 
State. 

Rear- Admiral Raphael Seimnes ended his notable 
service at sea with the loss of his ship, the famous 
" Alabama,'' but he continued to serve till the end 
of the War, commanding the Confederate flotilla on 
the James, and after the evacuation of Petersburg 
guarding the railways with a small naval brigade : 
these however were but minor points, and a notice 
of him would most fitly come in here. 



SEMMES 323 

In the Mexican War he commanded a ship at the 
blockade of Vera Cruz and afterwards went to Mexico 
City with the army. He had specially studied inter- 
national law, and was thus well qualified for his very 
responsible duties, which required him to represent 
his Government abroad diplomatically and to know 
exactly Vi/hat he might or might not do, without 
sending home for instructions. He was not considered 
a particularly smart or showy handler of a ship, but 
was unequalled in a comprehensive knowledge of what 
was required in making and carrying out large plans. 
His strategy, aimed at the destruction of American 
commerce, was unique, and was based on a most 
thorough knowledge of the great ocean highways : 
one of his peculiarities was his marvellous power of 
judging exactly how long he could stay in any locality 
before a heavier vessel of the United States service 
came to drive him away, and the combination of these 
qualities enabled him with the little " Alabama " to 
do more damage to his country's enemies than has 
been done by any single vessel before or since. After 
the War he settled in Mobile as a lawyer. (Continued 
on p. 371.) 



324 



THE FIRST HALF OF 1864 



1864 


January 


February 


March 








3. Grant appointed 








Commander - in - 


H 






Chief. 


U3 












28- 


4. 






Kilpatrick's and Da 


hlgren's raid to Rich- 






mo 


nd. 


H 








aj 








< 








W 








n 








p 




Olustee Expedition. 









20. Ocean Pond. 








19. Schofield takes 








command of De- 




S 




partment of the 






28. Rosecrans takes 
command in Mis- 
souri. 


Ohio. 








3. Sherman's Meri dian Campaign, to 5. 






1-25. Sooy Smith 


8. Red River Ex- 






and Forrest. 


pedition. 


S 




22. Action at West 




1 




Point. 


Steele and Price in 


to 






Arkansas. 




4. Banks recalled 








from Texas. 








1st week. The "Alabama" leaves the Chi 


na Seas, and sails 


►J 




Westward. 




> 

XI 




17. The sinking of 








the "Housatonic" 






off Charleston. 




If 


The " Rappahannock " lying at C 


alais, unarmed. 


Mexico. 


The " Florida " in the Atlantic. 


to 


5. The French en- 


The "Tuscaloosa" in the Atlantic. 


ter Guadalajara. 








Cession of Sonora 








Mines to Napo- 








leon. 





CHRONOLOGICAL TABLE 



325 



1864 


April May 


Jmra 




3. Grant marches 


1-12. Cold Harbour. 




apainst Lee. 


15. Siege of Peters- 






4-12. Kautz' Raid. 


burg begins. 






5. Butler marches 


7-29. Sheridan's 






against Rich- 


Trevilian Raid. 






mond. 


11. Battle of Tre- 






5-12. Battle of the 


vilian Station. 






Wilderness. 


22-July 2. Wilson's 






8-18. Spottsylvania. 


Raid. 






9-13. S h e r i dan's 


29. B a t t 1 e of 


1 




Richmond Raid. 


Ream's Station. 




11. Battle of Yel- 








low Tavern. 








12-16. Butler be- 








fore Richmond. 








23-27. Lee on the 








North Anna. 








28-31. Hawes' Shop 








and Totopotomoy. 








1-26. Sigel's Valley 








Campaign. 








26. Hunter's Lynch 


burg Campaign and 






retrea 


t. to 27. 


K H 


20. The Confeder- 


5. The '"^Albemarle" 




S? 


ates retake Ply- 


fights a Union 




^« 


mouth. 


Squadron. 




■ 


Forrest's raid in 


5. Sherman 


1-12. Sturgis and 




Kentucky and 


marches against 


Forrest. 




Tennessee. 


Johnston.. 


10. Brice's Cross 




13. Captures Fort 


15. Occupies Re- 


Roads. 




Pillow. 


saca. 


1-22. Morgan's raid 


S 




19-22. AtCassville. 


in Kentucky. 


^^ 






12. Action at Cyn- 
thiana. 






25. At New Hope 


Church, to 4. 
10-30. Sherman be- 

forc Kenesaw 

Mountain. 




Red River Ex 


pedition, to 19. 






8. Sabine Cross 


9-13. The Union 






Roads. 


flotilla runs the 




9. Pleasant Hill. 


rapids at Alex- 




^ 


Steele and Price in 
Arkansas. 


andria. 






30. Jenkins' Ferry. 








The " Rappah 


annock " lying at Cal 


ais, unarmed. 


:3 


The "Florida" in the 


Atlantic, to Bermuda. 




<o 


The " Tuscalo 


osa " in the Atlantic. 


to Cherbourg. 


^ ^ 

Z u 


24. The "Alabama" 


in the Atlantic, to 


Cherbourg. 


|l 






19. "Alabama" sunk 






by " Kearsarge." 


P 




Mexico. 


Mexico. 




28. Maximilian 


12. Maximilian 


S 




lands. 


enters Mexico 
City. 



CHAPTER XII 

THE SECOND HALF OF 1 864. THE DISRUPTION OF 
THE CONFEDERACY 

Note. — As the important phases of the War had 
shifted into different districts, the continuity of the 
narrative would be better kept by taking them in the 
order East, South, South-East, West, and South- West. 

General Position and Plans 

(Continued from p. 283.) The midsummer of 1864 
found the North faced with a very serious crisis on 
which the issue of the War might turn, in the in- 
creasing power of the poHtical party which openly 
declared it a failure, and that it would be better 
to allow the South to go and establish a separate 
Government. It was now the beginning of July, and 
the Presidential Election was coming on in Novem- 
ber. The extreme Republicans, or Radicals, put up 
Fremont, but he had no chance, and would have split 
the Republican vote. Lincoln therefore arranged 
with them in September to withdraw him, making a 
change in the Cabinet to suit their views (cf. p. 18). 
The Democrats had put forward General McClellan 
as their nominee for President, personally a very 
popular man, especially with the army in the East : 
he was besides able and ambitious, a really strong 
candidate. The appalling losses of the Army of the 
Potomac in advancing from the Rapidan to the James 
had depressed the country profoundly, and if no real 
success could be scored immediately the outlook was 
very bad for the Republican party. Grant was ex- 

326 



POLITICS IN THE NORTH 327 

ceedingly severe on the way in which the papers in 
the North were allowed to preach treason to the 
detriment of the Nation, and admired the strong 
control which the Confederate Government exercised 
over croakers of all sorts. He says, " In the North 
the people governed, and could stop hostilities when- 
ever they chose to stop supplies. The South was a 
military camp, controlled absolutely by the Govern- 
ment, with soldiers at its back to quell any discontent." 
Speaking generally, beyond the political outlook, he 
says plainly, " Anything that could have prolonged 
the War a year beyond the time that it did finally 
close would probably have exhausted the North to 
such an extent that they might then have abandoned 
the contest and agreed to a separation." 

The moral weakness of the North was not so 
apparent to outsiders like Napoleon as it was at 
home, and he was therefore more impressed with the 
evident material weakness of the South. It was 
a race between him and the North, which could 
settle its own affairs first, and keep up the opposi- 
tion to the other. In this the advantage now lay 
with the United States, for whether the Republic 
represented by Juarez survived or not, there seemed 
little chance of stability for Maximilian's Empire. At 
this time the fortunes of the Republic were at their 
lowest point, for its two senior generals went over 
to the Empire, but the best, Porfirio Diaz, resisted 
all Maximilian's tempting overtures. He commanded 
the only real Republican force in the field in the 
south, but Juarez and his Government could not 
keep the field in the north, and retired further, 
trusting to the chaotic state of affairs and the size 
of the country to keep the French busy. Here 
Juarez was out of the way, close to the American 
border, and was freely supplied by the North with 
arms, ammunition, and men, for they controlled the 
coast and border for some way inland as well as all 
west of Texas. Further, a most important point, 



328 THE SECOND HALF OF 1864 

they had always recognized the Mexican Republic, 
and could thus keep up agitation indefinitely, which 
must ruin Maximilian in the end without risk of 
war, since the French could not always be at his 
back. On the other hand, Napoleon could not so 
help the Confederates, as he had never recognized 
them, and Mr. Seward began to take a very high 
tone with him. Things did not go smoothly in 
Mexico, for Maximilian, who had come as a nominee 
of the extreme Clerical party, was Liberal in his 
views, and neither could nor would restore the se- 
questered Church property. An Imperialist Liberal 
party arose, opposed to both Republic and Clericals : 
the French were no backers of the Clericals, and 
would not force on Mexico conditions from which 
they boasted that they had freed themselves : further, 
Maximilian was weak and irresolute, an amiable 
dreamer and poet, the very last man to undertake 
such a task as he had done. Thus, though the 
military situation was easier, the settling of the 
Mexican Empire did not really progress. Lastly, 
Napoleon had not been able to get any advantage 
from the Sonora mines, to relieve the French tax- 
payer, and if his troops were to remain in the 
country, this must be done immediately. 

The North now saw clearly that if they were to 
crush the Confederacy quickly, they must apply the 
screw by destroying its home sources of supply, 
principally the fertile districts of Georgia, now a 
wheat-growing country, and the Shenandoah Valley. 
This idea had been growing of late, and was now 
made an integral part of the plans of campaigns. 

In the military sense, the centre of interest was 
the true one, the Middle States, where Sherman 
was trying to force hsick Johnston, who commanded the 
strongest Confederate army in the field. In the East, 
Grant was completely hung up by Lee, and his main plan 
was to destroy the railways on which he depended. 

In planning the next moves, Grant warned Sherman, 



PLANS OF BOTH SIDES 329 

on whom the principal work depended, that his real 
danger was that Kirby Smith might elude Steele, 
force the passage of the Mississippi, and attack him in 
rear, and wanted to collect a force at New Orleans, 
in case Smith moved on Mobile, but there were no 
men to spare. Sherman also wanted reinforcements, 
but Halleck strongly advised them to go slowly, on 
account of the great political excitement and oppo- 
sition to the draft, to enforce which troops might 
even have to be sent back from the front, which 
actually happened soon after. The main plan was 
still to cut the Confederacy in two again, from Atlanta 
to Mobile, but Sherman thought this line too vulner- 
able : the idea of the March to the Sea came later. 
Charleston was so strictly blockaded that it was 
almost useless to the Confederates, Savannah was 
little better, and if Mobile were soon taken, only 
Wilmington would be left to them. This was 
defended by the powerful Fort Fisher, which Grant, 
as soon as he reached the James, and had his hand 
almost on Richmond, planned to take with a com- 
bined military and naval expedition. There was also 
a political reason for this, because foreign Govern- 
ments, the British especially, were always threatening 
that they would not recognize the blockade unless it 
was really effective. 

On the Confederate side, the one chance was to 
prolong the War and not risk a decisive battle. 
With a Commander-in-Chief who could control the 
work from a military point of view, this might have 
been done, for it would have been better than the 
campaigns of even men like Lee and Johnston^ directed 
by a politician. Lee knew well that there was only 
one end to being tied to Richmond and Petersburg, 
and that well-considered operations in the field would 
be better, but he had to obey orders. Though he 
sent Early to put pressure on Washington to relieve 
that on Richmond, and thus deferred active attack 
for a time, he was not now in a position to make 



330 THE SECOND HALF OF 1864 

Grant relax his grip or withdraw a single man from 
Sherman. Unless he could materially weaken the 
latter, time gained at Richmond would not of itself 
appreciably lengthen the War. At the decisive point, 
Johnston was spinning out time capitally, and Grant 
thinks that when Jefferson Davis changed his policy 
from defensive to offensive, and Johnston for Hood^ 
he threw away his last chance. 

Davis was rather comically " hoist with his own 
petard" at this time. He was the great upholder of 
the theory that the Constitution was but a compact 
between " Sovereign and Independent States," any 
of whom had a right to withdraw when it suited 
their interests, and to manage their own State affairs 
their own way. In practice, however, he ignored this 
in toto, and ruled the Confederacy with an iron hand ; 
but now Governor Brown of Georgia claimed to ad- 
minister and control the State Militia in the interests 
of the State rather than of the Confederacy (cf. p. 150). 
He put them under General G. W. Smith in June, and 
sent them into the field in July as allies of the Con- 
federates, for State defence, not as a component part 
of the Confederate forces. Davis was furious, and, 
about the time that Johnston was superseded, came 
down and roundly abused both him and Brozvn as 
little better than traitors, which did not promote 
harmony at a critical juncture. 

The Trans-Mississippi States were becoming dis- 
affected, and thought themselves neglected by the 
Confederate Government : so far from being willing to 
send more men east of the river, they wanted those 
already there to be sent back. As the Union con- 
trol of the river prevented either side helping the 
other, and the Union troops were withdrawn from 
the southern portion, they were left to themselves, 
and thought of either setting up a separate Govern- 
ment, asking Napoleon for help, or joining Maximilian, 
the latter idea predominating. 

The condition of the armies on both sides gave rise 



DEPLETION OF THE ARMIES 331 

to serious difficulties in different ways. On the Union 
side, Sherman found his army seriously depleted after 
the fall of Atlanta, because a number of regiments 
were at the end of their service, and many senior 
officers took the opportunity to go on leave, especially 
those who were standing for Congress, which amounted 
to a public scandal. On the Confederate side, the 
terrible depletion of their army brought a different 
trouble. They, wisely perhaps, as maintaining esprit 
de corps, kept the names of regiments and larger units 
after they had become mere skeletons, grouping them 
in provisional units for service. For instance, one 
brigade was made up of fourteen regiments, and con- 
tained 858 of all ranks present for duty, of which the 
famous '^Stonewall Brigade'' comprised about a third. 
This arrangement had the effect of misleading the 
enemy as to their real strength, which was sometimes 
an advantage. (Continued on p. 376.) 

The East 

(Continued from p. 299.) When Hunter was driven 
out of the Shenandoah Valley, Early was ordered to 
cross the border and threaten Washington again, in 
order to divert Union troops and ease the pressure on 
Richmond. He started so promptly that he was across 
the Potomac before the North had moved any troops 
to stop him. He was at Winchester on July 2nd, next 
day drove back Sigel, broke the Baltimore and Ohio 
line, and on the 5th and 6th crossed the Potomac, 
Sigel retiring to the lines on Maryland Heights. On 
the 8th, Early moved on Frederick, his cavalry going 
on to break railways : he was to strike at Washington 
and try to release the Confederate prisoners there. 
At the crossing of the Monocacy, however. General 
Lew Wallace was posted ^ with a small force of raw 
troops, reinforced on the field with a division of the 
Vlth Corps. He fought gallantly, but was utterly 
routed : still he delayed Early a day, which just 

' S- Sherman crosses the Chattahoochee, July 9th. 



332 THE SECOND HALF OF 1864 

enabled reinforcements to reach Washington in time, 
for Grant, who at first had thought the whole thing 
bluff, did not send them off till he heard that Early 
had crossed the border. Washington was saved by 
Wallace's self-sacrifice. Early levied heavy contribu- 
tions on the Maryland towns and arrived before 
Washington on the nth, but was stopped by the 
strong defences, now well manned. He intended to 
attack them the next day, but heard that the Vlth and 
XlXth Corps had come up, and retreated without 
trying to release the prisoners. He moved off at dark 
on the 12th and recrossed the Potomac at Leesburg on 
the 14th :^ the pursuit was feeble, because Wright, in 
command, was harassed by contradictory orders from 
Washington. During this time of danger, Halleck 
was either helpless or sulky, and would take no 
responsibility. Grant then told Wright to take 
command, and Hunter to close on Early's rear. 
Halleck blamed Hunter, it seems, because he did not 
report direct to him and Stanton, but Grant approved 
his action. As soon as the danger was over, Halleck 
interfered, as ever, with bad effect. 

On the Confederate side, this brilliant little campaign 
did more for the force employed (10,000 men), and gave 
less satisfaction, than any other, because it was not 
understood that there was no intention of taking 
Washington. The net results were, that a strong 
force had been withdrawn from before Richmond, and 
the Confederates were enabled to get their crops in the 
Valley ; it certainly helped to prolong the War. 

Grant sent the XlXth Corps to Washington, but 
expected Early's next blow to be against Ohio or 
Pittsburg, and wanted the Vlth back, to strike at Lee 
before he made it, but as soon as they had gone. Early 
drove in Crook and Averell at Kernstown, followed 
them to the Potomac, broke the Baltimore and Ohio 
railway,- and raided into Maryland with his cavalry, 

' W. Smith beats Forrest, July 14th. 
- tj. Battle of Atlanta, July 22nd. 



SHERIDAN SENT TO THE VALLEY 333 

levying heavy ransom on the towns, and burning 
Chambersburg in revenge for the depredations in 
Virginia. Averell, however, followed the brigade 
which did this to Moorefield, across the Potomac, and 
dispersed it. Mosby now dashed in and kept up the 
panic, which had never been worse during the War. 
The troops taken from the Valley were sent back in 
all haste, with more to garrison Washington, Grant 
ordering Halleck to take charge, as no proper com- 
mander had been appointed. If we take the smaller 
numbers into consideration, the effect of this second 
raid was even greater than that of the first. Early 
had fully carried out his orders, to divert troops and 
break the important Baltimore and Ohio line, but at 
the sacrifice of his cavalry. 

Grant then determined to put an overwhelming 
force under a good commander and crush him, lest he 
become a permanent menace, and so to devastate the 
Valley that the Confederates could not keep an army 
there at all. To do this, several district commands 
must be amalgamated, and an energetic commander 
found. There was a strong cavalry force, and Grant 
thought of Sheridan, Hunter, who would not work 
under Halleck any more, retiring in his favour. This 
was in the first week in August,^ and the Army of the 
Shenandoah consisted of six infantry and three cavalry 
divisions, 40,000 men, besides garrison troops : it was 
afterwards increased. Early at this time had about 
20,000 men. 

Sheridan began cautiously, making a strong base 
at Halltown to menace the Valley, and Early ieW back 
on his lines at Fisher's Hill near Strasburg to wait for 
reinforcements. Sheridan moved out, but, hearing of 
their coming, retired again, as he could not live on the 
wasted country, and waited for reinforcements in his 
turn. Early took position opposite Halltown, where 
he could feed his men, and prevent the repair of the 

' S. Farragut forces Mobile Bay, August 6th. 
W. Rousseau and Wkeeler in Tennessee, August. 



334 THE SECOND HALF OF 1864 

railway. When stronger, he advanced, and Sheridan 
took position within his lines. Early tried to draw 
him by moving as if to invade Maryland again, but in 
vain, and as he could neither attack nor pass him, he 
fell back to the Opequon.^ Grant now told Sheridan 
that his operations would cause Lee to send for men 
from the Valley, and that he must take the chance to 
move out and lay the Valley waste. He moved on 
August 28th, but was much bothered by Halleck 
ordering him to detach in all directions, till Grant told 
him to keep his men together. 

As Grant had foretold, Lee was in desperate straits 
for men, and sent for Andersoits division back at the 
beginning of September.^ Early then retired further, 
having succeeded in keeping the railway broken, and 
Maryland in a state of panic. On the 17th, he advanced 
and drove Averell to Martinsburg, but spread out his 
army from there to Winchester. Sheridan moved at 
once to catch him scattered, but Wilson's cavalry was 
checked at Berryville, and Early was able to concentrate 
at Stephenson's Cross Roads, whence, after a sharp 
fight, he was driven through Winchester in disorder. 
This battle of the Opequon gained permanent control 
of the lower Valley for the Union. 

Early retreated to his base lines at Fisher's Hill, 
and on the 20th Sheridan was fighting his way into 
position against them and told Crook to turn the 
Confederate left, their right being almost impregnable : 
Early saw this, and meant to retreat in the night, but 
at sunset Crook burst in from flank and rear and 
rolled up his line, but the Confederate cavalry covered 
the retreat. Lee sent him back Kershaw's division, 
and he retreated, fighting, up the Valley, Averell being 
superseded by Sheridan for slack pursuit. On the 
26th, the Confederate reinforcements reached Port 

' S. Kilpatrick's Raid in Georgia, mid- August. 

The " Tallahassee" off New York, August. 
^ W. Morgan killed at Greenville, September 4th. 
W. Price invades Missouri, September. 



SHERIDAN AND EARLY 335 

Republic and checked the pursuit. Sheridan moved 
on Harrisonburg, and Early at once attacked and 
drove in the Union cavalry. 

Grant wanted to have the railways repaired in 
Sheridan's rear, and that he should move on Charlottes- 
ville, but he thought it too risky, that it would be 
better to complete the devastation of the Valley, and 
that then his troops would be wanted before Rich- 
mond. At this time Wilson was sent as cavalry 
commander to Sherman, and Custer took his division. 
Sheridan wished to fall back and shorten his long and 
vulnerable communications, returning the Vlth and 
XlXth Corps to Grant, since nothing seemed left to 
do, and an army could not be fed in the upper Valley. 
He preferred the Baltimore and Ohio line to that in 
mid-Virginia, as better concealed. On October 5th,* 
the two Corps started back, raiding right across the 
Valley, which destruction prevented local Confederates 
from joining their own army, since, when their slaves 
were gone, they had to stop and work. Early followed 
at once, as aggressive and strong as ever, for he had 
a good new cavalry brigade under Rosser, which was 
so troublesome that Sheridan told Torbert, his cavalry 
commander, to "whip the rebel cavalry or get whipped 
himself." Torbert turned and completely defeated 
Rosser at Tom's Brook on the 9th. Grant thought 
Sheridan should keep the XlXth Corps, and Halleck 
was harping on his dividing his force to threaten 
Gordonsville and Charlottesville as well, but when 
he knew that Grant wished it, he asked for the Vlth 
Corps too. At this time Early suddenly attacked 
Crook at Hupp's Hill, and though he soon retired, 
this brought the Vlth Corps back at once : had he 
waited a little, he would have caught Sheridan weaker 
Sheridan now prepared for a general action, but Early 
had disappeared. 

' E. Burbridge beaten at Saltville, October 2nd. 
E. Butler attacks Richmond, October 6th. 

The " Florida " captured at Bahia, October 7th. 



336 THE SECOND HALF OF 1864 

Sheridan was now told to hold as many men as he 
could of the enemy, and threaten the Virginia Central 
Railway and Canal, just as he was starting to confer 
with General Augur, commanding at Washington, but 
he left instructions with General Wright to go on. 
Early could not stay where he was, and noticed that 
the Union left seemed badly guarded : he sent Gordon 
to turn it while he attacked in front. On the igth,^ at 
dawn, KersJiaw surprised and drove in Crook's VII Ith 
Corps, and then Gordon burst in on the Union rear : 
the Vlth Corps, which came up, could not hold the 
ground, and the whole was forced back, but the 
Confederate cavalry was weak, the fighting hard, and 
Early's small force was getting exhausted, when 
Sheridan returned to find his army in full retreat. He 
succeeded in rallying them, and the tide turned : 
breastworks were thrown up, and an attack on them 
failed. Early now tried to make good his retreat with 
the captured guns, but Sheridan advanced and drove 
his army back in hopeless confusion, the Union 
cavalry striking the flying mass with terrible effect. 
This victory of Cedar Creek was due entirely to 
Sheridan's personal leadership, for which he got the 
greatest praise. Till Early struck at Hupp's Hill, the 
Valley campaign was thought over, but he was seen to 
be both strong and dangerous even after Cedar Creek, 
for he had been reinforced again, and was at New 
Market. He advanced, but was driven back, when 
Sheridan retired, and soon had to return Kershaw's 
division to Lee. Grant also sent for the Vlth Corps 
back, and sent Sheridan's cavalry to break the Virginia 
Central line,^ but Early ^ as soon as they left his front, 
again broke the Baltimore and Ohio line, in answer. 
The supreme importance of these operations to Lee, 
which kept a first-rate Union general in the Valley, 

' The '^Shenandoah" sails from the Desertas, October 20th; the 
'' Olnstee" and " Chickamau^a" from Wilmington end of month. 
^ S.E. Gushing sinks the " Albe»ia?-le,''' October 27th. 
S.E. Union fleet retakes Plymouth, October 31st. 



EARLY'S PERTINACITY 337 

with over 40,000 men, and made two Union Corps 
spend half their time in marching and counter-marching, 
may be judged by the fact that he made Early's 
command about equal in strength to his own at 
Petersburg. 

All this time Sheridan had been much harassed by 
the raids of Mosby, McNeill, and others, and in 
November^ sent Merritt's cavalry division against 
them, which kept them back for the time. His first 
raid against the Virginia Central line, under Torbert, 
drove back the Confederate cavalry, but their infantry 
stopped it at Gordonsville. Custer, with another 
raid, was stopped at Harrisonburg by Rosser. The 
weather was so severe that no more cavalry raids 
were made. After this, Sheridan sent most of his 
infantry away, mostly to Grant, and wintered at 
Kernstown, Early remaining at New Market. 

Nothing in the whole War is more remarkable than 
the indomitable pertinacity with which Early carried 
out his orders to keep the North in a state of panic, 
make them detach as many men as possible, and break 
their communications. He had no opportunity for 
brilliant strategy, like Jackson's, against divided forces, 
being opposed by a far stronger concentrated army 
under an excellent general : he had no chance of 
success, often very little of safety for his command, 
but whenever his opponent moved back, or he was 
reinforced, he struck at once, regardless of conse- 
quences. Now \.h.3.t Jackso7i was gone, it is safe to say 
that even the magnificent Confederate army produced 
no greater fighter. 

All this time the siege of Petersburg went steadily 
on, and a great mine was run under the Confederate 
works by the IXth Corps. On July 30th ^ it was to be 

' S.E. Sherman marches for the sea, November 15th. 
W. Hood invades Tennessee, November 20th. 

The " Olustee" and " Chickamauga'' off U.S. coast, November. 
* E. The Second Kernstown, July 24th. 
E. Chambersburg burnt, July 30th. 
S. Siege of Atlanta begun, July 28th. 

22 



338 THE SECOND HALF OF 1864 

fired and the works rushed, but Burnside made poor 
dispositions, and the misconduct of the officer com- 
manding the assault completed the failure. The troops 
on the flanks did their best, but the attack, both here 
and in other places, was defeated with heavy loss, for 
Beauregard had detected the tunnelling and cut off 
the threatened point with works in the rear, posting 
batteries specially to deal with the attack. Though 
Grant sent Hancock and Sheridan, with the Ilnd 
Corps and three cavalry divisions, to make a dash at 
Richmond, and draw troops away, this also had been 
guarded against. 

When the Vlth Corps was sent to Washington, 
Grant drew in his left, and devoted the month of July 
mainly to fortification, the siege train having arrived 
at the end of June. The lines were designed so that 
they could be held with a very small force, and be 
steadily extended, to compel similar extension on the 
Confederate side, and stretch their thin line to break- 
ing point, for at the end of July, the numbers available, 
not counting cavalry, were 69,000 and 39,000 re- 
spectively. 

Un August,^ Grant heard exaggerated accounts of 
the numbers sent to Early, and sent Hancock with 
the Hnd and IXth Corps and a cavalry division, to 
make a dash at Richmond on the north of the James, 
but Lee stopped him, and the troops returned to their 
places. At the same time, to make Lee withdraw 
troops from the Valley, Warren's Vth Corps, with 
some cavalry, was sent to break the Weldon railway, 
but not attack fortifications. Warren seized the line, 
a force under A. P. Hill drove him back, and then 
the arrival of Union reinforcements drove Hill back : 
Warren entrenched a good position, held it against 
Hill's attacks, and then connected these new works 

' Map 54, p. 386. 

^ E. Moorefield, August 7th. 

S. Farragut forces Mobile Bay, August 5th. 

S. Siege of Atlanta, August, September. 

The " Tallahassee " off U.S. coast, August. 



ATTACKS OUTSIDE PETERSBURG 339 

with the old Union flank works, depriving Lee of 
the use of this important railway, /////, however, 
prevented the destruction of the line, and was able 
to seize and hold some Union works. 

At the end of September,' as the Confederates had 
only six infantr}' brigades and one of cavalry, besides 
artillery, nortii of the James, the XVIIIth and Xth 
Corps, with Kautz' cavalry division, were sent to 
attack the New Market and Darby Roads ; the 
XVIIIth was to attack Chapin's Bluff and hold fast 
the force in its front. Fort Harrison was taken and 
held, but Fort Gilmer, the key of the ground, defeated 
all attacks. 

Meade now attempted to make Lee concentrate in 
the wrong place, by pretending to move to his left. 
If Petersburg were weakened enough, he was to 
attack it or the Southside railway. He took the 
cross roads covering the Boydton plank road, but 
Hill came up and stopped him, the Union troops 
entrenching the ground they had gained. Kautz 
held the works lately taken on the Darby road, but 
was driven out on October 6th, and Butler's attempts 
to retake them failed. At the end of October,- Grant 
planned to extend his works to the Southside line, 
leaving just enough men to hold his present ones: 
the attempt was made on the 27th by Hancock, with 
the llnd, Vth, and IXth Corps, and a cavalry division, 
but the Confederates were ready, and their works too 
strong to assault. Lee brought up troops and attacked 
furiously, and Hancock managed to hold on that day, 
but retired the next. On the Peninsula, Butler ad- 

' E. Fisher's Hill, September 22nd. 
S. Sherman occupies Atlanta, September 27th. 
W. Price in Missouri, Pilot Knob, September 27th. 
- E. Cedar Creek, October 19th. 
S.E. Cushin<^ sinks the ^^ Albemarle" October 27th. 
S,E. Union fleet retakes Plymouth, October 31st. 
W. Piice beaten at Newtonia, October 28th. 

The '' Olustee" " Chickamaiiga," and ^^ Shenandoah" sail, 
end of October. 



340 THE SECOND HALF OF 1864 

vanced to the old Seven Pines battlefield, up to the 
Confederate works, where he was heavily defeated 
by Longstreet. In December, Warren moved out and 
destroyed the Weldon line for a long way, Hill being 
too late to stop him. 

At the end of November, Hancock resigned the 
command of the Ilnd Corps, from ill-health, and was 
succeeded by Humphreys, being soon afterwards sent 
to Washington, to raise a new 1st Corps for the cam- 
paign in the spring. In December, most of the troops 
from the Valley rejoined their respective armies, and 
the Union Xth and XVIIIth Corps were reorganized 
as the XXIVth and XXVth, white and coloured, in- 
stead of mixed, and put under Generals Ord and 
Weitzel. 

^When Morgan was killed in September (cf. p. 360), 
Breckinridge took command of the Department of 
Soiith-West Virginia, with its important railway, and 
salt and lead works. In September, Burbridge ad- 
vanced against the salt works from eastern Kentucky, 
but a cavalry brigade under Giltner managed to delay 
him till Breckinridge came up. Burbridge attacked, 
but the position was held and the valuable works 
saved, on October 2nd. Next day Burbridge retired, 
and was pursued to the Big Sandy River. 

Stoneman, who was taken prisoner in July, had 
been exchanged, and in December^ was put in com- 
mand in east Tennessee. He at once moved against 
south-west Virginia with 4,000 cavalry, and was met 
by Breckinridge at the salt works with about 2,000, 
but to get even this force together, the rest of the 
country was denuded, so Stoneman went past, occu- 
pied the country, and moved on Wytheville and its 
lead works. Breckinridge stopped the Union main 
body at Marion on the i8th, but a column had been 

• Map 56, p. 388. 

"^ S.E. Sherman takes Savannah, December 21st. 
S.E. First attack on Fort Fisher, December 24th, 25th. 
Europe. Bulloch buys the "Sphinx," December, 
Mexico. Porfirio Diaz shut up in Oajaca, December. 



SHERMAN'S ADVANCE 341 

sent against the unprotected salt works, and nearly 
destroyed them before he could get back. Stoneman 
then withdrew into Tennessee. (Continued on p. 379.) 



The South 

(Continued from p. 310. Sherman's Operations from 
p. 308.) Sherman, when he found that the enemy was 
retreating from the Kenesaw position, strengthened 
and consolidated the force in front, on which Johnston 
fell back to a new line in rear, fighting continuously 
with the advancing troops till he found that they were 
turning his left and getting nearer to Atlanta than he 
was, which meant that to save the line of the Chatta- 
hoochee he must fall back at once. He retired on his 
new works, a great entrenched camp forming a tete- 
de-pont, with the cavalry watching the fords and 
ferries on the flanks, also covered by works. Before 
the main works, the strongest that he had yet en- 
countered, Sherman had to pause, and also the railway 
must be repaired before going further : all this gave 
Johnston time to complete his works at Atlanta. The 
mistake in the Chattahoochee position was that, 
though the main works covered the principal bridges, 
yet by concentrating his main force in front, instead 
of in rear of the river, Johnston lost the power of 
striking at any force trying to cross. A strong bridge- 
head, held by a detachment, the main body concen- 
trated in rear, would have been better. 

Thomas invested the main works, McPherson 
watched the flanks, and Schofield's army was held as 
a striking force. The weather had been execrable, 
and movements most difficult, but it now cleared up 
and Sherman regained freedom of movement, which 
he used to manoeuvre his opponent out of one posi- 
tion after another. On July 7th, Schofield surprised 
a crossing, and entrenched a bridge-head. Johnston 
saw at once that the river line was lost, drew in his 
cavalry, and after holding on till the very last moment, 



342 THE SECOND HALF OF 1864 

withdrew his army on the 9th ^ from the great bridge- 
head and destroyed the bridges. Meanwhile the 
Union army had begun to cross, and made demon- 
strations in various places to puzzle Johnsion. 

It now became necessary to tell off a special force 
to guard the communications, for which Northern 
Georgia was made a Military District, and General 
Steedman put in command. 

Atlanta lies some ten miles south of the Chatta- 
hoochee, and Johnstons strongest line was close to it, 
but if the enemy crossed below Atlanta, he would be 
cut off from the south, and would have to evacuate 
the town or change his base to the east to keep his 
communications with Richmond. He therefore took 
position on Peach Tree Creek to the north-east, thus 
not only securing his own communications with 
Richmond, but threatening Sherman's if he crossed 
below the town. 

Sherman heard from Grant that some 20,000 men 
might be sent io Johnston from Virginia, and determined 
to strike at the railway near Decatur : though this 
was a difficult crossing, above the town, it was the 
best. Schofield was to move on Decatur, McPherson 
against the line further east, and Thomas straight on 
Atlanta. Sherman then meant to wheel to his right 
against the town, holding the railway and bridge. 
This might throw the whole weight of the Con- 
federate attack on to Thomas, but he was sure that 
he could stand it.^ Johnston saw this too, and planned 
to crush Thomas and cut him off, but he was then 
superseded by Hood by orders from Richmond : 
Hood, however, took over his orders for the battle, 
and Cheatham took command of Hoods Corps. The 
news was received with the greatest satisfaction by 
the Union side. Hood was personally brave to rash- 
ness and cunning as a fox, but not to be compared 
vf'iih. Johnston as a general, and was also so crippled 

' E. Battle of the Monocacy, July 9th. 
'' W. A. J. Smith beats Forrest, July 14th. 



HOOD ATTACKS AT ATLANTA 343 

with wounds as to affect both personal activity and 
temper. The appointment meant a change of tactics 
from defensive to offensive, which Hood was not 
strong enough to carry out, and which was simply 
playing the game of the North. 

On July 18th, Sherman's army was all across the 
river, and the great wheel to the right began, but 
the maps were wrong and caused mistakes. The 
next day Thomas came close to the Confederate 
lines, which were on two sides of a great salient. 
Hood meant to hold the north front against him with 
one Corps while with the other two he crushed his 
left flank, but did not expect Schofield and McPherson 
to come up as quickly as they did ; the result was 
that he found his own right threatened and had to 
alter his dispositions. The main attack fell on the 
XXth Corps, as Thomas' other Corps went astray 
in the difficult country, but Hooker held his own 
and the Confederates retired, having lost heavily. 
Hood intended this to be a decisive victory, but the 
advance of Sherman's left wing upset his plans, and 
made him first tell off Wheeler's cavalry to stop them, 
and then reinforce him with an infantry division ; this 
stopped Hardee's attack on Hooker's hard-pressed 
Corps, but had it not been done, Wheeler would have 
been driven in, and the Union left wing have marched 
into Atlanta. This was on the 20th. 

The next day was spent in entrenching, the Armies 
of the Cumberland and Ohio moving close to the 
enemy's works. Howard was opposite the great 
salient, and Hood's flank being insecure, he prepared 
to retire to a new position which faced Sherman's 
flanks : this he proposed to hold with two Corps, send- 
ing Hardee round to the south against McPherson's 
flank and rear ; if he were successful, Cheatham would 
strike in and roll up Sherman's army from the south. 
Hardee took Wheelers cavalry, and marched that 
night. 

On the morning of the 22nd, the old Confederate 



344 THE SECOND HALF OF 1864 

lines were empty and an advance was ordered, when 
Hardee burst in on McPherson's flank and rear, 
McPherson himself being killed almost immediately. 
Logan took command of the Army. The Confederates 
gained ground, and Cheatham was ordered to advance. 
He broke the line of the XVth Corps, but Sherman, 
who was near, got together a great line of artillery 
and restored the battle. Hardee and Cheatham were 
too far apart to act properly in concert, which enabled 
the Union men to hold on, and the crisis passed.^ The 
only result of further Confederate attacks was to in- 
crease their own losses. The absence of Garrard's 
cavalry raiding had enabled Hardee to surprise the 
XVIth Corps (cf. pp. 302, 362), but the operation was 
a wonderful performance, a most difficult night march, 
coming up exactly at the right time and place, the 
attack being driven home with real power. Nothing 
had been seen like it since Jackson's death. 

On both sides reorganization was wanted. Logan 
was the senior officer of the Army of the Tennessee, 
an able and brave leader, the best man to command 
it in the opinion of Grant, who knew him well, but 
he was a civilian and a thorough-going politician, 
captious and critical, and a rival of Blair's : there had 
been so much trouble from political appointments 
that Sherman preferred a professional soldier, Thomas 
agreed, and Howard from the IVth Corps succeeded 
McPherson. Logan was bitterly disappointed, but 
this did not aflfect his loyal support of Howard. 
Hooker was the senior Corps Commander, but had 
shewn himself so impractical and insubordinate that 
he was passed over, when to Sherman's great relief 
he resigned, and Slocum came from Vicksburg in 
August to take his place. On the other side also there 
was friction. Hood blamed Hardee for the failures 
of both Peach Tree Creek and Atlanta, for he always 
had a scapegoat when things went wrong. Jefferson 
Davis had to ask Hardee not to resign. Stephen Lee 

' E. The Second Kernstown, Julyl24th. 



EZRA CHURCH 345 

took Hood's old Corps, Cheatham reverted to a 
division in Hardee s, and the other was Stewart's. 

Sherman at first worked by the east side of Atlanta 
in order to destroy Hood's communications with Rich- 
mond, but now changed to the west, both to attack 
them on that side also, and for convenience of supply. 
He brought the Army of the Tennessee over from 
left to right and repaired the Chattahoochee railway 
bridge : his cavalry also had been resting and refitting. 

On the morning of the 27th the move began, the 
XVIth Corps passing beyond the right of Thomas' 
Army and the XVIIth extending to Ezra Church, 
within a mile and a half of the southern railway. 
Hood replied with a long line of works to cover the 
line, and planned to attack the Union right as it came 
up, with one Corps, holding Thomas and Schofield 
in check with the other two. Logan's XVth Corps 
passed beyond the XVIIth to take the extreme right, 
and on the morning of the 29th Hood's attack struck 
it. Logan threw back his flank and held on, though 
two Confederate Corps were brought against him, 
and he defeated them with heavy loss. They had lost 
so heavily under the new regime that they did not 
shew their old dash, and Hood dared not take the 
offensive again for a month. Even President Davis 
warned him against the losses incurred by attacking, 
thus completely vindicating Johnston's policy. 

Meanwhile Sherman's cavalry was not idle. Rous- 
seau had been guarding the communications from 
Nashville, but now had orders to raid round in the 
Confederate rear, and on July loth he struck south 
from Decatur (Ala.) with two cavalry brigades : in 
nine days he had marched three hundred miles and 
was a hundred miles in rear of JoJinston's army, to 
the consternation of the people : he destroyed rail- 
ways and supplies and joined Sherman on the 22nd 
near Atlanta. On the 27th, McCook's division moved 
down the Chattahoochee to Campbelltown, and thence 
across to the Macon railway, damaging it badly and 



346 THE SECOND HALF OF 1864 

taking many prisoners, but McCook met a strong force 
on his return, and had to cut his way through with 
heavy loss, rejoining on August 3rd. Stoneman started 
on the same day as McCook, to break the railway by 
Jonesboro and go on to Macon and thence move against 
Andersonville, the great Confederate military prison. 
He was however attacked by superior forces, stood 
at bay with the rearguard to cover the retreat of his 
main body, and had to surrender. He was exchanged 
late in September. These raids were not successful, 
for cavalry could not stay to watch railways, after 
breaking them, so Schofield was sent to the south 
with his Army and Palmer's XlVth Corps; but Palmer 
resigned on a question of seniority and was succeeded 
by Jefferson Davis. On August i5th,^ Schofield's right 
was at East Point Junction, having gained ground 
against the Confederate line in many places. On 
August 15th also, Kilpatrick's cavalry division tried 
again to break the Macon railway, but was stopped 
by another under Jackson. 

Sherman now determined to hold the Chattahoochee 
bridge with the XXth Corps and swing the rest round 
to the south of the town. Hood had sent Wheeler's 
cavalry against his communications, but he took no 
notice, trusting to Rousseau and Steedman to hold 
them, which they did. Hood, however, thought he was 
falling back on the river, and when he reached East 
Point, told Hardee to take his own Corps and Lee'Sy 
move to Jonesboro and attack the enemy in flank the 
next morning, the 31st. Howard, whose command 
was threatened, expected an attack, and had fortified a 
good position : when the attack came, it was rather 
easily held off. Schofield and Stanley destroyed the 
railway south of the town. 

This puzzled Hood, who was in Atlanta with one 
Corps, and he sent for Lee's Corps back while Hardee 
attracted attention at Jonesboro, and Sherman, think- 
ing that the whole Confederate army was there, tried 

' E. Hancock strikes at Richmond, early in August. 



SHERMAN OCCUPIES ATLANTA 347 

to surround and capture him, but he held his own. 
Hood then stopped Lee south of Atlanta to cover his 
evacuation of the place, and on September 27th' con- 
centrated at Lovejoy's Station, Slocum entering and 
receiving the surrender of the town the same day, for 
the explosions in the night betrayed Hood's plans. In 
this latter phase of the campaign, Hoods army was 
scattered and he seemed bewildered, while Sherman 
had all his men in hand. Sherman lost about 31,000 
men in the fighting round Atlanta, and Hood's losses 
are supposed to have been about 35,000, but his re- 
turns were irregular. 

Sherman now held Atlanta and the railways to East 
Point and Decatur as well, while he watched the line 
of the Chattahoochee. The capture of Atlanta closed 
the last through east and west railway which the 
Confederates had, and materially narrowed the extent 
of their control. The army rested and prepared for 
the coming campaign. Many changes came with the 
fall of Atlanta, and the period of inactivity which 
succeeded it : regiments ended their term of service 
and were disbanded, and numbers of officers took 
leave for political and other reasons, including Generals 
Schofield, Logan, and Blair. On the other side, 
Governor Brown withdrew the division of Georgia 
militia from Hood's army to look after their own affairs 
and get the crops in, and there seemed a good deal 
of disaffection in the State, and feeling against 
President Davis : many friendly overtures were made 
to Sherman, but though he met them halfway, nothing 
came of them. The extremely hazardous political 
situation in the North has been alluded to, but the 
brilliant success at Atlanta saved it. 

The next thing was to secure the position which had 
been won : as it was clear that the whole army could 
not be tied up in the great Confederate lines in the 

' E. Butler attacks Richmond, September 28th. 
E. Fisher's Hill, September 20th. 
W. Price in Missouri, Pilot Knob, September 27th. 



348 THE SECOND HALF OF 1864 

midst of a hostile population, Sherman resolved to 
clear the civilian population out entirely, making the 
place a purely military station, and then to construct 
fresh lines suitable to the strength of the garrison to 
be left. He wrote to Hood about arrangements for 
moving the people, who mounted the high horse and 
denounced such "inhuman measures," etc., etc., but 
the commissioner appointed to represent him gratefully 
acknowledged Sherman's kindness and consideration. 

It was extremely difficult to see what was to follow. 
Sherman's communications were 140 miles longer than 
at Chattanooga, Wheelers cavalry were between him 
and that place, and Forrest's in Tennessee : either 
might break them at any time. He had hoped that by 
now Farragut and Canby would have taken Mobile, 
which would not only have shortened his communica- 
tions, but cut another slice off the Confederacy ; the 
sea entrance was taken in August, closing the port, 
but the town was not, for Canby had again been dis- 
appointed of A, J. Smith's command, which had now 
been sent to Missouri. Though Hoods army was 
still in the neighbourhood, the attacks of the Con- 
federate cavalry on the long line were such a serious 
trouble that two divisions were sent back, to Rome 
and Chattanooga respectively, while Rousseau re- 
turned to Nashville. 

About September 20th, President Davis came to 
Georgia, stumping the country to restore some en- 
thusiasm, and making wild statements about the trap 
into which the Union army had fallen, etc., etc. These 
were perhaps to make the best of the present situation, 
for Davis says that the plan he arranged with Hood 
and shewed to Beauregard, who had just been ap- 
pointed to command the whole South-West, over Hood 
and Taylor, \v2ls quite different : viz., to fortify a 
strong position between Atlanta and Chattanooga, 
against which it was hoped that Sherman might run 
his head and get beaten. If he could not be brought 
to action Hood should retreat to Gadsden, where the 



THE CONFEDERATE PLANS 349 

largest force could be best collected, and against 
which Sherman must act at the greatest distance from 
support, with a wasted country behind him. If he 
turned eastward Hood was to follow and attack him in 
rear, keeping the shorter line to north of him, which 
would also protect South Carolina : it was hoped that 
the Confederate strength in cavalry would prevent his 
living on the country, and this alone might defeat him. 
If he had plenty of transport the march was to be 
delayed in every way till his subsistence was gone. 
It was assumed that his first objective was Augusta, 
where were the principal powder-mills in the Con- 
federacy. Grant thought that the Invasion of Ten- 
nessee was Davis' plan and that it was the best he 
could have made, but Davis said that Hood should not 
have left Sherman's army unbeaten and invaded Ten- 
nessee : he did not calculate on Hood having to con- 
sider two Union armies, and thought that his army, 
after a rest, could beat Sherman's. Hood says dis- 
tinctly that the formation of Thomas' army defeated 
Davis' plan, since, if he fortified a position on the 
railway, his opponents could do the same, and hold 
him with one army, freeing the other, or Thomas 
might march south through Alabama. He therefore 
determined to invade Tennessee. 

Hood began by striking at one place after another 
to puzzle Sherman : Forrest took Athens on the 
Chattanooga line, and then appeared in Tennessee, 
where Rousseau stopped him, and he went back to 
Alabama : then Hood moved towards Tennessee, and 
Sherman sent back Thomas to Chattanooga with two 
more divisions, but Hood moved to Campbelltown : 
Sherman determined to attack him south of the 
Etowah, but suggested to Grant that Thomas could 
look after him if he went north of it. This was the 
germ idea of the Great March, but was not yet quite 
developed. A fierce attack on AUatoona shewed 
Sherman that he could not hold his line and keep 
any troops for off"ence : he followed Hood as far as 



35© THE SECOND HALF OF 1864 

Resaca/ but proposed the March to the Sea, when 
he disappeared again. This was sanctioned, and all 
reinforcements were to go to strengthen Thomas 
against Hood, Thomas being told to neglect the rail- 
way and concentrate all his men, as the only way to 
beat him. Hood's concentration cleared the way, and 
made unnecessary Sherman's first idea of waiting till 
Grant had taken Wilmington or Savannah as a base 
for him, while Governor Brown's contumacy secured 
his supplies. (For The March to the Sea, cf. p. 354. 
For Hoods Invasion of Tennessee, cf. p. 362.) 

FARRAGUT AND GRANGER AT MOBILE (Map 61, p. 4O4) 

Farragut had been waiting outside Mobile all spring 
for the reinforcement of ironclads which never came, 
while the Confederates had put the " Tennessee " into 
commission and stationed her at the entrance of the 
bay : they had also some well-armed gunboats. 
Farragut had always represented that he could not 
fight the ironclad with his weak squadron and that 
the blockade might be raised if he were not strength- 
ened. Canby also, commanding the Department at 
New Orleans, was helpless, waiting for men, so things 
drifted till the beginning of August,^ when he sent 
Granger with 1,800 men, and just then four promised 
monitors came. Farragut at once made preparation 
for forcing the entrance to the bay. Granger's work 
being to attack a fort rather away from the ship 
channel. 

Mobile town stands about thirty miles from the 
sea at the head of a long bay, which is over twenty 
miles across at the lower end, but the entrance is 

' E. Tom's Brook, October 9th. 
W. Frice in Missouri, October. 

The ^'■Florida" captured at Bahia, October 7th. 
E. Cedar Creek, October 19th. 
* E. Sheridan takes command in the Valley, August 7th. 
W. Rousseau and Wheeler in Tennessee, August. 

The " Tallahassee " sails from Wilmington, August 6th 



FARRAGUT ATTACKS MOBILE BAY 351 

nearly closed by a long spit running out from the 
east side, on the point of which stood Fort Morgan, 
a strong specimen of the old-fashioned brick fort, 
but unable to face the guns of that date. Then comes 
an opening of about three miles and a half to Dauphine 
Island, at the east end of which stood Fort Gaines : 
between this island and the mainland three miles 
distant a small new fort. Fort Powell, had been built 
on a sandbank. Fort Gaines was a small brick and 
earth fort with a few heavy guns, but too far from 
the main channel to be useful for defence. Fort 
Morgan was the only work to be dealt with by the 
fleet, and it had been strengthened by making earth- 
works against its sides and had earthwork batteries 
in front, etc. The channel was sown with mines and 
had been narrowed by obstructions opposite the fort, 
while behind these lay the formidable " Tennessee'' and 
three Confederate gunboats. 

On August 5th, Farragut stood in to attack Fort 
Morgan and force the passage, his fleet consisting of 
four monitors, carrying 15- and ii-inch smooth-bores, 
three first-class sloops or small corvettes, and eleven 
gunboats. Most of the wooden ships carried a rifled 
150- or loo-pounder Parrott gun and they had some 
1 1 -inch smooth-bores also. The vessels moved in two 
columns in echelon, the starboard column of monitors 
leading, the others consisting of the wooden ships 
lashed together in pairs, the stronger vessels nearest 
to the fort. The faster wooden ships began to over- 
haul the monitors, and the " Brooklyn," leading the 
port column, stopped and signalled for orders, causing 
a dangerous block right under the guns of the fort ; 
Farragut signalled to go ahead and went past in the 
" Hartford," when the leading monitor, the "Tecumseh," 
struck a mine and sank immediately : the ships were 
clubbed at close quarters and suffered severely, the 
gunboat " S^/ma," which was capitally handled, doing 
more damage to them than all the others ; she was 
captured later in the action. It was most fortunate 



352 THE SECOND HALF OF 1864 

for the Union fleet that only one mine exploded, for 
several vessels struck them and heard the primers 
snap, but they had become so overgrown with barn- 
acles that all but one missed fire. The fleet then 
passed the fort and went up the bay, where the next 
phase of the battle began, the fight with the " Ten- 
nessee'' 

The " Tennessee'' was a large vessel of the usual 
Confederate central battery type with inclined sides 
and low ends, and carried two rifled 7-inch guns and 
two 68-pounder smooth-bores : she was protected with 
three layers of 2-inch armour on the battery, but was 
too big for her engines and unhandy, and thus missed 
several good chances of attacking. Her steering gear 
was unprotected and soon was smashed, when she 
became unmanageable. Her attempts to ram failed, 
but her size saved her from being driven under when 
rammed. Her guns were silenced by the heavy con- 
centrated fire of the fleet, and she was further shaken 
by ramming till her armour ceased to be a protection, 
when being unable to use either gun or ram she 
surrendered. That evening the monitor " Chickasaw " 
silenced Fort Powell, which was evacuated after dark. 
Von Scheliha says that this fort was evacuated at the 
beginning of March after a ten days' bombardment, 
but in this case it must have been re-occupied. 
Granger landed troops on Dauphine Island, but seems 
not to have been ready to co-operate with the fleet. 
On the 8th he took Fort Gaines, and then, having been 
reinforced by Canby with a siege train as well as 
troops, attacked Fort Morgan by regular approaches 
along the narrow spit on which it stood, the fleet, 
including the " Tennessee," helping with their fire. 
On the 22nd, Fort Morgan surrendered and the port 
of Mobile was lost to the South, but the town was 
well fortified, and Granger could only watch it till 
he was sent to Thomas' army in November. Farragut 
retired in September, Commodore Palmer succeeding 
to the command. (Continued on p. 402.) 



CASHING SINKS THE '^ ALB^MARL^^' 353 

The South-East 

(Continued from p. 301.) The first thing that was 
done in this district was Cushing's attack on the 
" Albemarle" lying off Plymouth, North Carolinci, 
He got two steam launches, each armed with a 
howitzer and a spar torpedo, and started for the 
Roanoke via the Chesapeake and Albemarle Canal, 
losing a boat on the way, but he went on with the 
other and reached the Union fleet late in October,^ 

His main weapon, the torpedo, was a most com- 
plicated affair. It was fitted on a slung spar, handled 
by a topping lift from a short mast : before being fired, 
it was to be pulled off the spar by a cord, then allowed 
to float up under the vessel to be attacked, and then 
fired by pulling another cord. Each of these things 
must be done exactly, in proper sequence, and not 
prematurely, under the most difficult circumstances. 

Cashing started from the fleet on the night of 
October 27th, with seven men in the launch, and a 
cutter in tow with thirteen more. He found both 
banks of the stream, some 150 yards wide, watched 
by outposts, but got close to the ship without detection : 
when hailed, he threw off the cutter to attack the shore 
guards, and ran straight at the ship under heavy fire 
from ship and shore. As he got close, seeing that the 
ship was guarded with a boom of logs some feet from 
her sides all round, he turned out again and ran square 
at it, trusting to bump over, which he did within ten 
feet of the muzzle of a gun : all this under the heaviest 
fire. Cushing's clothes were nearly cut off his back 
as he stood in the bow of his boat with the five lines 
of his complicated gear in his hands, which he actually 
succeeded in manipulating accurately, bursting the 
torpedo under the overhang of the ironclad. Just 
then the gun was fired, and the boat swamped by the 

' E. Cedar Creek, October 19th. 
W. Price beaten at Newtonia, October 28th. 

The " (9/«<^/«^," ^' Ckickamaui^a," and '■'■Shenandoah" start, 
end of October. 

23 



354 THE SECOND HALF OF 1864 

wave from the torpedo. Gushing called to his men to 
save themselves and struck out down the river ; he 
landed in a swamp close to the town and lay close all 
day, but on the second evening seized a small boat 
and reached the fleet that night. His men were either 
drowned or captured, but he escaped with a slight 
scratch on one hand. The *' Albemarle " sank in eight 
feet of water with her upper works shewing. She 
was the only really effective Confederate ironclad, 
probably because she was not too big for her engines : 
no others were handy in action like her. The Con- 
federate power of building engines was so limited that 
it was best to let it govern the design of the vessel. 

A few days after this exploit, the Union fleet came 
up and re-took Plymouth, and in December a com- 
bined expedition was sent further up the river to 
reduce some Confederate works, but lost a vessel by 
a mine and saw no enemy. 

Surely no more gallant deed than Cushing's was 
ever done, for it combined the most extreme daring 
and dash with the coolest and most accurate calcula- 
tion, in the dark, under a heavy fire at close quarters. 

Sherman's march to the sea (cf. p. 350) 

Though the point of departure, Atlanta, lies in the 
Southern District, as we have taken it for convenience, 
yet the Great March crossed into the South-Eastern 
almost immediately, and is therefore best considered 
here. 

As soon as the scheme was sanctioned, Sherman 
got ready to carry it out, reorganizing his arm}'^ 
specially for the purpose of marching light and fast, 
all the men being picked and but few guns taken ; for 
there was no prospect of severe fighting, at all events 
till the coast was reached. He took the Armies of the 
Tennessee and Cumberland, or at least two Corps 
from each : the former, under Howard, consisted of 
the XVth and XVIlth Corps, under Logan and Blair 



SHERMAN'S PLANS 355 

nominall}^ but both were then away canvassing for 
election to Congress. Blair soon rejoined, but Logan 
did not do so till the end of the year. The Army of 
the Cumberland was under Slocum, Thomas being- 
sent elsewhere, and consisted of the XlVth and XXth 
Corps, under Jefferson Davis and Williams : the 
cavalry was a division under Kilpatrick. Total 
strength, 59,545. with 65 guns. 

The Confederates rather helped Sherman than hin- 
dered him, for Davis' angry speeches gave him useful 
information, and Governor Brown had filled the countr}'^ 
with provisions by withdrawing the militia to get in 
the harvest, which simplified the march immensely. 
The quarrel between the State and Army authorities 
in Georgia was also all in his favour. He saw that 
there was no force in Georgia able to stop him, and 
that what was wanted was to place a Northern army 
at Columbia, South Carolina, which would practically 
end the War, since it had been shewn that a State 
severed from the Confederacy was lost to it, and then 
only North Carolina would remain. Lee's only chance 
would be to escape from Grant, abandon Virginia, 
destroy Sherman's army, and re-establish the Con- 
federacy in some central place : if Sherman could 
stand till Grant closed in there was no hope for the 
South. This supposed that Thomas could hold his 
own against Hood,, and also that Lee was the arbiter 
of the situation on the Confederate side, which latter, 
unluckily for them, was not the case. It was necessary 
to establish a new base on the sea since the old one in 
rear could not be kept, and also to destroy the railways 
in Georgia and the resources of the country, and 
effectuall}" cut off the Gulf States. Though Sherman 
was aiming for Savannah, an alternative route might 
be found better as events developed, and he therefore 
asked that the fleet should look out for him at Morris 
Island near Charleston, Ossabaw Sound near Savan- 
nah, Pensacola, and Mobile : this would also tend to 
m3'stify the enemy and perhaps divide their forces. 



356 THE SECOND HALF OF 1864 

On November 12th he broke his communications, 
destroyed the railway north of Atlanta and the machine 
shops there and at Rome, and concentrated at Atlanta 
on the 14th. The first precaution was very necessary, 
for Grant was not over-sanguine about the scheme, 
his Chief of Staff, Rawlins, was bitterly opposed 
to it (cf. p. 443), and the President and politicians 
extremely nervous : it might have been counter- 
manded at the last moment. 

On the Confederate side, Beauregard had too large 
a district to manage properly, and the responsibility 
for defence fell on Hardee, the very best man, who 
used the means at his disposal to the best advantage. 
His principal force was a good cavalry command under 
Wheeler and the Georgia militia, with which he could 
not hope to stop Sherman, but he strengthened the 
defences of Savannah and other places. 

Sherman started on the i5th,^ on two lines, the Army 
of the Tennessee taking the right, that of the Cumber- 
land the left. Each Army usually marched on two 
roads, one for each Corps, and the right column 
moved roughly along the Savannah railway by Gris- 
woldville and Millen, the left along that to Augusta 
by Milledgeville and Louisville. Some severe cavalry 
fighting took place, the Confederates being the stronger, 
but Wheeler had not always the best of it. The 
peculiarities of the march were not the battles fought, 
but that the destruction of railways, and foraging to 
enable the army to live on the country, were reduced 
to exact sciences. A whole division would lift a long 
length of line, drop it to loosen the sleepers, then pile 
them up, make a fire, and heat and twist the rails, 
often round trees : over 300 miles of line were thus 
destroyed, and all forage along a belt 60 miles wide. 
To destroy the subsistence in the country, the army 
lived on it entirely, each brigade detailing a foraging 
party daily, and turning over to the Quarter Master's 

' E. Union Cavalry Raids in Virginia, November. 
W. Hood invades Tennessee, November 20th. 



THE MARCH TO THE SEA 357 

department everything it brought in. The men started 
on foot and returned mounted, thus keeping the army 
teams strong and the Confederate cavalry weak : if 
attacked they formed a skirmishing line to protect 
the laden mules, and generally brought them in. 
Though there were strict orders not to damage private 
property, unless attacked by the people, when it was 
done by order, there was much looting and needless 
destruction. Pioneer corps, largely composed of 
negroes, were organized for repairing roads, and 
marched between the advanced guard and the main 
body. Though the work was hard, the weather was 
perfect, and the march was almost a pleasant picnic to 
the men after what they had gone through. So things 
went on till the army neared Savannah. Up to now, 
the defences of the place had been designed entirely 
to meet attack from the sea or the inner channels : on 
the land side the best line of defence was close to the 
town, but it did not cover the railway to Charleston 
and would only leave one line of retreat, to the north 
across the Savannah River. Hardee therefore en- 
trenched one between the rivers Savannah and Ogee- 
chee, but the XVth Corps was sent down the right 
bank of the Ogeechee and turned it, forcing him to 
fall back to his inner lines. 

Foster commanded at Port Royal, and pushed a 
division to Grahamsville to threaten the crossing of the 
Savannah, but Taylor came up and saved it. Hardee 
sent a very clear report on the situation to Richmond, 
assuming that Sherman would establish a base at 
Savannah, before moving on Charleston ; that he 
{Hardee^ should not be caught there, but take his 
troops to reinforce Bragg at Augusta, and that this 
force should be used to stop Sherman's advance north- 
wards. His small force of 18,000 men was helpless by 
itself, but would be a welcome addition to Bragg's 
army. It would have been well for the Confederates 
had their Government taken this sound advice. Hardee 
made the outlying Fort McAllister a separate com- 



358 THE SECOND HALF OF 1864 

mand, and when Sherman came up he sent Howard 
against it, as it cut him off from the fleet : Howard 
took it with a rush on the 13th. Foster had en- 
trenched a position commanding the Charleston rail- 
way, but as this did not prevent the Confederates 
from using it, he seized the railway by order. The 
gunboats secured the inner waters, roads were made, 
and heavy guns sent for. 

Grant at this time asked Sherman to entrench a 
position to be held by a small force, and to bring the 
bulk of his army to Richmond by sea, but Sherman 
asked to take Savannah and then move on Columbia, 
and Grant assented.^ Sherman now began to make 
siege works on one side of Savannah, but Hardee 
evacuated it before he was ready to attack, and re- 
tired on Augusta, leaving his heavy guns but destroying 
some ironclads on the stocks. He effected his retreat 
on the night of December 20th after some sharp 
fighting. Sherman was thus able to offer Savannah, 
120 heavy guns, and 25,000 bales of cotton, to President 
Lincoln as a Christmas present. He then set to work 
to refit the army for the move forward in January. 

^As a secondary operation to Sherman's march, the 
combined military and naval expedition against Fort 
Fisher left Hampton Roads on December 13th, but 
did not get there till the 22nd. Being in General 
Butler's district, he provided the troops, which were 
under Weitzel, but went himself also. Admiral Porter 
commanded the fleet, which included five ironclads. 
Butler was sure that the explosion of a fire-ship close 
to the fort would wreck it ; this was done on the 
morning of the 24th, but without effect. The fleet 
then stood in and opened a tremendous fire on that 
and the next day, which drove the gunners to shelter : 

' E. Stoneman's Raid in S. W. Virginia, December. 

E. Warren breaks the Weldon line, December. 

W. Battle of Nashville, December 15th, 1 6th. 

Europe. Bullock buys the " Sphinx," December. 

Mexico. Porfirio Diaz shut up in Oajaca, December. 
2 Maps 57, 58, page 390. 



FIRST ATTACK ON FORT FISHER 359 

on Christmas Day a large force was landed and ad- 
vanced close to the north face under cover of the ships' 
fire, but when they masked this fire by their approach 
the fort opened on them with grape and musketry 
at point-blank range and drove them off. The fort 
mounted 44 guns : of these 8 were dismounted by the 
fire and 2 burst, while on the other side several rifled 
lOO-pounder Parrott guns burst. Butler and Weitzel 
thought that the fort was little injured and could not 
be taken without a regular siege, the weather was 
threatening, and the expedition returned to Hampton 
Roads. The fort had had only a small garrison, but 
this was reinforced before the attack, and Bragg was 
at Wilmington with some troops. Butler had been 
ordered not to relinquish his hold if he once landed, 
and Porter begged him to hold on and try again, for 
he could keep up a heavier fire if wanted : he com- 
plained bitterly of Butler's conduct, and Grant also 
blamed him for the failure. (Continued on p. 388.) 

The West and South-West 

(Continued from pp. 309,310.) On July ist,^ A. J. 
Smith, with his two divisions, sent to stop Forrest, was 
at La Grange, Tennessee, and he had also a cavalry 
division and a coloured brigade: Forrest with 12,000 men 
harassed his march. Smith moved against the Mobile 
and Ohio line and took position at Harrisburg on the 
14th. Next day Forrest attacked with all his accus- 
tomed dash, but was repulsed, and the Union troops 
advanced and drove him back into the woods, where, 
being mounted, his command escaped from pursuit. 
The Union cavalry had destroyed the railway, and 
Smith started back to Memphis, but Forrest harassed 
the march again and attacked the coloured troops, 
who drove his men back in confusion. This was not 

' S. Sherman crosses the Chattahoochee, July 9th. 
W. Rousseau's Raid starts, July loth. 
E. Battle of the Monocacy, July gth. 



36o THE SECO?fD HALF OF 1864 

only the worst defeat he had had, but a loss of pres- 
tige, and things were quieter in Tennessee for a time, 
Sherman's communications being only menaced by 
such few cavalry as Johnston could spare, who were 
held off. In Kentucky, however, there was enough 
guerilla fighting and attacking of communications to 
keep Burbridge's command busy during the whole of 
the Atlanta campaign, and about this time Morgan 
recommenced operations from south-west Virginia. 
He moved through eastern to central Tennessee, and 
was killed in an action at Greenville on September 4th 
(cf. p. 340), Breckinridge succeeding him in command 
o{ the Department of South-Western Virginia. Forrest, 
who was not driven out of the district, recommenced 
his attacks on Sherman's communications in Tennessee 
and Kentucky in the autumn. On October 30th he 
attacked and took a gunboat and two transports on 
the Tennessee at Johnsonville and then joined Hood's 
army near Decatur. Wheeler had also been sent 
against the communications in July, but Steedman 
drove him off, thence he moved to east Tennessee 
where Rousseau stopped him, and he went back south 
in August, having done nothing. 

We left Price in western Arkansas, preparing for the 
invasion of Missouri (cf. p. 3 1 3). He got together 1 5,000 
men and 20 guns, and on September ist crossed the 
Arkansas River at Dardanelle, and advanced to the 
Missouri border before Rosecrans at St. Louis heard 
of his movements and began to collect the Union 
forces, of which he had but few at the time, so that 
Smith's command, which was to have joined Sherman 
after defeating Forrest^ was sent to strengthen them. 
Ewing was holding the important position of Pilot 
Knob with only 1,000 men, and Price attacked him on 
September 27th •} he held on all that day, but evacuated 

' S. Sherman occupies Atlanta, September 27th. 

E. Butler's attack in the Peninsula, September 28th. 

E. Early driven back in the Valley, end of September. 

E. Burbridge attacks S.W. Virginia, end of September, 



PRICES INVASION OF MISSOURI 361 

the place in the night and joined Rosecrans at St. 
Louis. Price followed and attacked the lines of 
St. Louis, but was repulsed, and turned away against 
Jefferson City. There were several local commands 
which had not been touched by Price's advance, and 
Rosecrans collected them to defend the State Capital. 
Curtis and Blunt, commanding in Kansas, closed in, 
and when Price found himself followed by the Union 
forces under Smith and Pleasonton, he turned away 
westward against Kansas City and Fort Leavenworth, 
but was headed off. Blunt and Curtis delayed him by 
continual fighting outside Lexington till Pleasonton 
came up with the cavalry division just in time to take 
Price in rear on October 22nd, drive him through the 
town of Independence, and save Curtis from defeat. 
Next day Curtis and Pleasonton moved against Price 
from two directions, attacked him near Westport, 
drove him back and pursued him, Smith coming up 
and nearly cutting him off.^ He made a stand near 
Mine Creek, Kansas, but was driven in, losing many 
guns, and chased nearly to Fort Scott : the pursuit 
was kept up and he turned again at Newtonia on the 
28th, was again beaten, and retreated across the 
Arkansas River at Fort Smith. Most of the Con- 
federate guerillas followed the wrecks of his force, 
and there was no more trouble in Missouri. During 
all this time Kirby Smith is never heard of. Steele 
was evidently able to watch him. Halleck blamed 
Rosecrans for letting Price overrun Missouri as he 
did, apparently with reason, for though he cannot 
have been ignorant of Prices preparations, he was 
surprised by him. He ceased to command the Depart- 
ment on December 9th, and was not employed again. 

' E. Cedar Creek, October 19th. 
E. Butler beaten at Seven Pines, October 27th. 
S.E. Cushing sinks the " Albemarle,^' October 27th. 
S.E. Union fleet retakes Plymouth, October 31st. 
W. Forrest's Raid in Tennessee and Kentucky, end of October. 
The *' Olustee," " Chickamauga,'' and *^ Shenandoah" start, 
end of October. 



362 THE SECOND HALF OF 1864 

HOODS INVASION OF TENNESSEE (cf. p. 350) 

Thomas was organizing his army at Nashville in 
November, which consisted of the IVth and XXIlIrd 
Corps and about two divisions of cavalry, some 
28,700 men, but the total strength in his command 
was nearer 59,000, scattered along the lines of com- 
munication : before the end of the year it was 70,272. 
A. J. Smith's (new)XVIth Corps was sent to him after 
Prices defeat (cf pp. 302, 344). 

Hood concentrated at Decatur, and Schofield and 
Granger covered Nashville from the south. The 
weather was very bad, almost stopping operations. 
Hood crossed the Tennessee at Florence^ and tried to 
turn Schofield's right with his cavalry, Breckinridge 
making a diversion in east Tennessee of which no 
notice was taken. Beauregard ordered Hood to take 
the offensive, and he tried to cut off Schofield at 
Pulaski on November 20th, but Schofield fell back to a 
prepared position at Columbia, delaying Hood as much 
as possible. Forrest was in command of the Con- 
federate cavalry, but when Sherman sent Wilson to 
take command of the cavalry of Thomas' army, matters 
improved much (cf. p. 465). Granger was ordered to 
concentrate the detachments at Athens, Decatur, and 
Huntsville, at Stevenson, which relieved Hood of any 
anxiety for his right flank, and he pressed on, Forrest 
got the better of Wilson, and Schofield fell back again, 
destroying the bridges over Duck River : he had de- 
layed the enemy as long as possible, for their army 
was now crossing in several places, and he risked being 
cut off. His trains and escort were at Spring Hill, 
badly protected, Wilson having taken a wrong road, 
and Forrest struck at them there, being supported by 
Hoods arm}^, coming up by degrees. Cheatham's 
Corps was checked, and Stewart's did not arrive before 
dark. Some Union troops were still holding the river 
against Lee's Corps, and that night all retired to 

' S. Sherman starts for the Sea, November 15th. 
E. Union Cavalry Raids in Virginia, November. 



THE BATTLE OF FRANKLIN 363 

Franklin. Hood blamed Cheatham for the failure, 
though he was present himself at the critical time. 

Schofield took a position at Franklin to the south 
of the Harpeth River, covering the crossing, and 
entrenched it : Fort Granger, an earthwork on the 
north bank, commanded the bridges. Two brigades 
were pushed out to an advanced position to develop 
the attack, but not to fight there, but their commander 
Wagner tried to hold the ground, and his whole force 
was swept away by the furious Confederate attack. 
Pursuers and pursued broke through the Union line 
in rear, but supports came up and closed it again, and 
then began one of the fiercest fights of the whole War, 
Stewart and Cheatham putting in all their reserves and 
fighting to a finish. The Confederate loss was appal- 
ling, over 6,000 men, including twelve general officers, 
among whom was the gallant Cleburne. Schofield lost 
2,500, of whom 1,000 belonged to Wagner's command. 
He retired across the river in the night, and Thomas 
congratulated him on his gallant stand, asking him to 
stand again at Brentwood to gain a little more time for 
detachments to come in. 

Hood followed, his army being about 44,000 strong, 
intending to entrench a position in front of Nashville 
on the chance of getting reinforcements from Texas, 
and be able to defeat Thomas if he attacked, for he was 
not in a condition to do so after the losses at Franklin : 
he was very awkwardly placed, as either advance or 
retreat seemed equally bad : he went forward, putting 
Lee's Corps, which had suffered least, in the centre. 
Thomas took position on the heights round Nashville. 
In the first week in December, Hood sent out detach- 
ments to destroy railways and attack local garrisons, 
but Rousseau, commanding at Murfreesboro, was able 
to drive off a force of about double his strength under 
Forrest and Bate. Forrest then raided the country east 
of Nashville, but the Union gunboats and cavalry 
prevented him from crossing the Tennessee River. 

Grant ordered Thomas to resume the offensive, but 



364 THE SECOND HALF OF 1864 

he wanted to strengthen his cavalry more, and also 
the weather stopped all movements. Grant, however, 
fairly lost patience with him, and at one time even 
thought of coming himself, but sent Logan to supersede 
him if he did not move : before Logan arrived the 
decisive battle had been fought. 

Both sides had been waiting for the weather to 
mend, and when it did, Thomas moved against Hoods 
lines, which were over-extended, on December i5th,^ 
leaving a few men to hold his own works. TheXVIth 
Corps took some redoubts on Hood's right and the 
IVth drove in his left: the XXIIIrd was in reserve. 
Hood was driven back two miles from one position 
to another, with slight Union loss. Hoods new line 
was shorter, to the south of Nashville across the 
Granny White and Franklin roads, with its right on 
the strong position of Overton's Hill. On the left was 
Sly's Hill, which, though steep, was not strong. This 
position was taken up under fire. Thomas' line over- 
lapped Hoods at each end, Wilson's cavalry being out 
on the Hillsboro road. Hood sent for Forrest in haste, 
whom he had allowed to get away out of touch, hoping 
to hold on till he came. 

On the i6th, Thomas attacked all along the line, 
Wilson moving round the enemy's left flank beyond 
the Granny White road. Hood kept detaching troops 
to stop him till the position at Sly's Hill became too 
weakly held ; it was a sharp salient, and was crushed 
by the Union artillery. An attack on Overton's Hill 
failed, but the Confederate left was broken ; a second 
attack carried Overton's Hill and the Confederates 
were driven from the whole position in confusion, but 
Forrest now appeared and saved them from destruction. 
He had been ordered to retreat east and south, but, 
always at his best in difficulties, pushed three cavalry 
brigades to the westward in rear of the beaten army, 

' E. Warren breaks the Weldon line, December. 
E. Stoneman's Raid in S.W. Virginia, December, 
purope. Bulloch buys the " Sphipx," December, 



COMMENTS ON THE CAMPAIGN 365' 

held Wilson off, and rejoined Hood at Columbia, 
where, with the addition of an infantry force to his 
command, he covered the retreat to the Tennessee, 
which was crossed on the 27th ^ : two Union gunboats 
tried to interfere, but were driven off, and the retreating- 
army was not molested further. 

Thomas sent troops to re-occupy the posts in 
Alabama which had been given up at the beginning of 
the campaign, and as Sherman's projected advance 
northward from Savannah made it important that the 
enemy should not be allowed to concentrate troops in 
the Gulf States, he prepared for a new campaign in the 
spring. He stationed the IVth Corps at Huntsville, 
the XVIth and XXIIIrd at Eastport. 

The Confederates were so demoralized by the 
battle of Franklin that they did not fight so well at 
Nashville, where Hood made the mistake of letting his 
opponent overlap his line obliquely on the first day, 
and attack from that position. He should have drawn 
back to a better one. He also was not the man he had 
been, and missed several chances at Franklin : why he 
followed and stayed before Nashville, when Thomas 
was receiving reinforcements, and none were likely to 
arrive for him, is a mystery. After the battle Thomas 
got all the credit for his skill and tenacity, and the result 
redeemed his strategical errors before it, but at first 
he carried caution to an extreme, when he had a greater 
number of good troops who might have been called in, 
in not moving till Smith came, and it also looks as if 
he might have concentrated farther south, and kept 
Hood behind Duck River. Granger's eccentric move- 
ment to cover the railways only helped Hood by 
clearing his flank and freeing Forres/ : the consequence 
was that Schofield, covering the concentration, was 
much exposed and only just succeeded in doing so. 
Thomas' over-caution made him disregard Sherman's 

' S.E. Sherman takes Savannah, December 21st. 
S.E. First attack on Fort Fisher, December 24th, 25th. 
Mexico. Porfirio Diaz shut up in Oajaca, December. 



366 THE SECOND HALF OF 1864 

orders to neglect outlying districts and railways for 
the time being and concentrate all troops to fight 
Hood 2iS soon as possible, and so he ran unnecessary 
risks. 

There were no operations in the South-West 
District, other than the end of the pursuit of Price 
by Smith and Pleasonton, which is dealt with else- 
where. (Continued, West on p. 401, South-West on 
p. 402.) 

The Blockade 

(Continued from p. 314.) The Blockade, though 
stringent, was not impassable (cf. p. 125), for a vessel 
ran into Savannah just as Sherman's army marched 
in, and was captured at the wharf Fort Fisher kept 
Wilmington open, and was still defiant at the end 
of the year; the Confederate ram ^^ North Carolina'' 
appeared here, but did nothing. As we have seen, 
Farragut took Mobile Bay, which was lost to the 
Confederacy in August. No regular attacks were 
made on Charleston, but some operations were under- 
taken up the Stono River close to it, and in the 
neighbourhood. 

The " Coquette^' which Bulloch had bought in 1863 
for conveying heavy freight such as engines better 
than the ordinary blockade-runner, had been a most 
useful vessel and paid her way well, but her boilers 
had got into such bad order that she was sold out of 
the Confederate service early in July. (Continued on 

p. 404.) 

The War at Sea 

(Continued from p. 317.) During the summer, the 
" Florida^' having coaled at Bermuda, cruised about in 
the Atlantic, but had to come close to the American 
coast to find American ships : here, however, she did 
a fair amount of damage. At the beginning of October 
she reached Bahia, where was the U.S.S. " Wachusett," 
Captain Collins, and when she anchored about half a 
mile awa}^ a Brazilian man-of-war anchored between 



CAPTURE OF THE ''FLORIDA'' 367 

them. Collins, however, was not deterred by any 
scruples about the violation of neutrality from trying 
to stop his enemy's depredations ; he got under way 
early in the morning of October 7th,' and deliberately 
ran into the ^^ Florida,'' firing on her till she surrendered, 
many of her officers and men being on shore at the 
time. He then took her out as a prize to Hampton 
Roads, where she was sunk by collision on Novem- 
ber 28th. There seems no doubt that the United 
States Consul at Bahia had given positive assurances 
to the Brazilian Government that the laws of neutrality 
would be full}^ respected, which were binding on 
Captain Collins. The outrage was flagrant, the 
Brazilian Government instructed their Minister at 
Washington to make formal and immediate complaint 
to the Government of the United States, and Mr. 
Seward at once answered that the President would 
suspend and court-martial Captain Collins and dismiss 
the Consul at Bahia, since they could not take on 
themselves to do such things, but he specially declined 
to recognize that the ^^ Florida " had any rights what- 
ever or was other than a pirate. A large sum of 
money was taken in her, which was not returned by 
the United States authorities. The officers and men 
were paroled and allowed to go to Liverpool, on 
February ist, 1865. 

A blockade-runner called the "Atlanta" was fitted 
out at Wilmington as the Confederate cruiser " Talla- 
hassee," and sailed on August 6th,^ keeping close along 
the American coast where she was very successful, 
returning on the 26th to Wilmington. At the end 
of October ^ she ran out again, now called the " Olnstee," 

' E. Tom's Brook, October 9th. 

W. Price in Missouri, October. 

E. Cedar Creek, October 19th. 
- E. Sheridan takes command in the Valley, August 7th. 

S. Farra^ut forces Mobile Bay, August 5th. 
' E. Butler beaten at Seven Pines, October 27th. 

S.E. Gushing sinks the *' Albefnarle" October 27th. 

S.E. Union fleet retakes Plymouth, October 31st. 



^68 THE SECOND HALF OF 1864 

cruised up to Sandy Hook, took seven prizes and rail 
the blockade back into Wilmington. Here she was 
disarmed, and took a cargo of cotton to Bermuda to 
get supplies for Lee's army ; this time she was called 
the " Chameleon^ About the same time another fast 
vessel, the " Edith," was bought and armed at Wil- 
mington, and soon sailed as the cruiser " Chickmnauga^' 
making a successful cruise along the coast, returning 
to Wilmington, but neither of these two were fit to 
keep in commission as cruisers, for they were not 
full-rigged, and depended on their steam power ; the 
" Chickamauga" however, was kept for local defence, 
and was in action at the capture of Fort Fisher, in 
1865. 

The forced sale of the ships at Laird's had put some 
money into BullocJis hands when he most wanted it, 
just after the loss of the " Alabama^ He had seen 
a very fine vessel in T863, with good steam and sail 
power and a lifting screw, called the " Sea King," and 
now came across her again : she was just what he 
wanted for the project, then mooted, of attacking the 
American whaling fleet, in the Sea of Okhotsk and 
the North Pacific. The greatest care had to be 
exercised in the purchase : Bulloch hardly dared go 
near her, and an English merchant bought her in his 
own name, the captain having a power of sale with 
the proviso that she should take no prizes till he had 
had time to return to England and cancel her register. 
Then a tender was wanted, and a good one was soon 
bought called the " Laurel,'' which sailed ostensibly 
with passengers and cargo for Havana, but the 
passengers were officers and men for the " Sea King," 
and the cargo her armament. Though two Northern 
men-of-war were specially on the look-out in the 
Channel, they missed both ships, which sailed from 
Liverpool and London respectively at the beginning 
of October, for Madeira, where they met, and the 
captain of the " Sea King " sold her to the Confederate 
States and returned to England. She was armed and 



THE "SPHINX" 369 

commissioned under the name of the " Shenandoah,^ 
and mounted four 68-pounder smooth-bores and four 
small rifled guns. Captain ?^(7c/^/r// now took command 
with orders to go to Australia, thence to the New 
Zealand whaling ground, and then on to the North 
Pacific. He reached Melbourne on January 25th, 1865, 
having taken eight ships on the way. The ^^ Laurel" 
went on to Nassau to report to the Confederate agent 
there for such service as she might be fit for. 

By the time that one of the rams built for Bulloch, 
which had been sold to Denmark, then at war with 
Prussia, arrived there, the war was over and the 
Danes wanted to be off their bargain, of which her 
builder told Bulloch, and also negociated the purchase 
of the ship for him in December.^ She was then called 
the "Sphinx." She had an armoured semi-circular 
battery right forward, carrying one 300-pounder 
Armstrong gun, and a turret aft, with two 70-pounders, 
all rifled. The battery was thrown back from the 
stem to enable the heavy gun to fire right ahead as 
well as on each side : she had twin screws, was very 
heavy forward, clumsy, and unseaworthy-looking, 
but a formidable antagonist for any wooden ship. She 
was not ready for use till after the end of the year. 

The '^Rappahannock'' remained at Calais as a depot 
ship all the half-year, for the French supervision was 
so close that she could not be manned or got away, 
even to be armed elsewhere. (Continued on p. 405.) 

Summary 

(Continued from p. 320.) The year 1864 ended with 
the hopeless disruption of the Confederacy, Sherman's 
great march having cut a lane through the centre of 
it. As in the first part of the half-year the primary 

' E. Stoneman's Raid in S.W. Virginia, December. 
E. Warren breaks the Weldon line, December. 
S.E. Sherman takes Savannah, December 2ist. 
S.E. First attack on Fort Fisher, December 24th, 25th. 
W. Battle of Nashville, December 15th, i6th. 
Mexico. Porfirio Diaz shut up in Oajaca, December. 

24 



370 THE SECOND HALF OF 1864 

military operations were those against Johnston's 
army, so in the latter part those round Atlanta, and 
of Thomas against Hood, were so, those in the East 
being secondary throughout. This is shewn by the 
fact that after the fall of Atlanta all available men 
were sent to Thomas. Hood had started out " to undo 
the work of Stone's River," the decisive battle of the 
War in a purely military sense, but it was now too 
late, even had he beaten Thomas, to carry the War 
into the North as Sidney Johnston and Bragg had 
hoped to do. In the East, the interest centred, not 
in Lee's wonderful holding on at Petersburg, but in 
the campaign of the indomitable Early in the Valley 
against larger numbers under an abler general, whom 
he succeeded in holding fast there and in materially 
prolonging the War. 

The political danger to the Republican party in the 
summer, which Early succeeded in keeping alive in 
a wonderful degree, was dissipated by the fall of 
Atlanta followed by the battle of Cedar Creek, and 
the vigorous conduct of the War was assured from 
that time. There was however another political 
danger, which the appointment of Grant to chief 
command had not stopped, and that was the way in 
which Stanton and Halleck interfered in military 
matters, especially in the Valley. They gave orders 
which nullified Hunter's attempts either to beat Early, 
keep in touch with him, or prevent the Confederates 
from supplying themselves freely, till Sheridan was 
specially sent with orders to act otherwise : Grant once 
had to tell him not to obey Halleck, and then the}^ 
even went so far as to alter Grant's orders, which went 
via Washington, and send their own notions to him 
in Grant's name, so that Grant had to see him per- 
sonally at least once, because he could not rely on 
his orders being delivered as written. This was not 
done with President Lincoln's consent, for he wrote 
strongly to Grant, begging him to push his plans, 
because no one at Washington would adopt a vigorous 



CONFEDERATE BICKERINGS 371 

policy. When Washington was threatened, Halleck 
was absolutely helpless, and would neither take com- 
mand nor responsibility. 

The Union army was suffering much from the want 
of good leaders, for many had been lost and their 
places could not be filled. This seems curious, after 
some years of war, but Napoleon 1st suffered from the 
same trouble in his later years, i8i4-'i5. 

In the trans-Mississippi district the War was over. 
In the South and South-East, the country was not 
only cut through, but the Confederates were quarrel- 
ling among themselves. Not only was the feeling in 
Georgia bitter against Davis^ and between Davis and 
Johnston and Governor Broivn, but also between the 
States of Georgia and South Carolina, the latter 
being blamed for all their misfortunes as the starter 
and maintainer of the War and the one which had 
hardly suffered at all.. 

Wilmington was the only port remaining to the 
Confederacy. 

Union Loss. — Major-General McPherson, killed in 
action. 

Confederate Losses. — Major-Gencral Morgan, killed 
in action ; the " Florida^' captured in violation of 
neutralit3^ (Continued on p. 407.) 

Notices of Officers 

(Continued from p. 323.) Several notable officers 
disappear from the War during this half-year : on the 
Union side, Major-Generals Hooker and McPherson, 
and Admiral Farragut ; on the Confederate, Major- 
General Morgan. 

Major-General Joseph Hooker, known as "Fighting 
Joe," a nickname which he particularl}' disliked, was 
one of the senior officers in the War. An old West 
Point man, he had served in the Mexican War and 
was an experienced soldier. He commanded a division 
in the Peninsula, a Corps at the Antietam, a Grand 



372 THE SECOND HALF OF 1864 

Division (two Corps) at Fredericksburg, and then the 
Army of the Potomac. He was afterwards a Corps 
commander in the West. His men beHeved in him 
enthusiastically, and besides being a first-rate officer 
he was an excellent administrator, but was at his 
best in command of a division or Corps. He was so 
hampered by the Government and Halleck that it is 
difficult to judge him as a commanding general, but 
after Chancellorsville he handled his army ably till 
superseded by Meade. His mistakes at Chancellors- 
ville were largely due to an injury which dazed him 
for the time and from which he never really recovered. 
His great faults were selfishness and insubordination, 
especially under Sherman and Thomas, who had both 
been junior to him. He was always trying to cut 
loose and make a little glory for himself without regard 
to the operations of the army, leaving dangerous gaps, 
impeding other troops, etc. He would try to assert 
his authority as senior over other Corps commanders, 
to carry out his own schemes. Things came to a 
climax at Kenesaw Mountain : Sherman took him 
sharply to task, and nearly relieved him from com- 
mand. When Howard was given the command of 
the Army of the Tennessee he sent in his resignation, 
which was forwarded, " heartily recommended." He 
was not employed again. 

Major-General James McPherson was an old West 
Point man, and a lieutenant of Engineers at the be- 
ginning of the War. He was soon appointed Colonel, 
and served on Grant's Staff at Fort Donelson and 
after, as Commanding Engineer, then on Halleck's. 
In September, 1862, he was a Brigadier-General, in 
October Major-General, commanded a Corps before 
Vicksburg, and early in 1864 was given the command 
of the Army of the Tennessee. He and Sherman 
were the two whom Grant most specially thanked for 
their co-operation, when made Commander-in-Chief. 
McPherson was tall, handsome, vigorous, about the 
most lovable and popular man in the army, and whose 



FARRAGUT AND MORGAN 373 

death, at the age of thirty-four, was felt as a personal 
bereavement by all who knew him. 

Rear-Admiral David Glasgow Farragut was a 
Southerner, born in Tennessee, whose family after- 
wards went to New Orleans. He entered the Navy 
in 1810 and saw service in the West Indies, after- 
wards being naval commander at San Francisco in 
the troublous 'fifties. Early in the War, the fact of 
his being a Southerner made the Union authorities 
very doubtful about giving him a command, especially 
against New Orleans, but his Northern friends vouched 
for his absolute loyalty. He was a man of the most 
resolute character, who never shrank from responsi- 
bility or was affected by difficulty or danger. Though 
he never commanded a fleet of battleships in action 
in the open sea, he had to face heavy guns at close 
range with weaker ships, in cramped, shallow waters, 
with the new danger of submarine mines. His plans 
were well made and carried out, and he shewed every 
quality which marks a first-rate commander. 

Major-General John Morgan had had no military 
training, but was a daring and resolute man, and 
more than a successful partisan leader. From the 
middle of 1862 to that of 1863, he commanded a 
cavalry division which was a model in its way, for 
the secondary operations entrusted to him. He, with 
Forrest and Van Dorn, reduced Grant to impotence at 
the end of 1862, and had he been present at Stone's 
River that deci'sive battle might have ended very 
differently. He was however ruined by his ambition : 
Bragg ordered him not to cross the Ohio with his 
great raid in July, 1863, but he did so to make a little 
glory for himself and was utterly defeated. He seems 
never to have been entrusted again with important 
operations, and after this only made a few small raids. 
Though given the command of the Department of South- 
western Virginia, his sun had set, and he was killed 
in a skirmish at Greenville, Tennessee, in September, 
1864. (Continued on p. 409.) 



374 



THE SECOND HALF OF 1864 



1864 



July 



1-31. Siege of 

Petersburg. 
30. The Mine at 

Petersburg. 

3-14. Early's dash 

at Washington. 
9. Battle of the 

Monocacy. 
11. Early before 

Washington. 
24. The Second 

Kernstown. 
30. Chambersburg 

(Pa.) burnt. 



August 



September 



1-31. Siege of 
Petersburg. 
Hancock's attack 

on Richmond. 
Warren's attack on 
the Weldon Rail- 
way. 
7. Sheridan takes 
command in the 
Valley. 
7. Moorefield. 



1-30. Siege of 
Petersburg. 

28-30. Butler's at- 
tack in the Penin- 
sula. 
1-30. Sheridan and 
Early in the Val- 
ley. 

19. Battle of the | 
Opequon. 

Burbridge attacks 
south-west Vir- 
ginia from Ken- 
tucky. 



9. Sherman crosses 
the Chattahoo- 
chee. 

18. Hood succeeds 
Johnston. 

20-24. Fighting 
round Atlanta. 

20. Peach Tree 
Creek. 

29. Ezra Church. 

10-22. Rousseau's 
Raid. 

26-28. Mc Cook's 
Raid. 

26-31. Stoneman's 
Raid. 



1-31. Siege of 
Atlanta. 
31. Jonesboro. 
15-22. Kilpatrick's 

Raid. 
5. Farragut forces 
the entrance of 
Mobile Bay, and 
takes Fort Powell. 
8. Granger takes 
Fort Gaines. 
23. Farragut and 
Granger take 
Fort Morgan. 



27. Sherman occu- 
pies Atlanta. 



5 W 



Guerilla Fight 
1-23. A. J. Smith 
beats Forrest. 



ing in Kentucky and Tennessee. 



1-8. Rousseau and 
Wheeler in Ten- 



Morgan's last Raid. 
4. Morgan killed 
at Greenville. 
1-30. Price's Inva- 
sion of Missouri. 
27. Pilot Knob. 



The" Rappahanyiock" lying at Calais, unarmed. 
The "Florida" at sea, in the Atlantic, 
6-26. Cruise of the 
" Tallahassee." 



CHRONOLOGICAL TABLE 



375 



1864 


October 


November 


Decebiber 




1-31. Siege of 


1-30. Siege of 


1-31. Siege of 




Petersburg. 


Petersburg. 


Petersburg. 


27. Hancock at- 


Merritt a t tack s ; Warren breaks the | 


tacks the South- 


Moshy. 


VVeldon line. 


side line. 


Torbert 's and 




27. Butler beaten Custer's Raids in 


12-24. Stoncman's 


« at Seven Pines. | Virginia. 


Raid from Ten- 


w 1-31. Sheridan and 




nessee on south- 


1 Ea;'/yinthe Valley. 




west Virginia. 


1 9. Tom's Brook. 




18. Action at Mari- 


! Hupp's Hill. 




on. 


1 19. Cedar Creek. 








2. Saltville. Bur- 








bridge retreats to 






a 


Kentucky. 






Hood's see-saw stra- 






s 


tegy, to puzzle 






s 


Sherman. 












10-21. Sherman be- 








sieges and takes 


s 






Savannah. 


•<! 




15-30. Sherman's 


13. Fort McAllister 


w 
a 


27. Cushing sinks 


March to the Sea. 


taken. 


S 


the "Albemarle." 




23-25. First attack 


o 

CO 


31. Plymouth re- 




on Fort Fisher. 




taken by Union 




Expedition up the 




fleet. 




Roanoke River. 




1-28. Price's Inva- 




1-20. Hood's Inva- 




sion of Missouri, 




sion of Tennessee. 




and retreat. 




15-16. Battle of 




20. Lexington. 




Nashville. 


H 


22. Independence. 




Hood retreats to 




23. Westport. 




Tupelo. 


28. Newtonia. 








Forrest's Raid in 


20-30. Hood's In- 






Tennessee and 


vasion of Tennes- 






Kentucky. 


see. 






30. Takes ironclad 


29. Spring Hill. 






gunboat at John- 


30. Franklin. 






sonville. 








The "Rappahannock" lying at Ca 


lais, unarmed. 




The "Florida" goes 






to Bahia. 






7. The "Florida" 






treacherously 




Q 


captured by the 




^8 


" Wachusett." Cruises of the " Olus- 




ii 


The " Olusiee " and tee" and " Chicka- 




" Chickamaiiga" mauga." 




^ 


leaveWilmington. The "Shenandoah" at sea. 




20. The " Shenan- | Bulloch buys the 




doah" commis- "Sphinx." 




sioned at the Mexico. 




Desertas.Madeira. Porfirio Diaz shut 




, up in Oajaca. 



CHAPTER XIII 

the first half of 1 865. the last struggles 

General Position and Plans 

(Continued from p. 331.) The North's business was 
to close the War as quickly as possible, for there was 
nothing to prevent them. There was now no danger 
oi Kirby Stnith forcing the Mississippi, and Steele, who 
had been watching him in Arkansas, was brought over 
to Pensacola and joined Canby before Mobile, while 
Sherman could clearly make head against any possible 
combination without Grant's aid. Grant had originally 
thought of sending Hancock with the force of veterans, 
the new 1st Corps, which he was organizing, through 
the Valley or the west side of Virginia to about Lynch- 
burg : then with Sherman coming up from the south, 
Thomas' command in Tennessee, and Meade's round 
Richmond, Lee's army could be completely cut off, 
whether he moved or not. This was, however, before 
Sherman had got to Savannah, and when it was 
thought best to bring him north by sea on account 
of the swampy ground in his front, but when he 
reached that place, and proposed to march up through 
North and South Carolina and break up the only two 
remaining Confederate States, Grant agreed at once 
and altered his plans to support him. Schofield and 
the XXIIIrd Corps were brought east from Thomas' 
army to march up from New Berne or Wilmington 



PLANS OF BOTH SIDES 377 

and meet Sherman, this being an addition to the 
plan of taking Fort Fisher : Thomas was to send a 
Corps into the mountains east of Knoxville to block 
Lee's retreat in that direction, to strike south into 
Alabama with the rest of his army, and at Selma 
to join Canby, who would march northwards after 
taking Mobile. Grant, however, could not get 
Thomas to move, and was much dissatisfied with 
his slowness. 

On the Confederate side, it is difficult to see why 
their Government kept up the War at all, since there 
was now no prospect of success and every day of war 
increased the exhaustion and ruin of the country. The 
one chance of replenishing their armies was by the 
enlistment of negroes, but this was only authorized by 
the Confederate Legislature at the end of March, about 
a fortnight before Lee's surrender. Many of the best 
soldiers in the Confederacy realized the situation, but 
as soldiers kept on fighting till the politicians made 
peace. Lee, who well knew the fallacy of staying at 
Petersburg, wanted to withdraw behind the line of 
the Staunton River, calling in all detachments, which 
would have given him a stronger army and made 
Grant's communications very long. He could do no 
good where he was unless he was at once reinforced 
by 25,000 men, but these troops were not to be had 
in the Confederacy. He was not allowed however to 
try to carry out his plan, and in any case his enemies 
would soon have surrounded him, for Grant was not 
his only enemy, and also Lee was not in a position to 
have struck at his communications, as of old. Beaure- 
gard had asked to be relieved of his District command 
after Nashville, in order to look after the Gulf States. 
He suggested that Charleston might have to be 
abandoned in order to concentrate against Sherman, 
but it was so important, both politically and senti- 
mentally, that the Confederate authorities hesitated, 
and Sherman moved too quickly for them to recover 
the lost time. When hlood resigned his command in 



378 THE FIRST HALF OF 1865 

January, Beauregard succeeded him, but was soon 
moved east, leaving Taylor in command in the South. 
Hardee's December plan of opposing Sherman was 
the only feasible one, had it been carried out then, 
which it was not, and it was soon clear that the Con- 
federacy was doomed if no force was sent to protect 
Lee's rear from him. Taylor therefore suggested in 
January that Hoods army be brought up at once for 
this purpose, but it was done by driblets, and anyhow 
would have been too late. 

In Mexico, the strong man of the Republic, Porfirio 
Diaz, was shut up in Oajaca, where he soon had to 
surrender, but in the North-West the Republic was 
beginning to revive, while the Mexican Empire did 
not get stronger. Though outwardly cordial, Maxi- 
milian distrusted Bazaine, Bazaine and his second in 
command were at loggerheads, Maximilian's entourage 
hated the French, the French Government complained 
that the pay of the Mexican troops was thrown on 
them in addition to that of their own men, a direct 
breach of agreement, Maximilian and the Liberals 
blocked the access of the French to the Sonora 
mines, the Clericals and a strong section of the 
Liberals, while opposing each other, both bitterly 
attacked Maximilian, and the finances were in worse 
confusion than ever, Maximilian using them at Court 
as if the Empire were wealthy, and meeting all 
difficulties or complaints with highflown edicts which 
no one carried out. The Confederacy was breaking 
up, and so the United States, which gained strength 
every day, were proportionately able to disregard 
Napoleon's schemes as factors in the military or 
political situation, though they still required watching. 
The French generals had their hands more than full, 
as the chance of war with America was becoming a 
very serious risk, though Napoleon thought that 
America would not declare war on France without 
including Great Britain, and that this would be his 
safeguard. 



INFORMAL PEACE CONFERENCE 379 

The East 

(Continued from p. 341.) In February/ Mr. Blair 
arrived in Richmond unofficially, to propose a Peace 
Commission to consider the possibility of a settlement, 
in consequence of which, Vice-President Stephens and 
Messrs. Hunter and Campbell met President Lincoln 
and Mr. Seward on a man-of-war in Hampton Roads. 
It was suggested that combination could be managed 
on the enforcement of the Monroe Doctrine against 
the " usurpation " of empire by Maximilian in Mexico 
under the protection of France, Earlier in the War this 
might have had some effect, but Lincoln was now in a 
position to ignore it and talk of Confederate surrender 
pure and simple, as a necessary preliminary to any- 
thing else. Stephens would not or could not deal 
with this, and the meeting ended, but it enabled 
Jefferson Davis to make a last great appeal to the 
patriotism of his people, to which they gallantly 
responded. 

Round Petersburg, the Confederate works were 
now thirty-seven miles long, with only 35,000 men 
to man them, the greater portion of the lines being 
merely watched. The winter was very severe and 
little could be done in the way of military operations, 
but in February there was some fighting for the lines 
of road by which Lee's supplies came, the main result 
being that the Union works were extended to the 
Vaughan road, with the Vth Corps in rear of the left 
flank. 

In January and February there had been some 
smart cavalry raiding in and about the Valley, McNeill 

' S.E. Fort Fisher taken, January 13th. 
S.E. The " Patapsco " sunk off Charleston, January i6th. 
S.E. Kirk's Raid in North Carolina, January. 
S.E. Charleston evacuated, February i8th. 
S.E. Wilmington taken, February 22nd. 
Mexico. Bazaine takes Oajaca, February 9th. 

Europe. The " Stonewall" at Ferrol, February 28th : Barron resigns. 
Australia. The " Shenandoah " leaves Melbourne, February i8lh. 



38o THE FIRST HALF OF 1865 

took Crook prisoner, and Rosser took Beverly in West 
Virginia, but his brigade was disbanded for want ot 
subsistence. 

In February, Sheridan started from the Valley to 
interrupt and destroy the lines of supply through 
central Virginia, and then either join Sherman, return 
to the Valley, or go to the army before Richmond, 
He started on the 27th with two good cavalry divi- 
sions, and marched to Staunton almost without 
opposition. On March 2nd he encountered Early 
near Waynesboro and totally defeated him, taking 
all his guns and train and most of the command, 
Early himself barely escaping with a few men. 
Sheridan did not attempt to take Lynchburg, which 
was strongly held, but went on and destroyed the 
Virginia railway for miles and the James River Canal 
as well, reaching White House on the Pamunkey on 
March 19th. He had completely done his work in 
the Valley and wrecked the Confederate power there, 
but on his march through Virginia the astonishing 
Early, who had succeeded in rallying a few men, 
struck him in flank and rear near Gordonsville, but 
was not strong enough to do much. 

Grant, having, seen signs that Lee was likely to 
abandon his works and try to unite with Johnston, 
even before he was ready to follow, ordered the 
armies before Richmond on March 24th to move to 
the left on the 29th, to destroy the Danville and 
Southside railways, turn Lee's right, and force him 
from his lines. 

On the other side, Lee had begun preparing for the 
inevitable evacuation early in spring, by sending back 
all surplus stores and making a new base at Amelia 
Court House. He had been made Commander-in-Chief 
on February 6th, at least two years too late, and began 
by appointing /o/?«s/'o« to command the force operating 
against Sherman, which Jefferson Davis did not like 
at all, but he had to acquiesce. He had at last seen 
that Richmond must be abandoned, and had arranged 



THE WINNING STROKES 381 

with Lee that it be done as soon as the condition of 
the roads would permit, the plan being to move on 
Danville, unite with Johnston, and attack Sherman, 
but to do this successfully Grant and Sheridan had 
to be deceived, shaken off, or beaten. Lee's first 
object was to attack Grant's centre and make him 
concentrate and draw in his wings, and he therefore 
struck at Fort Stedman with almost half his army, 
under Gordon : this operation if successful would have 
given a choice of several great advantages, according 
to the measure of success. The fort and some ad- 
joining works were taken by a night attack, but 
recovered after daylight, the Confederate supports 
not being properly in touch : artillery could then be 
used with effect, and the net result was that the 
Confederates lost more than they gained, for they 
had concentrated so many men for the attack that 
great portions of their lines were almost deserted, 
and the Union Ilnd and Vlth Corps, seeing this, 
attacked and seized them, making the whole Con- 
federate position most insecure : in fact this day's 
work gave the Vlth Corps the winning position, from 
which it was able to carry the main line of Confederate 
works a few days later. Lee is believed to have lost 
about 4,000 men to his opponents' 2,000. 

At this time, March 27th, ^ Sherman came to see 
Grant from Goldsboro, and said that he would be 
ready to move by April loth and co-operate with 
him. He proposed to seize the Roanoke River near 
Weldon, from which he could either occupy Burke's 
Junction and cut off Lee's retreat on either Danville 
or Lynchburg, or join the armies before Richmond, 
as seemed best. Grant told him to carry this out, 
and informed him of his own plans, for he was sure 
that the knowledge of his approach would make Lee 
move. Ord now commanded the Army of the James, 

' S. Canby besieges Mobile, March a6th. 
S. Wilson's Raid in Alabama, March. 
E & S.E. .Sliineman's Raid, March. 



382 THE FIRST HALF OF 1865 

and on the 27th moved to the extreme left of the Army 
of the Potomac with three infantry divisions and one 
of cavalry, leaving Weitzel with only three to the 
north of the Appomattox. Lee knew nothing of all 
this. 

At this time the strength of the Armies was : Army 
of the Potomac, 69,000, with 243 guns ; Army of the 
James, 32,000, with 126 guns, and 1,700 cavalry; and 
Sheridan's Cavalry Corps, 13,000; total, 115,700. 
Against this force Lee had some 57,000 men in all. 

On March 28th, Sheridan was ordered to Dinwiddie 
Court House to manoeuvre Lee out of his position, 
but not to attack it, and if he did not stir, to go and 
attack the lines at each side of Burke's Junction and 
then either return or join Sherman : the Ilnd and Vth 
Corps to take more ground to their left, the Vlth to 
be ready to follow, and the IXth to take over their 
works. Sheridan was first to try to get in Lee's 
right rear and not mind the railways. Lee answered 
by sending his cavalry to Five Forks, supported by 
infantry under Pickett, and collected a strong force to 
attack the Vth Corps, but to do this he had to denude 
his lines in many places, which Grant saw, and 
hearing of Picketfs move, told the Vth Corps to 
support Sheridan, and Ord, Wright (Vlth), and Parke 
(IXth), to attack the Confederate lines. The conse- 
quence was that when Lee attacked and drove back 
the Vth Corps on the 31st, the Ilnd came up, turned 
the tables, and took some Confederate works : there 
was some fighting at Dinwiddie Court House between 
the cavalry of the two sides, backed on the Union 
side by a division of the Vth Corps, and the next day 
Sheridan moved against Pickett's entrenched position 
at Five Forks, supported by the whole of the Vth 
Corps. Picketfs command was defeated and broken 
up, and Lee sent a force to cover its rally and close 
the line of approach by Sutherland Station : he might 
have done this with the co-operation of Longstreet, 
commanding at Richmond, but could not in any way 



WARREN SUPERSEDED 383 

make head against Sheridan and at the same time 
hold the Petersburg Hnes. He had lost the Southside 
railway but not the Danville line, which might enable 
him to defer retreat till better weather. Pickett seems 
to have been put in a very exposed position, where 
a cavalr}^ command would have had a better chance. 

In these operations Warren's Vth Corps had been 
under Sheridan's command : speed being of vital 
importance to follow if Lee got away, Sheridan asked 
for his old and trusty subordinate Wright, with his 
Vlth Corps, but it was too far off, and the Vth was 
the only one which could be sent in time. This was 
most unfortunate, for two men less fitted to work 
together than the fiery and autocratic Sheridan, and 
the brilliant, conceited, and argumentative Warren, 
could not have been found in the whole army, Warren 
was a fine soldier, whose quick and sure coup d'ceil, 
promptness, and nerve, had saved the army at Gettys- 
iDurg, but Grant, who admired his good qualities, was 
not blind to his military failings. He was apt to 
argue over his orders and suggest changes to suit 
his own notions : though he gave excellent orders, 
he could not delegate power, and generally super- 
intended their execution ; the consequence was that 
combined operations were badly done : his warmest 
apologists admit that he was not an executive officer. 
P^or these reasons Grant authorized Sheridan on 
April I St to supersede him if necessary (cf. p. 437), 
which he did after the battle of Five Forks, where 
he had been much annoyed by the delays caused by 
his personal superintendence. Griffin succeeded to 
the command of the Corps. 

On April 2nd,^ the Vlth, IXth, and Hnd Corps 
carried the Confederate works in their front, the 
occupants being driven back on Amelia Court House, 
and two important works, practically the keys of the 
position, were taken later on. On this day the Con- 
federates lost the gallant General A. P. Hill, who was 

' S. Wilson beats Forrest at Selma, April 2nd. 



3^4 THE li'IRST Half of 1865 

killed while moving between his divisions in action. 
Lee at once notified President Davis that he would be 
obliged to retire in the night, and would try to 
reach Danville, but events moved so fast that he had 
to start at 8 p.m., and on the morning of the 3rd the 
Confederate lines were found empty, and Richmond 
surrendered to General Weitzel. 

Grant, seeing that Lee must move on either Dan- 
ville or Lynchburg, told Sheridan to keep south of 
the Appomattox, and strike the Danville line at 
Burke's Junction, Meade to take the Ilnd and Vlth 
Corps to Amelia Court House, and Ord, with the 
XXIVth, XXVth, and IXth, to follow the Southside 
line to Burke's Junction. (Note. — A new Xth Corps 
had been formed, for service against Fort Fisher 
(cf, p. 388), by taking troops from the XXIVth and 
XXVth Corps, so that these numbers represent what 
remained to them.) 

FitzHttgJi Lee's cavalry turned to bay at Deep Creek, 
delaying the pursuit till dark, and on the 4th, Sheridan 
was to reach the line Burke's Junction-Jetersville : 
Lee was then at Amelia Court House, but was not 
able to collect his army there till next day, when he 
sent away his spare artillery and trains by a road to 
his right, and himself moved towards Jetersville. 
That night he made a great march round the Union 
army to Rice's Station, and the attempt to surround 
him only came up with his rear troops, but Sheridan's 
cavalry took and destroyed some of his trains and 
spare guns, and took a train on the railway containing 
rations, another being carelessly sent on to Richmond. 
In these operations the Headquarters papers of Lee's 
army were destroyed, a great loss. 

On the 8th, Meade had to change his direction of 
march and lost time, but the Confederate columns 
were encumbered with too much baggage, and Sheri- 
dan's cavalry came up with the retreat at Sailor's 
Creek : he used some units to attack the march in 
flank and retard it, while with the rest he pressed 



LEE SURRENDERS 385 

forward and headed it off, portion by portion, till the 
infantry came up and finished the work. EwclTs and 
Anderson's commands were broken up and captured, 
but Gordon, taking another road, kept up a running 
fight and got away, though with the loss of a great 
part of his trains. The day's loss to the Confederates 
was about 8,000 men, and the retreat was now covered 
by Longstrecfs Corps, Rossers cavalry defeating a 
Union force near Farmville and destroying the bridge, 
which delayed the pursuit at that point and enabled 
Lee to take up a strong position, covering the roads 
to Lynchburg. The delay here, though, gave time 
for Sheridan's cavalry to post themselves across his 
path at Appomattox Court House, closely followed 
by Ord with two Corps : but for this, Lee could have 
got well away on his road to Lynchburg, and have 
reached that place on the 9th. 

Grant wrote to Lee on the 7th, pointing out that 
he had no chance, and that further loss of life was 
useless or worse, and advising him to surrender, but 
the pursuit went on just the same, and on the 9th ^ 
a sharp action opened, when Lee, finding that he was 
headed off in front and pressed in rear, surrendered. 
He had hoped to have forced his way through, for 
Sheridan's cavalry were being driven back, when 
Ord's infantry arrived in support and settled the 
matter. 

At the interview for the surrender Grant exhibited 
in a marked degree his sound common sense and kind- 
ness of heart. His object now was to bring about not 
only peace but good feeling (cf. p. 444), and his terms 
were that the officers and men of Lee's army be paroled 
and unable to serve again till properly exchanged, 
and all arms and military stores become captured 
property, but added that the officers' swords, private 
horses, and baggage were not included. In conver- 
sation, as it turned out that most of the animals in 

' S. Capture of Mobile, April I2th. 
S. Wilson's Raid in Alabama, April. 

25 



386 THE FIRST HALF OF 1865 

the Confederate army belonged to the men, Grant 
said that his great object was to bring about a real 
settlement of the country, and that he would direct 
his officers to allow any Confederate who claimed to 
own an animal to take it away with him, so that they 
could work their small farms and get their crops in, 
which kind thought Lee gratefully acknowledged. A 
question next arose as to the feeding of the Con- 
federate army, which was starving, and Grant ordered 
25,000 rations to be sent over: 28,000 men actually 
surrendered, but there were not half that number in 
the ranks really effective. 

The next thing was to send the news to all parts 
of both armies to stop further fighting, and then for 
a day or so more the two sides mingled freely as 
friends, especially the senior officers of the old army. 
Grant specially ordered that there be no cheering, 
no salutes, nothing done, in fact, which would look 
like exultation over a fallen enemy. 

The Army of the Potomac was brought to Wash- 
ington for the great review and march past the Presi- 
dent on May 22nd and 23rd, and then was disbanded.^ 

On the James River there had been a Confederate 
flotilla during the siege of Petersburg, which was 
very active at first, but Grant had blocked the river 
and kept a powerful force to hold it in abeyance, 
in which were several monitors, and the late Con- 
federate ironclad " Atlanta " ; but when all the monitors 
but one were withdrawn for the attack on Fort Fisher 
in January, 1865, the Confederate commodore thought 
that he had a chance of success if he could pass the 
obstructions which Grant had laid down. His fleet 
included three ironclads, the "/V^^/mc^s/^wr^," " /??c/?- 
mondl' and " Virginia^' the latter being said to be 

' S.E. Jefferson Davis captured, May loth. 
W. Thompson iM.xxe.xii^Qxs, May nth. 
S.W. Sabine Pass surrenders, May 25th. 
S.W. Kirby Smith surrenders, May 26th. 

The "■Stonewall" surrenders at Havana in May. 



NAVAL ACTION ON THE JAMES 387 

the most powerful vessel the Confederates ever had. 
The river being high and the passage feasible, he 
moved down with the three ironclads and some 
smaller vessels on January 23rd to attack the monitor 
" Onondaga " and her consorts and the land batteries, 
but had to retreat after a sharp action, two of his 
vessels getting aground for a time : that night they 
attacked again with the same result. In February, 
Senwics, of " Alabauia " fame, succeeded to the com- 
mand, but could do nothing, as both the Union fleet 
and the obstructions had been very much strength- 
ened. When Petersburg became untenable, he blew 
up his ships and formed his men into a small naval 
brigade, which was sent to guard the communications 
at Danville, to which place President Davis brought 
his Cabinet, archives, and treasure on the evacuation 
of Richmond. On the 9th the Government was moved 
to Greensboro, North Carolina, and on the i8th to 
Charlotte, in the same State. On the 24th, Davis 
approved of the convention between Johnston and 
Sherman. 

In January, Grant directed Thomas to tell Stone- 
man to repeat his raid of December and destroy the 
railway (Virginia Central) as far towards Lynchburg 
as possible. Stoneman started from Knoxville, but, 
greatly to Grant's annoyance, not till March 29th, 
with a cavalry division of three brigades, moved via 
Boone and Wilkesboro, North Carolina, into south- 
western Virginia, and destroyed the line from Wythe- 
ville nearly to Lynchburg : on April 9th he crossed 
again into North Carolina, destroying the railway 
between Danville and Greensboro with one column, 
while he moved on Salisbury with the main column, 
which got there on the 12th. He seems not to have 
entered Greensboro, where he might have captured 
Jefferson Davis and several members of his Govern- 
ment. Stoneman then returned to Tennessee, leaving 
Gillem with the bulk of the force to scour North 
Carolina. 



388 THE FIRST HALF OF 1865 

The South-East 

(Continued from p. 359.) In January^ another 
attempt was made on Fort Fisher by a combined 
expedition under Admiral Porter and General Terry, 
who commanded the new Xth Corps (cf. p. 384). The 
Confederate District was under Bragg, but General 
IVhiting commanded the troops at hand. 

The attacking force sailed from Port Royal on 
January 12th, and the next morning the ironclads 
went close in to bombard the fort while the rest of 
the fleet was landing troops and stores. Terry landed 
on the spit above the fort, entrenching a line across 
it to protect himself from the covering force under 
Hoke, and then reconnoitred the fort. That afternoon 
the whole fleet stood in and opened a tremendous fire 
upon it, which dismounted a number of guns, and to 
which but little reply could be made. Next day, the 
14th, the heavy gunboats supported the ironclads in 
the attack on the land face and kept up fire during 
the night. On the 15th, the fleet were to bombard 
the place in the morning, and the troops and a naval 
landing party to attack it in the afternoon. Again 
a crushing fire was opened, which for the time 
silenced nearly all the fort's guns, but the naval 
attack failed : the sailors and marines rallied, and 
supported Terry's attack on the land face, afterwards 
moving into the entrenchments to keep Hoke in 
check, supported by the fire of the gunboats. The 
land attack, with this support, and that of the heavy 
ships (especially of the " New Ironsides," which raked 
the land front), succeeded in getting in, but the 
fighting was most desperate, the works being taken 
piece by piece, and the resistance not ceasing till 
10 p.m. General IVhiting, who had come in with 
reinforcements, was mortally wounded. There were 

' E. Rosser takes Beverly, W. Va., January nth. 

The " Shenandoah " reaches Melbourne, January 23th. 
The '■'■ StonewalV commissioned, January 30th. 



THE FALL OF WILMINGTON 389 

elaborate arrangements for land mines, etc., but the 
electric wires were cut by the bombardment and they 
could not be fired. Bragg was much blamed for not 
coming to the assistance of the garrison, and also 
for having moved his command to Wilmington, which 
left the coast inadequately watched. The fort had 
been carefully strengthened since the attack in Dec- 
ember, and the garrison numbered 1,800 men, the 
covering force, under Hoke, 6,000. The Confederates 
abandoned the other works at the mouth of the river, 
and the Union troops took 169 guns and 2,000 
prisoners. Hoke, however, entrenched a good posi- 
tion and was supported by Bragg from Wilmington, 
thus holding Terry in check for the time. 

Meanwhile Schofield's troops were being brought 
over from the West, and early in February Grant 
and he arrived at Fort Fisher. His task was now 
to take Wilmington, and not only close this last port 
to the enemy, but ensure a new base for Sherman 
if wanted. Even after his XXIIIrd Corps was landed 
Hoke held the whole command fast for some time, 
and an attempt to take him in rear by a landing from 
the fleet failed, so the XXIIIrd Corps was moved 
across the river to attack a fort which protected his 
flank by its fire, but the ground was swampy, and 
the Confederates had utilized it most ably, which 
caused delay : the fleet however bombarded the fort, 
which was abandoned, the garrison falling back to 
lines in rear, to which movement Hoke conformed. 
This was another very strong position just in front 
of Wilmington, behind a swamp which was only 
crossed by one causeway, but it was held in front 
by a demonstration while a landing was made in 
rear, when it fell. Hoke on his side held Terry's 
Corps in check all day. Schofield sent a division 
round to attack him, but he evacuated the town in 
the night and got away. 

The next place in front of Schofield was New 
Berne, a much better base than Wilmington, being 



390 THE FIRST HALF OF 1865 

connected to a better harbour at Morehead City by 
a short railway, in working order, which the Wil- 
mington line was not, but this latter was soon re- 
paired. The inland line to Kinston was but little 
damaged, but thence to Goldsboro wanted much 
repair. Several fresh divisions for Schofield were 
sent to New Berne, under Cox, who moved against 
Kinston, where Hoke was reported to be waiting 
for him, on the Neuse River, supported by an iron- 
clad. This position was also well protected by 
swamps in front. 

Bragg now took command of the Confederates in 
the field, and brought reinforcements from Hoods old 
army, under orders from Johnston, now commanding 
the District, to join the troops he had assembled at 
Goldsboro and strike at Schofield's force, hoping to 
defeat it before Sherman could come up, and then 
to turn on Sherman in full force. Cox was therefore 
ordered to keep on the defensive till the army came 
up. On March 9th there was some fighting, and on 
the loth, Bragg, who had between 8,000 and 10,000 
men, attacked in earnest, but failed, and retreated to 
join Johnston at Goldsboro. Schofield then came up, 
set to work to repair the line, and sent Terry for- 
ward towards Goldsboro, where on the 20th he was 
in touch with Sherman, Johnston having fallen back. 

Although Stoneman did not repeat his raid, as 
ordered, in January, a small cavalry force under Kirk 
raided into North Carolina from the westward. 

Before Charleston, Fort Sumter was subjected to 
a most continuous and accurate fire, being only some 
1,300 yards from the guns on Cumming's Point: 51 
heavy guns were used up by the attack on it. During 
the last year, it had been transformed, under fire, 
from the shattered ruins of an old-type brick fort to 
a powerful earthwork, impregnable to assault, and 
able to take its full share in the defence of the place 
with six heavy guns to the end. In January the 
monitor " Patapsco " was destroyed by a submarine 



SHERMAN REACHES COLUMBIA, S.C. 391 

mine off the harbour, and combined operations were 
undertaken in the neighbouring creeks and inner 
waters, with sharp fighting, till within a few hours 
of the evacuation. On February i8th,' Charleston and 
its forts were found to be evacuated : several ironclad 
rams were found by the Union troops, the best of 
which, the " Coliiinbia,'' was aground, and there were 
also some torpedo-boats. The place was garrisoned 
by Foster's troops from Port Royal, which command 
also found the garrison for Savannah when Sherman 
marched out. 

To return to Sherman and his great stroke north- 
ward from Savannah to give the death-blow to the 
Confederacy. His plan was much the same in detail 
as in the march through Georgia, to seem to be head- 
ing for important places on each side, so that troops 
were collected there to stop him, and then to pass 
between them : as he had no lines of communication, 
leaving forces of the enemy in his rear did not matter : 
he lived on the country, as before, and destroyed 
supplies and railways. He considered Charleston as 
lost when its rear communications were cut, and took 
no heed of it in his plans, but by threatening both it 
and Augusta he divided the Confederate troops, and 
concentrated his own to the front near Branchville, 
an important railway junction. Thence he moved on 
Columbia, the Capital of South Carolina, which the 
army reached on February i6th, and on the night of 
the 17th the town was almost burnt down, not by 
any orders of his, for he did his utmost to stop it, 
but probably by some drunken soldiers. As he had 
foreseen, Charleston was evacuated, and its garrison 
reinforced Hardee. 

So far there had been little opposition from Hardee, 
commanding the defence, except from his cavalry, but 
this was continuous, and Wade Hampton, now com- 
manding it, captured Kilpatrick's headquarters, some 
guns, and several hundred prisoners, but Kilpatrick, 

' The ^* Shenandoah" leaves Melbourne, February i8th. 



392 THE FIRST HALF OF 1865 

who escaped, soon attacked again and got his guns 
back. Lee wrote to the Governor of South Carolina in 
January, pointing out that the holding of places was 
of less importance than the stopping of the Union 
armies, even if Charleston were to fall, and suggesting 
how Hardee s force could be raised to some 33,000 
men, but this was not done. On February 23rd he 
appointed Johnston to command the Confederate forces 
in the Carolinas, who had to begin by getting an army 
together in Hardee s rear, troops being brought from 
Hoods old army to reinforce him. 

Sherman entered Cheraw on March 3rd, where there 
were enormous stores, much being private property 
sent from Charleston for safety, and at Fayetteville, 
which he took on the loth, found that the U.S. Arsenal 
there had been very much enlarged and improved. 
From thence he wrote to Grant, proposing to drive 
Hardee beyond Goldsboro, and seize it to prevent 
Johnston concentrating there, expecting that he would 
more probably do so near Raleigh than attack Scho- 
field near New Berne. He also wrote to Schofield 
and Terry re co-operation, the danger being that 
Johnston might catch one Corps isolated and destroy 
it. Schofield was to try to join him at Goldsboro. 
The communication between them was now assured, 
and gave Sherman a fresh line, which was most useful 
for sending to safety thousands of negro fugitives who 
encumbered the march and could not be kept away : 
they were a very serious embarrassment, especially 
as they had to be fed, like the army, entirely from the 
country. Arsenal and ironworks at Fayetteville were 
destroyed, and Slocum's column made touch with 
Hardee's rearguard on the 15th : next day Hardee was 
found in an entrenched position at Averysboro, which 
was attacked in front while the cavalry turned one 
flank and an infantry brigade the other, causing the 
Confederates to retreat to another line of works in 
rear with some loss : the Union force encamped in 
front of this second position, but Hardee retired in the 



AFTER AVERYSBORO 393 

night. On the Union side, this battle was fought by 
the XXth Corps and Kilpatrick's cavalry. Hardee 
fought at Averysboro to give time for Braggs com- 
mand to join y^/?;/5/o;/, and to catch Slocum's wing by 
itself, which he knew he could do, being well informed 
of Sherman's dispositions, but he failed to beat it. 

(Note. — Johnston's army was estimated at this time 
at 37,000, viz. : 

Hardee, including Wheeler's cavalry . 18,000 
(this was Hardee's strength in December) 

Hoke, strength in January . . . 6,000 

Rhett, late Charleston Garrison, say 5,000 

IVadc Hampton's cavalry . . ,, 3,000 

Bragg' s command . . . . „ 5,000 

37,000 



Sherman put it rather higher, but both were above 
the mark ; unless the loss from desertion was enor- 
mous, Johnston must have had 30,000 men, for Hoke's 
and Wheelers commands were the only ones which 
had lately seen much real fighting.) 

From Averysboro the march turned eastwards to- 
wards Goldsboro, Slocum's command forming the left 
wing and Howard's the right, and the resistance 
became stubborn and continuous. On the morning 
of the 19th, Sherman said to Slocum that he thought 
Hardee had fallen back on Raleigh and that he 
(Slocum) could now easily reach the Neuse River, and 
then rode off to Howard's command ; but Slocum soon 
after ran up against Johnston's whole army near 
Bentonville, for Johnston, knowing that Sherman's 
army was marching by wings, had moved suddenly, 
to strike Slocum with his whole force and beat him in 
detail. Slocum got the information just in time, and 
was able to take up and begin to entrench a position 
on which his advanced troops could fall back, which' 
they soon had to do. He also sent at once to Sherman 
for help, having just before sent to say that he wanted 



394 THE FIRST HALF OF 1865 

none. He managed to hold his own till dark, and on 
the 20th Logan's XVth Corps came up from Howard's 
command. Johnston, knowing that the rest of Sher- 
man's army would soon follow, entrenched himself 
strongly in a position forming a salient, of which 
Slocum faced one side, while Howard's men moved 
against the other ; but Sherman, over-estimating his 
enemy's strength, did not attack, hoping that Schofield's 
command would soon arrive, and also being short of 
supplies. It seems that one of the causes of his over- 
estimate was the Confederate custom of retaining the 
names of units, however much they might be reduced, 
which has already been alluded to. On the 21st, 
Mower (XXth Corps) attacked and broke the Con- 
federate line, but Sherman did not want to bring on 
a general action, and held him back, which he after- 
wards admitted was a mistake, as he could then have 
fought a general action with advantage and probably 
destroyed Johnston's army. On the 22nd, Johnston was 
gone, having retreated on Smithfield, and Sherman 
moved on Goldsboro. The really hard fighting at 
Benton ville was on the first day, the 19th. Johnston 
gives his strength in the battle as a little over 14,000, 
but, knowing that it was his object to crush Slocum 
with his whole weight, it seems curious that he had 
not more: the Union figures give Slocum 12,000, 
Johnston 22,000, numbers actually engaged. However 
this may be, the move which brought on the battle of 
Bentonville was a bold and able stroke on Johnston's 
part. 

On the 22nd, also, Schofield's command joined 
Sherman, and in the next two days the whole army 
was assembled at Goldsboro. Sherman's old railway 
engineer. Colonel Wright, who had served him so well 
all the way to Atlanta, was again to the fore, and put 
the broken railways in working order almost as soon 
as the troops had reached their destinations. 

This Campaign of the Carolinas was even a greater 
achievement in its way than the March to the Sea, 



THE LAST UNION PLANS 395 

though less sensational, for the army had marched 
425 miles and crossed five broad navigable rivers, at 
any one of which a comparatively small force could 
have delayed it seriously, in fifty days ; the weather 
was bad, and the roads swamps, which had to be 
" corduroyed " as the army went along. Three im- 
portant towns and depots had been destroyed, as well 
as the communications of South Carolina, and the 
evacuation of Charleston was brought about by its 
isolation. Now that Schofield's army had joined, it 
really did not matter whether Lee joined Johnston or 
not before Grant's armies could come up. 

At Goldsboro, Sherman received Grant's answer to 
his report of March i6th. He then, for purposes of 
discipline, made Slocum's command from the old Army 
of the Cumberland, the " Army of Georgia," Schofield's 
retaining its old name of the Army of the Ohio. 
Grant wrote to Sherman about the next moves, detail- 
ing his own and Sheridan's plans with regard to Lee, 
and saying that Stoneman was to move on Lynchburg 
from Tennessee, and a Corps to go from Thomas to 
Bull's Gap on the Virginia border, while Canby 
marched for Mobile and the interior. After Charleston 
fell, Gillmore was ordered to seize all points that he 
could on the coast, and send any spare troops to 
Schofield, via Wilmington : Thomas to do the same. 
Sherman then went to see Grant, leaving Schofield in 
command, and there met President Lincoln, and ascer- 
tained his views on the terms for, and treatment of, 
the Confederates, when, as must soon happen, they 
had to surrender, and on other matters. This took 
place on March 27th and 28th, Sherman rejoining his 
army on the 30th. 

He had agreed with Grant that he would be ready 
to advance on April loth, and on the 5th ^ planned to 
place his army north of the Roanoke, facing west with 
its base at Norfolk, in full communication with Grant. 

' S. Wilson beats Forrest at Selma, April 2nd. 
S. Canby takes Mobile, April 12th. 



396 THE FlAST HALF OF 1865 

This was practically a flank march across Johnston's 
front, and all were to keep ready to turn and fight 
towards the left flank if required. It had for its object 
the flanking of Lee's line of march if he attempted to 
join Johnston, and was based on the knowledge that 
the latter's army was not strong enough to prevent 
such a movement, though it might molest it. It was 
necessary to be at the assigned place in time, and 
therefore to provide against being delayed by Johnston. 
Schofield was to cover Wilmington and district, to 
prevent an attack on the sea base and on the operation 
of changing base by the Sounds, Sherman's original 
army being enough for the march. 

On April 6th came the news of the fall of Richmond 
and Lee's retreat, which changed the whole problem. 
Sherman saw that his first plan would not now be in 
time to intercept a march by Lee to join Johnston, and 
that the only thing to do was to attack Johnston at 
once by moving on Raleigh, his base, he being then in 
front of it at Smithfield with probably over 30,000 men, 
covered by his cavalry. Grant's letters approved this 
plan, so on the day fixed, April loth, Sherman started 
for Raleigh, 50 miles away, in several columns, but on 
reaching Smithfield next day, found it abandoned and 
the bridges burnt, which delayed him a day, and on 
the night of the 12th came the news oi Lee's surrender. 
Johnston might surrender or disperse his army, for 
he could not be caught in that country, having more 
cavalry than Sherman, who had not enough to finish 
the work properly. As Sherman advanced, he was 
met by the citizens of Raleigh asking for protection, 
and heard that the Union cavalry raids were now 
breaking up the Confederacy in all directions : Stone- 
man was approaching Greensboro from east Tennessee, 
Wilson driving through Alabama, making for Georgia, 
and it was quite on the cards that Sheridan's Cavalry 
Corps would move on Raleigh from Appomattox. 
From Raleigh, Sherman proposed to move!on Ashboro 
to cut oflf Johnstons best line of retreat, by Salisbury 



ASSASSINATION OF LINCOLN 397 

and Charlotte, starting on April 14th, but a letter 
came from Johnston, asking for an armistice till the 
authorities could make arrangements to end the War. 
Sherman stopped the march, Johnston's troops also 
halting, and an appointment was made for the two 
commanders to meet on the 17th, but on that morning 
came the news of President Lincoln's assassination 
the night before. Sherman ordered the telegraph 
operator to keep it quiet, said nothing even to his own 
staff, and when he met Johnston, took him aside and 
shewed him the telegram privately. Johnston was 
much distressed and denounced the crime most 
vehemently, hoping that it would not be laid at the 
door of the Confederate Government, to which Sherman 
answered that though no one would ever think of 
connecting his name or Lee's with it, he would not say 
as much {or Jefferson Davis or some of his politicians. 
It made the situation very delicate, owing to the 
furious indignation aroused in the North, but as to the 
policy which the dead President would have wished 
to be followed, it being taken for granted that this 
would be consistently carried out, Sherman had no 
doubt whatever, for he had met him not three weeks 
before, and had fully discussed this very situation. 
Johnston plainly said that further fighting would be 
MURDER, and thought that terms of surrender might 
be made which would embrace all the Confederate 
troops in the field, by consultation with President Davis. 
They then parted, Sherman to break the sad news to 
his men and keep them quiet, Johnston to arrange for 
a general surrender, to meet again the next day. Next 
morning, Johnston had authority for the surrender of 
all the Confederate armies on the same terms as his 
own, and brought with him Breckinridge, his Secretary 
of War, who confirmed it, but they said that their 
officers and men had great doubts about the restora- 
tion of their political rights afterwards, and asked for 
some assurance to that effect. Sherman quoted 
Lincoln's Proclamation of Amnesty of December 8th, 



398 THE FI^ST HALF OF 1865 

1863, for all below the rank of colonel, on taking the 
oath of allegiance, and added that Grant had extended 
this to all the officers of Lee's army, including Lee 
himself, but this did not satisfy them. Sherman wrote 
out terms of surrender on the lines of his conversation 
with President Lincoln, saying that he would submit 
them to President Johnson for ratification, Johnston's 
army to remain where it was in the meanwhile, and the 
armistice to be terminated by forty-eight hours' notice 
from either side (cf. p. 424). These terms provided for 
the dispersal of the Confederate armies in such a way 
as to prevent them from forming guerilla bands, while 
leaving the North free to maintain as many troops as 
might be necessary. The Confederate troops were to 
be disbanded at the Capitals of their respective States, 
to which their arms were to be surrendered (cf. p. 427) : 
this proviso gave the States the power of keeping 
order. The United States to recognize the States of 
the late Confederacy, on their governments taking the 
proper oaths, the Federal Courts to be re-established, 
and the political rights of the people of all such States 
to be guaranteed. These terms were not approved at 
Washington, and Sherman was instructed by Grant, 
who came over, to give notice to Johnston to end the 
armistice, but he wrote a letter to him at the same 
time to the effect that he was empowered to deal with 
him and his army only, and offering him the same 
terms which had been offered to Lee : these were 
accepted and the surrender was carried out on 
April 26th. 

Sherman's terms were disapproved because he had 
acted ultra vires in dealing with political matters, but 
had Grant's suggestion been accepted that President 
Johnson call a Council to consider them, and if ap- 
proved adopt and promulgate them himself, matters 
would have been settled much sooner than they were, 
and much bloodshed and trouble saved, as well as the 
enormous cost of keeping armies in the field longer 
than necessary. Early in March, Lee had written to 



STANTON AND SHERMAN 399 

Grant, suggesting that they should meet in order to 
" submit the subjects of controversy'' between the 
belligerents to a convention," which was forwarded to 
Stanton, who instructed Grant from the President 
to hold no communication with Lee except on military 
matters, and especially not to deal with politics, which 
the President reserved to himself absolutely, while any 
military advantages were to be pressed to the utmost : 
had Sherman been informed of this it would have 
saved all the trouble. Stanton, however, published a 
bulletin reflecting on his conduct, hinting that he knew 
of it and was conniving at the escape of Davis with the 
Confederate treasure. Grant was sent down to super- 
sede him in command, though he did not do so, and 
Schofield was instructed to receive the surrender of 
Johnston's army at Greensboro. Soon afterwards 
Halleck was sent down and put over Sherman, whose 
army marched to Washington, where it passed the 
President in review on May 24th and 25th, and was 
then disbanded. Sherman resented the insult so 
keenly, that at the review he refused to shake hands 
with Stanton. 

Johnston issued a farewell order to his troops, 
begging them to return to their homes and become 
good and peaceful citizens, so as to restore tran- 
quillity to the country. 

At the beginning of April, General Echols was in 
command of the Confederate Department of South- 
western Virginia, and had under him some 6,000 men, 
of whom 2,200 were cavalry. He started to join Lee 
near Danville, and on the loth reached Christiansburg, 
where he heard of" the surrender at Appomattox. He 
then decided to send the cavalry to Johnston and 
" temporarily furlough," or disband, the infantry. 
Even here, though, the idea of going to join Maximilian 
in Mexico was mooted, for it was becoming very 
generally held in the Confederacy among the more 
irreconcilable spirits. After the cavalry had crossed 
into North Carolina, they heard that Stoneman's 



400 THE FIR^T HALF OF 1865 

command was close by, and the scouts soon got into 
touch with it : Duke's brigade was moving on parallel 
roads with Stoneman, to Lincolnton, but he turned off 
to Charlotte, where he found another Confederate 
cavalry brigade, and next day President Davis arrived 
there, with his family, General Bragg, some members 
of his Cabinet, and two more cavalry brigades. General 
Breckinridge, the IVar Secretary, soon joined them, 
expecting that the arrangement with Sherman, of 
which Davis approved, would be carried out, but when 
Johnston telegraphed to say that this was not so, and 
that he would take what terms he could get, Davis 
determined to march to join Taylor and Forrest in 
Alabama with all available troops Breckinridge com- 
manded the force, four cavalry brigades, and for some 
distance they were shadowed by Stoneman's men, 
who seem soon to have dropped off: another oi Echols' 
cavalry brigades joined them, and at Abbeville, South 
Carolina, was held the last Confederate Council of 
War. Davis spoke of tiding over the temporary 
depression and did not seem to think the military 
situation hopeless, which was curious, seeing that he 
had consented to a general surrender, but his generals 
frankly told him that it was, that they were only in 
arms now to protect him personally, and would use 
them for that purpose, but not to continue the War. 
The general feeling was to try to get their President 
safely out of the country, and then to obtain the same 
terms which had been granted to Johnston's army, 
failing which they would strike out for the trans- 
Mississippi district. It was decided to start that night 
and march for Washington, Georgia, for they had 
with them the money of the Confederate Treasury, 
over 500,000 dollars in coin, which was transferred 
from the railway to waggons. At the Savannah 
River, Davis ordered that over 100,000 dollars be 
paid to the troops, being less than the pay actually 
due to them, the rest being turned over to an 
officer of the Confederate Treasury. Davis then left 



JEFFERSON DAVIS CAPTURED 401 

with a small escort to help him to escape, and the 
greater part of the troops were given their discharge, 
their officers making arrangements for surrender. 
A body of some 350 men remained together, both to 
divert attention from Davis' movements and to help 
Brccki)iridge to escape, for the Northern feeling against 
him was very strong, he having been Vice-President 
of the United States just before the War. They were 
met by a strong Union force which advised them to 
surrender, and did not attack : after a parley, to give 
time to Breckinridge to escape, they surrendered, in 
which 2iQ.\. J effcrson Davis' family, and several prominent 
Confederates, were included. 

The West 

(Continued from p. 366,) In the West, the fighting 
was practically over, there being only a few skirmishes 
in various places in January : on the 2nd, some of 
Hood's trains were taken in the retreat from Nashville. 

Grant thought that Thomas, after Schofield's Corps 
had gone, would still be able to strike south to Selma 
with his army, but he did not, and shewed himself 
so unenterprising that Grant sent Smith's XVIth 
Corps away to Canby, telling Thomas to concentrate 
his army and prepare for a campaign towards Lynch- 
burg, but intending to put a smarter man in command 
if a chance came, for he was quite out of patience 
with him. Stoneman had been ordered to start on 
his raid in January, but did not get away till March ; 
Thomas was told to send another cavalry raid south 
into Mississippi in February, but this never started 
at all ; and Wilson was also to be sent to raid south 
and co-operate with Canby, but did not start till 
long after he should have done : but he was to some 
extent stopped by bad weather. Gillem was also to 
go and hold the east end of the Holston Valley to 
block that route against Lee^ which he eventuall}^ did : 
this force was afterwards increased to a whole Corps, 
the IVth. 

26 



402 THE FIRST HALF OF 1865 

On the Confederate side Hood's army, in retreat, 
passed out of this division, as we have taken them, 
for convenience, into the Southern. 



The South and South-West 

(Continued from pp. 352 and 376.) Hood took all 
responsibility for the Tennessee campaign, and re- 
signed his command after he had brought back the 
army to Tupelo : he was succeeded by Beauregard on 
January 14th. 

Grant ordered Canby first to move against and take 
Mobile, and then to strike inland towards Mont- 
gomery and Selma, where he would meet Thomas 
coming from the north, but neither would move, till 
Grant was in despair : both of them failed to carry 
out the parts assigned to them in time, thereby 
materially lengthening the War in the South. Grier- 
son was sent to take command of Canby's cavalry, 
and they were specially warned that their opponent 
would probably be the formidable Forrest. 

Canby, instead of taking Mobile and marching into 
Alabama in February, did not move against the former 
place till March. ^ The fleet in the bay co-operated 
with him, and he invested it on the 27th. Several 
vessels were lost by submarine mines, the main fort 
surrendered on April 8th, the line of works being 
taken by assault next day, two other forts were 
occupied on the nth, and the place was evacuated 
on the 1 2th. Steele had come from Pensacola at the 
beginning of the siege, and joined Canby, who then 
had 45,000 men, viz. Granger's (new) Xlllth Corps, 
Smith's XVIth, Steele's two divisions, and a cavalry 
brigade. Maury commanded the defence, consisting 
of 10,000 men and 5 gunboats : his troops retreated 
to Meridian. On May 4th, Taylor surrendered all the 

' E. Fort Stedman, March 25th. 
S.E. Bentonville, March I9th-2ist. 
Europe. The " Stonewall" leaves Ferrol, March 24th. 



WILSON'S GREAT MARCH 403 

Confederate forces east of the Mississippi at Citronelle, 
and the gunboats were handed over to Admiral 
Thatcher, Farragut's successor.^ On the 26th, Kirby 
Smith surrendered at Baton Rouge, and Sabine Pass 
and Galveston were given up on May 25th and June 
3rd. The last of the Confederate gunboats on the 
Mississippi surrendered to the Mississippi squadron 
in June, which had now done its work and ceased 
to exist, most of the boats being sold. 

On March i8th, Wilson started from the banks of 
the Tennessee, being sent by Thomas south towards 
Selma, to co-operate with Canby. He had a cavalry 
Corps of three divisions, 12,000 strong, and was 
opposed by Forrest with less than 8,000. Wilson 
marched in several columns, one of which, Croxton's, 
carried out an independent raid of its own. Forrest 
was therefore compelled to divide his smaller force 
to watch them. Wilson struck at Tuscaloosa, and at 
Montevallo had an action with the Confederate cavalry, 
which he drove back on March 31st. He then marched 
on Selma, and Forrest tried to concentrate, but Wilson 
struck him with greatly superior forces and totally 
defeated him, breaking up his command and taking 
Selma, on April 2nd.- Wilson's raids completel}- 
destroyed railways, ironworks, supplies, at Selma, 
Cahawba, and other places, and he reached Mont- 
gomery on the 1 2th, which surrendered. On the 
1 6th the enemy was found strongly posted near 
Columbus, by a small force under General Upton, 
and after a severe fight was driven out. At this 
place were found a powerful ironclad, nearly com- 
pleted, and a gunboat, which were destroyed. Another 
part of the command took West Point the same day. 
Macon surrendered to Wilson's force on April 20th. 

On the 20th, Wilson had received a letter from 
Beauregard, telling him of the truce between Sherman 

' S.E. Jefferson Davis captured, May loth. 

W. Thompson surrenders, May nth. 
^ E. Fall of Petersburg, April 2nd. 



404 THE FIRST HALF OF 1865 

and Johnston, and soon after came one from Sherman 
to the same effect. Croxton's brigade had left the 
main column on March 20th, and rejoined at Macon 
on May ist. He had been most successful, destroying 
the last ironworks in the Confederacy, and breaking 
down all resistance. This raid of Wilson's was 
ordered for the purpose of keeping the Confederates 
in the Gulf States full}^ occupied, and to prevent them 
from sending troops away. 

Wilson had been kept informed of Jefferson Davis' 
movements, and searched the country thoroughly for 
him, the capture being made on May loth, by the 
4th Michigan Cavalry of Minty's division, near 
Irwinsville, Georgia. After the capture of President 
Davis, Forrest surrendered, and manfully set an 
example of conforming peaceably to the new order 
of things. 



The Blockade 

(Continued from p. 366.) The very night that Fort 
Fisher fell, two blockade-runners came in, and a negro 
who knew the private signals told General Terry how 
to answer them, so that they came up and were taken, 
their officers walking unsuspectingly into the fort. 
While in Confederate hands, its guns had effectually 
protected any vessel running in. 

Off Charleston, Admiral Dahlgren's flagship, the 
" Harvest Moon," was sunk by a submarine mine on 
March ist. Both here and at Mobile the Blockading 
squadrons co-operated most usefully with the troops 
throughout. The Atlantic Squadron was put down at 
the end of the War, but the Gulf Squadron was kept 
up to watch the French designs in Mexico. 

The tenders which Bulloch had bought in Europe, 
chiefly for the arming of cruisers at sea, had made 
useful blockade-runners, and finally sold well, so that 
they more than paid for themselves. 



CRUISE OF THE ''SHENANDOAH'' 405 

The War at Sea 

(Continued from p. 369.) The " Shcnandoali" which 
had partially recruited her crew from prizes, reached 
Melbourne on January 25th, where IVaddell stayed for 
repairs till February 1 8th, ^ and sailed with a fairly strong 
crew : there seems no doubt that he enlisted men freely 
in Melbourne, which pointed to culpable laxity on the 
part of the Colonial authorities. On May 21st the ship 
entered the Sea of Okhotsk, but was caught in the ice 
and came out again, having made one prize, one of the 
officers of which joined her, proving a most useful 
pilot and guide. On June 13th she stood north for 
Behring's Straits, where she had a short and most 
effective cruise, completely breaking up the American 
whaling fleet between June 22nd and 28th, in which 
time she either destroyed or ransomed 24 vessels. 
IVaddell then stood southward to get in the track of 
trade and find out something about the War, for he 
had taken April papers in his prizes containing both 
the correspondence between Grant and Lee before the 
surrender, and the proclamation of President Davis, 
stating that the War would be prosecuted with the 
utmost vigour. Meanwhile Bulloch had asked Mr. 
Mason the Confederate Commissioner to ask Lord 
John Russell to send round to the British Consuls at 
foreign ports to stop the " Shenandoah " from com- 
mitting acts of war : he consented to this simply as a 
message, not in any way to cover the ship's actions, 
IVaddell met H.M.S. " Barracouta " on August 2nd, 
and heard of the end of the War, on which he dis- 
mounted his guns and sailed for Liverpool, arriving 
there on November 6th, and surrendering to the British 
Government. Mr. Adams asked that the ship be 
handed over to the United States, which was done, 
but the officers and crew were not detained, as it was 
said that none were British subjects. 

S.E. Charleston evacuated, February i8th. 



4o6 THE FIRST HALF OF 1865 

On January 30th/ the late Danish ironclad ram 
"Sphinx" was commissioned as the Confederate ship- 
of-war " Stonewall" off the French coast, but made bad 
weather, leaked, and put into Ferrol for repairs, leaving 
it on March 24th. The U.S. ships "Niagara" and 
" Sacramento " were waiting at Coruna, and the 
" Stonewall" lay off that port for them for some hours, 
but they declined the challenge, though the "Niagara" 
carried ten heavy rifled guns, and the " Sacramento " 
two ii-inch smooth-bores. She then made her way 
to Havana via the Canaries, and got there in May. 
The Confederacy being then at an end. Captain Page 
arranged with the Captain-General of Cuba to take 
possession of the ship for 16,000 dollars, with which 
he paid off his men. She was soon surrendered to 
the United States, and afterwards sold to Japan. 

At the end of February, Barron resigned his post of 
senior Confederate naval officer in Europe, and turned 
over the " Rappahannock" lying at Calais, to Bulloch^ 
who made a nominal sale to an English ship-broker, 
being only too glad to be rid of her, as he could give 
no legal title. He would not have been justified then 
in sending her to sea, even had he had the money to 
fit her out. 

Mexico 

In Mexico, Bazaine took Oajaca on February 9th, 
but this did not really help Maximilian's unstable 
position. In April the Republicans defeated an 
Imperial force at Tacambaro, while the ending of the 
American Civil War, which put a large veteran army 
at the disposal of the United States for any service, 
their great irritation against Napoleon and his schemes, 
and the chaos in the country, made those on the 
Imperial side who wished to see stable government, 
look directly to France. They thought that there was 
a real danger of American intervention, in which case 
the great and increasing party of Moderates said 

' S.E. Fort Fisher taken, January 13th. 



NEW FRENCH DIFFICULTIES 407 

plainly that they would infinitely prefer either annexa- 
tion to France or a direct French protectorate, in the 
very likely event of Maximilian proving a failure as a 
ruler, for the Americans had made themselves tho- 
roughly detested when in Mexico before. From the 
French point of view, Napoleon had been too slow, 
and had failed to get Mexico settled before the end of 
the Civil War. 

Bazaine was making direct preparations to deal 
with American military interference, and the political 
question was complicated by the well-known desire of 
many prominent Confederates to take refuge in Mexico. 
It was not thought that this, if allowed, would really 
bring war, but the North were so excited, that it was 
judged wiser not to excite them further, and that if a 
part of the Confederate army crossed the border, they 
must be at once disarmed, and their arms surrendered 
to the North, if the latter would recognize the Mexican 
Empire. Anyhow, Jefferson Davis must not be given 
an asylum in the country. The financial situation was 
no better, and France was not yet getting any value 
from the Sonora mines concession. 

Summary 

(Continued from p. 371.) The end of the half-year 
saw the surrender of the last Confederates, except 
Captain Waddell and the crew of the " Shenandoah,'' 
but they committed no act of war after June 28th. 

The total of Confederate troops surrendered was 
174,223, made up thus : 

Army of Northern Virginia, General Lee . 27,805 

Army of Tennessee, etc., General Johnston . 31,243 

Army of Missouri, General Thompson . 7,978 
Miscellaneous, Department of Virginia, 

Mosby, etc 9,072 

Paroled at various Eastern stations . . 9,377 

Paroled in Alabama and Florida . . 6,428 

Carried forward . . . 91,903 



4o8 THE FIRST HALF OF 1865 

Brought forward , . . 91,903 
Army of Department of Alabama^ General 

Taylor 42,293 

Army of Trans- Mississippi Department, 

General Kirby Smith .... 17,686 

Paroled in Department of Washington . 3,390 

Paroled in various places .... 13,922 

Surrendered at Nashville and Chattanooga 5,029 

Total . 174,223 



On the Union side, recruiting for the army was 
stopped on April 13th, and on April 29th the mustering 
out began : this went on gradually till November, by 
the 15th of which month 800,963 officers and men had 
been discharged, and the forces of the United States 
were brought down to Sheridan's army (cf p. 415), 
troops for the disaffected States, and a slightly larger 
Regular army. 

An event of greater importance than even the end 
of the War was the assassination of the great and wise 
President Lincoln, part of a conspiracy against the 
chief men of the Union, for Seward was attacked and 
wounded the same night. Had Lincoln's guidance 
been retained at the head of affairs, the South would 
in all probability have been settled in half the time, 
with the minimum, not maximum, of friction and 
bitterness. The South lost their truest and best 
friend when he died, and many of them recognized 
it at the time. His successor was a man of very 
different nature, and before Lincoln was cold in 
his grave the old evil of political interference with 
military affairs broke out afresh, for President John- 
son would not or could not control Stanton's officious 
meddling. This matter will come more into the next 
chapter. 

Union Loss. — President Lincoln, assassinated. 

Confederate Loss. — General A. P. Hill, killed in 
action. 



ABRAHAM LINCOLN 409 

Some Notices 

(Continued from p. ^y;^.) In addition to the deaths 
of President Lincoln and General A. P. Hill, General 
Hood resigned, on the Confederate side. 

Abraham Lincoln was born in Kentucky in 1809, 
of poor parents, and lost his mother, a good and pious 
woman, when quite 3^oung, but his step-mother, when 
his father married again, was another excellent woman, 
whom he loved devotedly. In 1830 the family moved 
to Illinois, and here occurred the sorrow of his life, 
the death of his fiancee in 1835, which for a time even 
endangered his reason, and tinged his whole character 
with a deep and abiding melancholy. He did not 
marry till 1842. He worked his way along, educating 
himself as best he could, for he never was six months 
at school in his life. After serving as a Volunteer in 
the Black Hawk Indian War of 1832, he took up the 
study of law and was admitted to the Bar in 1836, 
where his clear head, eloquence, and uncompromising 
honesty soon made him famous. In 1834 he had been 
elected to the State Legislature as a Whig, and two 
years later became the party leader, in opposition to 
the great Douglas, who led the Democrats. A strong 
opponent of slavery, though not an Abolitionist, he 
came to the front in 1854 in his opposition to the 
Kansas-Nebraska Bill, and signally defeated Douglas 
in Debate. He was sent to Congress in the 'forties, 
and was a candidate for election to the Senate in 1855 
and 1858, in the latter election being defeated by 
Douglas ; but he had made such a mark that he was 
nominated for President in i860. 

As a politician, after he became President, he repre- 
sented the principle of amalgamation and sinking of 
all minor interests for the maintenance of the Union, 
and in forming his Cabinet aimed at a coalition Union 
Ministry, even trying to include a member from a 
Southern State, but in this, probably fortunately, he 
failed. Mr, Welles, the Secretary of the Navy, and 



4IO THE FIRST HALF OF 1865 

Mr. Stanton, the Secretary of War from 1862, were 
both political opponents in the ordinary sense. 

Though a really strong man, he was lacking in self- 
assertion, modest, and diffident, in setting his own 
opinions against those of men who ought to have 
expert knowledge, wherever possible leaving military 
questions to military specialists, but he often had to 
make military decisions and give orders, because those 
who should have done so shirked the responsibility. 
He said to General Grant, when he appointed him 
Commander-in-Chief, that he was keenly conscious 
that these orders were very likely wrong, and hoped 
that he (Grant) would now take this burden of re- 
sponsibility off his shoulders. This does not mean 
that he in any way surrendered control, or wished 
to do so, but that he should be left free for his broad 
general duties of supervision and advice. 

Till he became President, the sobriquet of " Honest 
Abe " probably expressed him to the majority of 
people ; but he was far more than that, good as it 
was. Strong, wise, dignified, kindly, a simple and 
humble Christian man, he united in himself all the 
real elements of greatness. A trained and acute 
lawyer and advocate, he was eloquent without rant, 
while his shrewdness and keen sense of humour 
enabled him to parry awkward questions while making 
his meaning clear, without committing himself or his 
Government, by means of the queer yarns for which 
he was famous. But the keynote of his character was 
his simple faith and trust in God, which was an in- 
tegral part of his life. He was elected to maintain 
the Union, not to abolish slavery, and constantly 
reminded Abolitionists of this ; but he felt the curse 
of slavery on the country as keenly as any one, and 
the series of disasters to the Union arms in the East 
so wrought on him that he is said to have exclaimed 
in the anguish of his heart, " If there is any one out of 
Hell more miserable than I am, I pity him." He looked 
on these defeats as the evidence of God's wrath on the 



ABRAHAM LINCOLN 411 

country, and after the battle of Manassas vowed to 
Heaven that if God vouchsafed a victory to the Union 
arms, he would proclaim the Emancipation of the 
slaves, well knowing the political rashness of his act. 
A few days afterwards came the strategical victory of 
the Antietam, and the Proclamation was issued. The 
concluding words of his second Inaugural speech, on 
his re-election as President, are so characteristic of the 
man that I venture to insert them here. 

" The Almighty has His own purposes. * Woe to the 
world because of offences, for it must needs be that 
offences come : but woe to that man by whom the 
offence cometh.' If we shall suppose that American 
slavery is one of those offences which, in the Provi- 
dence of God, must needs come, but which, having 
continued through His appointed time, He now wills 
to remove, and that He gives to both North and South 
this terrible war, as the woe due to those by whom 
the offence came, shall we discern therein any de- 
parture from those divine attributes which the believers 
in a living God always ascribe to Him ? Fondly do we 
hope, fervently do we pray, that this mighty scourge 
of war may speedily pass away. Yet, if God wills that 
it continue till all the wealth piled by the bondman's 
two hundred and fifty years of unrequited toil be sunk, 
and until every drop of blood drawn with the lash 
shall be paid with another drawn with the sword, as 
was said three thousand years ago, so still it must 
be said, ' The judgments of the Lord are true, and 
righteous altogether.' With malice towards none : 
with charity for all ; with firmness in the right, as 
God gives us to see the right, let us strive on to finish 
the work we are in : to bind up the nation's wounds : 
to care for him who shall have borne the battle, and 
for his widow, and his orphan : to do all which may 
achieve and cherish a lasting peace among ourselves, 
and with all nations." 

These were almost Lincoln's last public words, for 
just a month later he was murdered : the world was 



412 THE FIRST HALF OF 1865 

the poorer by the death of one of its greatest men, 
and the South lost its best friend. 

General John B. Hood was an old West Point man 
whose early service was in the cavalry, mostly in the 
Pacific States : he had seen no real war service when 
the Civil War broke out. He was brave to rashness, 
and most energetic, being unsurpassed as a divisional 
commander, but when promoted to command a Corps 
he shewed a turbulent and insubordinate spirit, criti- 
cizing and intriguing against his superior officer. 
General Johnston,, which action was not stopped by 
those to whom it was addressed, as it should have 
been. It was well said, that criticism of superiors 
is not in itself a proof of ability. In chief command 
he was more cunning than able, and apt to find a 
scapegoat for anything that went wrong, though, on 
reflection, he was willing to hear an explanation, and 
to take responsibility on himself, as in the case of the 
Tennessee Campaign, of which President Davis did 
not approve. It must be said for Hood, latterly, that 
he was so crippled by wounds that both health and 
temper were affected, and he had not the physical 
activity requisite for command in the field : the strain 
of the last campaign completely broke him down. 

Lieutenant-General A. P. Hill was killed on April 2nd, 
when the Union troops broke the Confederate lines 
at Petersburg. He was an old West Point man, 
modest and unassuming, who never intrigued, and 
fought with distinction all through the War. It was 
said of him that " he had the best division, when he 
had a division, and one of the best Corps, when he 
had a Corps." Latterly, Lee trusted him with large 
commands, on semi-independent missions, and he 
proved his ability in every position in which he was 
placed. Both Lee and Jackson mentioned him in the 
delirium of death, and his loss was universally 
mourned by his many friends in both armies. Per- 
sonally, he was a small, smart, well-groomed man, 
quiet, resolute, and courteous. 



CHRONOLOGICAL TABLE 



413 



1886 



January 



February 



March 



Siege of Petersburg 
11. Rosser takes 1 6. Lee appointed 25. 
Beverly, West | Confederate Cow- 
Virginia, j tnander-in-Chief. 
27. Sheridan's Raid 



Fort Stedman. 
31. Dinwiddie Court 

House, 
in Virginia, to 25. 
2. Action at Way- 
nesboro. 



20. Stoneman's 
Raid, in South- 
west Virginia, 
and 



1-14. Kirk's Raid 
in western North 
Carolina. 
13. Fort Fisher 
taken. 



3-17. Operations 
near Charleston. 

18. Charleston evac- 
uated. 

22. Wilmington 
taken. 



North Carolina. 
10. Bragg repulsed 

at Kinston. 
16. Averysboro. 
19-21. Bentonville. 



16. Monitor " Pat- 
apsco" sunk by 
mine off Charles- 
ton. 



18. Sails 
Pacific. 



for the 



25. The " Shenan- 
doah " reaches 
Melbourne. 

30. The "Sphinx" j The "S^owezwa//" re- 
commissioned as pairing at Ferrol, 



18. Wilson's Raid in 
Alabama starts. 



27. Siege of Mobile. 



the " Stonewall." 



February and 
March. 
28. Barron resigns 
his post in Europe. 
9. Bazaine takes 
Oajaca, Mexico. 



1. Flagship " Har- 
vest Moon" sunk 
by mine off 
Charleston. 

The " Shenandoah " 
at sea. 



24. Puts to sea. 
"Niagara" and 
" Sacramento " 
decline action. 

Bulloch sells the 
"Rappahannock." 



414 



THE FIRST HALF OF 1865 



1865 


Aprii. 


May 


June 




2. FaU of Peters- 
burg. 

3. Weitzel occu- 








pies Richmond. 


The Great Review 






1. Five Forks. 


at Washington. 




s 


Lee's Last March. 


22, 23. March past 




w 


6. Sailor's Creek. 


of Grant's Armies. 






9. Lee surrenders. 


24, 25. March past 






16. President Lin- 


of Sherman's 






coln assassinated. 


Armies. 






n. M sby s u r- 








renders. 








1-12. Stoneman's 






a 


Raid in North 






•< 
w 


Carolina. 


10. Capture of Jef- 




s 


Flight of Jefferson 


ferson Davis. 




P 


Davis. 


Jones surrenders at 




5 


26. Johnston sur- 
renders. 


Tallahassee. 


V 


1 




11. Thompson sur- 






renders. 








Last Confederate 








gunboats on the 




2. Wilson beats 




Mississippi sur- 




Forrest at Selma. 




render. 




-20. Wilson's Raid 








in Alabama and 









Georgia. 






Croxton's Raid to 


Macon, to 1. 




aj 


12. Canby takes 


4. Taylor sur- 






Mobile. 


renders. 
26. Kirby Smith 
surrenders. 








25. Sabine Pass 


3. Galveston sur- 







surrenders. 


renders. 


R 


The "Stonewall" at 






i 


sea. 


The ' ' Stonewall "sur- 
rendered and paid 
off at Havana, in 




. 




middle of month. 




^ 


. . The " Shenan 


doah " at sea. . . 


22-28. The "Shen- 


1 






andoah" destroys 








American Whal- 








ing fleet near 


^ 






Behring's Straits; 


g 






disarms August 2; 


p 






surrenders at 


to 






Liverpool, No- 
vember 6. 



CHAPTER XIV 

THE END OF THE MEXICAN COMPLICATION 

After the surrenders of Lee and Johnston, Sheridan 
was assigned to command the district west of the 
Mississippi, to force the surrender of Kirby Smith 
and garrison the country, for which purpose an army 
of over 50,000 men was put under his orders in case 
of another campaign (cf. p. 408) : he was then to 
restore Texas and part of Louisiana to the Union 
as soon as possible. Grant told him personally that 
military control was the best till the political scheme 
had been thoroughly settled, but that the principal 
reason for giving him so strong a force, which was 
not put in writing, was that Secession would never 
be put down till Mexico was cleared of foreign troops, 
and that this Franco-Austrian adventure was looked 
on as part and parcel of the Civil War. He was to 
act carefully, since it was not desired to bring on 
a war with European powers. For the same reason 
also the East and West Gulf Squadrons were 
combined under Admiral Thatcher in July, and kept 
to watch the French squadron till May, 1867, when 
the abandonment of the Mexican Expedition rendered 
its further maintenance unnecessary. 

Kirby Smith had surrendered before Sheridan ar- 
rived, but the work was not properly carried out, 
parts of his army marching off as organized and 
armed military bodies, intending to go to Mexico. 
Sheridan therefore arranged for the immediate occu- 

41S 



4i6 THE END OF THE MEXICAN COMPLICATION 

pation of the Mexican frontier, Galveston, Brazos, 
Brownsville, and along the Rio Grande, and also for 
two cavalry columns to push right through Texas. 
A Confederate officer who had fought under Juarez 
in old days wanted to hand over some guns to hitn, 
but the Confederate commander, General Slaughter, 
had them put where the Imperialist Mejia could get 
them : Bazaine, however, ordered that they be handed 
over to the United States at once. 

Sheridan made such a show of force as to impress 
the Imperialists very much, and believed that if his 
Government had not interfered in order to carry on 
political negociations, they would have abandoned 
Northern Mexico at this time. Though very strong 
representations were made to Napoleon, military 
operations were not stopped thereb}'^, and the Im- 
perialists gained in strength till the cause of Juarez 
was at the last extremity. The position was, that 
the French and Imperial troops held a line through 
the centre of the country from Vera Cruz to Guada- 
lajara, cutting off Juarez and General Escobedo in 
the North from the Republicans in the South. They 
had just taken Oajaca, General Diaz was a prisoner 
in their hands, and they were advancing northwards, 
holding their own in the South. At the end of 
September, Juarez and Escobedo, who had gained 
some successes, were forced back to the frontier, 
when, on a false report that they had taken refuge 
in the United States, Maximilian made the great 
mistake which ruined him and caused his death. On 
October 3rd he issued an Edict, in which, while 
complimenting Juarez on his plucky resistance, he 
took the ground that as the Republican Government 
had fled the country, it had thereby resigned its 
pretensions, that there was no Government left but 
his own, and no Republic for which to fight, and 
that therefore those who continued to offer armed 
resistance were mere brigands, to whom no quarter 
must be given. 



THE WAR IN MEXICO 417 

Bazaine's troops had taken little or no part in this 
fighting, since Napoleon in a letter dated August 17th 
had warned him to be prepared for trouble with the 
United States, and to dispose his troops accordingly. 
He was told at the same time that the length of the 
PVench occupation might depend on the recognition 
of the Mexican Empire by the United States. He 
therefore made this his first consideration, and con- 
sulted Commodore Clone as to the power of Vera 
Cruz to resist an American naval attack. The French 
and Maximilian relied much on the so-called flight 
of Juarez to persuade the United States to recognize 
the Empire, but the latter knew the exact situation, 
being, at all events unofficially, in communication 
with him. 

In October, Juarez and Escobedo moved forward, 
while Diaz escaped from prison, took command again 
in the South, and more than held his own. About 
this time Maximilian made overtures to Diaz, saying 
that, much as he admired Juarez, it was useless to 
approach him, and hinting that he (Diaz) might have 
the command of the army : this was unconditionally 
refused. Bazaine, holding that his responsibility was 
now principally that of guarding against war with 
the United States, left the war more and more to 
Maximilian's army of Mexicans, stiffened with special 
Austrian and Belgian regiments. The retreat of the 
Imperialists and advance of the Republicans were 
largely due to the strong demonstrations made by 
Sheridan, and the careful circulation of reports that 
he intended to cross the border and support the 
latter. He openly encouraged them and supplied 
them with arms and ammunition, but in the autumn, 
in consequence of the representations of the French 
Government, he was ordered to observe a strict 
neutrality. The French Commodore Clone also sent 
a very strong protest to General Weitzel, commanding 
on the Rio Grande, in November, on the breaches of 
neutrality committed by the United States in supply- 

27 



4i8 THE END OF .THE MEXICAN COMPLICATION 

ing Juarez with help of all sorts, even with men, to 
which no satisfactory reply could be made. Sheridan 
took an active part in trying to unite conflicting 
factions among the Mexicans. It was well known 
to him that a so-called colonization scheme was on 
foot as a refuge for ex-Confederates in Mexico, headed 
by Price, Magruder, and others, which was favoured 
by Maximilian, so after waiting in vain for his 
Government to interfere he forbade any passengers 
to sail for Mexican ports without permits, in April, 
1866, which, as the land frontier was well watched, 
soon caused its failure. To counteract this, Bazaine 
had offered to Americans, Confederates, or Sheridan's 
men who might think of joining Juarez, better terms, 
viz. to join the Imperialist Foreign Legion on the 
same conditions as those who enlisted in Europe. 

In December occurred rather an awkward contre- 
temps for the Republic, for Juarez' term of office as 
President came to an end, and as it was impossible to 
hold elections, General Ortega, the President of the 
Supreme Court, who had deserted Juarez, followed 
the Mexican custom of dealing with an interregnum, 
and assumed power, to split the Liberal party : his 
action was condemned and he fled to the United 
States, but was arrested by Sheridan's order, and 
handed over to Escobedo. Juarez, to solve the 
difficulty, prolonged his own term by proclamation 
till proper elections could be held. 

Political negotiations in the latter part of 1865 
brought things to a head. Napoleon saw plainly that 
the whole expedition to Mexico was a failure, and only 
sought for a reasonable pretext for withdrawal, but 
tried to get the United States to recognize the Mexican 
Empire, to " save face." At first Mr. Seward was quite 
willing to meet him by trying to find some third party, 
other than Maximilian or Juarez, whom both sides 
could recognize, and for that purpose went to see that 
old intriguer Santa Anna, then living in the West 
Indies, but nothing came of it. This course failing, 



SEWARD'S STRONGER TONE 419 

Napoleon's anxiety became so patent that Seward 
saw that he had the game in his hands and took a 
higher tone, telling him that the American people 
manifested a warm and rapidly increasing interest in 
the Mexican Republic and viewed with impatience 
the prolonged intervention of France, a plain hint 
that his troops must go. 

In January, 1866, Napoleon wrote to Bazaine to say 
that all the troops must be back at the beginning of 
1867 : about this time Seward intimated that the 
United States contemplated armed intervention in 
favour of Juarez, giving Napoleon the choice of retreat 
or war, and it was arranged that the retirement be 
completed by November, 1867, at latest. In May, 
hearing that men were being enlisted at Trieste for 
an Austrian Legion for Maximilian's service, the 
Cabinet of Washington declared that it would not 
admit any interference by European powers in Mexican 
affairs and would withdraw its representatives from 
Vienna if a single transport sailed for Mexico. The 
Austrian Government yielded and disbanded the men. 
In July, the affairs of the Empire were hopeless ; even 
Maximilian saw it, and thought of abdication, but the 
Empress persuaded him to wait till she had played 
her last card, to see Napoleon personally, and re- 
mind him of his guarantee to them, which he was 
proposing to ignore : when this failed, her reason 
broke down, and the news decided Maximilian on 
abdication, which Napoleon also recommended. At 
this juncture Maximilian unfortunately listened to his 
evil genius, the disreputable Father Fischer, his con- 
fessor, and is also said to have been influenced by a 
sneer of Bazaine's. Anyhow, he determined to stay 
by the Empire and brave his fate out, concentrated 
his troops in the towns of Mexico, Puebla, and 
Queretaro, and cut loose from the French. His 
troops were deserting to the Republicans, whose 
forces steadily increased and gained ground : in the 
North, Juarez controlled the country down to San 



420 THE END OF THE MEXICAN COMPLICATION 

Luis Potosi by midsummer, and in the South, Diaz 
retook Oajaca on October 30th, At this time the 
United States appointed Mr. Campbell Minister to 
the Court of Juarez, General Sherman going with 
him. They reached Vera Cruz at the end of November, 
where everything pointed to the evacuation by the 
French very shortly, before the time fixed with Mr. 
Seward. They at last found Escobedo at Matamoros, 
and soon communicated with Juarez. 

At the beginning of 1867, Escobedo was gaining the 
upper hand and advancing, and Maximilian moved 
his Government to Queretaro, just before his troops 
were defeated in the field and besieged in that town, 
in February. Bazaine, who took no part in these 
operations, sailed in March with the last French 
troops, having made a last effort to save French 
prestige, by a proposal to Diaz to help him to over- 
throw both Maximilian and Juarez, and seize the 
supreme power, which was contemptuously refused. 
Diaz took Puebla on April 2nd, and advanced to 
Mexico City, Queretaro falling on May 15th. Maxi- 
milian was tried and condemned to death for his 
Edict of October, 1865, under which numbers of Re- 
publican officers, some of high rank, had been shot 
as brigands : this sentence was carried out on 
June 19th. 

So ended Napoleon's attempt to interfere with 
America, and the complications which it introduced. 
The success of Juarez was brought about by the 
action taken by Grant in sending Sheridan's strong 
force to overawe the Imperialists, since he rightly 
said that " the French invasion of Mexico was so 
closely related to the rebellion as to be essentially 
a part of it," but Maximilian's Government was im- 
possible, it had already failed, and the French occupa- 
tion must soon have ended of itself. 



CHAPTER XV 

RE-CONSTRUCTION 

Premature attempts at Re-construction were made 
even before the end of the War, for just after the fall 
of Vicksburg, Halleck wrote to Sherman suggesting 
that it would be as well to begin at once in Louisiana, 
Mississippi, and Arkansas, which Sherman answered 
at length, strongly against it (cf. p. 252). He said : " I 
would deem it very unwise at this time, or for years to 
come, to revive the State Governments of Louisiana, 
etc., or to institute in this quarter any civil government 
in which the local people have much to say. ... I know, 
and you know, and civilians begin to recognize the 
fact, that reconciliation and re-construction will be 
easier through and by means of strong, well-equipped, 
and organized armies, than through any species of 
conventions which can be framed . . . therefore . . . 
push the War, pure and simple." This clear, sensible 
reasoning settled matters for the time, but there was 
always the craving of the politicians to begin their 
innings, when the War should have been prosecuted 
sternly. The Governments which it was desired to 
set up were sham ones, by no means representing the 
temper and opinions of the people, were worked by a 
small majority of Union sympathizers plus the few 
who took the oath of allegiance, and, even when 
nominally carried out, could neither rule, legislate, nor 
even exist, without a backing of bayonets. Banks 
was busied with the creation of a sham Government 

421 



422 RE-CONSTRUCTION 

in Louisiana when he should have been starting the 
Red River Expedition, which failed, and the inglorious 
Olustee Expedition in Florida was an attempt to get 
a bogus State vote for the Republican party at the 
Presidential Election of 1864. By both of these 
muddles the War was lengthened and pacification 
delayed. 

All thinking Southerners considered the death of 
Lincoln as the greatest calamity that could have be- 
fallen them, for he was just and kind, there was no 
petty bitterness or spite in his nature, and his one 
desire was for unity again. He said to General 
Weitzel, commanding at Richmond after its capture, 
when going through the town with him : " If I were 
in your place, I'd let 'em up easy, let 'em up easy." 
His successor was a man of very different temper. 
Vice-President Andrew Johnson, like Lincoln, had 
begun life at the bottom of the ladder, and had fought 
his way up through poverty and trouble, educating 
himself as best he could, but with opposite results. 
The furnace of adversity had refined and strengthened 
the nobler nature of Lincoln, who was trusted and 
beloved by all who came in contact with him, while 
Johnson had emerged from it soured, vengeful, and 
suspicious, without a friend in the world. A South- 
erner, born in Tennessee, he resented bitterly the 
fact that he was looked down on by the Southern 
aristocracy, although he had worked his way up into 
prominence in the State and in Congress, and when 
he came into power his ideas of re-construction were 
those of revenge on his own and the Union's enemies. 
He was Military Governor of Tennessee from 1862 to 
the death of Lincoln ; why called " military," it is 
difficult to say, for there was nothing military about 
him : he was simply a bitter politician, who carried 
intemperance so far that in 1861 General Thomas 
nearly arrested him for preaching insubordination in 
camp. He was then Senator for Tennessee, and a 
sort of political hanger-on of the army, but when made 



THE NEW PRESIDENT 423 

" Military Governor" he at all events stopped in 
Nashville and did less harm. 

Such v^as the man on whose shoulders was suddenly 
laid the burden of finishing the War and re-constitut- 
ing the Nation. He openly hated the Southern gentle- 
men, and they returned his hate with interest, but 
soon his original feelings of revenge became tempered 
by responsibility, and he was anxious to deal justly ; 
but, being Southern himself, everything he did for the 
South was looked on by the rabid section of Northern 
politicians as treachery : their disappointment and 
anger were the greater since from his earlier record 
they had expected him to see eye to eye with them, 
and he was freely called turncoat and renegade. Add 
to this his suspicion of everybody, and his position 
will be seen to have been nearly impossible. 

It had taken all Lincoln's strength, tact, and charm 
to bring into and keep in line his turbulent and offici- 
ous War Secretar}^, Stanton, but when these were 
removed, there was no one to control him : perhaps 
he thought that as the War was practically over, the 
politicians should now resume sway, and the soldiers 
return to the old routine of garrison duty. At first 
he and the new President worked together, with 
Halleck, and began by objecting to the terms of 
Grant's agreement with Lee, as protecting prominent 
Confederates from the punishment due to them ; but 
Grant said that he had pledged his word that they 
should not be molested while they conformed to the 
laws of the country and lived peaceably, and insisted 
that the agreement be respected. These terms also 
covered other surrenders, and after Lincoln's death 
the South looked to Grant as their protector from 
political persecution. 

The Secretary of State, Mr. Seward, a rabid anti- 
rebellion man, tried to carry things in the most high- 
handed way in Europe as soon as the War was over. 
He acted on the line that the Confederacy was not a 
proper Government, and would not acknowledge the 



424 RE-CONSTRUCTION 

confederate ofificers, who were prepared to hand over 
property and accounts, thereby largely defeating his 
own ends. In England he had an army of spies and 
persecuted individuals to the utmost, but in France, 
when he prosecuted M. Arman the ship-builder, he not 
only lost his case with heavy costs, but subjected his 
country to the contemptuous treatment of being re- 
quired to give substantial security for them. 

Lincoln's carefully thought-out plan of Re-con- 
struction was based on allowing the seceded States to 
carry on with the existing de facto Government till a 
better could be provided. Much of it was embodied in 
Sherman's rejected agreement with Breckinridge and 
Johiston (cf. p. 398). When Johnson's bitter feelings 
toned down, his idea was to leave the matter as much 
as possible to these States, to re-construct themselves 
and return to the Union, under certain safeguards as 
to having loyal men as voters and in the principal 
offices. This sounds the stronger scheme, but Lincoln's 
was endorsed by the clear-headed Sherman, and suc- 
cess or failure really depended on the men who worked 
them, for Lincoln was trusted by both sides, Johnson 
by neither; Lincoln was exceedingly shrewd, while 
Johnson seemed easily gulled. 

The President proclaimed an Amnesty for such 
Confederates as would take the Oath of Allegiance 
to the Union, and to conform to the Emancipation 
Acts, but there were many exceptions among the 
senior officials and officers of the Army and Navy. 
This did not violate Grant's terms to Lee, that those 
covered by them should not be molested, but meant 
that they did not regain civil and political rights while 
outside the Amnesty. He began Re-construction by 
sending a provisional Governor to North Carolina as 
an experiment (cf p. 428, note), pending enquiries, but 
before his reports came in he did the same in all the 
other seceded States, in May and June. They were to 
take charge, see to the registration of voters on the 
new lines, and prepare for electing a proper State 



THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNORS 425 

Legislature to which they could hand over power. 
Needless to say, all had a military force at their backs. 
Tennessee was so completely under Union control 
that it was not dealt with, while in Texas the ex-Con- 
federate Governor Murrali and his Legislature thought 
that by means of the farce of a nominal adherence to 
the Union the State would be free to go on in its own 
way : they therefore proceeded with their elections 
without imposing any test or qualification for voters, 
to do the work independently of the Union Govern- 
ment ; but the advent of Mr. Hamilton, the provisional 
Governor, upset their schemes, for he promptly dis- 
franchised most of the voters, who probably had no 
intention of taking the oath of allegiance, and called a 
convention of those who would do so, which roused 
bitter opposition. The fear of the immediate enfran- 
chisement of the negroes started terrorism, which 
kept the troops busy all over the State (cf. p. 428). 
Mississippi was thinking of doing the same as Texas, 
but was stopped by the same cause, the arrival of the 
President's Governor. Louisiana had had a pro- 
visional Union Government for a year, and the 
Amnesty practically put the Confederate party in 
power. There was much friction here and in Texas, 
perhaps due to the fact that the military commander 
was General Sheridan, who had a large army to watch 
the French in Mexico, for his ruthless devastation of 
the Shenandoah Valley had made his name execrated 
by all Confederates, and he was by far the hardest 
and least sympathetic of the Union generals. 

In Alabama the military commander had suspended 
the Bishop and clergy from their functions for refusing 
to restore the prayer for the President of the United 
States to their liturgy ; but the President quashed this 
order. In other States there was little trouble, the 
principal business being the preparation of the new 
register for the conventions in autumn and winter, 
which met and passed the preliminary tests, viz. the 
Repeal of the Ordinance of Secession, the Repudiation 



426 RE-tONSTRUCTION 

of the Confederate War Debt of the State, and the 
Recognition of the Freedom of the late slaves. Most 
of them accepted at this time the Xlllth Amendment 
(cf. p. 437) to the Constitution, and the provisional 
Governors retired in favour of the newly elected 
men. In December, Congress appointed a Com- 
mittee of Fifteen to deal with all questions relating 
to the recognition of the late Confederate States. 
One of its duties was to scrutinize the names of 
all representatives from those States, and in many 
cases it prevented them from taking their seats. 
This sounds high-handed, but may have been neces- 
sary on account of the weakness of the President's 
scheme. 

1866.^ — In February and March two Bills were vetoed 
by the President, sent back, and passed over his head. 
The first established the " Freedmen's Bureau," and 
also proposed to set up military jurisdiction in the 
South ; the other was the Civil Rights Bill, declaring 
those born in the United States to be citizens, and pro- 
viding for the protection of the negroes in their rights. 

It may be well to quote here Bryce's clear de- 
scription of the working of the Presidential Veto. 
The President, "when a Bill is presented to him, may 
sign it, and thereby make it law. If, however, he 
disapproves of it, he returns it within ten days to the 
House in which it originated, with a statement of his 
grounds of disapproval. If both Houses take up the 
Bill again and pass it by a two-thirds majority in each 
House, it becomes law forthwith without requiring 
the President's signature. If it fails to obtain this 
majority it drops." 

In Florida the military control behind the new 
Governor was relaxed in April, and the civil authorities 
were really restored to power. In June the Com- 
mittee of Fifteen presented their Report, recommending 
the famous XlVth Amendment (cf. p. 438) to the 
Constitution, which was soon made the test for the 
re-admission of a Southern State to the Union. Its 



FRICTION WITH THE PRESIDENT 427 

terms, however, were so stringent that it excluded 
from office the better-class people, and hindered what 
it was intended to bring about. 

The new Governor of Texas persuaded the President 
to give him a free hand, which was used to nullify the 
laws for the protection of the negroes, and caused 
lawlessness and disorder. Local militia had been 
started in several States (cf. p. 398), and stopped by 
the generals commanding there, which action was dis- 
approved by the President, but loyal men were so 
much endangered that this veto was soon withdrawn. 
In Louisiana matters were much the same as in Texas, 
but here an attempt was made to re-model the Con- 
stitution of the State, and a serious riot took place 
in New Orleans on July 30th. The President garbled 
Sheridan's report of it, Sheridan complained, Grant 
backed Sheridan, and the friction was acute. Both a 
military and a parliamentary Commission investigated 
the matter, and both approved of Sheridan's action, 
and blamed the Mayor of New Orleans and his party : 
they also directly accused the President of knowledge 
of the fact that New Orleans was controlled by dis- 
loyal persons. Friction between him and his advisers 
had been growing for some time, for he was roundly 
abused for beginning his administration by preaching 
revenge and stern repression, and then for going to 
the other extreme and allowing himself to be gulled 
by such transparent Secession and Anti-Emancipation 
men as these, enabling them to work their States on 
their own lines, and nullify the laws and the work of 
the War. The findings of these Commissions were a 
direct challenge, and Johnson took up the gauntlet at 
once, and answered vehemently : thenceforward the 
Union Government was divided against itself 

These differences made people discuss the question 
of who should be the next President, for Johnson was 
already impossible, and all eyes turned to Grant in 
the autumn, which caused much jealousy. Sherman 
was sent for to Washington, to command the Army 



428 RE-CONSTRUCTION 

during Grant's absence while escorting the new 
Minister to the Mexican Repubhc to Mexico. Grant 
thought that this was merely an excuse to get rid 
of him, and said he would not go : Sherman then 
offered to go in his place, which compromise was 
accepted, probably preventing a serious quarrel. 

Although Johnson's scheme was approved by the 
executive and judicial branches of the Government, 
Congress had never liked it, thinking the safeguards 
insufficient. It was not properly thought out, and 
resulted in elections being carried out by an electorate 
which did not represent the people at all, under whom 
there was danger of a return to something like slavery 
again. Schurz ^ said that the acceptance of free negro 
labour should have been made an indispensable pre- 
liminary to the recognition of any State Government. 
Congress objected that the negroes, as freemen, were 
left to the jurisdiction of their own States, and wished 
to make constitutional provision for their status, and 
give them security as American citizens by laws which 
should override State law. Again, State jurisdiction 
did not protect men who had always been loyal to 
the Union, and it was felt that the real safeguard was 
negro franchise, in spite of its many disadvantages 
(cf. p. 425). At last, in December, Congress said that 
they would take Re-construction out of the Presi- 
dent's hands, for it was found that the Negro Franchise 
question was hanging fire, and the intention was to 
override the civil courts if necessary. They enacted 
that the late Confederate States, with the exception 
of Tennessee, be divided into five military districts, 
commanded by officers of suitable rank, with power 
to substitute a military for a civil court when it might 
seem advisable, and to be above all interference from 
any State authority, but with the proviso that no 
sentence of a military court be carried out without 
the consent of the Officer Commanding the District, 

' Schurz had been the President's Commissioner to report on the conditions 
in the South, in May, 186'; (cf. p. 424). 



MILITARY CONTROL 429 

and no sentence of death without that of the Pre- 
sident. That when any late Confederate State formed 
a Constitution conforming to that of the United States, 
and made by persons having the requisite qualifi- 
cations, which should be approved by Congress, and 
afterwards adopted the XlVth Amendment to the 
Constitution, it should be entitled to representation 
in Congress, and the first clause of this Act cease 
to appl^' to it : provided that no one excluded by the 
XlVth Amendment be eligible to vote or hold office. 
That until this be done, any Government of such 
States be deemed provisional only, and subject to 
the overriding authority of the United States, and 
that the provisions of the above-named Amendment 
apply to both voters and office-holders of such 
provisional Governments. 

1867. — On March 2nd a supplementary Act was 
passed prescribing the oath for qualification and the 
details for carrying out the voting under the super- 
vision of the Generals Commanding Districts ; the 
President vetoed it, but it was passed over his head. 
Up to this time he and Stanton appear to have been 
acting together, but now they were at variance, for 
Johnson was another strong-willed man, who, when 
he disagreed with his Government, ruled without 
consulting them : Congress retaliated by passing re- 
solutions to foil him at every turn, to which he 
retorted by veto, and then by attacking patronage. 
This was a home thrust, answered by the Tenure 
of Civil Office Bill, which would prevent the Presi- 
dent from removing any official without the consent 
of the Senate, and was passed over his veto. On 
August 5th he requested Stanton to resign, which 
in consequence of this Act he refused to do : Johnson 
suspended him, and put Grant in his place. 

Both the Re-construction Acts were passed over 
the veto, and in July a third one, passed in the same 
way, made the Military District Commanders subject 
to the disapproval of the Commander-in-Chief only, 



430 RE-CONSTRUCTION 

and authorized them to remove any person from 
office. Their districts were : 

1. Virginia, Major-General Schofield. 

2. North and South Carolina, Major-General Sickles, 

who was soon succeeded by Canby. 

3. Georgia, Florida, and Alabama, Major-General 

Pope. 

4. Mississippi and Arkansas, Major-General Ord. 

5. Louisiana and Texas, Major-General Sheridan. 

The effect of these measures was to subordinate 
State control and State law to that of the central 
authority, till the States were formally re-admitted 
into the Union, on the lines prescribed by Congress. 
The principal trouble was from the State judges 
upholding State law against Congress law, for which 
some were removed. This may have been necessary 
in the national interest, but in justice to them we 
must remember that they were appointed on oath 
to maintain State law. Sometimes the President re- 
vised the decision and restored the civil authority. 
In some cases there was friction between the com- 
manding general and the State Legislature, which the 
former used his new powers to over-rule, so as to 
prevent the carrying out of elections by those not 
qualified to do so under the Acts. In Louisiana, 
General Sheridan removed some notoriously disloyal 
men from office, in which he was supported by Grant, 
but the open war between President and Congress 
caused great difficulty in administration, and loyalists 
and freed negroes were not safe. Appeals were made 
to the President against the generals, thus playing 
off one authority against the other. Sheridan was 
removed in August, Grant protesting in vain, for 
Johnson had never forgiven the former for the affair 
in 1866. Hancock administered the district till the 
end of the year, under whom affairs ran smoothly, 
for, though strong, he had great courtesy and tact, 



RE-ADMISSION OF STATES 43* 

and soon became a persona grata, which Sheridan 
never was. 

Several States vainly contested the legality of the 
Re-construction Acts, between December, 1866, and 
the end of 1867, and the XlVth Amendment was 
submitted to, and rejected by, every Southern State. 
The disqualifications in Mississippi were so numerous 
that the negroes had a large majority of votes. In 
September, Johnson extended the Amnesty a great 
deal so as to exclude only the principal Confederate 
officers and officials. The new Conventions met, 
mostly in November, to consider the measures re- 
quired by Congress. At the end of the year Ord 
was succeeded by McDowell in No. 4 District, and 
Hancock by Buchanan in No. 5. 

1868.— Most of the Southern States adopted the 
XlVth Amendment and other points required by 
Congress in the spring of this year, and in June 
an Act was passed to the effect that when this 
was done, and on condition that the State Consti- 
tutions should never be so altered as to deprive any 
citizen or class of the vote, who were so entitled 
by the votes then passed and recognized, except as 
a punishment for crime, etc., each of the States of 
North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, Florida, 
Alabama, and Louisiana, should be admitted to re- 
presentation. All were admitted in July, but Georgia 
was put back because negroes had not been expressly 
given the right to hold office and had been turned 
out of the Legislature in consequence. Arkansas 
was also admitted in this year. 

Though most of the routine ordinances were 
passed in Mississippi, the XlVth Amendment was 
not among them : the new State Constitution was also 
rejected, because one section disfranchised all who 
had served under the Confederacy (cf. p. 435). 
McDowell removed the Governor and put General 
Ames in his place. In Virginia a Bill of Rights was 
adopted which declared that the State "shall ever 



432 RE-€ONSTRUCTION 

remain a member of the United States of America, 
and all efforts to sever such union are to be resisted," 
and that the laws of Congress were those of the 
land, " anything in any State law notwithstanding," 
a great difference from the old reservation of the 
right of Secession. Congress now imposed a test 
oath, first propounded in July, 1862, for any one taking 
office, to the effect that he had never borne arms 
against the United States nor countenanced any other 
Government, in addition to the ordinary oath of 
allegiance. General Schofield opposed this on the 
ground that sufficient officers could not be obtained 
under it, and it caused a dead-lock. In December 
the Amnesty was made complete, all exceptions being 
removed, and the pardon was unconditional without 
the formality of an oath. 

Grant had held the post of Secretary for War 
from August 5th, 1867, till January of this year, 
when the appointment came before the Senate for 
approval and was not confirmed. By the Tenure 
of Civil Office Bill he would have been liable in 
penalties had he held on : he therefore resigned it 
again to Stanton, but this did not legally re-instate 
the latter to the general satisfaction. A third party 
was proposed, to whom all could agree, but Johnson 
had his back up and would fight it out. Grant 
wanted him to take advantage of the situation and 
forbid the Secretary for War to give Army Orders, 
but this was not done, and work went on in the old 
ignorant and arbitrary fashion, so that the new Army 
Orders and Regulations which had been drafted by 
a Committee of Generals to embody the experiences 
of the War were pigeon-holed in favour of a cum- 
brous document which Sherman thought " would not 
stand the strain of a week's campaign in real war." 

The Senate incurred much unpopularity by its 
action, the generals were unanimous that Stanton 
should resign, and the President again turned Stanton 
out to test the legality of the Civil Office Bill, and 



THE PRESIDENT IMPEACHED 433 

in February made General Lorenzo Thomas Sec- 
retary for War ad interim, which was the immediate 
cause of his impeachment for disobeying the law. 
After the acquittal, Stanton resigned and was suc- 
ceeded by General Schofield. Thus the control of 
the political side of the Army passed at last into the 
right hands, and a better tradition was established 
and maintained. 

The President was impeached in March, but many 
other counts than the removal of Stanton were in- 
cluded, to make safe. The most bitter hostility 
characterized the proceedings, for the old Abolitionist 
party considered his honest though misguided attempts 
to bring re-construction by conciliation as treachery 
to the Nation, and he himself had practically no 
friends. He was declared acquitted because a two- 
thirds majority was not secured on any one count 
of the indictment. In this war between President 
and Congress, the strictly legal points were not 
always on the side of the latter, for Johnson was an 
able lawyer, and used to meet his opponents with 
constitutional objections at every turn, to which they 
retorted by acts which even their apologists can 
only justify on the ground that they served their 
purpose of defeating the enemy before their legality 
was tested, or rather their illegality exposed. 

All this quarrelling among the rulers spelt misrule 
and misery to the wretched South, and strengthened 
the hands of its bitterest opponents, for in order to 
spite the President they bullied his so-called proteges, 
because the real South now supported him. Thus, 
as it was plain that the elections could only be made 
safe by the manufacture of votes, the negro franchise 
was worked in the sole interest of the Republican 
party, not as a safeguard against reactionary ten- 
dencies, and civil rule brought the " Carpet-bagger." 
The military rule, though severe, was just in the 
main and administered by men of high character 
and standing, but the new civil rulers could not be 

28 



434 RE-CONSTRUCTION 

described in such terms, for with few exceptions 
they were poHtical adventurers and office-seekers, 
the dregs of the North. The best-class whites were 
disfranchised, the poHtical power was in the hands 
of the low-class whites and negroes, while the 
military force was at the back of the new rulers. 
Between these and the Southern aristocracy there 
was war to the knife, and where they came, came 
trouble, for their ranting excited the negroes and 
a reign of terror arose. The secret organization of 
the " Ku-Klux-Klan " met one terror by another 
and exercised real power in places, removing some 
carpet-baggers, and being specially designed to work 
on the superstitious fears of the negroes ; but after 
a while it died out, having practically disappeared 
in 1870. Most Southern outrages were manufactured 
for political purposes (cf. p. 436), being fewest, and 
administration and credit best, where the reverse 
should have been the case according to Northern 
politicians, in the few places managed by the better- 
class Southerners, even when in conjunction with the 
new negro electorate. 

After the failure of the Impeachment came a lull, 
and things went on more quietly till the end of 
Johnson's term of office, when he retired into private 
life for some years. He left Re-construction at the 
stage of there being no disabilities remaining, but 
his rule had sowed little but hatred. A suspicious 
but gullible man, he was badly advised, and put 
many most unsuitable men in power, some even dis- 
loyal : the bitter opposition to them put his back 
up, and he then supported them with all the stiff- 
necked obstinacy of his nature. It has been said of 
him that " he never made a dollar by public office, 
abstained from quartering a horde of connections on 
the Treasury, refused to uphold rogues in high places, 
and had too just a conception of the dignity of a chief 
magistrate to accept presents." If vulgar, narrow, 
and unwise, he was at all events honest. 



GRANT SUCCEEDS JOHNSON 435 

1869. — To Johnson as President succeeded General 
Grant, and great were the hopes of the rule of a man 
who was so strong, just, and kind, and had done so 
much to conciliate the late contending parties, but 
they were doomed to disappointment. Grant gave 
trust blindly, and was completely in the hands of his 
entourage ; though he was personally above suspicion, 
his ring pulled the strings in his name, working for 
the aggrandisement of the Republican party, and using 
him to maintain their own patronage and its profits 
(cf. pp. 444, 480). They had over-sea projects, with- 
out regard to the wishes of the nation, and once an 
American Consul had to call in British naval aid to pro- 
tect American interests against the President's agent. 

In March, Congress repealed the Tenure of Civil 
Office Act, which had done its work, and soon passed 
an Act which required a State to accept the XVth 
Amendment (cf. p. 438) as well as the XlVth be- 
fore re-admission, and left the impasse in Virginia 
to the discretion of President Grant. This State 
Legislature was re-constructed in July, and the re- 
quisite Amendments were adopted on October 5th. 
in Mississippi, Congress ordered the test oath of 
1862 to be applied for holders of office, and sent the 
new State Constitution to a revised electoral register 
for adoption, with the power of voting separately 
on the obnoxious section, which was struck out, 
and the Constitution ratified without it in December 
(cf. p. 431). 

1870. — Virginia was admitted into the Union in 
January, and in February Mississippi followed, having 
passed the Amendments : Georgia and Texas also 
came in during the year, the former on the adjustment 
of the difficulty about negroes holding office. 

The state of the South was pitiful. Under the 
disastrous " Carpet-bag " regime, credit and business 
declined, and the indebtedness of the Southern States 
went up by leaps and bounds. The frauds and 
usurpations caused such disturbances that in the 



436 RE-CONSTRUCTION 

middle seventies Committees appointed by Congress 
were kept travelling up and down to investigate them. 
The general corruption aroused strong political opposi- 
tion to the Republican party (cf. p. 434), and whenever 
they wanted to counteract it they beat the big drum 
of sectional passion, of " danger from the solid South," 
which generally did the work. In some cases special 
powers were taken to deal with the " danger." 

Grant's ring often made their own appointments. 
In New Orleans, in 1872, these burked the elections, 
and two Governors arose, while in the same town, in 
January, 1875, Governor Kellogg sent troops into the 
State Legislature and had five members ejected. In 
Arkansas, in April, 1874, two rival Governors con- 
tended for power with armed forces, and a battle was 
only stopped by the intervention of regular troops. 
It was an open question whether the State had a 
republican Government which the Nation could 
recognize. In December of the same year there was 
a serious riot at Vicksburg, caused by the frauds of 
officials. The Presidential Elections were watched by 
troops in the interest of the Republican party in 1876, 
and it was not till the next year that the last troops 
were withdrawn from the South by President Hayes. 

During Grant's first term there was much trouble 
with the Indians on the plains, which began to be 
opened up when the railway was carried through to 
San Francisco, and it may be said that he had finished 
his work of re-construction when.'he left office in 1877, 
for the conditions in the South were nominally normal 
again, and the country at peace, united, and free to 
develop as it had never been before. He vetoed an 
Inflation Bill, and, his financial policy was sound and 
honest, providing for a return to stable conditions as 
soon as possible, but his administration left behind it 
a legacy of corruption. 

The last echoes of the War were the eff'orts of 
Major-Generals Warren and Porter to remove the 
cloud under which they had been placed, Warren 



WARREN AND PORTER 437 

by removal from the command of the Vth Corps at 
Five Forks, which did not cost him his commission, 
Porter by the sentence of court-martial to be cashiered 
and incapable for ever of holding office, after Pope's 
report on the battle of Manassas (cf. pp. 162, 383). 

After repeated applications, Warren got Sherman, 
who commanded the Army in 1879, to recommend a 
Court of Enquiry, which exonerated him from blame, 
and President Arthur directed this finding to be 
published in 1881. 

Porter, after several ineffectual appeals to Johnson 
and Grant, was granted an Enquiry in 1878 by 
President Hayes, which, after considering the fresh 
evidence which he brought, reported that the sentence 
should be quashed and he be restored to his rank. 
This was laid before Congress, but Congress did 
nothing. President Arthur removed Porter's dis- 
qualification for office in 1882, but vetoed a Bill for 
restoring his rank as ultra vires : this was not passed 
and approved till 1886, under Cleveland. It is notice- 
able that Porter had to wait till the Democrats re- 
turned to power for the first time after the War, for 
his prosecution had evidently been political. 

AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTTfUTION REQUIRED 
BY CONGRESS TO BE ACCEPTED BY STATES 
AS A CONDITION OF RE-ADMISSION TO THE 
UNION 

Amendment XIII 

Section i.— Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, 
except as a punishment for crime whereof the 
party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist 
within the United States or any place subject to 
their jurisdiction. 

Section 2. — Congress shall have power to enforce this 
article by appropriate legislation. 

Proposed by Congress February ist, 1865, and 



438 RE-CONSTRUCTION 

declared ratified by 27 out of s^ States, December 18th, 
1865. 

Amendment XIV (Abstract) 

Section i. — Deals with the rights of citizens, born and 
naturalized. No State may infringe them, or 
interfere with the equal protection of the law 
for all. 

Section 2. — Deals with details of voting and repre- 
sentation in Congress. 

Section 3. — Disqualifies for office any officer or official 
who, after taking the oath to support the Constitu- 
tion, has been in any way concerned in insurrec- 
tion against it. " But Congress may, by a vote 
of two-thirds of either House, remove such 
disability." 

Section 4. — The United States Debt, including that 
for the Civil War, is sanctioned, but the Con- 
federate War Debt declared illegal, as also any 
claim for loss of slaves. 

Section 5.—" The Congress shall have power to 
enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions 
of this article." 

Proposed by Congress June i6th, 1866, declared 
ratified by 30 out of 36 States, July 28th, 1868. 

Amendment XV 

Section i. — The right of citizens of the United States 
to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the 
United States or any State on account of race, 
colour, or previous condition of servitude. 

Section 2. — The Congress shall have power to enforce 
this article by appropriate legislation. 

Proposed by Congress February 26th, 1869, and 
declared ratified by 29 out of ^y States, March 30th, 
1870. 

(Bryce.) 



CHAPTER XVI 



SOME ACTORS IN THE WAR 



In this chapter it is sought to give some short sketches 
of the principal men in the War who were in their 
places at the end of it, but the selection of names must 
always be difficult. Here the main rule has been to 
take the commanders of separate armies, and the 
names have been grouped in pairs, mostly either of 
famous antagonists, or of men who filled much the 
same offices on the two sides, but no series would be 
complete without Hancock and Longstreet, the two 
great cavalry leaders, Wilson and Forrest, and the 
two politicians, Stanton and Jefferson Davis. 

Two men tower above the rest of those whom the 
crucial test of the great Civil War brought to the 
front, morally and physically, the Great President, 
who prayerfully, faithfully, and wisely, piloted the 
Ship of State through the storm, but to whom it was 
not granted to bring it into port, and the Chivalrous 
Soul of the Lost Cause, General Lee. The one a true 
son of the people, rugged-featured and gaunt, the 
other strikingly handsome, and the highest type of 
aristocrat, two more diverse natures could hardly be 
found ; but they had one thing in common, the humble 
and sincere Christianity by which alone their actions 
were guided. The question never was, with either of 
them, " What is expedient ? " but " What is right ? " 

There are, however, others who had some special 
and surpassing power peculiar to themselves. As a 
leader of men in battle Sheridan may rank with even 

439 



440 SOME ACTORS IN THE WAR 

Ney and Skobeleff; no man ever surpassed Joseph 
Johnston in his wonderful eye for a position, or in the 
almost miraculous intuition which enabled him to stay 
in it long after it had become untenable, and move 
away at the very last moment unmolested. " Stonewall" 
Jackson and Stuart are the Masters of Counter-stroke 
and of Cavalry Outposts respectively, Longstreet could 
handle an Army Corps like a battalion, and the 
indomitable Early stands alone in his way : Semmes^ 
with one ship, ruined the foreign commerce of a great 
nation in less than two years, and Mosby, with twenty 
men, held up an army for some time, and almost 
besieged the enemy's strong capital. Truly, " there 
were giants in those days." 

STANTON 

Edwin Macy Stanton was born in Ohio in 1815, and, 
like so many men who rose to eminence, he was left 
the eldest of a family of orphans while quite a boy, 
which brought out the strength and self-reliance of his 
character. He studied hard, under many difficulties, 
and went to the Bar, where he rose rapidly and made 
a national reputation. He was just, but severe, in- 
flexible, and so rude, that Lincoln would not act in the 
same cases with him. Though a Democrat in politics, 
he had no sympathy with disloyalty to the Union, and 
entered Buchanan's Cabinet in December, i860, as 
Attorney-General, vice Black. He at once shewed 
himself the strong man in it, and within a week forced 
Floyd to resign, telling him in the plainest terms, 
before the President, what he thought of him. Rather 
more than a year later, on the resignation of the gentle 
old Mr. Cameron, the strangely chosen Secretary for 
War, from Lincoln's Cabinet, to which he was politic- 
ally opposed, Stanton was asked to take his place on 
the broader basis of the maintenance of the Union, 
which he did at once. Lincoln soon recognized that 
his rudeness sprang entirely from his uncompromising 



STANTON AND JEFFERSON DAVIS 441 

honesty of purpose, and refusal to have any dealings 
with Secession, He was masterful, officious, and inter- 
fering to the last degree, but not in the least through 
personal ambition. His theory was that even in war 
all decisions must lie with the politicians of the 
Cabinet : his jealousy was for this principle and for 
the due maintenance of political supremacy, especially 
of the President and War Secretary. He was always 
urging on Lincoln that he was not only the constitu- 
tional Commander-in-Chief, but that he could not, 
even by delegation, divest himself of this responsibility. 
He interpreted his own duty to include the giving of 
military orders and interfering with military plans and 
details, and his uncompromising character and want 
of tact and manner caused needless friction. Grant 
and Sherman, while generally on good terms with 
him personally, opposed his interference in military 
matters most vehemently, both during and after the 
War. He never questioned his own authority, but 
could not understand strategy, and, with all his hector- 
ing, was very timid in council. His attack on Sherman 
at the end of the War was probably a clumsy rebuke 
for meddling with politics, and what he considered 
truckling to rebellion, as also was his bitter opposition 
to President Johnson, when he saw that he was not 
going to ride roughshod over the South, as had 
been hoped. 

A strong, self-confident man was Stanton, in his 
prime, when he took up his great office in 1862 : he 
spent his whole health, strength, and ability for the 
maintenance of the Union, till, in the summer of 1868, 
prematurely aged, and broken in mind, body, and 
estate, he laid his office down, and died on Christmas 
Eve. To his country he had given freely all he had, 
seeking nothing for himself. 

JEFFERSON DA VIS 

Jefferson Davis came of a Mississippi planter 
family, and there is nothing to add to the notices on 



442 SOME ACTORS IN THE WAR 

pp. II and 71 in the way of former services. A man of 
high character and great experience, he attempted to 
centre too much in himself; the War Secretary was a 
non-entity, for Davis, who was an old soldier, took too 
much military direction on himself, which he should 
have left to those who had kept up their soldiering. 
The Union generals said that his military interference 
was often of much use to them. The consequence was 
that he neglected politics, especially foreign relations, 
which should have been his particular care, and it 
is curious that he, the great upholder of State 
Sovereignty, should have ignored it in practice, for he 
ruled the Confederacy with a rod of iron, and made all 
fall into line : a stickler for Constitutional procedure 
in all things, his perverted ideas of it not only led him 
into Secession, but did the Confederacy a very bad 
turn when he opposed the appointment of Lee as 
Commander-in-Chief in 1862. After his capture, he 
was imprisoned in Fort Monroe for a long time, and 
then went to Memphis, where he was head of an 
Insurance Company in 1870. He died about 1893. 
A curious thing was that he was the idol of the negro 
population after the War, a paradox for the Aboli- 
tionists. 



GRANT 

Ulysses Simpson Grant was born in 1822 in the 
State of Ohio, of old American stock, his grandfather 
having fought in the War of Independence. His 
father was a farmer and tanner, comfortably off, but 
young Grant preferred the farm life, and was soon 
known as an excellent horseman, for which he was 
principally famous at West Point also. In 1843 he 
joined the 4th Infantry and served with credit in the 
Mexican War. Here he got to know the characters 
of many of his future opponents (cf. p. 127), which was 
afterwards of great use to him. In 1848 he married, 
and after a turn of duty in California left the army 



GRANT 443 

as a captain. In civil life and business he was not 
a success, getting into low water, and even at one 
time falling to despair and drink, but his father took 
him back into business at Galena, Illinois, where he 
was living when the War broke out. As an old army 
man, he took an active part in the formation of the 
local Company, was soon appointed to command one 
of the new regiments, and soon afterwards brigadier- 
general. When forming his staff, he asked his friend 
John Rawlins, a rising local lawyer, to serve on it, 
and this was the beginning of a military connection 
which lasted till Rawlins, then Secretary for War, 
died in 1869. Rawlins was his Chief-of-Staff when he 
became a general, and remained so till the end of the 
War. His devotion to his chief was most touching, but 
he was a man of strong will and opinions, who some- 
times took on himself to act independently in what 
he conceived to be Grant's best interests. Thus he 
opposed Sherman's March to the Sea with all his might, 
even going so far as to ask the President to forbid 
it, without Grant's knowledge (cf. p. 356). No notice 
of Grant would be complete without some mention of 
this devoted friend and follower. 

Grant's history is henceforth that of the War, but 
he had many enemies who were jealous of the rise of 
this unknown man, and his fall in civil life was used, 
at least once, to try and induce the President to dis- 
miss him, but that shrewd observer merely said, " I 
rather like the man : 1 think we'll try him a little 
longer." 

Grant had never been much of a student, but his 
clear common-sense and iron resolution carried the 
country through a crisis where a weaker man would 
have failed, the terrible month of fighting in the 
summer of 1864, when he was advancing from the 
Rapidan to the James. He was so simple and unpre- 
tending that he had not at first been credited with 
much ability, but his bold assumption of responsibility 
and uniform success soon commanded attention. 



444 SOME ACTORS IN THE WAR 

No man was ever richer in saving common-sense, 
or carried out more thoroughly the sound maxim, 
" Parcere subjectis et debellare superbos." It was to 
his old friend Simon Buckner that he sent the stern 
message that no terms would be considered but the 
immediate and unconditional surrender of Fort Donel- 
son, adding that he proposed to attack it at once ; but 
the moment the surrender was carried out, he is said 
to have taken him aside with "Look here, Buckner, 
I fear you may be short of money before you can 
communicate with your friends ; if so, let me be your 
banker, and repay me at your convenience." It was 
rather curious that most of his best Army friends were 
in the Confederate service, IVilcox, Heth, Longstreet, 
Bragg, etc., and when he came East he was a stranger 
in the Army of the Potomac. Contrast his curt and 
stern dealings at Donelson, when the Confederate 
power was dangerous and rising (cf. p. 385), with his 
method at Appomattox, when it was fought out and 
the whole country weary : his object then was to give 
liberal terms, and remove all bitterness, so that his 
opponents might become good citizens again as soon 
as possible, and he forbade all demonstrations of 
victory which might hurt their feelings. 

He was a sincere Christian, pure in thought and 
conversation, but was not the sort of man to succeed 
in business, for he was so honourable that he sus- 
pected no guile, while his nature was so affectionate 
that where he gave trust it was given absolutely. 
It was, unfortunately, often misplaced, especially when 
he was President, for though he was above suspicion, 
his administration was one of the most corrupt on 
record. He could control an army, but not the poli- 
ticians (cf. pp. 435, 480). 

After his Presidential term was over, he travelled 
round the world, being made much of wherever he 
went, and then returned to civil life, where misfortune 
dogged his steps again. He was induced to become 
a sleeping partner in a bank with some relatives and 



GRANT AND LEE 445 

friends, whom he trusted too well. The bank broke, 
and he was ruined, and about this time symptoms of 
cancer appeared. He fought manfully as ever against 
his troubles, to pay his debts while he lived, and wrote 
his Memoirs for this purpose when he was a dying 
man, and knew it. Not even in the War had his 
bravery and resolution been so conspicuous as in this 
last fight. He died in July, 1885. It is singular that, 
though he detested war, he never succeeded in any- 
thing else. 

LEE 

Robert Edward Lee was born in 1807, the son of 
General Henry Lee, " Light Horse Harry," one of 
Washington's friends and captains in the War of Inde- 
pendence, and three times Governor of Virginia. One 
of his ancestors was the first Colonial-born Governor 
of Virginia at the end of the 17th century, whose 
father came over as Colonial Secretary in the time of 
Charles I, and did much to keep the Colony loyal. 

Young Lee went to West Point, and passed out in 
1829, going into the Engineers, with which branch of 
the service he was principally associated. In 1831 he 
married Miss Custis, the grand-daughter and heiress 
of Mrs. Washington, so that in more ways than one 
he may be said to have been the representative of 
"The Father of his Country." In the Mexican War 
of 1846 he served on the Staff of General Scott, where 
his skill and daring were so conspicuous that he rose 
from captain to brevet-colonel, and Scott said that 
he was the first soldier in America, it being generally 
thought that Lee would succeed him in command 
of the Army. After the Mexican War the Army 
was increased, and Lee was made lieutenant-colonel of 
the new 2nd Cavalry, being employed on the Indian 
frontier for some years against the Comanches. This 
regiment turned out more men who rose to high rank 
in the War than any other. 

Though a large slave-owner, Lee detested slavery, as 



446 SOME ACTORS IN THE WAR 

being more harmful to the whites than to the blacks, 
and, when war became imminent, said openly that 
" Secession is nothing but Revolution," and that the 
notion of the Union being merely a compact between 
independent States was absurd, but added, *' If the 
Union is dissolved and the Government disrupted, I 
shall return to my native State and share the miseries 
of my people, and, save in defence, will draw my sword 
on none." He was offered the command of the United 
States Army, declined it, and resigned his commis- 
sion. Had he or Sidney Johnston, who also refused it, 
accepted, there might have been either no war at all 
or a much smaller one. Here seems to have been the 
weak point in a very great character, that Lee did not, 
like Thomas, Farragut, and other great Southerners, 
realize that the maintenance of the Union was the 
interest of all, and that it was his duty to take an 
active part, and help to secure it with all his power 
and great influence, to practise what he preached as 
to the fallacy of State Independence, not sit down 
and let things slide. Whether this narrowness of 
view was due to modesty or what does not appear, 
but his very horror of Civil War seems to have been 
a powerful factor in bringing it. 

During the War, his doings fill the larger part of 
the conduct of it in the East, and when it was over, 
he retired to his house in Richmond, and lived there 
quietly. He used his influence to persuade those 
who had been fighting in the Confederate cause to 
settle down peaceably and become good citizens of 
the re-constructed country, and to this end Grant 
frankly sought his advice and co-operation, for this 
aim was uppermost in both their minds since they 
met as friends at Appomattox. During the War, Lee 
was never bitter or unjust, and tried to influence 
others in the same way. He was ruined by the War, 
and in August, 1865, was offered the post of Presi- 
dent of Washington College at Lexington, Virginia, 
which he only accepted when assured that his doing 



LEE AND SHERMAN 447 

so would not injure the institution. Under his wise 
guidance it prospered exceedingly. During these 
last years he was offered tokens of love and respect 
from all sides, but accepted very few. In October, 
1869, he began to suffer from the illness, rheumatism 
of the heart-sac, which he had contracted in the 
campaign of 1863 : it grew steadily worse, and he 
died on October 12th, 1870, As a soldier, perhaps 
his strongest point was his use of the holding power 
of a comparatively small force, to mass superior 
numbers at the decisive point, even with a smaller 
army, his weakest the use of cavalry ; but his power 
was gained by his excellence in all respects. 

Lee was, above all, a sincere and earnest Christian, 
a man of the noblest and most elevated character, 
and had such dignity that it carried command with 
it. He did everything thoroughly, and had the 
peculiarity of retaining his breadth of view of the 
largest matters, while missing no detail, however 
small. 

SHERMAN 

William Tecumseh Sherman, who came of an old 
Colonial family, was born at Lancaster, Ohio, in 1820, 
his father being a barrister in good practice, who 
soon became a judge. Young Sherman was sent to 
West Point, graduating in 1840, and got his first 
commission in the Artillery. He first saw service 
against the Seminoles in Florida, and then was sent 
to Marietta, Georgia, in 1844, gaining a knowledge 
of the country which was of great use to him twenty 
years later. Much of his earlier service was in the 
Southern States. He never went to the front in 
the Mexican War, but during part of that time was 
sent to California, held by the United States under 
military law, while it lasted. In 1850 he was sent 
to St. Louis, and married, leaving the army in 1853 ; 
he was a banker in San Francisco till 1857, and then 
went to a bank in New York for a time. He next 



448 SOME ACTORS IN THE WAR 

tried law, with little success, and in 1859 was made 
head of a military college in Louisiana, where he 
got to know well several of his future antagonists, 
Bragg, Taylor, and Beauregard. Bragg he had 
known in the army. In January, 1861, he resigned 
this post and got an appointment in St. Louis, on 
account of which he declined both a post in the 
War Office and that of brigadier-general in Missouri, 
which was then given to Lyon. The War, however, 
was on them, and events moved fast. He was brought 
back to the Army as Colonel of the new 13th Infantry, 
but sent to Washington on staff duty : in June he 
got command of a brigade in Tyler's division, which 
fought at Bull Run, from which time he rose steadily 
till he became second only to Grant. 

In June, 1865, he was given command of the 2nd 
Military District, Headquarters, St. Louis. Here his 
principal interest soon became the opening up of the 
West, by the construction of the Union and Kansas 
Pacific Railways, and the controlling of the Indians, 
who were powerful and very hostile, for they clearly 
saw what railway construction meant for them. But 
for the troops, Sherman thinks that these railways 
could not have been made. In July, 1867, he was 
made head of the Indian Peace Commission, and 
adopted the policy of removing the plains Indians 
to reservations far away from the railway lines. 

The re-construction of the Army on a peace estab- 
lishment was taken in hand in 1865, and early the 
next year Grant was made General, Sherman Lieu- 
tenant-General. Sherman was head of the Committee 
appointed to remodel the Articles of War and Army 
Regulations in the light of war experience, but their 
Report did not suit the political heads of the Army, 
and was pigeon-holed. He stayed at St. Louis and 
carefully kept out of the quarrel between President 
Johnson and Congress, refusing any appointment 
which would bring him to Washington. When Grant 
became President, Sherman was promoted to General 



and Commander-in-Chief. He took a year's leave, 
and went to Europe in 1871. On his return, he 
moved Headquarters to St. Louis to avoid the politi- 
cal interference of the Secretary for War, but when 
Mr. Taft succeeded General Belknap in this post, 
they were brought back. In November, 1883, being- 
near the age for retirement, 64, he resigned the 
Command, and retired to his home in St. Louis. 

Sherman's was the clearest intellect brought to 
bear on the War, and at first it got him into trouble ; 
he saw at once that there was no middle course, 
that the North must "whip, or get whipped," also 
the force and time required to finish the War. For 
this estimate, which was below the mark, he was 
howled at as a maniac, all the papers attacked him, 
and he was removed from command for a time, but 
his judgment was soon vindicated : his conduct at 
Shiloh brought him to the front and he never looked 
back. He was absolutely above all jealousy and had 
the rare power of forming an unbiassed comparison 
of his own powers and those of others. For instance, 
he said that he knew himself to be an abler soldier 
than Grant, but that they were rightly placed, since 
he lacked Grant's iron nerve. He always spoke his 
mind freely, but accepted his superiors' judgment 
on the matter, and was most loyal in his friendship 
for, and support of, General Grant. 

JOSEPH JOHNSTON 

General Joseph Johnston was a Virginian, whose 
father had fought with Lee's father under Washington 
in the War of Independence, and the two sons, who 
were at West Point together, were fast friends 
throughout their lives. Both were in the Engineers 
and distinguished themselves in the Mexican War, 
and at the outbreak of the Civil War Johnston had 
seen as much service with troops as any officer 
in the Army. He was Quartermaster-General in 

29 



450 SOME AtTORS IN THE WAR 

Buchanan's Cabinet, which carried the temporary 
rank of Brigadier-General, and was much aggrieved 
at his seniority in the Confederate Army being only 
that of Colonel : he attacked Jefferson Davis bitterly, 
for the supposed slight, and the friction between them 
was a serious injury to their cause. He was not 
great enough to be above jealousy of others' fame, 
though this always excepted that of his old friend, 
Lee. He was a magnificent soldier and had the con- 
fidence of his men, but cannot be called a lucky 
commander, though there were few, if any, abler 
ones. He was, however, essentially an Engineer, 
and not given to the offensive, whereby he lost 
many chances ; Seven Pines and Bentonville were 
exceptions. In some respects, however, he has never 
been surpassed. No one ever had a truer eye for 
a position, or could fortify it better, while not Marshal 
Ney himself could judge as well as Johnston exactly 
how long to remain in a position and bluff the enemy, 
after it had become untenable, in which most delicate 
operation he never made a mistake. Another pecu- 
liarity was his povv^er of retreating swiftly and secretly 
with a large army, leaving nothing behind. With 
the exception that he did not use the offensive, he 
was the greatest master of defensive strategy and 
tactics. 

HALLECK 

Henry Wager Halleck was born in New York 
State in 1814, and was educated at West Point, re- 
ceiving his commission in the Engineers. During the 
Mexican War he and Sherman were both quartered in 
California, where they took their share in settling its 
unruly residents and immigrants, and in 1854 Halleck 
retired, and went into civil life as a lawyer in San 
Francisco, where he did well, becoming one of its most 
prominent citizens. 

He was brought in at the beginning of the War as one 



HALLECK AND BRAGG 45 » 

of the four new Major-Generals, next in rank to General 
Scott, and his first active service was when he was 
sent to Missouri to succeed General Hunter in Novem- 
ber, 1861, from which time he took a prominent part in 
the War throughout, rather than a distinguished one. 
He was an able man in his way, but slow and ponder- 
ous of intellect, and more of a bookworm than a man 
of action. He was a close student of military matters 
and translated several works from other languages, 
but in war was pedantic and obstinate. He had two 
chances of ending the War in the West, one after the 
capture of Fort Donelson, the other after Shiloh, but 
lost both by his over-caution and slowness, though 
in the latter case his plans were good. As Com- 
mander-in-Chief his influence was baleful, for he did 
not trust the man on the spot, and insisted on his own 
cumbrous plans being carried out, and thus thwarted 
and quarrelled with the Union Commanders, of whom 
Sherman seemed the only one with whom he could 
get on at all : he persistently snubbed Grant, when 
a subordinate. He seems to have been jealous and 
vindictive, and most difficult to work with, for though 
interfering to the last degree, he would take no re- 
sponsibility, and was helpless in emergency. A weak 
man, he fell quite under the influence of the masterful 
Secretary for War, Stanton, especially after Grant 
succeeded him in command, when he was called the 
Chief-of-Staff, query, to the Cabinet, certainly not to 
Grant. At the end of the War he had a short period 
of administrative command in Virginia, and then 
disappears from the scene. Whoever trusted to 
Halleck's action, support, or promises, in war, was 
disappointed (cf. pp. 152, 162). 

BRAGG 

General Braxton Bragg was a native of North Caro- 
lina, was educated at West Point, and went into the 
Artillery in 1837. He served with credit in Mexico, 



452 SOME ACTORS IN THE WAR 

gaining the brevet of lieutenant-colonel while a Cap- 
tain. He left the Army in 1855 or '56, owing to a 
quarrel with Jefferson Davis, then Secretary for War, 
married and settled in Louisiana, and joined the forces 
of that State, in which he was a brigadier-general 
when the War broke out. He joined the Confederate 
service, and is said to have been dissatisfied with his 
rank at first. From March, 1861, to January, 1862, he 
commanded the coast of West Florida and Alabama, 
headquarters, Pensacola, and then was sent to join 
Sidney Johnston's army in Kentucky. He succeeded 
Beauregard in command of it after the retreat from 
Corinth, and Sherman considered him a much abler 
man, of greater powers of organization, of action, and 
of discipline, but severe and exacting, and not liked by 
his command. He has been called the best discipli- 
narian on the Confederate side. After Chattanooga he 
went to Richmond as Davis' Chief -of -Staff, his duties 
being to conduct military operations in the armies of 
the Confederacy under the direction of the President, 
but at the very end of the War he was put in command 
again, to resist Sherman in the Campaign of the Caro- 
linas : it was then, however, too late to do any good. 

Like Lee, he committed the fatal mistake, but to a 
greater extent, of dabbling in politics when he should 
have been striking a decisive blow, in his invasion of 
Kentucky in 1862. He could both plan and strike, 
being a good strategist and tactician : e.g. the masterly 
way in which he out-manoeuvred Buell, driving him 
back from before Chattanooga to Louisville, his use of 
cavalry to paralyze Grant and isolate Rosecrans, before 
Stone's River, his plan of action at Chickamauga, etc. 
But he had a most irritable temper, largely the result 
of ill-health, and was often at loggerheads with his 
subordinates, which was a principal reason for his fail- 
ure to crush Rosecrans at Chickamauga. He was not 
a lucky general, and did not keep the confidence of 
his men. Grant thought much of him, both personally 
and professionally, as a man of the highest character 



BRAGG AND SHERIDAN 453 

and conduct, but said that his cantankerous temper 
was always getting him into trouble. 

He died at Galveston, in September, 1876, of heart 
disease. 

SHERIDAN 

Philip Henry Sheridan was the son of an Irish 
farmer who emigrated from Ireland in 1830, the year 
before his famous son was born in New York State, 
but the family soon moved to Ohio. At West Point, 
young Sheridan was rather known for his independent 
disposition than for anything else, and joined the ist 
Infantry in 1853. His first service was all against the 
Indians, in Texas, California, and Oregon, and at the 
beginning of the War he was gazetted captain in 
Sherman's new 13th Infantry. When Halleck took 
command in Missouri he sent for Sheridan, needing 
his departmental experience, and he was soon made 
Commissary and Chief Quartermaster to General 
Curtis' Army of South- West Missouri. He had difificult 
work with the undisciplined units of those days, and 
left after the battle of Pea Ridge, this time on remount 
duty, and then became quartermaster to Halleck's 
headquarters after Shiloh. Soon a regular commander 
was wanted for a Michigan cavalry regiment, and 
Sheridan was named, for . though an Infantryman, 
most of his real service had been with the cavalry, and 
he was known as an energetic and efficient officer. 
Beauregard was just then evacuating Corinth, and 
Sheridan's able handling of his regiment in the pursuit 
brought him the command of the brigade in a very 
short time. From this time he never looked back. 
Grant, when looking for a commander to manage the 
cavalry of the Army of the Potomac better than 
Pleasonton had done, tried Sheridan : but had Grant 
not been in chief command, he would not have had 
the free hand that he wanted, for Meade's notions of 
the use of cavalry were rudimentary, and only Grant's 
interference saved the situation. 



454 SOME AOTORS IN THE WAR 

Sheridan's ability in command of an independent 
cavalry force pointed him out as an energetic com- 
mander of an army for secondary operations, and his 
great campaign in the Shenandoah Valley was the 
result : as a leader of men in battle he has never 
been surpassed. He has been execrated for his exact 
carrying out of Grant's stern order to devastate the 
Valley, but was the best man for the work, for he 
knew that to try to wage war with rose-water is not 
only not humane, but the very reverse, and that ending 
it quickly is best for all concerned. 

He was fiery and autocratic, and though he trusted 
his subordinates, and delegated power wisely, he never 
hesitated to remove from command any one who failed 
him : though severe and exacting, he was in the main 
just, but may have been mistaken about General 
Warren. One of the principal causes of his uniform 
success was the care and clearness with which his 
orders were drawn up, a most important point, 
in which he was far in advance of any other com- 
mander in the War, working on the plan which the 
Germans have reduced to a system, not by corres- 
pondence. 

After the War he went with a large army to 
Texas to watch the French, and here his boldness of 
character shewed itself: when on the frontier he sup- 
ported Escobedo morally, and a good deal more, for 
though he could not interfere directly, he once helped 
him out of a difficulty by giving leave of absence to 
a whole brigade : the French were furious, but took 
the hint. 

As military commander in Louisiana, he ruled with 
a strong hand, removing disloyal officials. When 
Sherman took command of the Army, he became 
Lieutenant-General, and went west in September, 1867, 
Indian-fighting again. He went to Europe in 1870, 
where he saw a good deal of the Franco-German War, 
and succeeded Sherman in the rank of General, and 
Command of the Army, in November, 1883. 



455 



EARLY 



The name of Lieutenant-General Jubal Early ^ Sheri- 
dan's great opponent in the Valley, may well follow 
his. Early was a Virginian, educated as a soldier, who 
left the army for the law, before the Mexican War, 
but served in it as a Volunteer with his State troops. 
He was a Representative at the Virginia State Con- 
vention to discuss the question of Secession, which he 
opposed with all his might, but when decided on, took 
part with his State in the War, in which there was no 
harder fighter. At Bull Run he commanded a brigade, 
and rose steadily in the service, winning a position at 
Gettysburg which would probably have decided the 
battle, had Rodcs supported him, on the evening of 
the second day. He took up the role of Jackson in 
frightening the Washington politicians ; but in his 
Valley Campaign, unlike Jackson, who was confronted 
by a number of mediocre commanders, whom he 
bewildered and beat in detail. Early had to deal with 
a large army under a better general, against which, 
however, he gained some minor successes, and nearly 
one victory, and, by deliberately accepting tactical 
defeat, carried out his strategical orders, to detain 
Sheridan's army. Nothing daunted or stopped him : 
a heavy defeat was but a temporary check, he rallied 
and attacked again at once : to carry out his orders, 
without considering the consequences to himself, was 
his only thought, and right well he did it : he finally 
escaped to Richmond after the break-up of his army, 
with a single orderly, the last man to give up the 
struggle. Of all the remarkable acts of the War, 
Early s deliberate acceptance of a hopeless position 
was perhaps the most so. Sheridan nearly captured 
him when crossing the Mississippi on his way to 
Mexico, after the surrenders, but at this time there 
was no desire to hunt down prominent Confederates, 
in accordance with Lincoln's wish. He soon came 
back, and was living in Virginia in 1870. 



456 SOME ACTORS IN THE WAR 

Early was one of the most curious and original 
figures of the War, being brusque and outspoken to 
a degree which many considered to verge on indis- 
cipline, but no man was more really loyal. Jackson 
once asked him sternly why he had seen so many 
stragglers from his division. ** Probably because you 
rode behind it," said Early. 

MEADE 

George G. Meade was a Pennsylvanian, who joined 
the Artillery from West Point in 1835, but left the 
next year. He rejoined in 1842, getting a commission 
in the Engineers, and served with credit in Mexico. 
He was a captain when the War broke out, and after 
the battle of Bull Run got a brigade in the Vth Corps, 
which he afterwards commanded. When appointed 
to command the Army of the Potomac, three days 
before Gettysburg, his grasp of the scattered situation 
was instant and masterly, and he shewed both judg- 
ment and nerve, when he heard of the death of 
Reynolds and the desperate state of affairs, in choosing 
Hancock, the junior Corps Commander, to go at once, 
take command of the three Corps on the ground, and 
hold on while he brought up the army. He was an 
excellent handler of large forces, and a great army 
commander, but not great in independent command, 
for he did not understand the use of cavalry, and, like 
most Engineers, his offensive was weak. He was a 
gallant soldier and a modest and loyal man, but was 
troubled with a most irritable temper, and was often 
very difficult to deal with. 

After the War he had the command of a military 
District in the South, but in the consequent re-arrange- 
ment of the Army on a peace footing there was 
not enough room left for the principal officers, and 
when Sherman was made General, Sheridan became 
Lieutenant-General over Meade's head, being chosen 
for his special fitness for active service, in bringing the 



MEADE, BEAUREGARD, AND BANKS 457 

hostile Indians of the plains to terms. Sherman says 
that there should have been three Lieutenant-Generals, 
to provide for both Meade and Thomas. Meade was 
much hurt, and died not long after, feeling that he had 
been neglected and ill-treated, after his great services 
to his country. 

BEAUREGARD 

General Gustave Beauregard was a Louisianian, 
educated at West Point, who went into the Engineers 
and served with credit in the Mexican War. He was 
one of the senior Confederate generals, and com- 
manded the army which faced McDowell's at Bull 
Run, but in the battle was second to Joseph Johnston, 
who came up from the Valley. He differed with Jeffer- 
son Davis over several things, and they seem not to 
have worked cordially together, which is little to the 
credit of either, but Beauregard, on his own showing, 
appears querulous and touchy. However this may 
be, he seems to have had few important commands in 
the field for a man of his standing and ability, but to 
have been kept to defence, for which as an Engineer 
he was well fitted. Latterly, he had command of a 
large district. His health, though, was none of the 
best. Though a good handler of troops in action, he 
seems to have been little of a strategist. After the 
War he retired to his home in Louisiana. 

BANKS 

Nathaniel P. Banks, a politician who had been 
Speaker of the House of Representatives, was one 
of the four new Major-Generals appointed when the 
War first broke out. Though a political, he never 
intrigued, and was a most useful man, doing his duty 
simply to the best of his ability wherever he was sent. 
A great commander in the field he was not ; when 
pitted against some of the good generals of the South 
he was completely over-matched, and was ;Q0t ec[uajl 



458 SOME ACTORS IN THE WAR 

to the command of the Red River Expedition. He 
was, however, a brave man and a good administrator, 
an excellent military governor of a disturbed district, 
and well able to conduct minor operations against 
irregular forces. After the battle of Manassas he was 
put in command at Washington, brought order out of 
chaos, restored confidence, and freed McClellan for 
the Maryland Campaign. Thence he was sent to 
command at New Orleans, and at the siege of Port 
Hudson rose to a high level, both in his conduct of 
the siege and when he refused to be drawn away by 
the alarmist reports of General Emory of the danger 
to New Orleans. A weaker man might have lost the 
one without saving the other, had it been really 
attacked, but Banks had the clearness of view and 
resolution which made him carry out the main 
strategical work, to open the Mississippi, the success 
of which would make the other only a temporary set- 
back. Here he remained till the end of the War. 



PRICE 

General Sterling Price had served with credit as a 
militia general in the Mexican War, so, though not 
a professional soldier, he had war experience. He 
was one of the Legislature elected in the autumn of 
i860 in Missouri, and voted against Secession, but was 
so enraged at the bogey of coercion, that Blair and 
Lyon should use force to maintain the Union and 
defeat its avowed enemies, that he entered the Con- 
federate service. This was a serious blow to the 
Union cause in Missouri, for Price was deservedly 
one of the most influential men in all that country. 
He was of noble and unselfish character, so much so 
as to resign command to a turbulent junior officer, 
McCulloch, by no means his equal in ability or experi- 
ence, rather than work at cross-purposes. Though 
Jefferson Davis treated him with great harshness on 
one occasion it did not affect his whole-hearted loyalty 



PRICE AND THOMAS 459 

to the cause in the least, or cause friction, and he was 
one of those who, at the very last, tried to arrange for 
Confederate emigration to Mexico. As a general in 
the field he was reliable and respectable, rather than 
brilliant. 

THOMAS 

Major-General George H. Thomas was a Virginian, 
who was at West Point with Sherman, and was also 
gazetted to the Artillery. In 1845 he was in Bragg' s 
battery, of whom the other officers were Reynolds, 
the Pennsylvanian, killed at Gettysburg, and D. H. Hill, 
who records that Thomas was the most enthusiastic 
Southerner of the three. He served in the Mexican 
War, and was for a time in the 2nd Cavalry, under 
Sidney Johnston and Lee. At the outset of the Civil 
War he was looked on with suspicion on the Union 
side, being a Southerner, but his army friends vouched 
for his absolute loyalty, and never was confidence 
more worthily bestowed. 

Practically all his service was in the West, as he 
was one of the officers sent by Lincoln, at the very 
first, to organize Union troops in Kentucky, and there 
was hardly an important battle between the Alleghanies 
and Mississippi in which he did not take his full share. 
As a soldier he was slow but sure, absolutely reliable, 
and as firm as a rock : Grant says that he could not 
be driven from any position that he had been given 
to hold. He was, however, too slow for independent 
command, but the combination of Rosecrans, a high- 
spirited, brilliant man, with the indomitable Thomas 
as second, was ideal. He was called " The Rock of 
Chickamauga " after that battle. His delays before 
Nashville seemed inexcusable to Grant, who sent the 
most imperative orders, but Thomas moved not ; 
partly because the weather made movement impos- 
sible, partly because he would not allow his hand 
to be forced when he saw his way. Grant was also 
much annoyed with his slowness in the spring of 



46o SOME ACTORS IN THE WAR 

1865, but it would appear that his health was not 
what it had been. 

As a man, Thomas was most lovable, and even 
Bragg, at the time when he twice shattered his army 
against his old subaltern's iron resistance, spoke of 
" Old Tom " with the greatest affection. Sherman, 
who knew him as well as any man, says that the 
popular idea of him as the impersonation of strength, 
calm and imperturbable, was a mistake, and that he 
^■^, was most touchy about fancied slights or wrongs. 
;;' He was much hurt at Grant's impatience before 
^* Nashville, and again at the promotion of Sheridan to 

Lieutenant-General, and the fancied favouring of 
•''^Meade in the choice of stations. Both he and Meade | 
N. well merited the higher rank for their great services^ 
\ As it was, Thomas, whose health had been broken by 
Vythe strain of the War, took the command at San 
Francisco, feeling that he had been badly treated, and 
died there in 1870 of heart disease. 



TA YLOR 

Lieutenant-General Richard Taylor was the son of 
General Zachary Taylor, who commanded in the first 
phase of the Mexican War, and was afterwards 
President. Jefferson Davis' first wife was his sister. 
Before the War he was a Senator for Louisiana, where 
Sherman knew him well. On the outbreak of war he 
soon got a brigade, and served in the East, at Bull 
Run, and in the Valley, wxidi^r Jackson. He afterwards 
went back to his own district, where, though his com- 
mand was nominally independent, he seemed much 
under orders, and would probably have done better 
with a freer hand, for he was an able soldier. He put 
great pressure on his enemies in Louisiana with a 
small force in July, 1863, by threatening New Orleans 
and taking several Union posts, and managed the 
early part of the resistance to Banks' Red River 
Expedition well : but for Kirby Smith, under whose 



TAYLOR AND SCHOli'IELn 46/ 

command he came at the crisis, he would probably 
have turned the Union failure into disaster. He 
afterwards commanded the Southern part of the 
Confederacy, when Sherman cut it in two and Canby 
attacked Mobile, but, though he had many troops 
under his orders, they could not be united for common 
action. He surrendered a larger force than any other 
Confederate general. 

After the War, he was able to be of use to his side 
by his friendship with prominent Union politicians 
who had known his father. 

SCHOFIELD 

General John McAllister Schofield was born in New 
York State in 1831, and joined the Artillery from West 
Point in 1853, returning there as a Professor a few 
years later. Being in St. Louis on leave when the 
War broke out, he was ordered to muster the Missouri 
troops, and was given a Volunteer commission as 
major. He served on Lyon's staff at Booneville and 
Wilson's Creek. In November, 1861, he raised and 
took command of the Missouri militia, waging a con- 
tinual fight with the roving Confederate bands. In 
1862 he was given the command of the Department of 
Missouri and Kansas, and formed an army of better 
troops which was called the "Army of the Frontier," 
to meet the army which was being collected by 
Hindman in Arkansas in the autumn. With this he 
drove the Confederates out of Missouri and across 
Arkansas, and held his own against all comers till he 
succeeded Foster in command of the Department and 
Army of the Ohio, at Knoxville, in February, 1864. 
In May, he took his place in Grant's great plan and 
joined Sherman's army, to drive back Johnston. 
Thenceforward he had his full share in the main 
operations of the War, and made a name as a sound 
and successful commander, and a brilliant handler of 
troops. He had again an independent command in 



462 SOME ACTORS IN THE WAR 

the operations against Wilmington, and the march 
inland to join Sherman, where he added to his reputa- 
tion. In Re-construction times he commanded the 
military District of Virginia, afterwards serving a term 
as Secretary for War, and finally rising to full General, 
and the Chief Command of the Army. Schofield was 
perhaps the youngest man who was trusted with a 
Department, and the military command of a large and 
important district, in which he had to raise and train 
most of his troops, and in which the fighting, though 
in itself secondary, was almost continuous for a time, 
and required the management of large forces, spread 
over great areas. 

HARDEE 

Lieutenant-General William J. Hardee was a major 
in the old service when the War broke out, and was 
known as a careful student of war : he had translated 
a French work on Tactics, which became much sought 
after by both sides for the training of all the new 
officers and men. Hardee was one of the great soldiers 
who had served in that great school of soldiers, the 
2nd Cavalry, and learned his trade under Sidney John- 
ston and Lee. In the War, his service was in the West 
till nearly the end. In the summer of 1861 he was 
sent to Arkansas, to raise troops and take command, 
joining Sidney Johnston in Kentucky the next year. 
He remained with this main army, under different 
commanders, till July, 1863, when he was sent to take 
command of the District of Mississippi and Alabama, 
but was back again, under Bragg, at the battle of 
Chattanooga. On September 28th, 1864, he was given 
the Department of South Carolina, Georgia, and Florida, 
and had the impossible task of opposing Sherman's 
advance from Atlanta. All that could be done with 
the small force at his disposal he did, in the hindrance 
to the advance and the defence of Savannah, till he 
came under Johnston's command in North Carolina in 
February, 1865. 



HARDEE AND HANCOCK 463 

HardeCy like Sheridan and some others, never found 
his limit, and the modesty which made him steadily 
refuse supreme command was almost a disaster to 
the Confederate cause, for no side has so many really 
first-rate men that in its hour of need it can dispense 
with any of them. Hardee was excellent at every 
point ; his great night march, and attack of Logan at 
Atlanta, is a model of a most difficult operation, being 
equal to anything done by Jackson himself, and his 
strategical advice at all times was the very best of all. 
Had it been taken, Sherman would have had a much 
harder task, when he advanced from Savannah in 
1865, though nothing would have averted the break- 
up of the Confederacy. 

HANCOCK 

Of all the officers on the Union side who did not 
rise to the command of an army, Winfield Scott 
Hancock was by far the most distinguished. Born 
in Pennsylvania in 1824, he joined the 6th Infantry 
from West Point in 1844, and served through the 
Mexican War with credit. He was in the Utah 
Expedition, and, when the Civil War broke out, was 
sent for from California, and made brigadier-general 
of Volunteers in September, 1861 ; his next campaign 
was in the Peninsula. Here he made his mark, and 
all his subsequent service was with the Army of the 
Potomac. He was a magnificent Corps Commander, 
and when the appointment of Sheridan to command 
the Valley army made probable a shuffling of com- 
mands, which would have given Meade a military 
District, Grant proposed that Hancock should succeed 
him in command of the Army of the Potomac. This 
was not done, but at the end of 1864, when enterprises 
were required which took a force of several Corps on 
detached service, Grant gave the command to him, 
and he always exercised it with conspicuous success. 
Grant says that " his name was never mentioned as 



464 SaME ACTORS IN THE WAK 

having committed in battle a blunder for which he' 
was responsible," while Sheridan speaks with admira- 
tion of his rare military judgment, and correct appreci- 
ation of a difficult position. 

He was strikingly handsome, tall and powerful, and 
of majestic presence, and, like Stuart, full}^ appreciated 
the showy side of soldiering, of which he made good 
use. Of courteous manners and remarkable tact, he 
made himself a persona grata in Louisiana as military 
governor in 1867,- after Sheridan's uncompromising 
methods had caused friction, and matters there ran 
smoothly during his term, but he never allowed the 
" suaviter in modo " to weaken the *' fortiter in re." ^ 
He afterwards succeeded to the rank of full General, 
and the Command of the United States Army. He ^ 
was the Democratic candidate for the Presidency in 
1880, but was beaten by Garfield. 

LONGSTREET 

Lieutenant-General James Longstreet was at West 
Point with Grant ; they served in the same regiment 
in Mexico, and Grant married his cousin. On joining 
the Confederate service he soon got a division, then 
a Corps, and ^iier Jackson's death was Lee's right-hand 
man. His power of handling an Army Corps in 
attack as a whole was most remarkable, but though 
a fine soldier, he was sometimes a difficult subordinate, 
being disputatious and obstinate, and used to worry 
Lee with his own schemes, as against his orders, 
notably at Gettysburg, where by waiting to complete 
some units for attack as a whole, when every minute 
was of consequence, he let the great chance slip. 
Unless Hardee be excepted, he was the greatest Corps 
Commander in the Confederate service, but this was 
his limit, for he never did much in independent 
command. Grant, however, thought highly of him as 
a soldier, and Lee called him his old war-horse. He 
fought to the very end of the War, and lived for many 
years afterwards. 



46s 

WILSON 

James Harrison Wilson was a lieutenant of 
Engineers at the beginning of the War, and served 
at first in the operations on the South-East coast 
under General Gillmore : we hear of him as doing- 
good work before Fort Pulaski in the spring of 1862. 
The next year he was a colonel of Engineers on 
Grant's staff before Vicksburg, and seems to have 
impressed Grant with his offensive power, because, 
when he went East to take up the Chief Command, 
and a Cavalry Corps was formed under Sheridan, 
Wilson was given the command of one of the divisions. 
Here he soon shewed that he was in his right place, 
and rose rapidly, being entrusted with the conduct 
of difficult and dangerous independent operations, a 
sure proof of Grant's confidence. Though badly 
beaten at Ream's Station, Grant did not blame him, 
for he had risked everything to carry out his orders, 
and done all that a man could do. Shortly afterwards, 
Grant sent him as Cavalry Commander to Sherman, 
and when Thomas' army was formed to resist Hoods 
invasion of Tennessee, Sherman, probably considering 
Thomas' constitutional peculiarity of extreme delibera- 
tion in all things, and that some real driving power 
could be advantageously added to this command, 
suggested that his cavalry service would be better 
if Wilson came to take command of it (cf. p. 362). 
Here again Wilson abundantly justified the selection, 
and at the battle of Nashville gave a striking instance 
of the power of a well-handled cavalry force in general 
action. In the beginning of 1865, the largest cavalry 
force used in the War was put under him, over 
13,500 men, and he drove through Alabama much as 
Sherman had done through Georgia, breaking up and 
scattering the inferior force with which his old 
antagonist, Forrest^ sought to stop him, and utterly 
destroying the numerous and invaluable ironworks 
and machine shops, on which the Confederates now 

30 



4^6 SOME ACTORS IN THE WAR 

depended. It is an entire misnomer to call this great 
operation of war a raid, as is commonly done, for 
Wilson's force did not depend for safety on time or 
mobility, but was intended to fight anything which 
could be brought against it. 

Wilson never reached the end of his military tether, 
as did so many others, for General Taylor^ then 
commanding the Southern District of the Confederacy, 
says that this march was the very best managed 
operation which came within his cognizance during 
the War. It seems a pity that Wilson did not get 
his chance sooner. 

FORREST 

Nathan Bedford Forrest was the son of a small 
trader in negroes and mules ; he was only fifteen 
when his father died and left him the sole support 
of ^is mother and the younger children : this brought 
out the strength of his character, and he manfully 
fulfilled his trust. He had no time for education, 
and could hardly read or write. He first comes into 
notice as the commander of the Confederate cavalry 
brigade which cut its way out of Fort Donelson before 
the sifrrender, then as a redoubtable partisan leader, 
developing into a great cavalry officer. He worked 
out his tactics for himself, and his stern character 
maintained discipline, while his personal leadership 
in action was brilliant. He had the breadth of mind 
which could understand strategy, and in the last year 
of the War Grant looked on him as the best man 
on either side for wide-ranging, independent action. 
Once when asked how he had managed to do so well, 
he replied, " Well, I got there first with the most 
men," almost putting the complete Art of War into 
a nutshell. He was unjustly blamed for the massacre 
of the coloured troops at Fort Pillow by his command, 
for he stopped it as soon as he came up : he was 
always markedly kind to his negro prisoners, and 



FORREST 467 

they used to speak of ^^ Mass' Forrest" with gratitude. 
A truly great man, he shone most in adversity, and 
no finer work was done in the War than his, of 
covering the retreat of Hood's beaten army from 
Nashville. 

When the War was over, he, like Lee^ used all his 
influence to persuade the late Confederate soldiers to 
settle down quietly, and become good citizens of the 
re-constituted Union, and to precept he added ex- 
ample, for, seeing that well-planned railways would 
be one of the best means of restoring trade and 
prosperity to the South, he interested himself in 
them, and in 1870 was the president of an important 
line between Selma and Memphis, the construction 
of which he pushed with all his energy. He died 
in ICS79. 

References to Personal Notices Elsewhere 
IN Book 

AsJiby, p. 142 ; Buchanan, p. 16; Buell, p. 183 ; Jeffer- 
son Davis, p. 71; Dupont, p. 276; Farragut, p. 373; 
Fremont, p. 17; ^. P. Hill, p. 412; Hood, p. 412; 
Hooker, p. 371; Jackson, p. 237; Andrew Johnson, 
p. 422 ; Sidney Johnston, p. 142 ; Lincoln, p. 409 ; Lyon, 
p. 99; McClellan, p. 180; McClernand, p. 240; 
McDowell, p. 183; McPherson, p. i'j2\ John Morgan, 
P- 373 1 Pemberton, p. 239; Pleasonton, p. 322; Polk, 
p. 320; Pope, p. 181; Reynolds, p. 239; Rosecrans, 
p. 276; Sedgwick, p. 321; Semmes, p. 322;/. E. B. 
Stuart, p. 321 ; Fan Dorn, p. 240; Warren, p. 383. 



CHAPTER XVII 

RESULTS AND LESSONS OF THE WAR 

The year 1870 saw the finish of the Re-construction 
period in its legal and constitutional sense, which 
left the individual States in a very different position 
to the Nation than they had been at the beginning of 
the War, for they had not only ratified the Amend- 
ments to the Constitution, which largely restricted 
their powers of internal legislation, but most if not 
all of the ex-Confederate States made new State 
Constitutions, by which they unconditionally adhered 
to the Union, and abandoned the " Sovereign and 
Independent" status, under which they had claimed 
to leave it at will. Although Amendments to the 
Constitution were passed to regulate the "domestic 
institutions" of the ex-Confederate States before re- 
admission, nothing was done about the Territory of 
Utah, whose "domestic institutions'' were much 
worse, and which might soon claim to come in, and 
did so, on conditions, in 1896, Since these did not 
include the acceptance of an Amendment to the 
Constitution, dealing with the evil, the Mormons, as 
soon as they got their State recognition, might alter 
any State Constitution prohibiting polygamy, as the 
National Government would then be unable to inter- 
fere in their private affairs. In 1880 they planned to 
form a block of six new States, in and around Utah, 
and owing to the balance of parties had a real chance 
of success. Their avowed object then was to set up 



STATE SOVEREIGNTY 469 

a Mormon Government, and defy that of the United 
States : though that attempt did not succeed, the 
national position has never been made safe. It has 
been freely stated that the War settled for ever the 
question of State Independence ; but will this bear 
examination ? 

Though the stern ordeal of war for national exist- 
ence impresses on all that union is strength, and that 
minor interests must be subordinated to the common 
weal, this lesson is only remembered by those who 
have learnt it by personal experience, for after peace 
has reigned for a generation, local and petty interests 
again assert the supremacy, and sap the wholesome 
discipline. The lesson was beginning to be forgotten 
even before the end of Washington's Presidency, after 
the War of Independence, and was soon reversed in 
practice. . What has happened before is happening 
again. None of the iVmendments to the Constitution 
really deal with the main question, but only wnth 
details of internal policy and administration, and ex- 
cept for the precedent, the Nation is no stronger than 
it was before, being guaranteed by the individual 
States, not vice versa. There has always been so 
great a reluctance to interfere with the several States 
that laws which Congress has the power to pass have 
not been passed (cf. p. 39), even though needed by 
the Nation : this was markedly brought out when 
some Italians were lynched at New Orleans in 1891, 
causing serious complications with the Italian Govern- 
ment, which recalled its Ambassador from Washing- 
ton, complaining that its subjects did not get the 
protection to which they were entitled by treat3^ 
It was then found that the National Government had 
never taken the measures requisite to cause its 
treaties to be observed by the various States, and was 
unable of itself to grant redress, but had to refer the 
matter back to the State of Louisiana. Another case 
occurred in 1906, the State of California refusing to 
admit the children of Japanese residents to her 



470 RESULTS AND LESSONS OF THE WAR 

schools, or to accept either ruling or advice from 
President Roosevelt, which caused a serious difficulty 
with Japan. Other causes of friction arose, and on 
December 12th, 1906, in the Senate, Mr. Rayner of 
Maryland spoke for an hour in support of the con- 
tention that the rights of individual States are above 
treaties concluded by the Federal Government. It 
was not till February 3rd, 1909, that the Californian 
House of Representatives threw out the Drew Bill, 
which prohibited aliens from owning land : this was 
regarded as foreshadowing the defeat of all measures 
tending to embarrass the Federal Government in its 
relations with Japan. Thus, since the close of the 
Civil War, the resurrection of the doctrine of State 
Sovereignty has twice brought the country within 
measurable distance of Foreign War, but it is to be 
hoped that California's sensible decision will be taken 
as a precedent. 

As a slave, the negro had his place and his market 
value, and was on the whole well treated. During the 
War, the planters' families and estates were mostly 
left in the power of their slaves, and not one single 
outrage was committed : to-day it is unwise for a lady 
to walk alone, even close to Washington, on account 
of the negroes. The slave found himself pitchforked 
into freedom, which he had never been taught to use, 
for years he was merely a political shuttlecock, and 
even now his theoretical "equality" is ridiculed, and 
a race hatred has grown up in some States, marked 
by acts of fiendish brutality, against which he is practi- 
cally unprotected. Though where suddenly befooled 
with sham power, or pampered by a communistic 
system of metayage, the black man deteriorated rapidly, 
yet, where less exposed to agitators, and paid regular 
wages, he as rapidly improved, both materially and 
socially, principally in the Cotton States, but, even 
there, only up to a certain point. The old regime was 
understood and respected, the new one is not so, and 
the future of the two races, more distinct than ever, 



THE ''ALABAMA" CLAIMS 471 

and living side by side, in some places in antagonism, 
is a serious problem, which sudden Emancipation 
has complicated, not solved, so that an outsider may 
well ask whether its blessings have not been rather 
theoretical than practical. 

During Grant's Presidency the long-standing dispute 
with the British Government over the ''Alabama'' and 
other Confederate cruisers was brought to a head 
and settled. During the building of the "Alabama" 
especially, the American Ambassador, Mr. Adams, 
complained bitterly to Lord John Russell, the Foreign 
Minister, who wanted proper proofs of breach of the 
Foreign Enlistment Act, while the volumes of wild 
gossip and rumour on which the American complaints 
were founded did their cause more harm than good, 
and only within a few hours of the ship's sailing were 
proofs sent in which justified the law officers of the 
Crown in telegraphing to stop her at Liverpool and 
Queenstown, but she had gone. If a breach of 
neutrality was established which justified such an 
order to these two places, it should have been sent 
round to all other British ports, on finding that she 
had gone, and the neglect to do this seems the crucial 
mistake of the whole business. 

After leaving England, the "Florida'' was seized on 
suspicion at Nassau, but released, as all was declared 
in order (cf. p. 141). Soon afterwards, she was armed 
from her tender in the neighbourhood (cf. p. 177); the 
Americans allege that this was done in British 
territorial waters, which, if proved, would certainly 
be a breach of neutrality according to the existing Act. 

The Foreign Enlistment Act of that day threw all 
the onus of proof on the prosecution, the builder need 
know no more than he was told, the real offence 
consisting in manning or equipping, within British 
jurisdiction. The words "equip" and "arm" seem 
held to be synonymous, but why ? (cf. pp. y6y 486). 
The American Ambassador tried a test case, and got 
the British Government to seize the "Alexandra," 



472 RESULTS ANp LESSONS OF THE WAR 

fitting for sea at Birkenhead, but which there had been 
no attempt to arm. The verdict was given for the 
defendants, and, though the judgment was appealed 
against, it was never reversed. 

It was claimed that England should return the 
friendly acts of the United States, which had taken 
powers to strengthen her Neutrality Act in the 
Canadian rebellion of 1837 (cf p. ^6)^ and had refused 
to fit out vessels against her in the Crimean War. To 
this it was answered that the United States Govern- 
ment did not stop American interference in the 
Canadian rebellion, or the supplying of a man-of-war 
to Russia, which fought against England at Petro- 
paulovsk, and was still in Russian service ; that they 
had also had recruiting stations in Canada during the 
Mexican War; that in 1861 and 1862 the North had 
shipped over 300,000 rifles (cf. p. ']6)^ and had made 
overtures to Laird's to build ironclads for them, 
Mr. Laird, in Parliament, offered to shew this corre- 
spondence to the Speaker or Premier. It was also 
claimed on the British side that what England had 
done was in strict accordance with the practice of the 
United States and the principles laid down by their 
best judges, that the destruction of prizes at sea, now 
called piracy, was ordered by Congress in the War of 
18 1 2, and that Mr. Seward himself had said that contra- 
band of war for Mexico, complained of by France, 
must take its risk, within the very time covered by 
the American complaints. The Solicitor-General said 
that the country must be the interpreter of her own 
laws, which must not be enforced just to please the 
United States, but in English fashion, on proper evi- 
dence, not mere suspicion ; and the Premier, Lord 
Palmerston, that, on international law, belligerents 
have no right to complain of, nor the Government to 
interfere with, the mercantile transactions of supplying 
warlike stores, arms, and ships, which latter are on 
no different footing (Debate in the House of Commons, 
March 27th, 1863). To this standpoint the British 



EARLY STAGES OF THE QUARREL 4 73 

Government adhered throughout, and that tluy liad 
maintained an honest neutrahty. 

Individual members of the Government, however, 
injured their case by the most indiscreet speeches at 
different times. Mr. Gladstone said that Jefferson 
Davis had made a nation and an army, and was 
making a navy : this was seized on to shew that the 
Government knew what was going on, and took no 
steps to stop it. By this and stronger sayings he 
offended the North, and aroused hopes of recognition 
in the South, and, though he afterwards said that he 
never meant his words to bear such a construction, it 
was that which every one put upon them. Lord John 
Russell admitted to Mr. Adams that " the cases of the 
^Alabama' and * Oreto ' {^Florida') were a scandal"; 
and the Solicitor-General said that he had " strained 
the law " for Mr. Adams, whose Government took care 
that he should continue to do so. 

Actual negociations ran somewhat as follows : In 

1863, Lord John Russell refused to seize the turret- 
ships building at Laird's, but when Mr. Adams replied 
with a veiled threat, he did so. In October, Mr. Adams, 
for the United States, agreed to the principle of 
arbitration which he proposed. Nothing was done in 

1864. In August, 1865, Lord John Russell acknow- 
ledged a communication from Mr. Adams, " that the 
Government of the United States is ready to agree to 
any form of arbitration," saying that the only questions 
were. Whether the British Government had acted in 
good faith in maintaining neutrality, and Whether they 
were rightly advised in declining to detain the " Ala- 
bama " and others, under the Foreign Enlistment Act, 
He declined to submit such points to a third party, 
to admit bad faith, or to allow a foreign Government 
to interpret English law, but said that the Govern- 
ment would agree to a Commission, to which all claims 
which the Powers may agree to refer shall be referred. 
He would not admit any violation of British law, or 
any default in the performance of neutral duties, which 



474 RESULTS ANr\ LESSONS OF THE WAR 

would render them liable to a claim for compensation 
from the United States. 

When Lord Palmerston died in November, 1865, 
Lord John Russell became Premier, and was suc- 
ceeded at the Foreign Office by Lord Clarendon, to 
whom Mr. Adams wrote to say that the United States 
declined the proposal, as England would not admit 
their war claims. He therefore answered, closing the 
controversy. 

In 1866 the Conservatives came in, with Lord 
Stanley as Foreign Minister, and Mr. Seward re- 
opened the question, making the wildest statements 
and claims, which Lord Stanley criticized sharply, 
reminding the United States that they had closed 
the matter by declining arbitration : he accepted his 
predecessors' standpoint. He, however, enquired 
whether they would accept the principle, and on 
what points, which would be considered in the most 
friendly spirit to end the ill-feeling. With Mr. 
Reverdy Johnson, Mr. Adams' successor, he worked 
out fresh proposals, that four Commissioners should 
meet in London, appoint an arbitrator, and judge 
the matter on the official correspondence, but that 
there be power to ask for argument or further 
evidence, if necessary. This, however, was not 
approved by Mr. Seward. 

The Liberals then came in, with Mr. Gladstone as 
Premier, and Lord Clarendon as Foreign Minister. 
The United States had now got their old opponents, 
who had been in power all through the War. A new 
Convention was signed in London in January, 1869, 
providing for Commissioners, to examine documents, 
and hear one person on each side on every claim, 
but this was rejected in America, after some very 
violent speeches. Lord Clarendon was told that it 
only dealt with the claims of individuals, not with 
the relations of the two Governments, that it laid 
down no principle and settled no question, and that 
it would be better to let things cool down. Mr. Fish, 



GRANT'S DECISIVE STROKE 475 

however, Mr. Seward's successor, suddenly re-opcned 
it, making claims direct and indirect, but said that 
he would leave the method of settling the matter to 
Her Majesty's Government. 

Messrs. Seward and Fish had thus, by vehemence 
and persistence, gained point after point against the 
Liberal Government; but against other Governments, 
who had allowed Confederate cruisers to use their 
ports, and who resisted them firmly, they went no 
further. 

Early in 1871 President Grant made another step 
forward. He said to Congress that England seemed 
unwilling to allow that the United States had any 
just cause of complaint, and proposed to the House 
to buy up the private claims of American citizens, 
so that the nation might own and control all such 
demands against Great Britain. It is significant that 
after this time the British Government agreed to 
ever3^thing. 

Lord Clarendon had proposed a Joint High Com- 
mission, to sit at Washington, '* to treat of and discuss 
the mode of settling all questions which had reference 
to the fisheries and to Her Majesty's possessions in 
America." The President thought that it would fail 
to establish the friendship between the two countries 
unless the differences caused by the acts of the Con- 
federate cruisers were included, but if this were 
accepted, he would be glad to appoint Commissioners 
to meet those of England. The Liberals at once gave 
way on this crucial point and sent their represen- 
tatives over : they seemed worn out with American 
persistence, though they continued to assert their 
honest neutrality. No new evidence had been brought 
in to alter the situation. 

The British Commissioners sailed in February, with 
authority to make this amazing climb-down : " For the 
escape of the ' Alabaina ' and consequent injury to the 
commerce of the United States, Her Majesty's Govern- 
ment authorize you to express their regret in such 



476 RESULTS AND LESSONS OF THE WAR 

terms as would be agreeable to the United States, and 
not inconsistent with the position hitherto maintained 
by Her Majesty's Government as to the international 
obligations of neutral nations." Even after this, they 
still maintained that Great Britain was not responsible. 
When settling the subjects for discussion, the United 
States took the practical line of proposing to begin by 
accepting this Plea of Guilty at its real value, and pro- 
ceeding to deal at once with questions of damages, 
but the British wanted to submit all questions of law 
and fact to arbitration. The United States demurred 
to this, unless the principles on which the Arbitrators 
were to work were settled beforehand, and made 
certain propositions to this effect. The matter was 
referred home, and the British Government answered 
that " though the proposed rules did not represent 
international law at the time the claims arose, yet 
they were so anxious to strengthen the friendly 
feeling that the arbitrators could assume that they 
had undertaken to act on the principles of the rules 
proposed by the United States." They thus con- 
sented to a verdict for the United States, for which 
purpose the rules were framed, and the only object in 
going to arbitration on points of law and fact was the 
poor one of trying to " save face " : before giving their 
consent, they did not consider the effect or even the 
proper interpretation of these rules, which caused 
endless trouble and jangling at the trial itself. The 
treaty for the settlement was signed May 8th, 187 1. 

The Rules for the Arbitrators run as follows, from 
Article VI of the Treaty. A neutral Government is 
bound — 

First. — To use diligence to prevent the fitting out, 
arming, or equipping, within its jurisdiction, of any 
vessel which it has reasonable ground to believe is 
intended to cruise or to carry on war against a Power 
with which it is at peace : and also to use like diligence 
to prevent the departure from its jurisdiction of any 
vessel intended to cruise or carry on war as above, 



THE ARBITRATION 477 

such vessel being specially adapted, in whole or in 
part, within such jurisdiction, to warlike use. 

Secondly. — Not to permit or suffer either belligerent 
to make use of its ports or waters as the base of 
naval operations against the other, or for the purpose 
of the renewal or augmentation of military supplies 
or arms, or the recruitment of men. 

Thirdly. — To exercise due diligence in its own ports 
and waters, and, as to all persons within its juris- 
diction, to prevent any violation of the foregoing 
obligations and duties. 

The Court was composed of a member nominated 
by each of the following : the Queen of England, the 
President of the United States, the King of Italy, the 
Swiss Confederation, and the Emperor of Brazil. 
The principal difficulty was to deal with the con- 
struction of vague new rules, and their possible effect 
in the future, for, Great Britain having practically- 
abandoned the main points, there was little to do 
as between the principals but assess damages. 

The American Case was verbose and begged the 
question, making all sorts of assertions, alleging animus 
on the part of Great Britain, which was more resent- 
ment at Mr. Seward's overbearing ways than anything 
else, for, if Mr. Adams had not been a very different 
man, matters would have been serious, but he was 
both tactful and firm, and was about the only person 
who came out of the affair with credit. Such as- 
tounding claims were made, both in numbers and 
amount, that he sensibly dropped many of them, 
electing to stand on a few of the strongest. 

Great Britain was adjudged to have broken the new 
rules, which were retrospective, in the cases of the 
•' Alabama " and " Florida" and their commissioned 
prizes, and in that of the " Shenandoah" after recruit- 
ing at Melbourne, which was certainly a breach of 
neutrality, as was also the bringing in of the " Tusca- 
loosa " to Capetown. It will be noticed that all these 
vessels were charged with breaches of the old Foreign 
Enlistment Act also, which looks as if the same result 



478 RESULTS AND LESSONS OF THE WAR 

could have been obtained with a fraction of the trouble, 
or as if the Court hesitated to convict on the new rules 
alone. The damages were assessed at 15,500,000 
dollars, or over ^3,000,000, and proved to be so ex- 
travagant that the Government of the United States 
could not find claimants for nearly half the money, and 
it was actually proposed in Congress that the surplus 
be returned. 

A nation which merely yields to pressure cannot 
claim to have found out a new and better way of set- 
tling disputes, and in this case neither side approached 
the matter in the right spirit. The Americans used 
much the same methods as in the impeachment of 
President Johnson, jeopardizing a strong case, which 
was saved by Mr. Adams' clear common-sense. A 
great chance was lost, for nothing was settled about 
International Law, the finding only bound the two 
parties to the Treaty, and the proposal to exempt 
private property from capture was not even discussed. 
The Geneva Arbitration may have been a great step 
in principle, but, like many first attempts, it was rather 
clumsy in practice. 

The friction of the last few years had caused the 
British Government to appoint a Commission to ex- 
amine the Neutrality Laws in 1867, the result of which 
was the Foreign Enlistment Act of 1870, a very differ- 
ent affair in principle from the old one (cf. p. y6), for 
it shifted the onus of proof from the prosecution to 
the defence, laying it, in a case of shipbuilding, entirely 
on the builder, and also prohibited British subjects 
from leaving the country to take service elsewhere. 
The old Act, in force during the War, was passed in 
18 19, on account of the complaints of Spain of the 
open help given by Englishmen to the revolted Spanish 
colonies in South America. The Rules for the Geneva 
Arbitrators are the main principles of the Act of 1870, 
in a more vague and elastic form, and made applicable 
to Governments, not individuals. So ended this 
extraordinary episode. 



THE DECLARATION OF PARIS 479 

There were other disputes as to the Rights of 
Neutrals at sea, but, where only between the United 
States and the British Government, were easily settled, 
for Mr. Seward did not hesitate either to acknowledge 
or apologize for a proved offence against ordinary 
international law, of which in the heat of war there 
were several cases, but where the Confederacy was 
concerned he seemed quite rabid, and though his own 
Government acknowledged the Confederates as belli- 
gerents, at first in practice, then formally, he never did 
so, and much of his bitter indictment against Great 
Britain was based on this line of argument. The 
United States had not been parties to the Declaration 
of Paris of 1856, signed, after the Crimean War, by the 
Powers concerned. Great Britain, Austria, France, 
Prussia, Russia, Sardinia, and Turke}'. It declared 
that— 

1. Privateering is, and remains, abolished. 

2. The neutral flag covers an enemy's goods, except 

contraband of war. 

3. Neutral goods, except contraband of war, are not 

liable to capture under the enemy's flag. 

4. Blockades, in order to be binding, must be 

effective, that is, maintained by a force suffi- 
cient really to prevent access to the coast of 
the enemy. 

The United States were invited to assent to these 
proposals at the time, but declined to agree to No. 3 
unless all private property was exempted from capture 
on the high seas. After the War broke out, they 
approached the British Government and proposed to 
accept the Declaration unconditionally, but this was 
refused while the War lasted. During the War the 
traditional attitudes of the two nations were reversed, 
for now it was the United States which contended for 
the right of search, and England which denied it. 

The American mercantile marine and sea-borne 
trade seemed to have disappeared, and shewed no 
signs of returning : the feeling against England on 



48o RESULTS AND LESSONS OF THE WAR 

this account was very bitter for years after the War, 
but the reasons for its non-recovery were entirely 
American. One was that the spirit of adventure had 
been diverted from the sea to the opening up of the 
Great West, and Americans lost their taste for the sea, 
on which they had been so conspicuous ; another was 
that the Civil War occurred just as the era of wooden 
ships was passing away, in the building of which 
America had been pre-eminent, and iron ships, against 
which they could not compete, had come to stay. 
While others were founding works, and learning to 
build iron ships, they were at war, and peace found 
them with their ironworks almost in an embryo 
condition. Their protective laws forbade them to 
recover their carrying trade with bought iron ships, 
till they were able to build for themselves, and so 
others seized and kept it. 

An evil legacy of the War, or rather of the period 
of re-construction which followed it, is the wide- 
spread and deep-rooted corruption pervading American 
politics. President Johnson, an honest but obstinate 
man, tried to re-construct on the lines of ordinary civil 
law, which were not sufficient ; he then quarrelled 
with Congress, which seized the management, and 
worked things very differently, not hesitating to 
use very questionable means to gain the mastery, 
and control all patronage. The "spoils to the 
victor" policy was carried out in its worst form, 
and as it became necessary to look ahead to the 
next Presidential election, the evil increased. Re- 
construction was worked in the interests of one 
political party only, and those of the nation ignored, 
so that when Grant came into power, and tried to 
put things right, the evil was too strong for him : he 
was clearly shewn that he must not interfere with 
political patronage (cf. pp. 435, 444). By the end 
of his second term the country was hopelessly 
infected with the canker of "the management of 
elections," from which it has never recovered, despite 



POLITICIANS AND WAR 481 

the earnest efforts of good and strong men like 
Garfield, Cleveland, and others, the first of whom 
was shot by a disappointed place-hunter. 

Were the American politician the real representative 
of the great and sensible American nation, her case 
would indeed have been hopeless, for his cowardice 
in danger was as amazing as his arrogance when it 
was not present. Politicians created the rancour 
which brought the War, and needlessly kept it up 
for years after the War was ended. Time and again 
the interference of their conceit and cowardice brought 
defeat and needless loss of life : the general in com- 
mand must have a free hand in army movements, to 
adapt his strategy to the political situation, and it is 
here that he meets his War Minister, the political 
intermediary between him and his Government, but 
he must not be badgered by Congress or Parliament. 
Even though this lesson be learnt by bitter experience, 
it is soon forgotten in peace, since all Constitutional 
power is normally political, which forgetfulness in- 
variably brings disaster, when trouble comes again, 
as it must do sooner or later. 

Whoever depends on the military aid, after the 
outbreak of war, of those who will not rise to uphold 
their principles in the first instance, will surely be 
disappointed (cf. p. 150): promises to rise en masse, 
to second the army, if it will only come and enable the 
people to do so, are merely so much wind, and it is 
amazing that men of the ability and experience of Lee 
and Bragg should each have made the fatal mistake 
of believing them in 1862. When war is imminent, 
preparation for war is everything, political organiza- 
tion out of date. Contrast the action of Lincoln and 
of Governor Magoffin in Kentucky (cf. p. jy), whose 
political organizing gave the North the chance to raise 
troops, and whose State Proclamation of Neutrality 
gave them time to train them. This attempt at 
neutrality, where neutrality was impossible, subjected 
Kentucky, and Missouri, another divided State, to 

31 



482 RESULTS AND LESSONS OF THE WAR 

the curse of guerilla warfare more than any others. 
Political organization is also worse than premature 
till the country is settled after the War, of which 
there were many cases. 

In America, everything pertaining to so-called 
" Freedom " runs riot, till the sense is lost in the 
sound, and in nothing so much as in the Freedom of 
the Press. It was carried to such a pitch on the 
Northern side that Grant estimated its value to the 
enemy at 100,000 men, and when he saw confidential 
plans and orders given away in the papers, to the 
injury of the cause which they professed to support, 
he envied the stern control which the other side was 
able to exercise. Sherman was nearly hounded out 
of the army at a critical time, because he clearly 
foresaw the magnitude of the struggle, and the 
position of General Cox in West Virginia was made 
almost impossible, because he would not betray the 
trust reposed in him, to provide copy. When will 
the Anglo-Saxon race learn that the methods of peace 
are not suited to war time ? 

On both sides preparation for war was neglected, 
with disastrous results on its duration and severity. 
To shew your enemy that you are in earnest is more 
likely to make him pause than go forward, while he 
is encouraged by lack of preparation, and war gene- 
rally follows. This happened here : the South said 
scornfully that the Yanks dared not fight, which, 
while it hastened war, made their own preparation 
somewhat careless. Steady preparation is the most 
likely way to make political negociations successful. 
Though the South began with the best moves, they 
had no plan of action generally, but everything was 
done piecemeal, and in trying to be strong everywhere 
they were weak everywhere. One reason of this 
was probably that the Southern States did not all 
secede at once, and the sides were not exactly known, 
till war actually broke out. Grant considers that the 
South had a great advantage in possessing no army, 



MILITARY ORGANIZATION 483 

but a number of excellent officers who could raise 
one, and that General Scott made a great mistake 
in keeping the Regular Regiments intact, and not 
breaking them up to supply cadres for the national 
arm3\ The ridiculous mistake was made of calling 
men out for three months only ; it is hardly too much 
to say that this was responsible for the loss of the 
Bull Run campaign. On the Northern side, too, the 
army was kept up by the raising of new regiments 
by the different States, rather than by sending strong 
drafts to existing ones, whose officers knew their 
business. This was due to the curse of political 
patronage at home, in great measure. One State 
only, Wisconsin, adopted the right course, and it is 
recorded that towards the end of the War a Wis- 
consin battalion was considered the equivalent of a 
brigade from any other State. The South gave their 
generals proper seniority, and thus were but little 
troubled with the intriguing and jealousy which were 
the curse of the Union side, where all were Major- 
Generals, and were put up and down without refer- 
ence to seniority, creating a distinction without a 
difference. In the lower ranks, especially in the 
Republican North, the insane practice prevailed, at 
first, of the men electing their ofificers, for they re- 
sented orders as an infringement of equality. Though 
this was soon stopped, it cost the country dear, for 
it is hardly too much to say that many of these 
officers were chosen for their military incapacity. 
For years the country had looked on War as an 
anachronism, and now had to pay for its folly. Dis- 
cipline was thus a weak point, for though latterly 
it was excellent among those present for duty, yet 
the general lack of it was shewn by the fact that 
the difference between effective and paper strength 
was something like 30 per cent, of the latter. The 
system of appointing political generals went on 
longer, and few of these were worth their salt : even 
Logan and Blair, the best of them, absented them- 



484 RESULTS ANI> LESSONS OF THE WAR 

selves from their commands at a critical time, to look 
after their own elections to Congress. They would 
probably have found that stricter attention to the 
country's service was the best political ticket. This 
War provided another illustration of the old adage, 
" Youth will be served," for, magnificent soldiers as 
they were, Lee^ Joseph Johnston^ and Bragg had not 
the vitality and drive of their younger days. Lees 
health broke down in 1863, and he was never the 
same man again. The first two were each about 54 
in 1 86 1, Bragg close on 50, while Grant was 39, 
Sherman 41, and Sheridan 30. 

Perhaps the principal military lesson is in the use 
of Cavalry. The problem of getting Cavalry to fight 
well on foot, without losing its Cavalry Spirit, is 
often spoken of now-a-days as a sort of ideal to be 
approached rather than attained; but Sheridan, S//mr/, 
and Forrest all solved it to perfection, using mounted 
and dismounted action indifferently, though the two 
latter had few real cavalry in proportion to the size of 
their commands. Compare Buford's fine handling 
at Gettysburg. Strategically, Bragg's use of cavalry 
to paralyze Grant, and isolate Rosecrans,in December, 
1862, and, on a smaller scale, AsJiby's, when he 
bewildered and paralyzed the large forces surround- 
ing Jackson, before the battle of McDowell, and 
Miinford's, screening Jackson's march to the Penin- 
sula, are models in their way. Lee, great general 
as he was, did not get the full use of his cavalry, 
for he allowed it to be away when he fought his 
two most important battles, Sliarpsburg and Gettys- 
burg : Hooker and Hood both made the same mistake. 
Much has been said about Raids, but on a large scale 
they are two-edged weapons: they seem of little use 
in an enemy's country, while his armies are unbroken, 
and must not be undertaken just before an important 
battle : a small body will see as much or more, run 
less risk, and incapacitate fewer horses. 

The most able and daring move in the whole War 



DISBANDMKNT, NAVAL AFFAIRS 485 

was probably Evans defence of the Confederate left 
at Bull Run, when he divined Tyler's orders from 
his hesitation, and McDowell's whole plan, and dared 
to mask this strong division with four companies, 
while he took the rest of his tiny force to the decisive 
point, and gained the time and ground which saved 
the battle. For a night march and daybreak attack, 
so much in vogue now, there is no better example 
anywhere than Hardee's attack at Atlanta. 

The disbandment of the armies at the end of the 
War had an excellent effect, for thousands of men, in 
the best condition, set to work on the huge task of 
opening out the Great West, which turned their ener- 
gies into a useful channel. America has never looked 
back. This result of what is usually a most critical 
and dangerous period may be looked on as unique. 

The Northern Navy was, at first, both weak and 
inefficient, not ready for war, and ships were im- 
provised and run up in such haste, that many were 
almost useless. On the Southern side, it is hardly 
too much to say that if they could have built an 
efficient marine engine, they might have broken the 
blockade, and perhaps turned the tide in their own 
favour. Though this was quite patent, they did 
nothing beforehand to remedy the deficiency. At 
sea, Semmes' strategy consisted in striking at the 
trade routes, and in calculating how long he could 
stay in any locality before a more power-ful vessel 
came to drive him away. This he carried out with 
such marvellous accuracy and success, that no one 
vessel ever did so much harm to an enemy as did 
the little ''Alabama:' 

Note. Some Principal Points in the Foreign 
Enlistment Act, 1870 

This Act, Section 8, i (cf. p. "/G), makes it an offence 
if any one "builds, agrees to build, or causes to be 
built, a ship with knowledge or reasonable cause to 
believe," etc., etc., or 



486 RESULTS ANt) LESSONS OF THE WAR 

(Section 8, 4) " despatches, or causes or allows to 
be despatched, any ship with intent or knowledge, 
or having reasonable cause to believe," etc, etc. 
" Provided that he shall not be liable if on proclama- 
tion of neutrality he furnishes the Secretary of State 
with particulars of the contract, and gives security 
that the ship be not despatched without Her Majesty's 
license before the end of the war." 

Section 9. The onus of proof, in a disputed case, 
lies on the builder, that he could not have known 
that the ship was intended to be used against a 
friendly State. (The conditions to satisfy this Clause 
are very stringent.) 

Section 21. Customs and other local officers may 
seize and detain ships liable to seizure and detention, 
without prejudice to the overriding authority of the 
Court of Admiralty. 

Section 30. " Equipping " includes " fitting or 
adapting for sea or for naval service," using the 
words "any tackle, apparel," etc., besides "arms," 
etc. (Cf pp. 'je, 471.) 

There are also stringent provisions, forbidding Her 
Majesty's subjects to leave the country for the pur- 
pose of taking service with either side, or inducing 
or allowing any one else to do so. 



MAP INDEX 

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS. SPECIAL DISTRICTS AND 
BATTLE MAPS IN BRACKETS 



Ala. Alabama 

(Ant.) The Antietam, 

Sharpsbur:; 
Ark. Arkansas 
(Atl.) Atlanta 

(B.R.) Bull Run 

(Chan.^ Chancellorsville 
(Char.) Charleston 
(Chat.) ChattanooRa 
(Chick.) Chickaniauga 

n.C. District of Columbia 
Del. Delaware 

Fla. Florida 

(Fred.) Fredericksburg 

(Ft. F.) Fort Fisher 

Ga. Georgia 
(Get.) Gettysburg 

111. Illinois 



Ind. Indiana 

lo . Iowa 

I.T. Indian Territory 

Kan. Kan.sas 
Ky. Kentucky 

L,a. Louisiana 

(Man.) Manassas 
Md. Maryland 
Me. Maine 
Mex. Mexico 
Miss. Mississippi 
Mo. Missouri 
(Mob.) Mobile 
(Murf.) Mur/rees'ioro, 
Stone's River 

(N.A.) North Anna 
(Nash.) Nashville 
N.C. North Carolina 
N.J. New Jersey 
N.M. New Mexico 



N.Y, New York 

O. Ohio 

Pa. Penn<ivlvania 
(Pen.) The Peninsula of 
Virginia 

(R. & P.) Richmond and 
Petersburg 

S.C. South Carolina 

(Shi.)Shiloh 

(Spot.) Spottsylvania 

Tenn. Tennessee 
Tex. Texas 

Va. Virginia 

(Val.) The Shenandoak 

Valley 
(Vicks.) Vicksburg 

W.Va. West Virginia 
(Wild.) The Wilderness 



Abbeville, Ga., 49 

Abbeville, S.C, i 

Abingdon, Va. (S.W.), i, 43, 56 

Acapulco, Mex., 65 

Acquia, Va., i, 13, 17, 26 

Acquia Cr., Va., 17 

Acquia Creek Sta., Va., 17, 26 

Acworth, Ga., 41, 42 

Adamsville, Md., 26 

Aguas Calientes, Mex., 65 

Aiken, S.C, 49, 60 

Alabama, State, i, 15, 23, 37, 42, 

49A, 52, 63, 64 
Alabama R., i, 49A, 63 
Albemarle Sd., N.C, 1, 59 
Albuquerque, N.M., 65 
Aldie, Va., 26 
Aldie's Gap, Va., 26 
Alexandria, La., i, 2-5, 51, 65 
Alexandria, Va., i, 8, 13, 26, 46 
Allatoona, Ga., 41, 42 
Alleghany Mts., i, 45 



Alpine (or McAlpine), Ga., 37, 52 
Alston, S.C, 60 
x\ltamaha R., Ga., i, 49 
Altamaha Sd., Ga., 49 
Altamont, Tenn., 23 
Alton, 111., I 
Amelia C.H., Va., i, 54 
Amelia Spr., Va., 59 
Anderson, Ft., N.C., 57 
Andersonville, Ga., i, 49 
Anna R., North, Va., 40, 54 
Anna R., South, Va., 54 
Annapolis, Md., i, 26 
Antietam Cr., Md., 19, 26 
Apache Canon, N.M., 65 
Appalachicola, Fla., i 
Appalachicola R., i 
Appomattox C.H.. Va., i, 54 
Appomattox R., Va., 14, 54, 55 
.\rizona Territory, 65 
Arkansas, State, i, 15, 22, 31, 
50. 51 



487 



488 



MAV INDEX 



Arkansas Post (or Ft. Hindman), 

Ark., I, 2-5, 31, 50, 51 
Arkansas R., i, 31, 49A, 50, 51 
Ashboro, N.C., 60 
Ashby's Gap., Va., 12, 26, 46, 47 
Ashepoo R., S.C., 33 
Ashland, Ky., 43 
Ashland, Va., 13, 54 
Ashley R., S.C, 33, 34, 60 
Atchafalaya R., La., i, 51 
Athens, Ga., i, 49 
Athens, O., 10, 44 
Atlanta, Ga., i ,2-5, 42, 48, 49, 63 
Atlee's Sta., Va., 54 
Auburn, Miss., 31 
Augusta, Ga., i, 49 
Austin, Tex., i 
Averysboro, N.C., 60 
Aylett's, Va., 54 
Ayutla, Mex., 65 
Azores Is., 7 



Back Cr., W.Va., 12, 47 
Bagdad, Max., 65 
Bahama Is., 6, 7 
Bahia, Brazil, 7 
Bainbridge, Ala., 52 
Bakersville, Md., 19 
Bald Hill, Va. (B.R.). 9 
Bald Mts., 56 
Ball's Bluff, Va., 8 
Baltimore, Md., i, 2-5, 13, 26 
Bamburg. S.C., 60 
Banister R., Va., 54 
Banks' Ford, Va. (Chan.), 25 
Barboursville, Ky., 23 
Barbourville, W.Va., 10 
Bardstown, Ky., i, 23, 24, 43 
Barnesville, Ga., 49, 64 
Barnwell, S.C, 60 
Barton's Sta., Ala., 64 
Batesville, Ark., 50 
Baton Rouge, La., i, 49A, 51 
Bayou Boeuf, La., 51 
Bayou La Fourche, La., 51 
Bayou Sara, La., i, 51 
Bealeton, Va., 26 
Bear Cr., Big, Ala., 52, 64 
Bear Cr., Little, Ala., 64 
Beaufort, N.C., 59 
Beaufort, S.C, i, 33, 49, 60 
Beaufort's Br., S.C, 60 
Beaver Cr., O., i, 44 
Beaver Dam Sta., Va., 54 
Belize, British Honduras, 6 
Belmont, Mo., i, 15, 22 
Belpre, O., 10, 44 



Benton ville. Ark., 22 

Bentonville, N.C, 60 

Bermuda, 6, 7 

Bermuda Hundred, Va., 54, 55 

Berryville, Va. (Val.), 12, 26, 47 

Berwick Bay, La., 51 

Bethel, Big, Va. (Fen.), 11 

Bethel, Little, Va. (Pen.), 11 

Bethlehem Ch., Ga. (Atl.), 48 

Bethlehem Ch., Va. (R. & P.), 55 

Beverly, W.Va., i, 10 

Beverly Ford, Va., 26 

Bevil's Br., Va., 54 

Big Barren R., Ky., 15, 23 

Big Bayou, Miss. (Vicks.), 32 

Big Black R., Miss., i, 31, 49A 

Big Creek Gap, Tenn., 23 

Big Hill, Ky., 23 

Big Sandy R., i, 10, 43 

Big Shanty, Ga., 41, 42 

Big Sunflower (or Sunflower) R., 

Miss., 1,31, 49A 
Bird's Pt., Mo., 15, 22, 50 
Bisland, Ft., La., 51 
Black R., Ark., 22, 50 
Black R., S.C, 60 
Blackburn's Ford, Va. (B.R.), 9 
Blacks and Whites, Va., 54 
Blackville, S.C, 60 
Black Warrior R., Ala., i, 52, 64 
Blackwater R., Fla., 63 
Blackwater R., Va., 54, 55, 59 
Blakely, Ft., Ala., 62, 63 
BUss, Ft., Tex., 65 
Bloody Angle, Va. (Spot.), 39 
Bloody Lane, Md. (Ant.), 20 
Bloomfield, Ky., 23 
Blountsville, Ala., 64 
Blue Ridge, i, 12, 13, 26, 45, 47, 

54. 56 
Bogue Id., N.C, 59 
Bolivar, Md., 19 
Bolivar, Tenn., 24 
Bolivar Hghts., W.Va., 19 
Bolton Sta., Miss., 31 
Bonsecours Bay, Ala., 63 
Boone, N.C, 56 
Boone C.H., W.Va., 10 
Boonsboro, Md., 19, 26, 46 
Boonville, Mo., i, 2-5, 22 
Boteler's Ford (Ant.), 20 
Bottom's Br., Va. (Pen.), 14 
Bowling Green, Ky., i, 2-5, 15, 23 
Bowling Green, Va., 54 
Boydton, Va., 54 
Branchville, .S.C, 60 
Brandenburg, Ky., 43 
Brandon, Miss., 49 a 



MAP INDKX 



489 



Brandy Sta., Va., 17, 26 

Brashcar City, La., 1,51 

Brazos R.. Tex., i 

Brazos Santiago, Tex., 65 

Brentsville, Va., 26 

Brentwood, Tcnn., 52 

Brentwood Hills, Tcnn. (Nash.), 33 

Brest, France, 7 

Bricc's Cross Roads, Miss., 49A 

Brier Cr., Ga., 49 

Bridgeport, Ala., i, 23, 37, 42, 52, 

64 
Bridgeport, Md., 26 
Bridgcville, Ala., 64 
Brimstone Hill, Va., 26 
Bristoe Sta., Va., 8, 17, 26 
Bristol, Va. (S.W.), 56 
Broad R., N.C., 56, 60 
Broad Run, Va., 26 
Brock Road, Va. (Wild.), 38, 39 
Brookhaven, Miss., 49A 
Brookvillc, Md., 26 
Brown's Cr. , Tenn. (Nash.), 53 
Brown's Gap, Va., 12, 47 
Brownsville, Tex., i, 65 
Bruinsburg, Miss., 31 
Brunswick, Ga., i 
Brush Mt.. Ga., 41 
Bryantsville, Ky., 23 
Buchanan, Va., 45 
Buchanan, Ft,, N.C. (Ft. F.), 58 
Buckhannon, W.Va., 10 
Buckhead, Ga., 49 
Buckhead Ch., Ga. (Atl.), 48 
Buckland, Va., 17 
Buena Vista Ferry, Tenn. (Nash.), 

53 
Buffalo R., Va., 54 
Buffington Id., 10, 44 
Buford's Gap, Va., 45 
Buford's Sta., Tenn., 52 
Bull Pasture Mt., Va. (Val.), 12 
Bull Run, Va., 8, 9, 17, 18, 26 
Bull Run Mts., Va., 17, 26 
Bull's Bay, S.C, 60 
Bull's Gap, Tenn., 56 
Bulltown, W.Va.. 10 
Burke's Jn., Va., 54 
Burkesville, Ky., 43 
Burnside's Br., Md. (Ant.), 20 
Burnsville, Ala., 64 
Bush R., Va., 54 
Buttahatchie R., Ala., 32, 64 



Cacapon R., W.Va., 12, 47 
Cairo, 111., i, 2-5, 15, 22, 24, 50 
Calcasieu R., La., i 



Calhoun, Ga., i, 42 
California, Gulf of, 65 
California, Lower, 65 
California, State, 65 
Camargo, Mcx., 65 
Camden, Ark., 50, 51 
Camden, S.C, i, 60 
Camp Dick Robinson, Ky., 23, 43 
Camp Jackson, Mo., 22 
Campbell's Sta., O., 44 
Campbell's Sta., Tenn., 23 
Campbcllsvillc, Ky., 43 
Campbclltown, Ga. (Atl.), 48 
Canary Is., 7 
Canauchec R., Ga., 49 
Canaveral, C. Fla., i, 6 
Caney R., Tenn., 23, 52 
Canton, Ga., 42 
Canton, Miss., 1, 31, 49A 
Cape Fear, N.C, i, 57, 39, 60 
Cape Fear R., N.C, i, 57, 58, 39 

60 
Cape Girardeau, Mo., i, 15, 22 
Cape Town, 7 
Cape Verde Is., 7 
Carlisle, Pa., i, 26 
Carnifex Ferry, W.Va., 10, 43 
Carolina, North, State, i, 23, 56, 

59. 60 
Carolina, South, State, i, 33, 49, 

56, 60 
Carolina City, N.C, 39 
Carondelet, Mo., i 
Carrick's Ford, W.Va., 10 
CarroUton, Ga., 64 
Cartersville, Ga., 41, 42 
Carthage, Mo., i, 22, 50 
Carthage, Tenn., 23 
Cashtown, Pa., 26 
Cass Sta., Ga., 41 
Cassville, Ga., 42 
Caswell, Ft., N.C, 57, 58, 59 
Catawba R., N.C, 56, 60 
Catharpen Run, Va. (Man.), 18 
Catherine Furnace, Va. (Chan.), 

25 
Catlett's Sta., Va., 26 
Catoctin Cr., Md., 19 
Catoctin Mts., Md., ig, 26 
Caw Caw Swamp, S.C, 60 
Cedar Bluffs, Ala., 64 
Cedar Cr., Va. (Val.), 47 
Cf^dar Pt., Ala. (Mob.), 61, 63 
Cedar Run, Va., 17 
Cemetery Hill, Pa. (Get.), 26. 27, 

28, 29 
Cemetery Ridge, Pa. (Get.), 27, 

?8, 29 



49° 



•MAP INDEX 



Centreville, Ala., 64 
Centreville, Va., 8, 9, 17, 26 
Chaffin's (or Chapin's) Bluff, Va., 

54. 55 
Chalco, Mex., 65 
Chambersburg, Pa., i, 26, 46 
Champion's Hill, Miss. (Vicks.), 31 
Chancellorsville, Va., i, 25, 26 
Chantilly, Va., 17 
Charles, C, Va., i, 13, 59 
Charles City C.H., Va. (Pen.), 54 
Charles City Cross Roads, Va. 

(Pen.), 14 
Charleston, S.C.,'i, 2-5, 6, 33, 34,60 
Charleston, Va., 26 
Charleston, W.Va., i, 10, 45 
Charlestown, W.Va., 12, 47 
Charlotte, N.C., i, 56, 60 
Charlottesville (or Charlotte), Va., 

12, 13, 45, 47, 54 
Charlton R., Mo., i 
Chattahoochee R., i, 42, 48, 64 
Chattanooga, Tenn., i, 2-5, 23, 

24. 36, 37. 42. 52, 64 
Chattanooga Cr., Tenn., 36, 37 
Cheat R., W.Va., i, 10, 44 
Cheraw, S.C., i, 60 
Cherbourg, France, 7 
Cherokee Sta., Ala., 64 
Chesapeake Bay, i, 11, 13, 26 
Chester, S.C., 60 
Chester Gap, Va., 12, 26, 47 
Chesterfield, S.C., 60 
Chesterfield Br., Va. (N.A.), 40 
Chesterfield C.H., Va., 54, 55 
Chesterfield Sta., Va., 54 
Cheves, Batt., S.C. (Char.), 34 
Chickahominy R., Va., 13, 14, 54, 

55 
Chickamauga Cr., Ga. (Chick.), 

35. 37 
Chickamauga Cr., South, Tenn. 

(Chick.), 36 
Chickamicomico, N.C., i, 59 
Chickasaw Bluffs, Miss., 24, 31 
Chilesburg, Va., 54 
Chillicothe, O., 44 
Choatan Sd., N.C., 59 
Choctawhatchie R., Ala., i 
Cholula, Mex., 65 
Chowan R., N.C., 59 
Christiansburg, Va. (S.W.), 10, 56 
Christiansville, Va., 54 
Chula, Va., 54 
Cincinnati, O., i, 2-5, 23, 43 
Citronelle, Ala., i, 49A, 63 
City Pt., Va., 14, 54, 55 
Clark. Ft., N.C., 59 



Clark's Mountain, Va., 54 

Clarksburg, W.Va., 10, 44 

Clarksville, Tenn., i, 15 

Clarksville, Va., i 

Cleveland, Tenn., i, 23, 37, 42 

Clifton, Tenn., 24 

Clinch R., 23, 43, 56 

Clinton, La., 51 

Clinton, Miss., 31 

Clinton, N.C., 60 

Clinton, Tenn., 23 

Clover Hill, Va., 54, 55 

Cloyd's Mountain, Va. (S.W.), 56 

Coatzacoalcos, Mex., 65 

Cold Harbour, Va., 54, 55 

Colima, Mex., 65 

Colliersville, Tenn., 49A 

Collins R., Tenn., 37 

Colorado R., 65 

Colorado R., Tex., i 

Columbia, Ky., 23, 43 

Columbia, Pa., 26 

Columbia, S.C, i, 2-5, 49, 60 

Columbia, Tenn., 1, 15, 23, 24, 52 

Columbus, Ga., i, 64 

Columbus, Ky., i, 2-5, 15, 22, 24 

Columbus, Miss., i, 49^, 64 

Columbus, O., I, 44 

Combahee R., S.C, 33, 60 

Como, Miss., 49A 

Conrad's Store, Va. (Val.), 12 

Cooksville, Md., 26 

Cooper R., S.C, 33, 34, 60 

Coosa R., I, 42, 52, 64 

Coosawhatchie, S.C, 60 

Coosawhatchie R., S.C, 33 

Cordoba, Mex., 65 

Corinth, Miss., i, 2-5, 15, 24, 49A, 

52, 64 
Corpus Christi, Tex., i 
Corydon, Ind., 43 
Covington, Ga., 49 
Covington, Ky., 23 
Covington, Va., i, 10, 45 
Cowskin Prairie, 22 
Crab Orchard, Ky., 23 
Craig, Ft., N.M., 65 
Crampton's Gap, Md., 19, 26, 46 
Crawfish Spr., Ga. (Chick.), 35 
Crawford, Ft., Ala., 63 
Crawfordsville, Ga., i 
Cross Keys, Va. (Val.), 12 
Cross Roads, Ga., 52 
Cub Run, Va. (B.R.), 9 
Cuba, 6, 65 
Cuernavaca, Max., 65 
Culpeper C.H., Va., i, 2-5, 12, 13, 

26, 47 



MAP INDEX 



491 



Gulp's Hill, Pa. (Get.), 27, 28, 29 
Cumberland C.H., Va., 54 
Cumberland Gap, i, 23, 43, 56 
Cumberland Mts., i, 43, 56 
Cumberland R., i, 15, 23, 24, 43, 

52. 53. 56 
Cumberland Valley, Md., 26 
Cumming's Pt., S.C., 33, 34 
Curdsville, Va., 54 
Currituck Sd., N.C., 59 
Cynthiana, Ky., i, 43 
Cypress Cr., Tex., i 



Dallas, Ga., 41, 42 

Dalton, Ga., i, 23, 37, 42, 52, 64 

Dan R., Va., 54, 56 

Danville, Ky., 23 

Danville, Va. , i, 2-5 

Darby Town, Va. (Pen.), 14, 54, 55 

Darling, Ft., Va. (R. & P.), 55 

Dauphin6 Id., Big, Ala. (Mob.), 

61, 63 
Dauphine Id., Little, Ala. (Mob.), 

61 
Davisboro, Ga., 49 
Decatur, Ala., i, 23, 24, 49A, 52, 64 
Decatur, Ga., i, 2-5, 48, 49, 64 
Decatur, Miss., 49 a 
Decherd, Tenn., 23, 37, 52 
Deep Cr., Va., 54 
Deep Run, Va., 26 
Deep Run, Va. (Fred.), 21, 25 
Deer Cr., Miss. (Vick.), 31 
Delaware, State, i 
Delaware Bay, i 
Delaware R., i 
Demopolis, Ala., 49A, 64 
Denton ville, Va., 54 
De Russy, Ft., La., 51 
Des Arc, Ark, i, 50 
Devil's Den, Pa. (Get.), 27, 28, 29 
Dillsburg, Pa., 26 
Dinwiddle C.H., Va., 54, 59 
Dismal Swamp, N.C., 59 
Donaldsonville, La., i, 51 
Donelson, Ft., Tenn., i, 2-5, 15, 24 
Dover, Pa., 26 
Dover, Tenn., 15 

Dowdall'sTav., Va. (Chan.), 25, 38 
Downsville, Md., 26 
Dranesville, Va., 26 
Drury's Bluff, Va., 54. 55 
Duane's Shop, Ga. (Atl.), 48 
Dublin (or Newbern), Va., (S.W,), 

56 
Duck R., Tenn., i, 15, 23, 37, 52 
Duerson's Mill, Va. (Chan.), 25 



Dumfries. Va., 26 

Duncan, Ft., Tex., 65 

Dunkard Ch., Md. (Ant.), 20 

Dunlop's, Tenn., 23 

Durango, Mex., 65 

Durham, N.C., 60 

Dutch Gap., Va. (R. & P.), 55 



Eagleport, O., 44 

East Point, Ga., 48, 49, 64 

Eastport, Miss., 64 

Eaton ton, Ga., 49 

Ebenezer Ch., Ala., 64 

Edenton, N.C., 59 

Edgefield, Tenn., 52, 53 

Edisto Id., S.C., 33 

Edisto R., S.C, I, 3^, 60 

Edisto R., North, S.t., 33 

Edisto R., South, S.C, 33 

Edwards' Ferry, Va., 26 

Edwards' Sta., Miss., 31 

Eldridge, Ala., 64 

Eley's Ford, Va. (Chan.), 23 

Elizabeth City, N.C., i, 59 

Elizabethtown, Ky., 23, 43 

Elk R., Tenn., i, 23, 37, 52 

Elk R., W.Va., 10 

Elkhorn Tav., Ark., 22, 50 

Elkwater, W.Va., 10 

Elm Spring, Ark., 22 

Elyton, Ala., i, 64 

Emmanuel Ch., Va. (R. & P.), 55 

Emmettsburg, Md., 26 

Enfield, N.C., 59. 60 

Escambia R., Fla., i, 63 

Etowah, Ga., 41 

Etowah R., Ga., i, 41, 42, 52, 64 

Evansville, Ind., i 

Evergreen Sta., Va., 54 

Ezra Ch., Ga. (At!.), 48 



Fairburn, Ga. (Atl.), 48 
Fairfax C.H., Va., 17, 26 
Fairfax Sta., Va., 17 
Fairfield, Pa., 26 
Fair Oaks Sta., Va. (Pen.), 14, 55 
Fairview, Va. (Chan.), 25 
Faison's Sta., N.C., 59, 60 
Falling R., Va. (R. & P.), 55 
Falling Waters, Md., 19, 26 
Falmouth, Va., 21, 25 
Farm ville, Va., 54 
Fayette C.H., W.Va., 10 
Fayetteville, Ark., 22 
Fayetteville, N.C., i, 60 
Fayetteville, Pa., 26 



492 



MAP INDEX 



Fayetteville, Tenn., i, 23, 52 

Federal Pt., N.C., 57, 59 

Fernandina, Fla., i, 2-5 

Ferrol, Spain, 7 

Fish R., Ala., 63 

Fisher, Ft., N.C., i, 2-5, 6, 57, 58, 

59. 60 
Fisher's Gap, Va., 12, 47 
Fisher's Hill, Va. (Val.), 47 
Five Forks, Va., 54, 55 
Flemingsburg, Ky., 43 
Flint R., I, 49, 64 
Florence, Ala., i, 24, 49A, 52 
Florence, N.C., 60 
Florence, S.C., i 
Florida, State, 63 
Folly Id., S.C, 33, 34 
Ford's Depot, Va., 54, 55 
Fort Valley, Ga., 49. 64 
Fox's Gap, Md., 19, 46 
Frankfort, Ala., 64 
Frankfort, Ky., i, 23, 43 
Franklin, Ky., 23 
Franklin, La., 51 
Franklin, Tenn., i, 52 
Frayser's Farm, Va. (Pen.), 14 
Frederick, Md., i, 13, 19, 26, 46 
Fredericksburg, Va., i, 13, 21, 25, 

26, 54 
Frederickshall, Va., 54 
Fredericktown, Mo., i, 22, 50 
Freeman's Ford, Va., 26 
French Broad R., Tenn., 23, 56 
Front Royal, Va. (Val.), 8, 12, 26, 

46- 47 
Fulton, Ga., 41, 42, 48 
Funkstown, Md., 26 



Gadsden, Ala., i, 52, 64 
Gaines, Ft., Ala. (Mob.), 61, 63 
Gaines' Mill, Va. (Pen.), 14 
Gainesville, Ala., i, 49A 
Gainesville, Va., 8, 17, 26 
Gallatin, Tenn., i, 23, 24, 52 
Gallipolis, O., 10 

Galveston, Tex., i, 2-5, 6, 7, 51, 65 
Garden's Corner, S.C., 60 
Garlandsville, Miss., 49A 
Gasconade R., Mo., i 
Gauley Br., W.Va., i, 2-5, 10, 45 
Gauley R., W.Va., 10 
Gaylesville, Ala., 52 
Georgetown, Md., 46 
Georgetown, Miss., 49A 
Georgetown, S.C, 60 
Georgetown, Va., 17 
Georgia, State, i, 23, 33, 37, 49, 60 



Germanna Plank Rd., Va. (Wild.), 

38 
Germanton, N.C., 56, 60 
Gettysburg, Pa., i, 2-5, 26, 27, 28, 

29 
Gibraltar, Spain, 7 
Gila R., 65 

Gilmer, Ft., Va. (R. & P.), 55 
Girard, Ala., i, 64 
Gladesville, Va., 43 
Glasgow, Ky., 23 
Glasgow, Scotland, 7 
Glendale, Va. (Pen.), 14, 55 
Glorieta, N.M., 65 
Gloucester Pt., Va., 11 
Glover, Batt., S.C. (Char.), 34 
Goldsboro, N.C., i, 2-5, 59, 60 
Goochland, Va., 54 
Goode's Br., Va., 54 
Gordon, Ga., 49 

Gordonsville, Va., i, 12, 13, 47, 54 
Grafton, W.Va., i, 10, 44 
Grahamsville, S.C, 60 
Grand Ecore, La., 51 
Grand Gulf, Miss., i, 24, 31 
Grand Jn., Tenn., 15, 24 
Grand R., Mo., i 
Granny White Pike, Tenn. 

(Nash.), 53 
Grant's Pass., Ala. (Mob.), 61, 63 
Grapevine Br., Va. (Pen.), 14, 55 
Gravelly Run, Va., 54, 55 
Gravelly Spr., Ala., 64 
Grayson, Ky., 23, 43 
Great Smoky Mts., 56 
Green R., Ky., i, 23, 43 
Greenbrier R., W.Va., 10, 45 
Greencastle, Pa., 26 
Greeneville, Tenn., i, 56 
Greensboro, Ky., 23 
Greensboro, N.C, i, 56, 60 
Greensburg, Ky., 43 
Greensburgh, La., 49 a 
Greenupsburg, Ky., 23, 43 
Greenville, N.C, 59 
Greenwood, Pa., 26 
Gregg, Batt., S.C. (Char.), 34 
Gregg, Ft., Va. (R. & P.), 55 
Grenada, Miss., i, 24, 31, 49A 
Griswoldville, Ga., 49 
Groveton, Va., 17, 18 
Guadalajara, Mex., 65 
Guadalupe, Mex., 65 
Guadalupe R., Tex., i 
Guanajuato, Mex., 65 
Guatemala, 65 
Guaymas, Mex., 65 
Guiney's Sta., Va., 54 



MAP INDEX 



493 



Gum Spr., Va., 26 

Guntersville, Ala., i, 23, 37, 52, 

64 
Guntown, Miss., 49 a 
Guvandotte, W.Va., 10 



Hagerstown, Md., i, 19, 26, 46 
Haines' Bluff, Miss. (Vicks.), 31 
Haiti, 6 

Halfway Ho., Va., 54, 55 
Halifax C.H., Va., 54 
Hall town, W.Va., 46, 47 
Hamilton, O., 43 
Hampton, Va. (Pen.), 11 
Hampton Roads, Va., 11 
Hancock, Md., 26 
Hanging Rock, S.C., 60 
Hankinson's Ferry, Miss., 31 
Hanover, Pa., 26 
Hanover C.H., Va., 13, 54 
Hanover Jn., Pa., 26 
Hanover Jn., Va., 40, 54 
Hanovertown, Va., 54 
Hardeeville, S.C., 33, 49, 60 
Harper's Ferry, W.Va., i, 8, 12, 

13. 19, 26, 46, 47 
Harpeth R., Tenn., 52 
Harris, Ft., Tenn., 15 
Harrisburg, Miss., 49 A 
Harrisburg, Pa., i, 2-5, 26 
Harrison, O., 43 
Harrison, Ft, Va. (R. & P.), 55 
Harrisonburg, Va. (Val.), 10, 12, 

13. 45. 47 
Harrison's Ldg., Va. (Pen.), 13, 14 
Harrodsburg, Ky., 23 
Hartsville, Tenn., 24 
Hartwood, Va., 26 
Hatcher's Run., Va., 54, 55 
Hatchie R., Tenn., i 
Hatteras, C, N.C., i, 2-5, 6, 59 
Hatteras, Ft., N.C., 59 
Hatteras Inlet, N.C., 59 
Havana, Cuba, 6, 7 
Haymarket, Va., 17 
Hazel Grove, Va. (Chan.), 25 
Hazelhurst, Miss., 49A 
Hazel Run, Va., 17 
Hazel Run, Va. (Fred.), 21, 25 
Hedgman's Cr., Va., 17 
Heidlersburg, Pa., 26 
Heiman, Ft., Ky., 15 
Helena, Ark., i, 24, 31, 49A, 50, 51 
Henderson's Hill, La., 51 
Henry, C, Va., i, 13, 59 
Henry, Ft., Tenn., 15 
Henry Hill, Va. (B.R.), 9, 18 



Herndon Sta., Va., 26 
Hickman, Ky., i, 15, 22 
Hickory Hill, S.C, 60 
llicksford, Va., 54 
High Br., Va., 54 
Hillsboro, Ga., 49 
Hillsboro, N.C., i. 60 
Hillsboro, Tenn., 52 
Hilton Head, S.C., 33 
Hilton Head Id., S.C, 33 
Hindman, Ft. See Arkansas Post 
Hiwassee R., Tenn., 23 
Hocking R., O., 44 
Holly Spr., Miss., 24 
HoUybranch Ch., Va., 54 
Holston R., I, 10, 23, 43, 56 
Honduras, British, 6, 65 
Hood's Mills, Md., 26 
Hoover's Gap., Tenn., 37 
Houston, Tex., i, 51, 65 
Houston, Ft., Tenn. (Nash.), 53 
Howard's Br., Va. (Pen.), 11 
Humboldt, Tenn., i, 15, 24 
Hungary Sta., Va., 54 
Huntersville, W.Va., 10 
Huntertown, Pa., 26 
Hunting Run. Va. (Chan.), 25, 38 
Huntsville, Ala., i, 2-5, 23, 24, 52 
Huttonsville, W.Va., 10 
Hyde's Ferry, Tenn. (Nash.), 53 

Illinois, State, i, 22, 50 
Illinois R., 111., I 
Independence, Mo., 50 
Indian Territory, i, 22, 50, 51 
Indiana, State, i, 23, 43 
Indianapolis, Ind., i 
Iowa, State, i 
Iron Mts.. 56 
Iron Works., Ala., 64 
Ironton, Mo., i, 22, 50 
Ironton, O., 43, 44 
Irwinsville, Ga., i, 49 
Ixmiquilpan, Mex., 65 

Jackson, Miss., i, 24, 31, 49A 
Jackson, O., i, 43, 44 
Jackson, Tenn., i, 15, 24, 52 
Jacksonboro, S.C, 60 
Jacksonville, Ala., i, 64 
Jacksonville, Fla., i, 2-5 
Jacksonville, Va. (S.W.), 56 
Jalapa, Mex., 65 
Jamaica, 6 

James Id., S.C. (Char.), 34 
James R., Va., i, 10, n, 13, 14, 
45. 54. 55. 59 



494 



•MAP INDEX 



Jarratt'sSta., Va., 54 
Jasper, Ala., 64 
Jasper, O., 10, 43, 44 
Jasper, Tenn., 37 
Jefferson, Pa., 26 
Jefferson, Va., 17 
Jefferson City, Mo., 1, 22, 50 
Jenkins' Ferry, Ark., i, 50, 51 
Jericho Mill, Va. (N.A.), 40 
Jetersville, Va., 54 
Johnson, Ft., S.C. (Char.), 34 
Johnsonville, Tenn., 15, 52 
Jonesboro, Ga., 48, 49, 64 

Kanawha R., Great, W.Va., i, 10, 

44' 45 
Kanawha R., Little, W.Va., i, 10, 

44 
Kansas, State, i, 22, 50 
Kansas City, Kan., i, 22, 50 
Kansas R., Kan., i 
Keedysville, Md., 19, 20 
Kelly's Ford, Va., 17, 26 
Kenesaw Mt., Ga., 41, 42 
Kentucky, State, i, 10, 15, 23, 43, 

44. 56 
Kentucky R.. Ky., i, 23, 43 
Keokuk, lo., i 

Kernstown, Va, (Val.), 12, 47 
Key West, Fla., 6 
Kilkenny Bluff, Ga., 49 
King's Br., Ga., 49 
King's Iron Works, Ala., 64 
Kingston, Ga., 42, 52, 64 
Kingston, Jamaica, 6 
Kingston, Ky., 23 
Kingston, Pa., 26 
Kingston, Tenn., 23 
Kingsville, S.C, 60 
Kinston, N.C., i, 59 
Knoxville. Tenn., i, 2-5, 23, 56 

Lafayette, Ga.. 37, 42, 52 

La Grange, Tenn.. 24, 49A 

Lancaster, Ky., 43 

Lancaster. S.C, 60 

Lanesville. Ky., 43 

Laurel Hill, N.C., 60 

Laurel Hill Ch., Va. (R. &. P.), 55 

Laurenceburg, Ky., 23 

Laurenceburg. Tenn., 52 

La Vergne, Tenn., 52 

Leadville, W.Va.. 10 

Leavenworth. Ft., Kan., i, 2-5, 50 

Lebanon, Ky., i, 23. 24. 43 

Lebanon, Mo., 22 

Lebanon, Tenn.. 52 



Lebanon Spr., Va. (Val.). 12. 47 

Lecompton, Kan., i 

Lee & Gordon's Mill, Ga. (Chick.). 

35 
Lee's Hill, Va. (Fred.). 21 
Lee's Mill, Va. (Pen.), 11 
Leesboro, Md.. 26 ■ 

Leesburg, Va., i, 8, 13. 19, 26, 46 ■ 
Leon, Mex., 65 ■ 

Lewisburg, W.Va., i. 10, 45 
Lewistown, Va., 54 
Lexington, Ky., i. 23. 43 
Lexington, Mo., 22, 50 
Lexington, N.C, 56. 60 
Lexington, S.C, 60 
Lexington, Tenn., 24 
Lexington, Va., 10, 45 
Liberty, Va. (S.W.), 10, 45 
Liberty Gap, Tenn., 37 
Lick Cr., Tenn. (Shi.), 16 
Licking R., Ky., i, 23, 43 
Lickskillet, Ga. (Atl.), 48 
Light Ho., S.C. (Char.), 34 
Light House Cr., S.C. (Char.), 34 
Ligontown, Va., 54 
Lincolnton, N.C, 56, 60 
Lisbon, Md., 26 
Lithonia, Ga., 49 
Little North Mt., Va. (Val.), 47 
Little R., Va., 40, 54 
Little Rock, Ark., i, 50, 51 
Littlestown, Pa., 26 
Liverpool, England, 7 
Livingston, Ala., 64 

London, England, 7 

London, Ky., 23, 43 

Long Br., Va. (Pen.), 14. 54 

Lookout, C, Va., i, 59 

Lookout Cr., Tenn. (Chat.), 36, 37 

Lookout Mt., 36, 37, 42 

Lost Mt., Ga., 41, 42 

Loudon, Tenn., 23 

Loudon County, Va.. 26 

Loudon Hghts., Va., 19. 26 

Louisa, Ky., 43 

Louisa C.H., Va., 54 

Louisiana, State, 1,31. 49A. 51. 65 

Louisville, Ga., 49 

Louisville, Ky., i, 2-5, 23, 24. 43 

Lumpkin's Sta., Ga.. 49 

Luray, Va. (Val.), 12. 47 

Lynch R., S.C, 60 

Lynchburg, Va., i. 2-5, 10, 45 

Lynnville, Tenn., 52 

McAllister, Ft., Ga.. 33. 49 
McConnellsburg, Pa., 26 



MAP INDEX 



495 



McDonough, Ga., 49 
McDowfll, Va. (Val.), 12, 13. 47 
McFarland's Gap, Ga. (Chick.), 35 
McKenzie's Sta., Tenn., 52 
Mackville, Ky., 23 
McLemore's (McElmore's, or Mc- 
Lennon's) Cove, Ga. (Chick.), 35 
McMinnville, Tenn., i, 23, 37, 52 
Macon, Ga., i, 2-5, 49, 64 
Macon, Ft. (or Mahon), N.C., i, 59 
Macon, Miss., 49A 
McPhersonville, S.C, 60 
Madeira, 7 
Madison, Ga., i, 49 
Madison, Ind., i, 23, 43, 
Magnolia, Miss., 49A 
Malvern Hill, Va. (Pen.), 14, 55 
Manassas Gap, Va., 8, 12, 26, 46, 

47 
Manassas Jn., Va., i, 8, 9, 13, 17, 

26, 46 
Manchester, Md., 26 
Manchester, Tenn., 37 
Manchester, Va., 54, 55 
Mansfield, La., 51 
Maplesville, Ala., 64 
Maramee R.. Mo., i 
Marietta, Ga., i, 41, 42, 48, 49, 64 
Marietta, O., i, 10, 44 
Marion, Ala., 64 
Marion, Miss., 49A 
Marion, Va. (S.W.), i, 56 
Marmiton R., 50 
Marsh Batt., S.C. (Char.), 34 
Marsh Run, Pa., 26 
Marshall, La., 51 
Martinsburg, W.Va., 12, 19, 26, 46, 

47 
Marye's Hill, Va. (Fred.), 21 
Maryland, State, i, 8, 26 
Maryland Hghts., Md., 19, 26 
Massanutten Mts., Va. (Val.), 12, 

13. 47 
Massaponax Cr., Va., 21, 25, 39 
Mat R., Va., 54 
Matagorda, Tex., i 
Matamoros, Mex., i, 6, 65 
Matapony R., Va., 54 
Matthews Hill, Va. (B.R.), 9 
Mattoax, Va., 54, 55 
May, C, N.J., I 
Maysville, Ark., 22 
Maysville, Va., 59 
Mazatlan, Mex., 65 
Meadow Br., Va. (R. & P.), 55 
Meadow R., W.Va., 45 
Meadow Sta. Va. (Pen.), 14 
Mechanicsburg, Pa., 26 



Mechanicstown, Md., 26 
Mcchanicsville, Va. (Pen.), 14, 54, 

35 
Meherrin R., Va., 54, 59 
Meherrin Sta., Va., 54 
Melbourne, Australia, 7 
Memphis, Tenn., i, 2-5, 15, 24, 

49A. 50 
Mercersville, Md., 19, 20 
Meridian, Miss., i, 2-5, 31, 49A 
Messenger's, Miss., 49A 
Mexico, I, 6, 65 
Mexico City, Mex., 65 
Middleburg, Md., 26 
Middleburg, Va., 26 
Middletown, Md., 19, 26 
Midway, S.C, 60 
Mier, Mex., 65 
Milan, Ind., 43 
Milledgeville, Ga., i, 49 
Millen, Ga., i, 49 
Milliken's Bend (Vicks.), 31 
Mill Spr., Ky., i, 2-5, 43 
Millwood, Va. (Val.), 26 
Mine Run, Va. (Chan.), 25 
Mines, Ft., Ala., 63 
Missionary Ridge, Ga., 35, 36, 37 
Mississippi, State, i, 15, 31, 49A, 

50, 51, 52, 63, 64 
Mississippi R., i, 15, 22, 24, 31, 

32, 49A, 50, 51 
Missouri, State, i, 15, 22, 50 
Missouri R., i, 22, 50 
Mitchell's Ford, Va. (B.R.), 9 
Mobile, Ala., i, 2-5, 6, 7, 49A, 61, 

63. 65 
Mobile Bay, Ala., 61, 62, 63 
Moccasin Pt., Tenn. (Chat.), 36 
Monocacy, Md., 26, 46 
Monocacy Jn., Md., 26, 46 
Monocacy R., Md., 19, 26, 46 
Monongahela R., W.Va., 10, 44 
Monroe, La., 51 
Monroe, N.C., 56, 60 
Monroe, Ft., Va. (Pen.), i, 2-5, n, 

13.59 
Monterey, Mex., 65 
Monterey, Va., 10, 45 
Monterey Gap., Pa., 26 
Montevallo, Ala., i, 64 
Montgomery, Ala., i, 2-5, 64 
Montgomery, Ft., Ala., 63 
Monticello, Ga., 49 
Moorefield, W.Va., 10, 12, 46, 47 
Morehead City, N.C., i, 59 
Morgan, Ft., Ala., i, 61 
Morganton, N.C., i, 56, 60 
Morris Id., S.C. 33, 34 



496 



.MAP INDEX 



Morristown, Tenn., 56 
Mott's Run., Va. (Chan.), 25 
Moultrie, Ft., S.C. (Char.), 33, 34 
Mound Batt., N.C. (Ft. F.), 58" 
Mt. Airy, Md., 26 
Mt. Holly, Pa., 26 
Mt. Hope, Ala., 64 
Mt. Jackson, Va. (Val.), 12, 47 
Mt. Pleasant, S.C. (Char.), 34 
Mt. Pleasant, Tenn., 52 
Mt. Sterling, Ky., 43 
Mt. Vernon, Ala., 63 
Mt. Washington, Ky., 23 
Mummasburg, Pa., 26 
Munfordville, Ky., 23, 43 
Murfreesboro, Tenn., i, 2-5, 23, 24, 

30, 37. 52 
Muskingum R., O., i, 44 
Mustang Id., Tex., i 



Namozine Ch., Va., 54 
Namozine Cr., Va., 54, 55 
Nashville, Tenn., i, 2-5, 15, 23, 24, 

52. 53 
Nassau, Bahama Is., 6, 7 
Natchez, Miss, i, 51 
Natchitoches, La., i, 51 
Navy Yard, Va. (Norfolk.), 59 
Neches R., Tex., i 
Neuse R., N.C, i, 59, 60 
New Albany, Miss., 49A 
New Baltimore, Va., 17, 26 
New Berne, N.C, i, 2-5, 59 
Newbern, Va. (S.W.). See Dublin. 
Newberry, S.C, 60 
New Carthage, La. (Vicks.), 31 
New Castle, Va., 54 
New Cold Harbour, Va. (R. & P.), 

55 
New Gilead, N.C, 60 
New Holland, Pa., 26 
New Hope Ch., Ga., 41, 42 
New Jersey, State, i 
New Lisbon, O., 44 
New Madrid, Mo., i, 2-5, 15, 22 
New Market, Md., 26 
New Market, Va. (B.R.), 9, 17, 18 
New Market, Va. (Pen.), 14, 55 
New Market. Va. (S. Va.), 54 
New Market, Va. (Val.), i, 12, 46, 

47 
New Mexico TeiTitory, 65 
New Orleans, La., i, 2-5, 6, 7, 

49A, 51, 65 
New Philadelphia, O., 44 
Newport News, Va. (Pen.), 11, 54, 

59 



New R., W.Va., i, 10, 45, 56 
New Store, Va., 54 
Newton, Miss., 49A 
Newtonia, Mo., 1, 50 
New York, N.Y., 7 
Norfolk, Va., i, 6, 13, 59 
North Mt., Little. Va. (Val.), 12 
Nottaway C.H., Va., 54 
Nottaway R., Va., 54, 59 
Nueces R., Tex., i 
Ny R., Va., 25, 39, 59 



Oajaca, Mex., 65 

Oak Hill, Pa. (Get.), 27. 28, 29 

Occoquan Cr., Va., 17, 26 

Ocmulgee R., Ga., i, 49, 64 

Oconee, Ga., 49 

Ocracoke Inlet, N.C, 59 

Ogeechee Ch., Ga.. 49 

Ogeechee R.. Ga., i. 33, 49, 60 

Ohio, State, i, 10, 23, 43, 44 

Ohio R., I, 15, 23, 24, 43, 44 

Ohoopee R., Great, Ga., 49 

Okolona. Miss.. 49A 

Okolonee R., Fla., i 

Old Town Cr., Miss., 49 a 

Oostenaula R., Ga., 42 

Opelika, Ala., 64 

Opelousas, La., i, 51 

Opequon Cr., Va. (Val.), 12, 19, 

26, 47 
Orange C.H., Va., 12, 54 
Orange Plank Rd., Va. (Wild.), 38 
Orange Turnpike, Va. (Wild.), 38 
Orangeburg, S.C, 60 
Oregon Inlet, N.C, 59 
Orizaba, Mex., 65 
Orleans, Va., 17 
Osage R., Mo., i, 22, 50 
Ossabaw Id., Ga., 33 
Ossabaw Sd., Ga., i, 33, 49 
Overall's Cr., Tenn. (Murf.), 30 
Overton's Hill, Tenn. (Nash.), 53 
Owl Cr., Tenn. (Shi.), 16 
Ox Ford, Va. (N.A.). 40 
Oxford, Miss., 24, 31 



Pace's Ferry, Ga. (Atl.). 48 
Paducah, Ky., i, 15, 24 
Painesville, Ky., 54 
Paintville, Ky.. i, 2-5, 43 
Pamlico Sd., N.C. i. 59 
Pamphlin's Sta.. Va.. 54 
Pamunkey R., Va., i, 13, 14, 54 
Paris. France, 7 
Paris, Tenn., 15 



MAP INDEX 



497 



Parisburg, Va. (S.W.), lo, 56 
Parker's Store, Va. (Wild.), 38 
Parkersbiirg, W.Va., i, 2-5, 10, 44 
Parras, Mex., 65 
Parr's Ridge, Md., 26 
Pascagoula Bay, Miss., 63 
Pascagoula R., Miss., i, 49A 
Pass, North-East, La., i 
Pass, South, La., i 
Pass, South-West, La., i 
Pass k la Loutre, La., i 
Pea Ridge, Ark., i, 2-5, 22 
Peach Orchard, Pa. (Get.), 27, 28, 

29 
Peach Tree Cr., Ga. (Atl.), 48 
Pearl R., Miss., i, 31, 49A. 
Pecos R., Tex., 65 
Pedee R., Great, N. & S.C, i, 56, 

60 
Pedee R., Little, N. & S.C, 60 
Pelican Id., Ala. (Mob.), 61 
Pemberton, Ft., Miss. (Vicks.), 31 
Pemberton, Ft., S.C. (Char.), 33 
Pennsylvania, State, i, 26, 44 
Pensacola, Fla., i, 2-5, 6, 63, 65 
Pensacola Bay, Fla., 63 
Peralta, N.M., 65 
Perdido R., Fla., i. 63 
Perry ville, Ky., 23 
Petersburg, Va., i, 2-5, 54, 55 
Petersburg, W.Va., 10 
Petite Bois Id., Miss. (Mob.), 63 
Philadelphia, Miss., 49A 
Philadelphia, Pa., i, 2-5 
Philippi, W.Va., i, 2-5, 10 
Pickens, Ft., Fla., i 
Piedmont, Va. (Val.), 45 
Piedras Negras, Mex., 65 
Pillow, Ft., Tenn., 15, 49.\ 
Pilot Knob, Mo., 22, 50 
Pinckney, Castle, S.C. (Char.), 34 
Pine Mt., Ga., 41, 42 
Pipe Cr., Md., 26 
Pittsburg, Pa., i, 2-5, 44 
Pittsburg Ldg., Tenn., i, 15, 16, 

49A, 52 
Planter's Factory, Ga., 49 
Planterstovvn, Va., 54 
Plaquemine, La., 51 
Plaquemine Brulee R., La., i 
Pleasant Hill, La., 51 
Pleasant Valley, Md., 19 
Plum Run, Pa. (Get), 27, 28, 29 
Plymouth, N.C., i, 59 
Po R., Va.. 38, 39, 54 
Pocotaligo, S.C, 33, 60 
Pocotaligo R., W.Va., 10 
Point of Rocks, Md., 19, 26 



Point of Rocks, Va., 54, 55 

Point Pleasant, W.Va., 10 

Pollard, Fla.. 63 

Pollock's Mill, Va. (Chan.), 25 

i'omeroy, O., 10, 43, 44 

Pontotoc, Miss., 49A 

Pooler's Sta., Ga., 49 

Poolesville, Md., 46 

Port au Prince, Haiti, 6 

Port Gibson, Miss, 31 

Port Hudson, La., i, 2-5, 49A, 

51 
Port Republic, Va. (Val.), 12, 47 
Port Royal Id., S.C. 33 
Port Royal, S.C, i, 2-5, 6, 33, 49 
Port Walthall, Va. (R. & P.). 55 
Portertown, Md. (Ant.). 20 
Portland, Me., 7 
Portsmouth, N.C, 59 
Portsmouth, O., 43, 44 
Portsmouth; Va.. 59 
Potomac R.. i, 8, 10, 12. 13, 17. 

19. 20. 26. 46, 47, 54 
Pou"nd Gap. i. 43, 56 
Powder Spr., Ga.. 41 
Powell. Ft., Ala. (Mob.), 61 
Powell's R., Tenn., i, 56 
Power's Hill, Pa. (Get.), 27. 28. 29 
Powhatan C.H., Va., 54 
Prestonburg, Ky., 43 
Price's Sta., Va., 54 
Prince George C.H., Va., 54, 55 
Princeton, W.Va., 10 
Proctor's Cr.. Va.. 54. 55 
Prospect Sta., Va., 54 
Puebla, Mex., 65 
Pulaski, Tenn.. i. 23. 52 
Pulaski. Ft.. Ga.. i. 33. 49 
Pumpkin Vine Cr.. Ga., 41 
Purdy, Tenn., 15 
Purysburg, S.C, 60 



Queretaro, Mex., 65 
Quincy, 111., i 



Raccoon Mt., Tenn., 36, 42 
Raleigh, Miss., 49A 
Raleigh, N.C, i, 60 
Randolph, Ala., 64 
Randolph, Ft., Tenn.. 15 
Rapidan R., Va., 13. 25, 26. 54 
Rappahannock R., Va., i, 13, 17. 

21, 25, 26, 54 
Rappahannock Sta., Va., 17, 26 
Rawhide. Ala., 52 
Raymond. Miss., 31 



32 



498 



•map index 



Ream's Sta., Va., 54, 59 

Rectortown, Va., 26 

Red River, La., i, 49 A, 50, 51 

Resaca, Ga., 1, 42, 52, 64 

Rice's Sta., Va., 54 

Rich Mt., W.Va.,' 10 

Richland Cr., Tenn., 52, 53 

Richmond, Ky., 23 

Richmond, O., 44 

Richmond, Va., i, 2-5, 6, 13, 14, 

54. 55 
Ridgeville, Md., 26 
Ridgeway, N.C., i 
Ringgold, Ga., i, 37, 42 
Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, 7 
Rio Grande del Norte, i, 6, 65 
Ripley, Miss., 49A 
Ripley, Ft, S.C. (Char.), 34 
Rivanna R., Va., 54 
Rivers' Br., S.C, 60 
Roanoke Id., N.C., i, 2-5, 59 
Roanoke R., i, 59 
Roanoke Sta., Va., 54 
Robertsville, S.C, 60 
Rock Cr., Pa. (Get.), 27, 28, 29 
Rockfish Gap, Va., 12, 45, 47 
Rockville, Md., 26, 46 
Rogersville, Tenn., 23, 56 
Rohrersville, Md., 19, 46 
Rolla, Mo., I, 22. 50 
Rolling Fork, Ky., 43 
Rome, Ga., i, 42, 52, 64 
Romney, W.Va., 12, 46, 47 
Rossville, Ga., 35, 36, 37 
Roswell, Ga., 42 

Rough and Ready, Ga. (Atl.), 48 
Round Top, Pa. (Get.), 27, 28, 29 
Round Top, Little, Pa. (Get.), 27, 

28, 29 
Russellville, Ala., 64 
Rutherford Cr., Tenn., 52 
Rutherford ton, N.C, 56 



Sabillasville, Md., 26 

Sabine City, Tex., i, 2-5, 51 

Sabine Cross Roads, La., 1,51 

Sabine R., i, 51 

Sailor's Cr., Va., 54 

St. Augustine, Fla., i 

St. Catherine Sd., Ga., 49 

St. Fran9ois R., Ark., i 

St. George, W.Va., 10 

St. Helena Id., S.C, 33 

St. John's Id., S.C, 33 

St. Joseph, Mo., I 

St. Louis, Mo., I, 2-5, 22, 50 

St. Lucas, C, Lower Cal., 65 



St. Mary's, Ga., i 

Salem, 111., i 

Salem, Ind., 43 

Salem, Mo., 22 

Salem, Pa., 17, 26 

.Salem, Va. (S.W.), 10, 45, 56 

Salem Ch., Va. (Fred.), 21, 25 

Saline R. Ark., 50, 51 

Salisbury, N.C, 56, 60 

Salkehatchie, S.C, 33, 60 

Salt R., Ky., 23, 43 

Saltville, Va. (S.W'.), i, 10, 56 

Salyerville, Ky., 43 

San Antonio de Bejar, Tex., i, 65 

San Domingo, 6 

San Juan de Lagos, Max., 65 

San Lorenzo, Mex., 65 

San Luis Potosi, Mex., 65 

Sand Id., Ala. (Mob.), 61 

Sanders, Ft., Tenn. (Knoxville), 23 

Sandersville, Ga., 49 

Sandtown, Ga. (Atl.), 48 

Sandy R., Big, i, 10 

Santa Fe, N.M., 65 

Santa Rosa Sd., Fla., 63 

Santce R., S.C, i, 60 

Sapelo Sd., Ga., 49 

Sardis Ch., Ga. (Atl.), 48 

Satilla R., Ga., i 

Savage's Sta., Va. (Pen.), 14 

Savannah, Ga., i, 2-5, 6, 33,49, 

60 
Savannah, Tenn., 15, 52 
Savannah R., i, 33, 49, 60 
Scarboro, Ga., 49 
Scarytown, W.Va., 10 
Scioto R., O., 44 
Scott, Ft., Kan., 50 
Scott's Ford, Va. (Chan.), 25 
Scottsville, Ala., 64 
Scottsville, Va., 54 
Second Swamp, Va. (R. & P.), 55 
Sedalia, Mo., i, 22, 50 
Selma, Ala., i, 2-5, 64 
Seminary, Pa. (Get.), 27, 28, 29 
Seminary Ridge, Pa. (Get.), 27, 

28, 29 
Seneca, Md., 26 

Sequatchie R., Tenn., 23, 37, 52 
Seven Pines, Va. (Pen.), 14, 54, 55 
Shady Dale, Ga., 49 
Sharpsburg, Md., i, 2-5, 19, 20, 26 
Shelby ville, Tenn., 37 
Shenandoah Mt., Va. (Val.), 12, 47 
Shenandoah R., Va. (Val.), i, 8, 

10, 12, 13, 19, 26, 46, 47 
Shepherdstown, W.Va. (Val.), 19, 



MAP INDEX 



499 



Shiloh Ch., Tenn., i, 2-5, 15, 16, 

49A, 52 
Ship Id., Miss., 6 
Shrcveport, La., i, 2-5, 51, 65 
Shute's Folly Id., S.C. (Char.). 34 
Silver Spr., Md., 46 
Simsport (or Semmesport), La., i, 

51 
Sinaloa, Mex., 65 
Sipsey R., Ala., 64 
Sister's Ferry, S.C, 60 
Slate R., Va., 54 
Slocum's Cr., N.C., 59 
Sly's Hill, Tenn. (Nash.), 53 
Smith, Ft., Ark., i, 50 
Smith Id., N.C., 57, 59 
Smithville, N.C., 57, 59 
Smithville, Va., 54 
Snake Cr., Tenn. (Shi.), 16 
Snake Creek Gap, Ga., 42 
Snicker's Gap, Va., 12, 26, 46, 47 
Socorro, N.M., 65 
Soledad, Mex., 65 
Somerset, Ky., 43 
Sonora, Mex., 65 
South Mills, N.C., 59 
South Mountain, Md., 19, 26 
South R„ Ga. (Atl.), 48 
Southside Ry., Va., 54, 55 
Spanish Fort, Ala. (Mob.), 62, 63 
Sparta, Ala., 63 
Spartansburg, S.C, i, 56 
Spottsylvania Ch., Va., 39 
Spottsylvania C.H., Va., 39, 54 
Springfield, 111., i 
Springfield, Ky., 23 
Springfield, Mo., i, 22, 50 
Spring Hill, Tenn., 52 
Springhill, Va. (R. & P.), 55 
Stafford C.H., Va., 26 
Stafford Hghts., Va. (Fred.), 21 
Statesville, N.C, 56, 60 
Staunton, Va. (Val.), i, 2-5, 10, 

12, 13, 45, 47, 54 
Staunton R., Va., 54 
Stedman, Ft., Va. (R. dt P.), 55 
Steele's Bayou, Miss. (Vicks.), 31 
Stephenson's, Va. (Val.), 47 
Steubenville, O., 44 
Stevensburg, Va., 26 
Stevenson, Ala., i, 23, 37, 42, 52, 

64 
Stockton, Ala., 63 
Stone Mt., Ga., 48, 49 
Stone's R., Tenn., 30, 37 
Stoney Gap, 43 
Stono Inlet, S.C. (Char.) 33 
Stony Cr., Va., 54 



Stony Creek Sta., Va., 54 
Strasburg, Va. (Val.), i, 8, 12, 13, 

¥h 47 
Stubbs's Farm, Miss., 49A 
Sudley's Ford., Va. (B.R.), 9, 18 
Suffolk, Va., I, 54, 59 
Sugar Tree Cr., Tenn., 53 
SuUivan's Id., S.C. (Char.), 34 
Sulphur Fork, Tex., i 
Sulphur Spr., Va., 17 
Sumansville, Ind., 43 
Summerfield, Ala., 64 
Summerville, Ga., 52 
Sumter, Ft, S.C. (Char.), i, 33, 

34 
Sunflower R., Miss., i, 31 
Susquehanna R., Pa., i, 26 
Sutherland's Sta., Va., 54, 55 
Suttonsville, W.Va., 10 
Suwanee R., Fla., i 
Swift Cr., Va., 54, 55 
Swift Run Gap, Va., 12, 47 
Sykestown, Mo., 1,15, 22, 50 
Sykesville, Md., 26 



Ta R., Va., 54 

Tabernacle Ch., Va. (Chan.), 25 

Tacambaro, Mex., 65 

Talladega, Ala., i, 64 

Tallahassee, Fla., i 

Tallahatchie R., Miss., i, 24, 31, 

49A 
Tallapoosa R., Ala., 64 
Talula, Miss., 31 
Tampico, Mex., 6, 65 
Tanneytown, Md., 26 
Tar R., N.C, 59 
Taylor's Hill, Va. (Chan.), 25 
Taylorsville, Ky., 23 
Taylorsville, Va. (S.W.), 56 
Teche R., La., i, 51 
Tehuacan, Mex., 65 
Tehuan tepee, Mex., 65 
Tenille Sta., Ga., 49 
Tennessee, State, i, 15, 23, 37. 42. 

49 A, 50, .52, 56 
Tennessee R., i, 15, 16,23, 24. 36, 

37, 42, 49A,52. 56. 64 
Tensas Sta., Ala., i, 49A, 63 
Terre Haute, Ind., i 
Texas, State, i, 50, 51, 65 
Thibodeaux, La., 51 
Thomastown, Ga., 64 
Thornhill, Ala., 64 
Thornton's Gap, Va., 12, 26, 47 
Thoroughfare Gap, Va., 8, 17, 

26 



500 



MAP INDEX 



Thunderbolt, Ft., Ga., 49 
Todd's Tavern, Va. (Chan.), 25, 

38, 39 
Tombigbee R., i, 49A. 52, 63, 64 
Tom's Brook, Va. (Val.), 47 
Toos Pt., Va. (Pen.), 11 
Topeka, Kan., i 
Totopotomoy Cr., Va., 54 
Tracy City, Tenn., 37, 52 
Trent Reach, Va. (R. & P.), 55 
Trent R., N.C., 59 
Trenton, Tenn., 37 
TrevUian Sta., Va., 54 
Trinity R., Tex., i 
Trion, Ala., 64 
Troupville, Ga., i 
Tullahoma, Tenn., i, 23, 37, 52 
Tunstall's Sta., Va. (Pen.), 14, 54 
Tupelo, Miss., i, 24, 49A, 52, 64 
Turner's Br., Va. (Pen.), 14 
Turner's Ferry, Ga. (Atl.), 48 
Turner's Gap, Md., 19, 26, 46 
Tuscaloosa, Ala., 64 
Tuscumbia, Ala., i, 52, 64 
Two Taverns, Pa., 26 
Tybee Id. Ga., 33 

Union, Miss., 49A 
Union, Ft., N.M., 65 
Union City, Tenn., i, 15, 24 
Union Mills, Md., 26 
Uniontown, Md., 26 
Upperville, Va., 26 
ITrbanna, Md., 26 
Urbanna, Va., 54 
Ushant, France, 7 
Utica, Miss., 31 

Valverde, N.M., 65 

Van Buren, Ark., 50 

Vaughan, Miss., 31 

Vera Cruz, Mex., 65 

Vernon, Tnd., i, 43 

Vicksburg, Miss., i, 2-5,24,31,32, 

49A, 51 
Victoria, Tex., i 
Vienna, Ind., 43 
Vienna, Va., 8 
Villanow, Ga., 52 
Virginia, State, i, 8, 23, 43, 45, 56, 

59 

Wabash, R., i 

Wadesboro. See Waynesboro, N.C. 
Wagner, Ft., S.C. (Char.), 34 
Walden's (or Walling's, or Wah- 

len's) Ridge, Tenn., 37 
Walker's Ch., Va., 54 



Warrenton, Miss. (Vicks.), 31 
Warrenton, Va., i, 12, 13, 17, 26, 

47 
Warrenton Jn., Va., 17, 26 
Wartrace (or Wartran), Tenn., 37 
Warwick C.H., Va. (Pen.), 11 
Washington, D.C., i, 2-5, 6, 8, 13, 

26, 46 
Washington, Ga., 49 
Washington, N.C, 59 
Washita R., i, 50, 5j 
Wassaw Sd., Ga., i, 33 
Waterloo, Ala., 64 
Waterloo, Va., 17 
Wauhatchie, Tenn., 37 
Waynesboro, Ga., 49 
Waynesboro (or Wadesboro), N.C. 

56, 60 
Waynesboro, Tenn., 52 
Waynesboro, Va. (Val.), 45, 54 
Weldon, N.C, i, 2-5, 59 
Wellville, Va., 54 
West Liberty, Ky., 43 
West Point, Ala., 64 
West Point, Ga., 64 
West Point, Miss., 49A, 64 
West Point, Va., 54 
West Union, W.Va., 10 
West Virginia, State, i, 44, 45, 56 
Westminster, Md., 26 
Weston, W.Va., 10 
Westport, Mo., 50 
Wetumpka, Ala., 64 
Wheeling, W.Va., i, 2-5, 44 
White Ho., Va. (Pen.), 13, 14, 54, 
White Oak Swamp, Va., 54 
White Oak Swamp, Va. (Pen.), 14 

54. 55 
White Plains, Va., 17 
White R., Ark, i, 22, 31, 49A, 50 
White R., Ind., i 
White Run, Pa. (Get.), 27, 28, 

29 
White Sulphur Spr., W.Va., 10 
White's Gap, Va., 45 
White's Sta., Tenn., 49A 
Whitesburg, Ky., 43 
Whyteville. See Wytheville 
Wilderness, Va., 54 
Wilderness Ch., Va., 38 
Wilderness Run, Va., 25, 38 
Wilderness Tavern, Va., 38 
Wilkesboro, N.C, 56, 60 
Williamsburg, Va. (Pen.), 11 
Williamsport, Md., 12, 19, 26, 46 
Willis R., Va., 54 
Willoughby Run, Pa. (Get.), 27. 

28, 29 



MAP INDEX 



501 



Wilmington, N.C., i, 2-5, 6. 57, 59, 

60 
Wilson's Cr., Mo., i, 2-5, 22, 50 
Winchester, Tenn.. 37 
Winchester, Va. (Val.)> i. 2-5, 8, 

12, 13, 26, 46 
Winton, N.C., 59 
Woodbine, Md., 26 
Woodstock, Ga., 49 
Woodville, Ga. , 49 
Woodville, Miss., 51 
Wrightsville, Pa., 26 
Wytheville (or Whyteville). Va, 

(S.W.), I. 2-5, 10, 56 



Yadkin R., N.C., 56. 60 
Yallabusha R., Miss., i, 31, 49A 



Yazoo City, Miss. (Vicks.), 31, 

49A 
Yazoo Pass, Miss. (Vicks.), 31 
Yazoo R., Miss., i, 24, 31, 49A 
Yellow Tavern, Va., 54 
York, Pa., i, 26 
York R., Va., 11 
Yorktown, Va. (Pen.), 11, 13 
Yorkville, S.C, i, 56, 60 
Young's Branch, Va. (B.R.), 9, i£ 
Young's Mill, Va. (Pen.), 11 
Yucatan, Mex., 65 



Zacatecas, Mex., 65 
Zamora, Mex., 65 
Zanesville, O., 44 
Zoar Ch., Va. (Chan.), 25 



INDEX 



For List of Abbreviations see beginning of Map Index, p. 4B7. 



Abolitionists, 6, 9, 10, 17, 19, 21, 
22, 27, 92, 146, 147, 409, 410, 

433. 442 

Adams, Mr., Minister to London, 
405, 471, 473, 474. 477. 478 

"Alabama," cruiser, 75, 178, i8o, 
185, 186, 234, 242, 243, 271, 
272. 278, 279, (sunk, 315, 316), 
320, 323-5, 368, 485 

Alabama, State, 8, (Representa- 
tives, 26), 40, 47, 55, 58, 219, 
237, 263, 282, 349. 365. 377. 
396, 400, 402, (Wilson's Raid, 
403, 404), 407, 408, 413, 414, 
425, 430, 431, 452, 465 

"Alabama " Claims, 471, 473, 475, 

477 
Alabama R., 62 
"Albemarle," river ironclad, 300, 

301, 325, (sunk, 353, 354^, 375 
Alexander, E. P., Brig. -Gen., 212 
"Alexandra," 235, 471 
Alexandria, La., 228, 310-12, 325 
Aliens Act, 31 
Alleghany Mts. (see also District), 

2, 60, 62, 74, 113, 128, 174, 224, 

265, 279, 303, 459 
Almonte, Mex. Gen., 246, 248 
Amendments to the Constitution, 

429, 431, 435, 437. 438, 468 
American Party (Know-Nothings), 

5. 26 
Amnesty, 397. 424. 425. 43i. 432 
Anderson, R., Bvt. Maj.-Gen., 45, 

47. 50. 91 

Anderson, R. H., Lieut. -Gen., 190, 

289, 334. 385 
Anna R., North, Va., 163, (Lee's 

Position on, 292, 293), 298, 325 
Antietam Cr., Md., (Battle, 160), 

185, 371, 411 
Apache Caiion, N.M. (or Glorieta). 

138. 144 



Appomattox C.H., (Lee's Sur- 
render, 385. 386), 396, 399, 444. 
446 
Arbitration, 473, 476, 477, 478 
"Archer," cruiser, 234, 243 
Arizona Territory. See New Mexico 
"Arkansas," river ironclad, 176, 

Arkansas, State, (Representatives, 
26), 47, 56, 58, 75, 90. 93, 129, 
142, 176, 180, 185, 186, 251, 
270, 278, 282, 309, 311, 313, 
324. 325. 360, 376, 421, 430, 
431. 436, 4^1. 462 

Arkansas Post (or Ft. Hindman), 
221, 242 

Arman, M., French Ship-builder, 

424 
Armistead, L. A., Brig. -Gen., 213 
Army of Georgia, 395 
Missouri, 407 
Northern Virginia, 151, 195, 

214, 288, 297, 298, 407 
Tennessee, 407 
Virginia, 123, 182 
Army of the Cumberland, 183, 

259, 266, 276, 302, 305, 343, 

354-6, 395 
Frontier, 177, 461 
James, 287, 293, 294, 300, 381 
Ohio, 284, 302, 305, 343, 395. 

461 
Potomac, 82 
Potomac, 86, 106, 107, 120, 

151. 153. 156, 179. 180, 182, 

183, 18S, 201, 203, 204, (at 

Gettysburg, 208-14), 285, 

287, 288, 291, 298, 299, 322. 

326, 382, 453. 463 
Shenandoah, 82 
Shenandoah, 334 
South-West (or, of South-West 

Missouri), 94, 129, 453 



503 



504 



INDEX 



Army of the Tennessee, 302, 305, 

344. 345. 354. 356, 370 

Valley, 118 
Arthur, C, President, 437 
Ashby, T., Brig. -Gen., 1 14-17, 

(Notice, 142-3), 484 
"Atlanta." See " Tallahassee" 
"Atlanta" ("Fingal"), ironclad, 

232, 243, 386 
Atlanta, Ga., 5, 59, 73, 250, 266, 

267, 281, 282, 309, 318, 329, 

331, (Operations round, 341-7), 

348, 354. 356, 370. 374. 394. 

462, 463, 485 
Augur, C. C, Maj.-Gen., 336 
Averell, W. W., Bvt. Maj.-Gen., 

190. 254, 278, 279, 308, 333, 334 
Averysboro, (Battle, 392, 393), 

413 

Bahama Is., 178, 186, 233, 234, 

242 
Bahia, Brazil, 234, 236, 272, 

{"Florida" captured at, 366, 

367). 375 

Bailey, J., Col., 312 

Baltimore, Md., (Democratic Con- 
vention, 26), 61, 65, 77, 80, 157, 
138, 201, 202, 204 

Baltimore and Ohio Ry., 60, 77, 
81, 112, 113, 180, 217, 254, 331. 

333. 335. 336 
Banks, N. P., Maj.-Gen., 78, 
113-16, 120, 123, 151, (at 
Washington, 157), 176, 184, 
222-4, 227, (at Port Hudson, 
228, 269), 229, 234, 236, 242, 
2|3, 250, 251, 265, 270, 278, 
279, 281-3, 302, 308. 309, (Red 
River Expedition, 310-13), 314, 
324,421, (Notice, 457, 458), 460 
" Barracouta," H.M.S., 405 
Barron, S., Capt., 272, 316, 406 
Bate, W. B., Maj.-Gen., 363 
Bates, Mr., 70 
Bazaine, French Gen., 249, 378, 

406, 407, 416-20 
Beauregard, G. T., Gen., 50, 55, 
64, 78, 79, 82, (at Bull Run, 
83-5), 86, 129, 131, (at Shiloh, 
132, 133), 134, 135. 145. 166, 
196, 294, (at Richmond, 297, 
298). 338, 348. 356, 3^52, 377. 
378, (commands in South, 402), 
403. 448, 452, (Notice, 457) 
Belknap, W. W., Maj.-Gen., 449 
Bell, Mr., Candidate for Presidency, 
26 



Belmont, Mo., (Action at, 92, 93), 

103 
Benjamin, Mr., 71 
Bentonville, N.C., (Battle, 393), 

413. 450 
Bermuda, 97, 139, 234, 271, 278, 

316, 325, 366, 368 
Birkenhead. See Liverpool 
Birney, D. B., Maj.-Gen., 289 
Black, Mr., 46, 53, 440 
Blair, F. P., Maj.-Gen., (saves 

Missouri, 51, 32), 78, 90, 306, 

344. 347. 354. 355, 483 
Blair, M., Mr., 70, 379, 458 
Blow, Taylor, Mr., 20 
Blunt, J. G., Maj.-Gen., 361 
Booneville, Mo., (Battle of, 90), 

99, loi, 461 
Boonsboro, Md., (Battle of, 159; 

see South Mountain), 216 
Bowen, J. S., Maj.-Gen., 224 
Bowling Green, Ky., 62, 63, 93, 

94, 126, 128 
Bragg, Braxton, Gen., 50, 55, 79, 
134, 148, (invades Kentucky, 
167-9), 170, (at Stone's R., 171- 
2, 217, 218), 174, 179, 185, 186, 
194, 219, 220, 224, 225, 236, 
237, 242, 243, 250, 257-60, (at 
Chickamauga, 261-3), 264, (at 
Chattanooga, 265-7), 298, 321, 
357. 359. 370-3. 388-90, 393, 
400, 413, 444, 448, (Notice, 
451-3). 459. 460, 462, 481, 484 
Brandy Sta. Va., 189, 195, (Battle 

of, 196, 197), 215, 243, 254 
Brazil, Emperor of, 477 
Breckinridge, J. C., Maj.-Gen., 20, 
(Candidate for Presidency, 26), 
(besieges Nashville, 169, 170), 
(at Stone's R., 172), 176, (in 
Valley, 286, 287), 296, (in S.W. 
Virginia, 340), 360, 362, 397, 
400, 401, 424 
Brice's Cross Roads, Miss., (Action 

at, 308), 325 
Brooke, J. M., Lieut., 64, 75 
' ' Brooklyn, ' ' sloop-of -war, 97,137, 

351 
Brooks, P., Mr., 14 
Brown, John, (in Kansas, 13), 

(at Harper's Ferry, 22), 321 
Brown, Joseph, Governor, 32, 330, 

347. 350, 355. 371 

Buchanan, F., Adm., iii 

Buchanan, J., President (see 
President), 2, (Notice, 16, 17,) 
20, 24, (Message to Congress, 



INDEX 



505 



27-9), 33. 39. 41. 42-4. 48. 51. 
70, 71, 78, 104, 245. 440, 450 
Buchanan, R. C, Bvt. Maj. Gen., 

431 

Buckner, S. B., Lieut. -Gen., q-^, 95, 
(at Ft. Donclson, 126-8), 220, 
258, 259. 308. 444 

Buell, D. C, Maj. -Gen., 79, 94, 
95, 126, 128, (at Shiloh, 131-3), 
134, (against Bragf; in Ken- 
tucky, 168-71), 180, (Notice, 
183), 185, 186, 219, 276, 452 

Buford, J., Maj. -Gen., 153, 202, 
203, (at Gettysburg, 205, 206), 
210, 484 

Bull Run, Va., 2, 64, (Battle of, 
83), 102, 153, 154, 156, 180, 
184, 237, 448, 455-7, 460, 483, 

485 
Bulloch, J. D., Capt., 75, 141, 178, 

234-6. 273, 317, 366, 368. 369, 

375, 404-6, 413 
Burbridge, J. G.. Bvt. Maj. -Gen., 

286, 302, (against Morgan in 
Kentucky, 308-9), (in S.W. 

' Virginia. 340), 360, 374, 375 

Burnside, A. E., Maj. -Gen., 79, 
(in North Carolina, 88, 124), 
144, 145, (at Fredericksburg, 
162-5), 186, 188, 200, 220, 230, 
239, 250, 257-9, 264, 265, 267, 
268, 278, 284, 287, 280, 292, 338 
Butler. B. F., Maj. -Gen., (at 
Democratic Convention, 25), 
79, 81, 88, loi, 137, 176, 282, 

287, 288, (before Richmond, 
294. 295. 297. 299, 339), 325, 
(at Ft. Fisher, 358), 359, 374. 

375 
Butler, Mr., 14 

Cairo, 111., 57, 61, 72, 77, 91, 92, 
130, 175, 268 

Calhoun, J., Mr., 11 

Cameron, S., Mr., 70, 77, 104, 440 

Camp Jackson, Mo., 52, 56, 99 

Campbell, Mr., 379 

Campbell, Mr., 420 

Canada, 35, 76, 98, 472 

Canby, R. S., Maj. -Gen., 96, 103, 
(in New Mexico, 138, 139), 308, 
313. 348, 350, 352. 376, 377. 
395, (Mobile Campaign, 401-3), 
411, 430, 461 

Carolina, North, State, (Repre- 
sentatives, 26), (considers Se- 
cession, 31), 35, 41, 47, 51, 52, 
56, 58, 88, (Burnside's Expedi- 



tion, 124), 141, 237, 282, 355, 
376. 387, (Schoficld's Opera- 
tions, 390), 399, 413, 414, 424, 
430, 431, 462 

Carolina, South, State, 28, (Dis- 
pute with U.S.. 33), 35, 39. 40. 
(sends Commissioners to Wash- 
ington, 42, 44-6, 53), 51, 56, 58. 
t^. 74. 79. 103, 141, 282, 349. 
371. 376, 395. 430. 431 

Carpet-baggers, 433, 436 

Carrick's Ford, \V.Va., (.\ction 
at, 88), 102 

Cass, L., Mr., 46 

Cavalry, 484 

Cedar Cr., Va., (Val.), (Battle. 

33'^^'). 370. 375 

Cedar Mt., Va., (Action at, 151), 
185 

Centrcville, Va., (Bull Run, 80-4), 
86, 105, 107, III, 113, 114, 154, 
156. 188, 198, 215, 216, 253 

"Chameleon," 368 

Chanccllorsville, Va., (Battle, 190- 
3), 201, 206, 215, 236, 243, 321, 
322, 372 

Chantilly, Va., (Action, 156), 185, 
242 

Charleston, S.C, 25, 41, 42, 45, 
47. 50. 55. 62, 69, 79, 89, 90. 
98, 125, 140, 177,229, (Dupont's 
Attack, 230-2), 233, 242, 250, 
(Gillmore's Attack, 255-7), 270, 
271, 276, 278, 294, 314, 324, 
329, 355. 357. 358, 366, 377, 
390, (evacuated, 391). 392, 395, 

404. 413 
Charlottesville (or Charlotte), Va., 

295. 296, 335 

Chase, Mr., 70 

Chasseloup-Laubat, M., 236 

Chattanooga, Tenn., 62, 94, 128, 
129, 134, 150, 166, 167, 187,219, 
220, 237, 249-51, 258, 259. 
261-4, (Battle, 265-7), 268, 
274, 279, 281, 284, 302, 303, 
306, 348, 349, 408, 452, 462 

Cheatham, B., Maj. -Gen., (at At- 
lanta, 342-5), 362, (at Franklin, 

363) 
" Chickamauga," cruiser, 368, 375 
Chickamauga, Ga., 253, 259, 260, 

(Battle, 261-3), 266, 267, 274, 

276, 278, 452, 459 
"Chickasaw," monitor, 352 
" Chicora," c.d. ironclad, 229 
Civil Rights Bill, 426 
"Clarence," cruiser, 234, 243 



5o6 



INDEX 



Clarendon, Lord, 474, 475 
Clay, Mr., 9 

Cleburne, P.. Maj.-Gen., 363 
Cleveland, G., President, 437, 

481 
Cloue, French Commodore, 417 
Cloyd's Mt.. Va. (S.W.), (Action 

at, 286) 
Cobb, Howell, Mr., 21, 45, 46, 71 
Cold Harbour, Va., 288, (Battle, 

293. 294). 296-9, 325 
Collins, Capt., 366, 367 
Coloured Troops, 227, 302, 319, 

340. 357. 377 
"Columbia," c.d. ironclad, 391 
Columbia, S.C, 355, 358, 391 
Columbus, Ky., 62, 91, 92, 94, 

126, 130, 174 
Compromise Act, 33, 39 
Confederation, Articles of, 34, 35, 

38 
Confiscation Act, 146, 147 
"Congress," sloop-of-war, 110 
Connecticut, State, (considers Se- 
cession, 35) 
Conscript Laws, 149, 251 
Constitution, State, 38, 47 
Constitution, U.S., 34, 36, 38, 47, 

48 
Constitutional Union Party, 26 
Cooper, S., Gen., 11, 21, 66, 71, 78, 

82 
"Coquette," 273, 366 
Corinth, Miss., 128, 129, 131, 
{Beauregard at, 133), 134, 141, 
145, 148, 166, 167, (Battle, 170, 
171), 173, 179, 186, 240, 309, 

453 
Cotton States, 10, 30, 33, 40, 

69 
Cox, J. D., Maj.-Gen., 390, 482 
Crampton's Gap, Md., 159, 217 
Crittenden, G., Maj.-Gen., 94, (at 

Mill Springs, 126) 
Crittenden, J. J., Senator, 48 
Crittenden, T., Brig.-Gen., (at 

Stone's R., 172), (at Chicka- 

mauga, 259, 261, 262), 265 
Crook, G., Maj.-Gen., (in S.W. 

Virginia, 285, 286), 308, (in 

Valley, 332, 334, 336, 380) 
Cross Keys, Va. (Val.), 114, 

(Action, 117), 145 
Croxton, J. T., Bvt. Maj-Gen., 

403, 404, 413 
Culpeper C.H., Va.,152, 162, 163, 

196, 198, 215, 253 
"Cumberland," sloop-of-war, no 



Cumberland Gap, 93, 94, 132, 166, 

168, 169, 259 
Cumberland Mts., 93, 126, 237 
Cumberland R., 57, 61-3, 92-4, 

99, 102, 127, 175, 218, 219, 221, 

258, 268, 313 
Curtis, S. R., Maj.-Gen., 99, (at 

Pea Ridge, 129), 130, 135, 173, 

175, 177, 270, 361, 453 
Gushing, W. Comr., 301, (sinks 

"Albemarle," 353, 354), 375 
Custer, G., Maj-Gen., 285, 335, 337. 

375 

Dahlgren, J. A., Rear-Adm., 255, 

257, 277. 404 
Dahlgren, U., Col., 284, 324 
Danville Ry., 299, 380, 383, 384 
Davis, C. H., Rear-Adm., (at 

Battle of Memphis, 135), 138, 

175 

Davis, Jefferson (or President), 9, 
II, (opposes Douglas, 21, 24), 
25, 38, 43, (elected President, 
49), 50. 55. 56, 71. 72. 79. 81, 
82, 87, 91, 96, 98, 102, (refuses 
to make Lee Commander-in- 
Chief, 105), 163, 171, 179, 196, 
237, 249, 265, 283, 284, 298- 
319. 330. 344. 345, 347-9, 355. 
371. 379, 380, 384, 387, (ap- 
proves of Surrender, 397), 
(Flight, 399-40 1 ) , (Capture, 404) , 
405, 407, 412, 414, 439, (Notices, 
II, 71, 441, 442), 450, 452, 457, 
458, 460, 473 

Davis, Jefferson, Bvt. Maj.-Gen., 

346. 355 
"Deerhound," English yacht, 316 
Democrat Party, 13, 15, 18, 20, 

23, 24, (Conventions, 25, 26), 48, 

149,181, 326,409, 437, 440,464 
Dennison, Governor, 77 
Department No. i, 135 

No. 2, 93 

Trans-Mississippi, 311, 320 
Department of Alabama, 408 

Arkansas, 309 

Missouri, 79, 92, 94, 270, 309, 
361. 461 

New Mexico, 103 

South Carolina, Georgia, and 
Florida, 103, 462 

South-West Virginia, 286, 308, 
340, 360, 373 

Virginia, 112 

Washington, 40S 

West Florida and Alabama^ 452 



INDEX 



507 



Department of the Gulf, 176, 313, 
350 
Ohio, 77, 79, 94, 220, 284, 309, 

461 
Shenandoah and Kanawha, 285 
South-West, 348 
Diaz, Porfirio, Mex. Gen., 327, 

375. 378, 416, 417, 420 
Dinwiddie C.H., Va., (Action at, 

382), 413 
District, Alleghany-Mississippi, 2, 
74, 128, 174, 224, 265, 279, 

459 

2nd Military, 448 

Southern, 466 

Trans-Mississippi, 58, 61, 62, 
227, 250, 269, 283, 318, 330, 
371, 400, 408. 415 
District No. i, Virginia, 430, 462 

No. 2, North and South Caro- 
lina, 430 

No. 3, Georgia, Florida, and 
Alabama, 430 

No. 4, Mississippi and Arkansas, 

430 

No. 5, Louisiana and Texas, 430 
District of Mississippi and Ala- 
bama, 462 

Northern Georgia, 342 

the Carolinas, 390 
Dix, J., Maj.-Gen., (threatens 

Richmond, 196), 198, 200, 243 
Donelson, Ft., Tenn., 63, 91, 93, 

107, 126, (taken, 127, 128), 130, 

131. 135. 141. 142. 144. 179. 

183. 221, 372, 444, 451, 466 
Douglas, Stephen, Mr., 12, 20, 24 

25, (Candidate for Presidency, 

26), 43, 69, 409 
Drew Bill, 470 

Dubois de Saligny, M., 248, 249 
Dudley, T., Mr., U.S. Consul at 

Liverpool, 235 
Duke, B. W., Brig. -Gen., 400 
Dupont, S. F., Rear-Adm., (at 

Port Royal, 89), 90, 125, 139, 

140, 229, (attacks Charleston, 

231), 232, 255, 275, (Notice, 276, 

277) 

Eads, James, Mr., Engineer, 75 
Early, Jubal, Lieut. -Gen., (at Bull 
Run, 85), 193, 199, 202, (at 
Gettysburg, 206, 210), 237, 252, 
290, 293, 294, 296, 329, (attacks 
Washington, 331, 332), (in 
Valley, 333-7, 380), 338, 370. 
374. 375. 440. (Notice, 455. 456) 



Echols, J., Brig. -Gen., 399, 400 
"Edith." Sec " Chickamauga" 
Elkhorn Tavern, Ark. See Pea 

Ridge 
Emancipation, 7, (Virginia State, 

10), 17, (Fri;mont's Scheme, 92), 

146-8, 41 1, 424, 427, 471 
Embargo Act, 32 
Emerson, Dr. and Mrs., 19 
Emory, W. H., Maj.-Gen., 228, 

251. 458 
Emperor. See Napoleon 
Emperor of Brazil, 477 
Empress of Mexico, 419 
Enforcing Act, 33, 39 
England. See Great Britain 
Escobedo, Mex. Gen., 416-18, 420, 

454 
Evans, N. G., Brig. -Gen., 84, 485 
Everett, Mr., Candidate for Vice- 
Presidency, 26 
Ewell, R. S. , Lieut. -Gen. , (in Valley, 
115-17), 122, 195, 196, 198- 
200, 203, (at Gettysburg, 206- 
11), 216, 217, (in Wilderness 
Campaign, 289-92), 294, 385 
Ewing, F., Bvt. Maj.-Gen., 360 
Exchange Cartel, 98, 149 

Fair Oaks, Va. (Pen.). Sec Seven 
Pines 

Farmville, Va., 385 

Farnsworth, E. J., Brig.-Gen., 213 

Farragut, D. G., Rear-Adm., 96, 
135, (takes New Orleans, 136, 
137), 140, 145, (attacks Vicks- 
burg, 175), 177-9, 1S5, 186, 222, 
228, 229, 236, 242, 268, 271, 
281, 314, 348, (takes Mobile 
Harbour, 350-352). 3^^6, 371, 
(Notice, 373), 374. 403, 406 

Federalist, or Nationalist Party, 

37. 39 
Finegan, L., Brig.-Gen., 300 
"Fingal." See "Atlanta" 
Fischer, Father, 419 
Fish, Mr., U.S. Secretary of State, 

474. 475 
Fisher, Ft., N.C., 177, 271, 329, 

(ist Attack, 358, 359). 366.368, 

375- 377. 384. 386, (taken, 388, 

389), 404, 413 
Fisher's Hill, Va. (Val.), 333, 334 
Fishing Cr., Ky. See Mill Springs 
Fitzpatrick, Mr., Candidate for 

Vice-Presidency, 26 
Five Forks, Va.. (Battle, 382), 383, 

414. 436 



5o8 



INDEX 



"Florida," cruiser, 75, 141, 144, 
177, 180, 185, 186, 233, 242, 
243, 271, 278, 279, 315, 324, 
325, (taken, 366), 367, 371, 374, 

375. 471-3. 477 

Florida, State, (Representatives, 
26), 47. 50, 55, 58, 63, 75, 103, 
125, 141, 200, (Northern Con- 
trol, 282, 299, 300), 407, 422, 
426, 430, 431, 447, 452 

Floyd, J., Brig. 'Gen., 21, 23, 
(prepares for War, 40, 41, 45), 
(leaves the Cabinet, 46), 64, 
104, (at Ft. Donelson, 127, 128), 
440 

Foote, A. H., Rear-Adm., (at Ft. 
Donelson, 126, 127), 130 

Force Bill, 33 

Foreign Enlistment Act, British, 
75. 316, 471, 473, 477, 478, 486 

Forey, French Gen., 247-9 

Forrest, N. B., Lieut. -Gen. (at Ft. 
Donelson, 128), 133, 167, 174, 
185, 186, (beats Streight, 219), 
282, 301, (takes Ft. Pillow, 
302), (beats Sturgis, 308), 309, 

310, 324, 325, 3 |8, 349, (beaten 
by A. J. Smith, 359), 360, (in 
Nashville Campaign, 362-5), 
373-5, 400, 402, (against Wilson 
403), 404, 414, 439, 465, (Notice, 
466, 467), 484 

Foster, J. G., Maj.-Gen., 165, 186, 
268, 284, 309, 357, 358, 391, ^61 

Fox, Mr., Assistant Secretary of 
Navy, 230 

France, 30, 32, 145, 179, 194, 235, 
245, 246, 248, 273, 278, 282, 317, 
318, 378, 407, 419, 420, 424, 

472, 479 
Franklin, Tenn., (Battle, 363), 

364, 365, 375 
Franklin, W. B., Maj.-Gen., 159, 

162, (at Fredericksburg, 164), 

311. 312 

Fraser, Trenholm cS- Co., 6g, 75 
Fray.ser's Farm, Va. (Pen.), 

(Battle, 122), 123 
"Fredericksburg," river ironclad, 

386 
Fredericksburg, Va., 115, 120, 

150, 162, 163, (Battle, 164), 1S6, 

189, (2nd Battle, 192), 195, 197, 

198, 200, 215, 243, 290, 295, 

296, 321, 372 
Fredericktown, Mo., (Battle, 165), 

186 
Free Soil Party, 13, 14, 15, 22 



Freedmen's Bureau, 173, 426 
Fremont, J. C, Maj.-Gen, (Candi- 
date for Presidency, 16, 326), 
(Notice, 17, 18), 21, 33, 78, (in 
Missouri, 91, 92), 94, 103, (in 
Valley, 1 15-18), 123, 129, 147, 

151 
French, S. G., Maj.-Gen., 165 
French, W. H., Maj.-Gen., 213, 

216 
Front Royal, Va. (Val.), 113, 115, 

(Action, 116), 117, 145, 215 
Fugitive Slave Act, 9, 11, 28 

Gaines, Ft., Ala. (Mob.), 351, 

(taken, 352), 374 
Gaines' Mill, Va. (Pen.), Battle, 

122 
Galveston, Tex., 140, (re-taken, 

177), 180, 186, 187, 228. 233, 

234, 242, 403, 41 :, 416 
Gardner, F., Maj.-Gen., 269 
Garfield, J. A., Maj.-Gen. and 

President, 95, (beats Marshall, 

125, 126), 464, 481 
Garviett, R. B., Brig. -Gen., 213 
Garnett, R. S., Brig. -Gen., 87, 88 
Garrard, K., Bvt. Maj.-Gen., 303, 

344 

Garrison, W. L., 10 

Gatling, Dr., 275 

Geneva. See Arbitration. 

"Georgia" ("Japan"), cruiser, 
236, 272, 278, 279, 316 

Georgia, State, 7, 10, (Represen- 
tatives, 26), (refractory, 32, 
35, 41), (Reasons for Secession, 
47). 55. 5^. 62, 103, 282, 283, 
328, 342, 348, 355, 371, 391. 
396, 414, 430, 431, 435, 465, 
484, 

Gettysburg, Pa., 73, (Campaign, 
196-205, 213, 214, 252-3, 
Moves, 214, 217), (Battle, 
205-13), 236, 240. 243, 249-51, 
254, 265, 278, 322, 455, 456, 459. 
464 

Gillem, A. C, Bvt. Maj.-Gen., 

387. 401 
Gillmore, Q. A., Maj.-Gen., (takes 
Ft. Pulaski, 125), 145, 233, (at- 
tacks Charleston, 255-7), 275, 

299. 300. 395. 465 
Giltner, H. L., Col., 340 
Gist, Governor, 40, 42 
Gladstone, W. E., Mr., 473, 474 
Glendale, Va. (Pen.), Action, 122 
Glendenin, Col., 243 



INDEX 



509 



Glorieta, N.M. See Apache Ca- 
non 

Goldsboro, N.C., 165, 186, 381, 
390, 392-4 

Goldsborough, L. M., Rear-Adm., 
88, 108, III, 112, (on North 
CaroUna Coast, 124), 139 

Gordon, J. B., Lieut. -Gen., 336, 

381. 385 
Gordonsville, Va., 118, 121, 150, 

151, 162, 286, 288, 295, 296, 

335. 337. 380 
Gorgas, J., Brig. -Gen., 59 
Grand Gulf, Miss., 137, 223-5, 

243 

Granger, G., Maj.-Gen.,(atChicka- 
mauga, 261, 262), 265, (at Mo- 
bile, 350. 352, 402), 362, 365, 

374 
Grant, U. S., General and Presi- 
dent (see President), 4, 66, 91, 
(seizes Paducah, 92), 93, 102, 
107, (at Ft. Donelson, 126-8), 
129, (at Shiloh, 131-3), 166, 
170-6, 179, 180, 182, 186, 188, 
218-21, (at Vicksburg, 222-7), 
228, 236, 237, 240, 242, 243, 
249-51, 258, 263, (at Chatta- 
nooga, 265-7), 268-70, 276, 
279-82, 284, (made Commander- 
in-Chief, 285), 287, (Wilderness 
Campaign, 288-97), (at Peters- 
burg, 298, 337, 338, 380, 381, 
383). 300. 302, 303. 310-12, 
320, 322, 324-6, 328, 329, 330, 
332-5. 342. 344. 348. 349, 355. 
356. 358, 359, 363. 370. 372, 373. 
376, 377, 382, 384, (at Appom- 
attox, 385, 386), 387, 389, 392, 
395. 398, 399. 401. 402, 405. 
409, 414, 415, 420, 423, 424, 
427-30, 432, (made President, 
435). 436, 437. 441. (Notice, 
442-5), 446, 448, 449, 451-4. 
459-61, 463-6, 471, 475, 480, 
482, 484 
Great Britain (England), 32, 
("Trent" Affair, 98), 107, 194, 
235, (in Mexico, 245, 246), 272, 
273, 282, 317, 318, 329, 378, 
424, ("Alabama" Claims, 471- 

8), 479 
Greene, G. S., Bvt. Maj.-Gen., 209 
Greeneville, Tenn., (Action, 360), 

373. 374 
Grierson, B. H., Maj.-Gen., 219, 

(Raid, 225), 226, 243, 402 
Griffin, C, Maj.-Gen., 162, 283 



Groveton, Va., 154, (Battle, 155), 

186 
Guthrie, Mr., 303 

" Habana." See " Sumter " 
Habeas Corpus Act, 187, 251 
Haines' Bluff, Miss. See Vicks- 
burg 
Halleck. H. W., Maj.-Gen., 68, 78, 
79. 92, 94, 103, 106, 126, 127, 
131, 132, (after Shiloh, 133, 
134), 145, 148, 150, (made Com- 
mander-in-Chief, 151), 152, 153, 
(after Manassas, 156, 157), 159, 
161, 162, 166, 171, 173, 174, 
181, 197, 198, 200, 202, 204, 
219, 220, 224, 249, 251, 253, 
254, 269, 270, 276, 280, (be- 
comes " Chief-of-Staff," 281), 
291, 309, 329, (Early's Attack 
on Washington, 332), 333-5. 
361, 370-2, 399, 421, 423, (No- 
tice, 450. 451), 453 
Halltown, W.Va., 334 
Hamilton, A., Maj.-Gen., 39 
Hamilton, Mr., Provisional Go- 
vernor, 425 
Hamlin, H., Mr., Vice-President, 

26, 49, 70 
Hampton, Wade, Lieut. -Gen., 391, 

393 

Hampton Roads, Va., 89, (Action, 
no). 144, 358, 359, 367, 379 

Hancock, W. S., Gen., (at Chan- 
cellorsville, 192), (at Gettys- 
Vjurg, 206, 207, 209, 210), 
(Wilderness Campaign, 289-92), 
(round Petersburg, 338-40), (in 
Louisiana, 430, 431), 439. 45^, 
(Notice, 463, 464) 

Hardee, 11'. /., Lieut. -Gen., 90, 
95, (at Stone's R., 172), (at 
Atlanta, 343-6), (in Georgia, 
356-8), 391, (at Averysboro. 
392), 393, (Notice, 462, 463). 

464. 485 
Harney, W. S., Bvt. Maj.-Gen., 

52. 90 

Harper's Ferry, W.Va., (John 
Brown's Raid, 22), (taken, 81, 
158, 159). 117. 197. 199-202, 
237. 321 

Harrison's Ldg., Va. (Pen.), (Ac- 
tions, 123, 150), 185 

"Hartford," sloop-of-war, 137, 
222, 351 

" Harvest Moon," flagship, 404, 

413 



5IO 



INDEX 



• Hatteras," armed steamer, 234, 

Hatteras, Ft., N.C., 88, 102 
Hawes' Shop, Va., (Action, 293), 

325 
Hayes, R., President, 436, 437 
Head of Passes, La., Naval Action, 

103 
Heiman, Ft., Ky., 93, 126 
Helena, Ark., 173, (Actions, 175, 

221, 270), 177, 180, 243, 278 
Henderson's Hill, La., Action, 

311 

Henry, Ft., Tenn., 63, 91, 93. 
(taken, 126), 127, 144, 170, 183 

Heth, H., Maj.-Gen., (at Gettys- 
burg, 203, 205), 444 

Hickley, Capt., R.N., 141 

Hill, A. P., Lieut. -Gen., (in Penin- 
sula, 121, 122), (Manassas Cam- 
paign, 154), 191, 195. 198-202, 
(at Gettysburg, 206, 207, 211), 
(Wilderness Campaign, 289, 
293), (round Petersburg, 338, 
340, (killed, 383), 408, 409, 
(Notice, 412) 

Hill, D. H., Lieut. -Gen., 159, 196, 
260, (at Chickamauga, 261), 
264, 276, 459 

Hindman, Ft. See Arkansas Post 

Hindman, T. C, Maj.-Gen., 176, 
185, 461 

Hoke, R. F., Maj.-Gen.. 300, 388- 

90. 393 
Hollins, G. M., Conn., 134, 135 
Holly Springs, Miss., 174, 186, 240 
Holmes, T. H^, Lieut.-Gen., 270, 

278 
Hood, J. B., Gen., 5, 73, (at 
Gettysburg, 208, 209), 330, (at 
Atlanta, 342-50). 355. 360, 
(invades Tennessee, 362-6), 370, 
374. 375. 377. 378. 390. 392, 
401, 402, 409, (Notice, 412), 
465, 466, 484 
Hooker, J., Maj.-Gen., 160, 162, 
(at Fredericksburg, 164), 188- 
9, (at Chancellorsville, 190-3), 
194, 197-202, 216, 236, 240, 243, 
253. (at Chattanooga, 264-6), 
302, (at Atlanta, 343, 344). 
(Notice, 371, 372), 484 
" Housatonic," gunboat, 312, 324 
Howard, O . O.. Maj.-Gen. (at 
Chancellorsville, 190-2), (at Get- 
tysburg, 206), 266, 302, (at At- 
lanta, 343, 344. 346). 35^'-8, 
372. 393. 394 



Huger, B., Maj.-Gen., 81 

Hull, F. S., Mr., 75 

Humphreys, A. A., Maj.-Gen., 340 

Hunter, D., Maj.-Gen., 92, 103, 
129, 148, 232, 233, 286, (Lynch- 
burg Campaign, 295, 296), 312, 

325. 332, 333. 370. 451 
Hunter, Mr., 379 
Huntsville, Ala., 132, 134, 166, 

310, 362. 363, 365 
Hupp's Hill, Va. (Val.). (Action. 

335). 336. 375 
Hurlbut, S. A., Maj.-Gen., 221, 

264, 265 
Huse, C, Major, 75 

Illinois, State, 8, 12, 20, 52, 57, 

77, 92, 240 
Lmboden, J. D., Brig. -Gen., 214, 

216, 254 
Independence, Mo., 361, 375 
Inflation Bill, 436 
Irwinsville, Ga., 404 
Island No. 10, 129, 130, 145 
Italy, King of, 477 
luka. Miss., 170, 185 

Jackson, A., General and Presi- 
dent, 33, 39, 49, 76 
Jackson, C., Governor, 51, 90 
Jackson, T. J., Lieut.-Gen., 84, 
(Valley Campaign, 1 13-18), 
(Peninsular Campaign, 120-3), 
144, 145, (Manassas Campaign, 
1 5 1-6), (Invasion of Maryland, 
158-61), 163, 164, 182, 183, 185, 
(Chancellorsville, killed, 191, 
192), 194, 214, (Notice, 237-9), 
321, 322, 337, 344, 412, 440, 

455. 456, 4<Jo. 464. 484 
Jackson, W. H., Brig.-Gen., 346 
Jacksonville, Fla., 217, 242, 299, 

300 
James R., Va., 108, iii, 119-22, 
124, 165, 189, 255-7, 282, 294, 
297-9. 326, 329, 338, 386, 442 
" Japan." See " Georgia " 
Jefferson, Mr., 31, 39 
Jefferson City, Mo., 90, 91, 361 
Jenkins' Ferry, Ark., 313, 325 
Johnson, A., President (see Presi- 
dent), 2, 398, 399, 408, 422-32, 
(impeached, 433), 434, 435, 437. 
441, 448, 478, 479 
Johnson, E., Maj.-Gen., 113, 115, 
1 16, (at Gettysburg, 209-12), 291 
Johnson, Mr., Candidate for Vice- 
Presidency, 26 



INDEX 



Sii 



Johnson, Reverdy, Mr., Minister 
to London, 474 

Johnston, Joseph, Gen., 5, 21, 73, 
(quarrels with Jefferson Davis, 
79), 81, (Bull Riin, 82-6), 87, 
102, 105-7, ^^^' 113-15. (JJi 
Peninsula, 119, 120), 174, 179, 
194, 219, 221, (covering Vicks- 
burg, 224-7), 237, 267, 268, 
281-4, 287, (in Georgia, 303-7), 
309, 319. 325. 328-30, (at At- 
lanta, 341, 342), 345, 360, 370, 
371. 374. 380, 381, 387, (in the 
Carolinas, 390, 392-6, (sur- 
renders, 397, 398), 399, 400, 
404, 407. 412, 414, 415, 424, 
440, 449, (Notice, 450), 457, 
461, 462, 484 

Johnston, Sidney, Gen., 50, 53, 
63. 78, 93-5. 102, 103, 126, (at 
Shiloh, killed, 131, 132), (No- 
tice, 142), 166, 168, 370, 446, 
452, 459. 462 

Jones, Ma]. -Gen., 414 

Juarez, B., Mex. President, 96, 
244-7, 271. 280, 319, 327, 416- 
20 

Kanawha R., Great, 87, 88, 285, 

296 
Kansas-Nebraska Bill, 11, 12, 24, 

409 
Kansas Pacific Ry., 448 
Kautz, A. v., Bvt. Maj.-Gen., 

294. 297. 325. 339 
"Kearsarge," sloop-of-war, 315, 

325 
Kelley, B. F., Bvt. Maj.-Gen., 87, 

113 

Kellogg, Governor, 436 

Kenesaw Mt., Ga., 306, 307, 321, 
325, 341, 372 

Kentucky, State, 3, 31, 47, 57, 
58, 61, 70, (Neutrality, 77), 79, 
92-4, 101-3, 125, 126, 129, 131, 
134, 146, 148, (Invasion of, 
166-9), 170. 171. 185, 186, 220, 
221, 237, 242, 258, 286, 301, 
302, 308, 310, 525, 340, 360, 

374. 375. 452. 459. 462, 481 
" Keokuk," lightironclad, 230, 231 
Kernstown, Va. (Val.), (ist Battle, 

114), 144, (2nd Battle, 333), 337. 

374 
Kershaw, J. B., Ma]. -Gen., 334, 

336 
Key West, Fla., 140 
Keyes, E. D., Maj.-Gen., 122 



Kilpatrick, H. J., Maj.-Gen,, 194, 
196, (at Gettysburg, 202, 210, 
212, 213), 217, 243, 252, (Raid, 
284), 324, 346, 355, 374, 391, 

393 

Kimball, N., Bvt. Maj.-Gen., 114 

King, R., Maj.-Gen., 154 

Kinston, N.C., 390, 413 

Kirk, E. N., Brig.-Gen., 390. 413 

Know-Nothings. See American 
Party 

Knoxville, Tenn., 62, 75, 94, 95, 
167, 171, 220, 251, 258, 259, 
264, 265, (Siege of, 267, 268), 
278, 279, 284, 377, 387, 461 

La Grange, Tenn., 219, 225, 308, 

359 
Laird's, and Laird, J., Mr., 178, 
185, 235, 272, 273, 368, 472, 473 
Lane, Mr., Candidate for Vice- 
Presidency, 26 
Lardner, J. L., Commodore, 234 
"Laurel," tender, 368, 369 
Law, E., Maj.-Gen., 292 
Leavenworth, Ft., Kan., 361 
Lecompton, Kan., Constitution of, 

13 
Lee, A., Brig.-Gen., 311 
Lee, Fitzhtigh, Maj.-Gen., 384 
Lee, R. E., Gen., 5, 10, 22, (State 
Loyalty, 38), 50, 51, 53, 56, 66, 
72, 73, 78, 80-2, 87, 88, 90, 103, 
103, 1 14-16, 118-20, (commands 
in Virginia, 121), (in South 
Carolina, 123), (in Peninsula, 
119-23), 128, 148, 150, (Man- 
assas Campaign, 131-3, 155). 
(invades Maryland, 157-61), 
(Fredericksburg, 164), 179, 181, 
182, 185-8, (Chancellorsville 
Campaign, 189-93), 194, (Get- 
tysburg Campaign, 196-204, 
206, 208, 210-14, 217, 252, 253), 
236, 238, 250, 254, 274, 276, 
278-80, 282, 284, 286, 287, 
(Wilderness Campaign, 288-94. 
296, 297), (Petersburg, 298, 
338. 339. 379. 381. 383). (ap- 
pointed Commander-in-Chief, 
380), 295, 299, 319. 321. 322, 
325. 329. 332. 334. 33C). 355. 
368, 370, 376-8, 382-4, (sur- 
renders, 385, 386), 392, 395-9. 
401, 405, 407, 412-15, 423, 424, 
439, 442, (Notice, 445-7). 449, 
450. 452, 459, 462, 464, 46b, 
481, 484 



512 



INDEX 



Lee, Stephen, Lieut. -Geii., 344, 346, 
347. 362 

Lee, S. P., Rear-Adm., 301, 313 

Letcher, Governor, 113 

Letters of Marque, 50, 56, 70, 71, 
97. 98 

Lexington, Mo., 91, 361, 375 

"Liberator" Newspaper, 10 

Lincoln, A., President (see Presi- 
dent), 2, 4, 12, 18-20, (elected 
President, Policy, 27), 28, 30, 
40, 41, \6, 47, 49-51. 56, 69, 
70, 72, 77, 78, 80, 98, 102, 104, 
106, 121, 123, (Emancipation 
Proclamation, 146, 148), 149, 
157, 162, 171, 181, (suspends 
Habeas Corpus Act, 187, 251), 
198, 201, 250, 252, 281, 299, 
3". 356, 358, 370. (Peace Con- 
ference, 379), 386, 395, (as- 
sassinated, 397), 398, 399, 408, 
(Notice, 409, 412), 414, 422, 
424, 439-41. 443. 455. 459, 481 

Liverpool (also Birkenhead and 
Mersey), England, 69, 17S, 317, 
367. 405, 414, 471, 472 

Logan, J. B., Maj. Gen., (at 
Atlanta, 344, 345, 347), 354, 

355. 3<J4. 463. 483 

Logan's Cross Roads, Ky., 126 

I.ongstreet, J., Lieut. -Gen., (in Pen- 
insula, 112, 119, 122), (Man- 
assas Campaign, 152-6), (in 
Maryland, 159), 163, (at Fre- 
dericksburg, 164), (Suffolk, 189), 
194, 195, (Gettysburg Cam- 
paign, 198-201, 207-9, 211, 
212), 240, 242, (Chickamauga, 
260-2), 264, 265, (besieges 
Knoxville, 267, 268), 279, 283, 
2S4, 286, (Wilderness Cam- 
paign, 288, 289, 292), (at 
Petersburg, 340), 382, 385, 439, 
440, 444, (Notice, 464) 

Lorencez, French Gen., 246 

Lost Mt., Ga., 306 

"Louisiana," river ironclad, 136, 

137 

Louisiana State, 8, (Represen- 
tatives, 26), 31, 47, 55, 58, 176, 
228, 242, 243, 251, 269, 274, 
278, 282, 311, 415, 421, 425, 
427, 430, 431, 454, 460, 464, 
469 

Louisville, Ky., 62, 95, 134, 148, 
166-9, 171. 219. 302, 356, 452 

Louisville and Nashville Ry., 
303 



Lovell, M., Maj. -Gen., 49, 135, 136. 

170 
Low, J., Capt., 141, 316 
Lynchburg, Va., 59, 62, 220, 254, 

(Hunter's Campaign, 295), 325, 

376. 379, 381, 384. 385. 387. 

395. 401 
Lyon, N., Maj. -Gen., 50, 52, 56, 

78, (Missouri Campaign, killed, 

90, 91), (Notice, 99), 102, 129, 

448, 458, 461 

McAllister, Ft., Ga., 229, 357, 375 

McClellan, G. B., Maj. -Gen., 68, 
77, 78, (appointed Commander- 
in-Chief, 79), 80, (in West Vir- 
ginia, 86-8), 94, 95, loi, 105, 
(quarrels with the Cabinet, 106), 
107, 108, 1 1 1-20, (in Peninsula, 
121-3), 126, 144, 145, 150, 152, 
(Maryland Campaign, 156-61), 
162, 166, (Notice, 180), 181,185, 
186. 326, 458 

McClernand, J. A., Maj. -Gen., 173, 
174, 221, 224, 226, 227, (No- 
tice, 240), 242 

McCook, A. McD., Maj. -Gen., 169, 
172, 218, 259, 261, 262, 264 

McCook, E. M., Bvt. Maj. -Gen.. 

345.346.374 
McCulloch, B., Brig. -Gen., 90, 91, 

129, 458 
McDowell, L, Maj. -Gen., 64, 81. 

82, (Bull Run, 83-6), loi, 102, 
105, 106, 117-21, 123, (Man- 
assas Campaign, 153-5), 180, 
182, (Notice, 183), 431, 457, 485 

McDowell, Va. (Battle, 116), 143, 

145, 484 
Machine Guns, 274 
McLaws, L., Maj.-Gen., 158, 192, 

193, 196, 208, 2og 
McNeill, J. H., Capt., 337, 379 
Macon, Ft., N.C., 124, 145 
McPherson, J. B., Maj.-Gen., 221, 

285, (in Georgia, 302-6), (at 

Atlanta, killed, 341-4), 371, 

(Notice, 372, 373) 
Madison, Mr., President, 32 
Maffitt, J. N., Capt., 141, 178, 233 
Magazine Rifles, 274 
Magoffin, B., Governor, 77, 78, 481 
Magruder, G., Capt., 49 
Magruder, J. B., Maj.-Gen., 81, 

83, loi, III, (in Peninsula, 112, 
122), 115, (re-takes Galveston, 
177), 186, 228, 233, 242, 311,418 

Mahone, W., Maj.-Gen., 292 



INDEX 



5^3 



Mallory, Mr., 71 

Malvern Hill, Va. (Pen.), Battle, 

122, 123 
" Manassas," river ironclad, 136, 

137 
Manassas Gap Ry., 82, 83 
Manassas Jn., Va., 80, (Battle, 82), 
87, 102, 105, 152-4, (Battle, 155, 
156), 162, 182, 184, 185, 191,215, 
411. 437, 458 
Marietta, Ga., 447 
Marion, Va. (S.W.), 340, 375 
Marshall, //., Ma j. -Gen., 94, 95, 

125, 126 
Maryland, State, 3, 7, 10, (Repre- 
sentatives, 26), 47, 57, 64, 77, 
87, 117, 146, (Invasion of, 157- 
60), 162, 185, 189, 216, 296, 

332-4 

Mason, Mr., Commissioner to Eng- 
land, 98, 405 

Mason, Mr., Senator, 46 

Massachusetts, State, 7, 8, (threat- 
ens Secession, 31), 32, 33, 35, 

37. 57 
Matamoros, Mex., 97, 139, 271, 

279, 420 
Maury, D. H., Maj.-Gen., 402 
Maury, M. F., Comr., 236, 272 
Maury, W. L., Capt., 236 
Maximilian, Emperor of Mexico, 
245, 248, (accepts the Crown, 
249), 279, 319, 325, 327, 328, 
331. 378, 379. 399, 406, 407. 
416-20 
Meade, G. G., Maj.-Gen., 200, 
(succeeds Hooker, 201), (Gettys- 
burg Campaign, 202, 203, 206- 
9, 211, 213, 214, 216, 250, 252), 
240. 243, 253, 254, 278, 279, 
282, 284, 285, 287, (Battle of 
Wilderness, 289), 297, 322, 339, 
372, 374. 384. 453. (Notice, 456, 
457), 460, 463 
Mechanicsville, Va. (Pen.), Action, 

121, 123 
Mejia, Mex. Gen., 416 
Memminger, C, Mr., 71 
"Memphis," sloop-of-war, 314 
Memphis, Tenn., 61, 62, 102, 128, 
129, 134, (Battle, 135), 141, 166, 
173, 175, 221, 222, 251, 264, 302, 
306, 308-10, 359, 442, 467 
Memphis and Ohio Ry., 127 
Meridian, Miss., 224, 281, 283, 
(Sherman'sCampaign, 310), 324, 
402 
" Merrimac " ("Virginia ") iron- 



clad, 75, 108, 109, (Action, no, 
destroyed, in), J12, 120. 144 
Merritt, W., Maj.-Gen., 337, 375 
Mersey R. See Liverpool 
Mexico, 4, 80, 96, 145, 237, 243-7, 
279, 280, 282, 319, 324, 325, 328, 

375. 378. 379. 399. 404. 4°^^. 407. 

415-20, 425, 428. 455, 458, 464, 

472 
Mill Springs, Ky. (Fishing Creek). 

93, 126 
Miller & Sons, Messrs., 178, 235 
Milroy, R. H., Maj.-Gen., 115, ii6j 

141, 144, 197 
Mine Run, Va., 254 
"Minnesota," frigate, no, 314 
Minty, R. H. G., Bvt. Maj.-Gen., 

404 
"Mississippi," cruiser, 222 
" Mississippi," river ironclad, 136, 

137 

Mississippi, State, 8, (Representa- 
tives, 26), 40, 47, 55, 58, 93, 
134, 166, 170, 173, 219, 225, 
240, 251, 282, 302, 309, 401, 
421, 425, 430, 431, 435 

Mississippi Central Ry., 222, 224 

Mississippi R., 2, 57, 61-4, 72, 74, 
75, 78, 80, 91, 93, 95, 96, 97. 99. 
103, 126, 131, 135, 140, 142, 
150, 166, 174, 175, 179, 180, 185- 
8, 221, 223-5, 227, 228, 232, 236, 
237, 243, 265, 268, 269, 271, 
274, 279, 281-3, 302, 309, 313, 
318, 320, 329, 376, 403, 414, 
415, 455, 458, 459 

Missouri, State, 8, 12, 17, 19, 20, 
47, 50-2, 57, 58, 78, 79, (Lyon's 
Campaign, 90, 91), 92-5, 99- 
102, 129-31, 142, 146 147, 150, 
180, 185, 186, 270, 276, 283, 

309. 313. 320, 322, 324, 348, 
{Price's Campaign, 360, 361)1 

374. 375. 448, 451. 453. 458. 461, 
481 
Mitchel, O. M., Maj.-Gen., 128, 

^32 
Mobile, Ala., 55, 62, 140, 177, 178, 
186, 233, 242, 250, 281, 308, 

310, 311, 313, 314, 329. 348. 
(Harbour taken, 350-352). 355. 
356, 374. 376. 377. 395. (Town 
taken, 402), 404, 413, 414. 
461 

Mobile and Ohio Ry., 174, 224, 358 
" Monitor," 1st monitor, 75, (Ac- 
tion, no). 111. 144, 177, 180, 
186 

33 



514 



• INDEX 



Monocacy R., Md., (Battle, 331), 

374 
Monroe, Ft., Va. (Pen.), 43, 47, 50, 
57, 65, 81, loi, 108, 112, 119, 
165, 196, 282, 442 
Monroe Doctrine, 379 
" Montauk," monitor, 229 
Montgomery, Ala., (ist Confeder- 
ate Capital, 46), 49, 53, 55, 62, 
65, 402, 403 
Moorefield, W.Va., 254, (Action, 

333). 374 
Morgan, Ft. See Mobile 
Morgan, G. W., Maj.-Gen., 132, 

166 
Morgan, John, Maj.-Gen., 132 
167, 171, 185, 218, (Ohio Raid, 
258), 278, 286, 308, 325, 340, 
(killed, 360). (Notice, 373) 
Mormons, The, 18, 58, 66, 468 
Mosby, John, Col., 188, 189, 197, 
242. 243, 288, 333, 337. 371. 373, 

375. 407. 414. 440 
Mower, J. A., Maj.-Gen., 394 
Munford, T. T., Brig. Gen., 118, 

484 
Murfreesboro, Tenn., 3, 73, 131, 

167, 168, 171, (Battle, 172, 217, 

218), 220, 363 
Murrah, P., Governor, 425 

" Nahant," monitor, 231, 232 

" Nantucket," monitor, 231 

Napoleon III, Emperor of the 
French, (Jealousy of United 
States, 4), 80, 137. 235, 237, 
244-50, 273, 280, 317-319. 324. 
327, 328, 331, 378, 406, 407, 
416-20 

" Nashville," cruiser, 98, 103, 
140, 141, 144, (destroyed, 
229) 

Nashville, Tenn., 61, 79, 94, 128, 
131, 134, 141, 148, 167, 168, 
(Siege of, 169, 170), 171, 183, 
185, 186, 267, 283, 302, 303. 308, 
310, 345, 348, 362, 363, (Battle, 
364). 365. 375, 377, 401, 408, 
422, 459, 460, 465, 467 

Nashville and Chattanooga Ry., 
308 

Nassau, Bahama Is., 97, 139-41, 
177. 233. 235. 242, 471 

National Courts, 36 

Nationalists. See Federalists. 

Nelson, W., Maj.-Gen., 95, 168 

Neutrality, 76, 178, 317, 472, 478. 
481 



New Berne, N.C., 124, 144, 165, 

376, 389, 392 
New Hampshire, State, (Hartford 

Convention, 32), 35, 37, 57 
New Hope Ch., Ga., 305, 306, 

325 

"New Ironsides," ironclad, 230, 

256, 270, 388 
New Madrid, Mo., 63, 129, (taken, 

130), 144 

New Market, Va. (Val.), (Action, 
286), 336, 337 

New Mexico Territory (and Ari- 
zona), 9, 58, 96, 99, 102, 103, 
(Campaign, 138, 139), 144 

New Orleans, La., 49, 59, 62, 72, 
79. 96, 97. (taken, 135-7), M^. 
142, 145, 176, 179, 185, 228, 
229, 232, 251, 269, 309, 311, 

329, 350, 373. 427. 436, 458. 
460, 467 

Newtonia, Mo., 361, 375 

"Niagara," frigate, 316, 406, 413 

Norfolk, Va. (and Navy Yard), 24, 
49. 50. 56. 63, 64, 81, 108, 109, 
124, 395 

North, Lieut., 178 

" North Carolina," c.d. ironclad, 
366 

North Carolina, State. See Caro- 
lina, North 

Nullification, 11, 31, 39 

Ocean Pond, Fla., 300, 324 
Ohio, State, 57, 77, 79, 94, 168, 

180, 258, 278, 332 
Ohio R., 57, 60-2, 75, 87, 99, 

258, 268, 373 
"Olustee," cruiser, 367, 375 
Olustee, Fla., 300, 324, 422 
"Onondaga," monitor, 387 
Opequon Cr., Va. (Val.), 334, 374 
Ord, E. O. C, Maj.-Gen., 226, 340, 

381, 382, 384, 385, 430, 431 
"Oreto." See "Florida" 
Ortega, Mex. Gen., 418 

Page, T. J., Capt., 406 
Paintville, Ky., 125, 144 
Palmer, J. M., Maj.-Gen., 346 
Palmer, J. S., Commodore, 352 
Palmerston, Lord, 472, 474 
"Palmetto State," c.d. ironclad, 

229 
" Pampero," 273 
Paredes, Mex. President, 245 
Parke, j. G., Maj.-Gen., 382 
"Passaic," monitor, 231 



INDEX 



515 



" Patapsco," monitor, 231, 390, 

413 
Patterson, R.,Maj.-Gcn., 56, 81-4, 

86, 102, 106 
Pea Ridge, Ark. (Elkhorn Tavern), 

(Battle, 129), 135, 142, 144, 165, 

453 

Peace Conference, 48, 49, 55, 379 

Peach Tree Cr., Ga., 342, 344, 374 

Peck, J. J., Maj.-Gen, 165, 189, 
242 

Pegram, Capt., 141 

Pegram, Maj.-Gen., 102 

Pemberton, J. C, Lieut. -Gen, 171, 
174, 219, (at Vicksburg, sur- 
renders, 224-7), 237, (Notice, 
239), 240 

Pender, W. D., Maj.-Gen., 213 

Pensacola, Fla., 47, 64, (Head- 
quarters, 137), 140, 142, 355, 
376, 402, 452 

Perry ville, Ky., (Battle, 169), 179, 
186, 218 

Petersburg, Va., 5, 165, 1S9, 294, 
296, 297, (Siege, 298), 319, 325, 
329. 33^. (Siege, 337. 339), 370, 
374. 373. 377. 379. 380, (Siege, 
383), (evacuated, 384), 386, 387, 
412-14 

Pettigrew, J. J., Brig. -Gen., 165, 
203 

Philippi, W.Va., 87, 99, loi 

Pickens, Governor, 42, 44, 46 

Pickett, G. G., Maj.-Gen., (at Get- 
tysburg, 211, 212), 291, 294, 
(Five Forks, 382), 383 

Pierce, F., l^resident, 11, 15, 18, 
21, 66 

Pillow, Ft., Tenn, 130, 134, (taken, 
302), 325, 466 

Pillow, G., Maj.-Gen., 91, 92, 127, 
128 

Pittsburg Ldg., Tenn., 130-3 

Pleasant Hill, La., 312, 325 

Pleasonton, A., Maj.-Gen., 189, 
(Chancellorsville, 192), 195-7, 
200, (Gettysburg, 203), 253, 276, 
285, 309, 320, (Notice, 322), 
(Missouri, 361), 366, 453 

Plummer, J. B., Brig. -Gen., 165, 
186 

Polk, L.. Gen., 91-3, 102, (Perry- 
ville, 169), 218, (Chickamauga, 
260-2), (Kenesaw, killed, 306- 
307), 310, (Notice, 320, 321) 

Pope, J., Maj.-Gen., 18, 94, 123, 
129, (at New Madrid, 130), 131, 
133, 144, 145, 150, (Manassas 



Campaign, 151 6), 157, 162, 
166, 180, (Notice, i8i, 182), 183, 
185, 240, 430, 437 

Port Hudson. La., 166, 176, 222, 
223, 227, (Siege, 228, 269), 229, 
236, 237, 242. 243, 251, 278, 
458 

Port Republic. Va. (Val.), (Action, 
117, 118), 145, 335 

Port Royal, S.C., 79, (taken, 89), 
90. 99, 103, 125, 144. 232, 255, 
276, 357. 388, 391 

Porter, D. D., Rear-Adm., 174-6, 
185, 186, 221-3, 229, 268, 309, 
(Red River Expedition, 310, 
313). 358, 359. 388 

Porter, Fitzjohn, Maj.-Gen., 122, 
154. 155. (cashiered, 162), 183, 
436, (restored to Rank, 437) 

Porterfield, G. A., Col., 87 

Portland, Me., 234 

Potomac R., 57, 60, 64, 77, 80, 112, 
116, 157, 159-61, 198-200, 203, 
217, 243, 252, 331-3 

President. See Buchanan, Lin- 
coln, Johnson, Grant 

President. See Davis 

Press, Freedom of, 327, 482 

Price, S., Maj.-Gen., 52, (against 
Lyon, 90-2), 94, (Pea Ridge, 
129), 166, 167, (Corinth, 170), 
185, 186, 270, 276, 278, 311, 313, 
322, 324, 325, (invades Missouri, 
360, 361), 366. 374, 375, 418. 
(Notice, 458, 459) 

Prince Consort, 98 

Pulaski, Ft., Ga., 55, (taken, 125), 
145. 255. 465 

Queen Victoria, 477 
Queretaro, Mex., 419, 420 
Quincy, Mr., 31 

Raids, 404 

"Raleigh," river ironclad, 301 

Rapidan R., Va., 254, 274, 282, 
284, 288, 299, 326, 443 

" Rappahannock " (" Victor "), 
cruiser, 272, 279, 316, 324, 325, 
369. 374. 375. 406, 413 

Rappahannock R., Va., 107, 112, 
115, 150, 152, 162, 164, 188, 
194-7. 253, 274 

Rawlins, J., Maj.-Gen., 356, (No- 
tice, 443) 

Rayner, Mr., 470 

Read, C. W., Lieut., 324 

Reagan, Mr., 71 



5i6 



INDEX 



Ream's Sta., Va., 235, (Action, 

297). 465 

Re-construction, 251, 280, 299, 
421-37, 462, 480 

Red River, 62, 176, 221, 222, 
228, 270, 281, 309, (Expedition, 
310-13), 314, 319, 324. 325. 422, 
458, 460 

Reeder, A., Governor, 12, 13 

Republican Party, 6, 13, 15, 26, 
43, 48, 51. 326, 370, 422, 432, 
435. 436 

Requa, Inventor, 275 

Resaca, Ga., 303, 304, 325, 350 

" Retribution " (" Uncle Ben "), 
cruiser, 178, 186, 233, 242 

Reverdy Johnson, Mr. See John- 
son 

Reynolds, J. F., Maj.-Gen., 155, 
198, 200, 201, (at Gettysburg, 
killed, 203-6), 213, 237, (Notice, 
239, 240), 456, 459 

Rhett, A., Col., 393 

Rhode Id., State, (considers Se- 
cession, 32), 35-7, 57 

Rich Mt., W.Va., (Action, 88), 
99, 102 

"Richmond," river ironclad, 386 

Richmond, Va., 5, 26, 62, 65, 66, 
79, 80, (becomes Confederate 
Capital, 81), 85, 94, 107, 108, 
III, 1 1 7-19, (Peninsular Cam- 
paign, 121-3), 124, 150, 151, 
157, 162, 163, 165, 187, 189, 
194, 196, 198, 200, 243, 246, 
282, 284, 287, 289-91, 294-8, 
317, 324, 325, 329-32, 335, 
(attacks, 338, 339), 342, 345, 
357. 358, 374. 376, 379, 381. 
382, (surrenders, 384), 387, 396, 
414, 422, 446, 452. 455 

Ricketts, J. B., Bvt. Maj.-Gen., 

154 
"Roanoke," frigate, 314 
Roanoke Id., 124, 141, 144 
Rodes, R. E., Maj.-Gen., 210, 

455 
Roosevelt, T., President, 470 
Rosecrans, W. S., Maj.-Gen., 88, 
102, 103, 113, 166, 167, (Corinth, 
171), (Stone's R., 172, 218), 
180, 186, 187, (quarrels with 
Halleck, 219), (Tullahoma Cam- 
paign, 220), 236, 237, 240, 243, 
250, (Chickamauga, 257-65), 
275, (Notice, 276), 309, 322, 324, 
(in Missouri, 360, 361), 452, 459, 
484 



Rosser, T., Maj.-Gen., 335, 337, 

380, 385, 413 
Rousseau, L., Maj.-Gen., 308, 

(Raid, 345), 346, 348, 349, 360, 

363. 374 
Russell, Lord John, 235, 316, 
405, 471, 473, 474 

Sabine City, Pass, River, 177, 186, 

233, 269, 270, 278, 403, 414 
Sabine Cross Roads, La., 312, 

325 

"Sacramento," cruiser, 413 

Sailor's Cr., Va., 384, 414 

St. Louis, Mo., 19, 51, 56, 57, 92, 

94, 99, loi, 134, 269, 360, 361, 

448, 449, 461 
Saltville, Va. (S.W.), 59, 286, 375 
San Antonio de Bejar, Tex., 53, 

56, 139 
" San Jacinto," sloop-of-war, 98, 

178 
Sanford, J., Mr., 19, 20 
Santa Anna, Mex. Gen., 418 
"Sassacus," gunboat, 301 
Savannah, Ga., 62, 79, 89, 90, 125, 

141, 232, 329, 350, 355-7, 

(taken, 358), 365, 366, 375, 376, 

391, 462, 463 

" Savannah," privateer, 98, loi, 

102 
v. Scheliha, Col., 352 
Schenck, R., Maj.-Gen., 81 
Schoepf, A., Brig. -Gen., 95, 126 
Schofield, J. McA., Gen., 177, 185, 
186, 270, 284, (in Georgia, 302, 
304, 306, 307, 309, 324), (at 
Atlanta, 341-3, 345-7), (in 
Tennessee, 362, 363, 365), 376, 
(in North Carolina, 389, 390, 

392, 394. 395, 396), 399. 401, 
430. 432, 433, (Notice, 461, 462) 

Schurz, C, Maj.-Gen., 428 

"Scorpion," H.M.S., 317 

Scott, Dred, 19, 20 

Scott, W., Lieut.-Gen., (" Views," 
41), 42, 55, 66, 67, 70, 77, 78, 
81, 82, 237, 445, 451, 483 

Scurry, W. R., Brig. -Gen., 138 

" Sea King." See " Shenandoah " 

Sedgwick, J., Maj.-Gen. (Chancel- 
lorsville, 189, 190, 192, 193), 
210, 252, 285, (Spottsylvania, 
killed, 290), 295, 320, (Notice, 
321, 322 

Sedition Act, 31 

" Selma," gunboat, 351 

Semmes, R., Rear-Adm., 97, 234, 



INDEX 



5' 7 



315, 320. (Notice, 322, 323), 387, 

440, 485 
Seven Pines, Va. (Pen.), (Fair 

Oaks), 118, (Battle, 120), 145, 

(Battle. 340), 375, 450 
Seward, W. H., Mr., Secretary of 

State, 70, 80, 98, 245, 246, 249, 

328, 367, 379, 408. 418-20, 423, 
472, 474, 475, 477, 478 

Seymour, T., Bvt. Maj-.Gen., 299, 
300 

Sharpsburg, Md., 159, (Battle, 
160), 179, 185, 191, 484 

"Shenandoah" ("Sea King "), 369, 
375, 405, 407, 413, 414, 477 

Shenandoah Valley, Va., 80, 102, 
(/acAson's Campaign, 113, 118), 
144, 145, 150, 153, 157, 158, 
163, 185, 197, 253, 282, 285, 
287, 294-6, 325, 328, 331. (Cam- 
paign of 1864, 333-6). 370. 
374-6, (Campaign of 1865, 380), 
425, 454, 455, 457, 460, 463 

Sheridan, P. H., Gen., 134, 181, 

251, 285, 287, 289, 293, 294, 
(Raids, 295, 296), 322, 325, (in 
Valley, 1864, 333-8). 370, 374, 
375. (in Valley, 1865. 380), 381, 
(Pursuit of Lfe, 382-5), 396, 408, 

413, (on Mexican Frontier, 415- 
18), (in Louisiana, 425, 427, 
430, 43i),'439,(Notice, 453, 454), 

455. 45^>. 460, 463-5. 484 
Sherman, T. W., Maj.-Gen., 79, 
(takes Port Royal, 89), 90, 125, 
276 
Sherman, W. T., Gen., 70, 90, 95, 
(Shiloh, 133), 147, 149. 171. 173- 
5, 180, (Arkansas Post, 221), 
(Vicksburg, 222, 223, 224, 227), 

252, 264, (Chattanooga, 265- 
7), 268, 269, 280-3, 285, (ad- 
vances from Chattanooga, 302- 
II). 313. 320, 324, 325, 328, 

329. 335. (at Atlanta, 341-7). 
348-50, (March to the Sea, 
354-8). 360-2, 365, 369, 372, 
374-8, 380-2, 387, 389-91, 
(Campaign of the Carolinas, 
391-5). 396-400, 403, 404, 

414, 420, 421, 424, 427, 428, 
432.437. 441.44). (Notice, 447, 
449). 450-2, 454, 456, 459-63. 
465, 482, 484 

Shields, J., Bvt. Maj.-Gen., 117, 

118 
Shiloh, Tenn., (Battle, 132, 133), 

141,142,145, 183,449,451, 453 



Ship Id., Miss., 136 

Sibley, H. H., Brig. -Gen., 96, 102, 
(in New Mexico, 138, 139), 144, 
145 

Sickles, D., Maj.-Gen., igi, 192, 
(at Gettysburg, 208, 209), 430 

Sigel, F., Maj.-Gen., (in Missouri, 
90, 91, 129), 151, 152, (Manassas. 
154. 155). 282, (in Valley, 285- 
7. 331). 295. 296, 325 

Sinclair, E. T., Lieut., 272 

Slaughter, Maj.-Gen., 416 

Slidell, J., Commissioner to France, 
98, 179, 235, 273, 317, 318 

Slocum, H. W., Maj.-Gen., (at 
Chancellorsville. 189, 191), 207, 
344, (at Atlanta, 347), 355, (in 
the Carolinas, 392-5) 

Slough, J. P., Brig. -Gen., 138, 
139 

Smith, A. J., Maj.-Gen., 308, (Red 
River Expedition, 310, 311), 
348, (beats Forrest, 359, 360), 
(in Missouri, 361), (in Tennessee, 
365), 366, 374, 401, (at Mobile, 
402) 

Smith, G. W., Maj.-Gen., 330 

Smith, Kirby E., Gen., (at Bull 
Run, 85), 132, (in Kentucky, 
167-9), 270, (Red River Expe- 
dition, 311-13), 319, 329, 361, 
376, 403, 408, 41 ^, 415, 460, 

Smith, Mr., 70 

Smith, W. F., Maj.-Gen., 293, 297 

Smith, W. Sooy, Brig.-Gen., 309, 
(fights Forrest, 310), 324 

Snead, T., Col., 99 

Soledad, Mex., Convention of , 246 

Solicitor-General (England), 472, 

473 
Sonora, Mex., 249, 280, 319, 324, 

328, 407 
South Carolina, State. See Caro 

lina. South. 
South Mountain, Md., (Battle, 

159, sec Boonsboro), 185, 199, 

202, 203, 207, 214, 216 
Southside Ry.,Va., 294,297, 298, 

339. 375. 380, 383, 384 
"Sphinx." See "Stonewall" 
Spottsylvania, Va., (Battle, 290, 

291), 293, 299, 325 
Spring Hill, Tenn., 362, 375 
Squatter Sovereigntv, 24 
Stanley, D. S.. Maj.-Gen., 218, 346 
Stanley, Lord, 474 
Stanton, E. M., Mr., Secretary of 

War, 46, 104, 117, 121, 151, 201. 



5i8 



INDEX 



220, 281, 332, 370, 399, 40S, 
410, 429, 432, 433, 439, (Notice, 
440. 441), 451 

" Star of the West," 46, 55 

State Rights, 10, 11, 15, 18, 26, 47 

State Sovereignty, 15, 36, 38, 43, 
44, 71, 72, 150, 330, 428, 441, 
442, 446, 448, 469, 481 

Staunton, Va., 114-16, 286, 295, 
380 

Steedman, J. B., Maj.-Gen., 342, 
346, 360 

Steele, F., Maj.-Gen., 270, 278, 
282, 309, 311, 312, (beats Price, 
313), 324, 325, 329, 361, 376, 
(at Mobile, 402) 

Steinwehr, A., Brig. -Gen, 206 

Stephens, A., Mr., Vice-President, 
10, 49, 71, 379 

Stevenson, C. L., Maj.-Gen., 224 

Stewart, A. P., Lieut. -Gen., 345, 
362, 363 

Stoneman, G., Maj.-Gen., (in 
Peninsula, 122, 123), 189, 190, 
(Raid, 193, 194), 243, (in S.W. 
Virginia, 340, 341), (taken 
Prisoner, 346), 374, 375, (Raids, 
387. 396), 390, 395. 399, 401. 
413. 414 

Stone's R., Tenn., 3, 73, (Battle, 
172, 217,218), 179, 180, 186, 187, 
242, 264, 370, 373, 452 

" Stonewall " (" Sphinx " ), iron- 
clad, 406, 413, 414 

Stoughton, C. B., Bvt. Brig. -Gen., 
189, 242 

Stowe, Mrs. H. B., 15 

Streight, A. J., Bvt. Brig. -Gen., 
219, 243 

Stringham, S. H., Rear-Adm., 88 

Stuart, J. E. B., Lieut. -Gen., (in 
Peninsula, 121, 123), 145, 161, 
181, (Chancellorsville, 190, 192, 
195, (Brandy Sta., 196, 197), 
(Gettysburg Campaign, 198, 
199, 202, 210-13, 215, 216), 
253, 285, (Wilderness, 289, 290), 
(Yellow Tavern, killed, 295), 
(Notice, 320, 321), 440, 464, 484 

Sturgis, S. D., Bvt. Maj.-Gen., 91, 
306, 308, 325 

Submarines, 274, 314 

Suffolk, Va., 165, 189, 195, 243 

Sumner, E. V., Maj.-Gen., 162, 164 

Sumner, Mr., 14 

" Sumter " {" Habana "), cruiser, 
68, 75, 97, 98, 102, 103, 140 

Sumter, Ft., S.C, 2, 42, 44-7, 



(surrenders, 50), 53, 55, 56, 63, 
230, (Attacks on, 231, 255-7), 
243. 390 
Supreme Court of United States, 
19 

" Tacony," cruiser, 234, 243 
Taft, Mr., Secretary of War, 446 
" Tallah a ssee " ("Atlanta"), 

cruiser, 367, 374 
Taney, Chief Justice, 20 
Tattnall, J., Commodore, 89, 11 1 
Taylor, R., Lieut. -Gen., 79, 228, 
242, 243, 251, 269, 278, (Red 
River Expedition, 311-13), 319, 
320, 348, 357, 378, 400, 402, 
408, 414, 448, (Notice, 460, 461), 
466 
Taylor, Z. , General and President, 

142 
"Tecumseh," monitor, 351 
" Tennessee," ironclad, 314, 350-2 
Tennessee, State, 47, 48, 56, 58, 

61, 79, 93, 94, 130. 132, 134, 

150, 166, 171, 185, 187, 2ig, 

221, 237, 242, 250, 253, 259, 

263, 267, 281, 283, 284, 286, 

301, 303, 308, 325, 340, 341, 
343, 348, 349, 360. 362, 374-6, 
387. 395, 396, 402, 422, 425. 
428, 465 

Tennessee R., 61-3, 92-4, 99, 102. 
126, 127, 131, 132, 175, 218, 
221, 237, 258, 259, 263, 268, 

302, 313, 362, 363, 365, 403 
Tenure of Civil Office Bill, 429, 

432, 435 

Terry, A. H., Maj.-Gen., 388-90, 
392. 404 

Texas, State, 9, (Representatives, 
26). 33, 47, 49. 51, 55-^. 96, 
102, 139, 142, 145, 176, 177, 
233, 234, 246, 250, 271, 279, 
282, 309, 311, 324, 327, 415. 
416, 425, 427, 430, 435, 454 

Thatcher, H. K., Act. Rear-Adm., 

403, 415 
Thomas, G. H., Maj.-Gen., 95, 
(at Mill Springs, 126), 128, 167. 
(at Stone's R., 172), (at Chicka- 
mauga, 261), 262, 264, 265, 
(at Chattanooga, 266), 276, 281, 
(in Georgia, 302, 304, 306), 
(at Atlanta, 341-5), 34^-50, 355- 
(Nashville Campaign, 362-5), 
370, 372, 376, 377, 387, 395, 
401, 403, 422, 446, 457, (Notice, 
459-60), 465 



INDEX 



5'9 



Thomas, Lorenzo, Bvt. Maj.-Gen., 

433 
Thomas, Mr., 46 
Thompson, Jacob, Mr., 21 
Thompson, M. J., Brig.-Gen., 91, 

165, 186, 407, 414 
Tilghman, L., Brig.-Gen., 127 
Tom's Brook, V^a. (V'al.), 335, 375 
Toombs, Air., 71 
Topeka, Kan., Constitution of, 13, 

14 
Torbert, A. R. A.. Bvt. Maj.-Gen., 

335. 337. 375 
Totopotomoy Cr., Va., 293, 325 
Tredegar Works, Richmond, Va., 

59, 76 
" Trent," R.M.S., 98, 103, 107, 178 
Trevilian Sta., Va., 296, 325 
Tullahoma, Tenn., 218, 220, 224, 

243. 257 
Tupelo, Miss., 134, 145, 166, 174, 

310. 375. 402 
"Tuscaloosa," cruiser, 271, 278, 

316, 324, 325, 477 
Twiggs, D. E., Ma]. -Gen., 49, 55, 

96 
Tyler, R. C, Bvt. Maj.-Gen., 83, 

84, 118, 448, 485 

' ' Uncle Ben. ' See ' ' Retribution 
Union, Ft., N.M., 138, 139 
Union Pacific Ry., 448 
Upton, E., Bvt. Maj.-Gen., 403 

Valverde, N.M., 138, 144 
" Vanderbilt," sloop-of-war, 271 
Van Dorn, E., Maj.-Gen., (Pea 
Ridge, 129), 131, 135, 148, 166, 
167, (Corinth, 170), 171, (Raid, 
174), 176, 185, 186, 225. 237, 
(Notice, 240), 373 
Vermont, State, (considers Seces- 
sion, 32), 57 
Veto, Presidential, 426 
Vicksburg, Miss., 61, 62, 128, 135, 
138, 145, 166, 173, (ist Attacks, 
175), 176, 179, 180, 194, 219- 
21, (Grant's Campaigns, cap- 
ture, 222-7), 228, 229, 237, 239, 
242, 243, 249-51, 264, 265, 268, 

274. 309. 344. 372, 421. 436, 465 
" Victor." See "Rappahannock " 
Victoria, Queen, 477 
" Virginia." See " Merrimac" 
" Virginia," river ironclad, 386 
Virginia, State, 3, 7, 10, (Repre- 
sentatives, 26), (considers Se- 
cession, 31), 35, 37, 43. 47, 48, 



51. 55. 56, 58. 59. 74. 79, 80. 
94, loi, 107, 114, 115, 121. 158, 
161, 166, 186, 253, 260, 274, 
278, 279, 281, 282, 284, 286, 
309, 332, 333, 335. 340. 342. 
355, 3^'0, 374-6, 380, 387, 3^5, 

413, 430,431.435, 451. 462 
Virginia and Tennessee Ry., 254, 

286 
Virginia Central Ry., 286, 295, 
336, 337, 380, 387 

"Wabash," frigate, 314 

" Wachusett," gunboat, 366, 375 

Waddell, J. S., Capt., 369, 465, 

407 
Wagner, G. D., Brig.-Gen., 363 
Walke, H., Capt., 176, 1S6 
Walker, J. G., Maj.-Gen., 158 
Walker, L. P., Brig.-Gen., 71 
Walker. Sir B., Adm., R.N., 271 
Wallace, Lew, Maj.-Gen., 332 
Warren, G. K.. Maj.-Gen., (Get- 
tysburg, 209), 285, (Wilderness 
Campaign, 292), (round Peters- 
burg, 338, 340, Five Forks, 
superseded. 383), 436, 437. 

454 
Washington. D.C., 23, 24, 41, 42. 
44, 47, 48, 55, 56, 61, 64, 65, 
77, 78, 80-2, 85-8, 102, 106, 
no, 112-14. 115, 117-20, 148, 
150, 153, 156-8. 162, 165, 173, 
174, 181, 186, 189, 197-200, 
202, 204, 207, 224, 249, 254, 
255, 281, 284, 285, 288, 296, 297, 
301, 329, (Early before, 331, 
332). 333. 336, 338. 340. 367. 
370. 371. 374- 386, 398. 399. 
408, 414, 419, 427, 448, 458, 

475 
Washington, G., General and 

President, 36, 39, 41, 107, 445, 

469 
Waynesboro, Va. (Val.), 380, 413 
Webster, Mr., 37 
"Weehawken," monitor, 232, 

243, 270 
Weitzel, G., Maj.-Gen., 340, (at 

Ft. Fisher, 358, 359), 382, 384, 

414, 417, 422 

Weldon Ry., 297, 338, 340, 374, 

375 
Welles, G., Secretary of the Navy, 

70, 409 
West Point, Miss., 310, 314 
West Virginia, State, 17, 57, 58, 

60, 74. 77, 80, 86, 87, 93, 99, 



520 



INDEX 



IOI-3, 113, 115, 180, 254, 276, 
278 
Wheeler, J., Lieut. -Gen., 267, 308, 
343. 346, 348, 356, 360, 374, 393 
Whigs, 15, 26, 409 
Whiting, W. H. C, Maj.-Gen., 388 
Wilcox, C. M., Maj.-Gen., 444 
Wilderness, Va., 288, 290, 294, 

325 
Wilkes, C, Capt., 98, 178, 234 
Williams, A. S., Maj.-Gen., 355 
Williams, T., Brig. -Gen., 175, 185 
Williamsburg, Va. (Pen.'*, 112, 119, 

122, 145 
Wilmington, N.C., 62, 177, 250, 
271, 301, 329, 350, 359, 366-8, 
371. 375. 376, (taken, 389), 390, 
395. 396, 413. 461 
Wilson, J. H., Maj.-Gen., 297, 
325. 334. 335. (Nashville Cam- 
paign, 362, 364, 365), 396, 401, 
(Raid in Alabama, 403, 404), 
413, 414, 439, (Notice, 465, 466) 
Wilson's Cr., Mo., (Battle, 91), 92, 

102, 130, 461 
Winchester, Va. (Val.), 81, 82, 113, 
114, 116, 117, 145, 197, 215, 
259. 331. 334 



Winslow, J. A., Capt., 315 
Wisconsin, State, 57, 58, 483 
Wise, H., Maj.-Gen., 87 
Woodson, Act. Governor, 13, 14 
Worden, J. M., Rear-Adm., 110 
Wright, H. G., Maj.-Gen., 292, 

332, 336. 382, 383 
Wright, W., Col., 305, 394 
Wyndham, P., Col., 188 
"Wyoming," sloop-of-war, 315 
Wytheville, Va. (S.W.), 59. '77, 

286, 340, 387 
"Wyvern," H.M.S., 317 

'Yancey, W. L., Mr., 25, 26 
Yazoo City, Pass, River, Miss., 

173, 176, 186, 222, 223, 226, 

242, 313 
Yellow Tavern, Va., 285, (Action, 

295). 325 
Yorktown, Va., (Pen.), loi, 112, 

"9. 145 
Young, Brigham, 18 
Yturbide, Mex. Emp., 244 

Zaragoza, Mex. Gen., 247 
Zollicofjer, F., Brig.-Gen., 93-5. 
126 



v-V 



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